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Abstract 
FREBDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL m 
EPICTETUS' DISCOURSES, A thesis submitted to 
Durham University for the .de_gree· of master of Letters, 
March 1971, by L •J. .ROSS, B·A· 
The thesis examines the philosophic basis and 
validity of the Stoic freedom expressecil in Epictetus' 
Discourse~. The concept of Erohairesis, which he 
introduces into Stoic thought, is central to Epictetus• 
doctrine and indicates an advance in ancient theory 
on will. 
Aristotle's definition of prohairesis in 
discussing voluntary action, and its part in phronesis 
and akrasia, provides a basis for considering the 
co-ordination of reason and desire, which is important 
in Epictetus. Plato's Republic, Philebus and Laws also 
show the invmlvement of non-rational factors in right 
conduct. The strict rational system of the Stoics led 
them to examine free will. Voluntariness was confined 
to sugkatathesis - the assent to logical conclusions -
controlled by the heRemonikon. Two influences in 
Stoicism from Posidonius to Seneca weakened the strict 
rational dogmatism: first, an appreciation of the total 
Abstract (2) 
personality at man involving conscience and feelings 
as well as reaon ; second, a spiritualising tendency 
towards a religious interpretation of the rational 
system. 
Epictetus adheres to the Stoics• concept of 
reason, through which alone his freedom is possible. 
The relation of human reason to cosmic reason as 
apospasma eases the apparent lack of freedom in the 
1 live according to natur~ rule. The notion o£ false 
phantasiai reveals a subjective element in the initial 
data of reason, marking a significant intrusion of the 
non-rational into Epictetus • basically rational position.· 
The orientation of the subjective phantasiai is 
controlled by different capacities (gynameis) and 
characteristics of personality. Each man has a 
responsibi~y of maintaining the inner virtue of 
self-respect, and applying knowledge, aided by a proper 
understanding of oneself, and possibly by religion. 
Both the rational and personal aspec~s of man contribute 
to andunderstanding of prohairesis, which is the 
reciprocation between choice in each decision and the 
free character, each influencing the other, thus 
combining the aspects of hegemonikon and s~kntathesis 
Abstract (3) 
of the Stoa into a single idea of will. Prohairesis 
embraces three stages of freedom: freedom of choice, 
freedom from anxiety, and freedom for rational existence. 
Considered in relation to modern thought on freedom, 
Epictetus' theories are notable because they are 
contained in the Stoic rational monism. His concept of 
prohairesis exhibits some essential qualities of the 
'will', and isolates the aspects of a person which 
contribute to his free self~identity. Provided that the 
full benefits of the free personality, as proffered by E 
Epictetus, are appreciated in the term Stoic freedom, 
rather than just 'resignation to nature', the self-
centredness of the Stoic freedom, criticised by Berlin, 
is valid both philosophically and in practical conduct.· 
The association of Epictetus' writings with 
Christian thought is examined in an Epilogue. 
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Chapter one DTT:OOIJJCTION 
1. Purpose of the thesis 
page 1 
1 
Stoic freedom becomes a major0 philosophic concept in Epictetus, 1; 
" , Examination of c>.e u 9;: p 1 oc. ; political freedom, 2; freedom of 
will, 2; inner freedom, 3; escapism of the Hellenistic Age, 6; 
freedom of will in Epd:ctetus, 7; freedom and rationalism, 8; ;..:L' 
limitations of a rationalist system, 9; three questions to be 
examined, 10; the problem of orig.l.nal.ity in Epictetus, 11. 
2. lolethod of the inquiry 
Prohairesis a key, 11; this concept clarified by a study of 
predecessors: Aristotle, Stoics and Seneca, 12. 
.. • ..._ . 
. .;. ~~~2 
11 
3. Epictetus' wozks, character and writings 14 
His life, 14; Musonius RufUs, 14; Epictetus' philosophic and 
religious character, 15-16; Arrian: the Discourses and 
Encheiridion, 17; nature and purpose of the Discourses, 18; 
Epictetue' social background, 19. 
Chapter two ARISTOTLE 31 
1. Purpose and scope of chapter 31 
~po•~ and prohairesis in Epictetue, 31-2; prohairesis: first 
important in Aristotle's account of deliberation,32; It 
entails co-ordination of desire and reason, 32; seen also 
in qpo'v,crts and akrasia, 33; The contribution of Plato 
and Aristotle to the problem of desire and reason in right 
conduct, 34. 
vi. 
chapter two (contd.) 
2. p:c-ohP.ir~siR in Nic.Eth III 
Virtue l.:-.. 1 tho Ethics, 34-5; voluntary ~nd in-
voluntary actions, 35p p~ohairesis in the context 
of wish and deliberation, 36; definition of ~hoico: 
a voluntary act, 36; shares rational and irrationa] 
characteristics, 36-7; it is preceded by delibera-
tion, 37p· the sphere of deliberation, 37; final 
definition of choice, 38; the rational and the 
irrational in choice, 38~ definition of wish, 39; 
its connection with prohairesis: Ando's inter-
pretation, 39-40; :grohR.irAsis and goodness, 4·0; 
P.rohai~csis as character, 40-41. 
34 
3. D~eire and reason .in prohairesis (N.E.VI). 41 
Correct reasonine in moral conduct requires 
~pC:vorrcr•s, 42; two types of intellectual virtues,42-3; 
a definition of prohairesis involving character, 43; 
it is correct reason plus correct desire, 449 good 
and bad choice is dependent on ~pc{v"Jcr•s , 45; l.r:yos 
and &'pcf•s are inseparable in conduct, 45-6; 
cleverness and natural virtue, 46; Anscornbe~s 
criticism of Aristotle's uosition, 47; Aristotle's 
arbitrary definition of choice, 48; Brohairesis as 
aeti vi ty ( choiuc) and character, 48-9; ~pe! •s and 
A~o~ in the practical syllogism, 49-50; phantasia 
and desire, 50- 51. 
4. Akrasia (N.E.VII). 
Useful for asoessing Epictotus• concept o~wJB, ,52; 
passions and voluntary actions, 52-3; definition of 
the iKpii(T'.fs, 53; akrasia and ~KoAa~.c:rf«, 53 9 two kinds 
vii 
chapter two (contd.) 
of· knowledge 9 54; illustrated by practical syl-
logism, 54-5; the~trpo~.nfs fails in the application 
af lmowledge to particulars 9 55,; c-onflict of desire 
in the:CKp~,.:,c, 55:-6; two kinds of akrasia and the 
position of prohairesis, 56-7. 
5. Reason and desire :iin Plato. 
Plato's consideration of the whole soul, 57-8; 
three stages in the development of ethics, 58; 
the divisions of the soul (Republic) 9 59; 9u~~' 
as a driving force 9 59-60; psychological conflict 9 
60; blending of desire and reason in Philebus, 60-1, 
A mixed life of pleasure and intelligence is best 9 
61-2; true and false pleasures and phantasiai 9 62-3; 
wish 9 63; habituation and education in Laws; 63-4; 
regulation of desires in childhood 9 64-5; their 
importance in a man's character recognised 9 65. 
6o: Platonic· thought in Epictetus o 
Souilhe 1 s Socratic elements listed, 66-7; Socratic 
basis of Stoic e:thics 9 67; self-love 9 68-9; self 
and prohairesis, 69;9E~p(~ and Stoic apospasma9 69; 
divine control and its consequences 9 70-1; free-
will iti Plato 9 71-3; Dodd's theory of the irrational 
cosmos 9 73-4; Socratic daimon 9 -as intermediary 
force, 74-5; charac~eristics of happiness in Plato 
and Aristotle, 75-6; desire· necessary for 
happiness, - and prohairesis, 77. 
7. Aristotle, Plato and Epictetus 
fhe problem of reason and desire in Plato and 
57 
66 
78 
chapter two ( c·ont.d. ) viii 
Epictetus; 78-9; possibility of direct influence 
from Plato, 79; the question of Aristotelian 
influence in the Stoic School, 79-80; comparison 
of the term prohairesis in Aristotle and Plato, 80-1. 
Chapter three THE STOICS 
1.1 The new era 
Development of Stoic system, 104-5; characteristics 
of the age: freedom from tradition, 105-6; 
rationalism, 105-6; purpose of philosophy, 106; 
method of the philosophers: dogmatism and 
rationalism, 107-8; false approach to philosophy, 
108; reason and nature, 109; popularity of· 
Stoicism, 110-11; attention to man's nature, 111; 
importance in secondary theories, 112.· 
104 
104 
2 .' Theory of knowledge 113 
a.P.hantasiai ( Zeno), 113'~ 1 The process of knowledge, 
113'; true and false phantasiai, 114; critic ism 
of Sceptics 9114; voluntariness of~uyK«T~Br~•s; 
114; +G(vTe~<cr(oe. KGt1'oC~'fl'71-~ 115; -in Zeno and 
Chrysippus, 116.' 
b.-Phantasiai ( Chrysippus), 116.: Chrysippus 1 
psychological monism, 116; phantasia is a 
change in the hegemonikon, 116-7; a difficulty 
in his theory, 117; the Sceptics• position on 
tCGc.Tr1_A"JtiS 9 117. 
c.Other criteria, 117. the rvvDI~I 9118; their 
origin, 118-9; prolepsis in Epicureans and 
Epictetus, 119-20. 
ix 
chapter three (contd.) 
3. Reason and nature 
Reason and nature in the Stoic system, 120; reason 
as causation and goodness, 120-21; nature as divine 
purpose and as oikeiosis, 121-2; reason in man, 122; 
the hegemonikon, 122-3; reason as judgement, 123; 
hegemonikon as controlling every function of the 
body, 124; the position of irrational functions 
(-rto'c. e.,)' 124; definitions of wJ. 9os ' 125; the 
irrational factor in choice 9 125-6; importance of 
Chrysippus' view, 126-7. 
4~ 1 Ethics and freedom 
tJoodness as perfection of reason, 127; difficulty 
in making this accord with 'goo·d things' and 'good' 
actions, 128; the adiaphora, 128-9; moral goodness 
an internal quality, 129; the difficulty of 
responsibility in a determined system, 129; problem 
of free will, 129-31. 
5. Posidonius and the Fourth Academy 
Sceptics attack Stoic doctrines, 131; Stoics 
concentrate on adiaphora, 132; Posidonius 9 132; 
- shapes Stoicism to meet criticisms: irrational 
soul, 132; c·onflict of desire and reason, 133; 
theory of knowledge, 133; daimon, 134; CJ'UtL'Ifr1.9etCIC 9 
135 9 Apprecta:b.tcitnn of man's whole nature 9 135 9 
Chapter four SENECA 
120 
127 
131 
lo The new humanism 150 
A transition period in the Stoa; 150; greater 
awareness of human nature, 151; the place of 
X 
chapter four (contd.) 
duties in moral goodness, 152; Roman influence on 
virtues, 153; Roman religious influence 9 154; the 
characteristics of Cicero and Seneca's writings, 154-5. 
2. Will, personality and conscience 155 
Inner responsibility for virtues, 155; moral duties 
and the good in Cicero, 156; the individual's will 
in Seneca, 156; general and particular will, 157; 
will and decision 9 158; interest in personality, 158; 
reason and personality, 159-60; conscientia in Cicero 
and Seneca 9 161; its relation to cruve~_s_,_cr,s 9 162; 
conscience in Epictetus 9 163; examination of one's 
conscience, 163-4. 
3. Reason and emotion 164 
Seneca follows Chrysippus' monism, 164; rational or 
irrational will produces judgements, 165; doctrine 
applied to anger, 165; two grades of passion, 165-6; 
the part of reason and will in emotions, 166; 
reason and impulse, 167. 
4. Duties and the good 
A broader view of goodness by the Romans, 168; 
Panaetius and duties, 168-9; goodness not confined 
to Sapiens, 169; goodness towards externals, 170; 
consideration for others in Seneca, 171. 
5. The religion of Stoicism 
The religious aspect of Stoicism in Seneca, 171; 
concept of God ih early Stoa 9 phyical theory, 172; 
Cleanthes1 Hymn to Zeus, 172-3; transitt~nn from 
168 
171 
xi 
' chapter four ( contd.) 
theological theory to religious feeling, 173; religious 
awareness in Seneca, 173-4; the numinous, 175; 
influence of Roman pantheism, 175-6; soul in 
Seneoa, 176. 
Comparison of Seneca and Epictetus, 176; 
similar in duties, 176; in other areas a more 
rational approach by Epictetus 7 176-7; the concept 
of will and nrohairesms; 177-8. 
Bhapter five EPICTETUS: CONCEPT OF MIND 
1.· The functi6n of reason 
The main aspects of freedom are contained in 
Epictetus' psychology, 190; he followed Stoic 
doctrine but with aifferent emphasis, 190-1; 
190 
190 
a psychological and moral function, 192; characteristics 
of human reason, 192-3; three aspects, 193-4; the 
independence and self-analysis of reason, 194; 
reason consists of phantasiai, 195; reason as 
apospasma of divine reason, 195; three questions 
of freedom in doctrine on reason, 195-6. 
2. The prolepseis 
Prolepsis in E~ictetus and earlier Stoics, 196; 
the origin of general concepts, 196-7; three 
aspects of prolepsis in Epictetus, 197-8; P.rolepsis 
of the good, 198; reason related to the good 
life, 198-9; natur~l and learned prolpseis, 200-1; 
use of Stoic principles, 201-2; application of 
prolepseis in judgements, 202; problem of the 
practical syllogism, 203; the extent of freedom in 
applying prolepseis, 203-4. 
196 
xii 
chapter five (contd.) 
3. ~e phantasiai 
~hantasiai in the Stoa, - a more flexible attitude 
in Epictetus, 205; ffour main applications of the 
term in Epictetus, 206; 
a.Phantasiai and motion, 206. Animal and human 
reason compared, 206; animals act with use 7 
but not understanding of phantasiai, 207; 
understanding of phantasiai makes man a moral 
creature, ·208o 
204 
b.Phantasiai and knowledge 7 208. Relation of Enictetus 
to Stoic doctrine of knowledge, 208; phantasiai 
as sense data, 208-9; true and false phantasiai, 
210; catagories of phantasiai 9 210-11; three 
stages in Epictetus' theory: animal cognition, 
e1ementary cognition and compl.ex cognition, 211-12. 
CoPhantasiai and moral behaviour, 212. Three-fold 
basis of moral conduct, 212; phantas-iai of 
moral conduct related to phanta~aiof cognition 9 
212-3; pha~tasiai as suggested 'fancies' and 
logical ideas, 213-4; subjective nature of a 
'fancy', 214-5; 'fancies' can be true or false; 
215; c-onfusion of the 'good' and the 'logically 
correct', 215-6; judgement of reason upon 
'fancies', 216-7; criticism of Epictetus' 
position, 217-9; false 'fancies' a matter for 
practical concern in Epictetus, 219-20. 
d. Phantasiai and emotions, -2'~0. Persuasiveness of 
false impressions, 220; their subjective origin 
and man's irrational nature, 221-3; reason 
must fight the desire-phantasia com,lex, 223-4; 
reason may produce C'ounter images, 224; 
development of desire-phantasia into n!A.Bos, 225; 
xiii 
chapter five (contd.) 
~~9o~ in Epictetus compared with other Stoics, 
225-7; Medea, an example of"'"C'o{Bos, 227-8; 
akrasia, 228-9; desire intrudes the rational 
monism, 229-30; importance of good emotions,in 
prohairesis and the desire of the good, 230-2. 
4. Reasoh as apospasma. 232 
Apospasma prev~us~ important in physical theory, 
232; Epictetus uses the theory to extol man's 
position and freedom, 233; cosmic and individual 
reason, 233-4; reason as a deity, 234-5; unity of 
reason produces cosmic obedience, 235; the freedom 
paradox, 235-6. 
5. The hegemonikon. 
Hegemonikon in the early Stoa, 236-7; a disposition 
guiding choice in Epictetus, 237; as the factor 
producing choice, or prohairesis, 238; freedom 
of the hegemonikon,~238-9; comparison of hegemonikon 
and prohairesis, 239. 
6. Reason and freedom 
Decisions of reason 'cause' actions, 240; freedom 
inherent in reason as logic, 240-41; freedom of 
choice in application of reason to conduct, 241-2; 
the desiring function in the application of reason 
as choice, 242-3; the term 'prohairesis' adopted as 
the total desiring and reasoning personality, 243-4. 
236 
240 
xiv 
Chapter six EPICTETUS: CONCEPT OF MAN 
Lo 1 Man in the cosmos. 
The principles of fOO"I·S and oikeiosis, 259; 
oikeiosis in the universe, 260; Stoic physical 
259 
259 
theory, 260-61; doctrine on death, 261-2; general 
oikeiosis of man, 262-3; freedom: a moral end, 263; 
moral self-sufficiency, 264; importance of"'tCC(prA.KoAofiB'I,.'! 
in Epictetus' theory, 265-6. 
2. Oikeiosis in the individual 
From general to individual oikeiosis, 266; two 
stanclards, general and individual,267; dynameis 
as an aspect of individual personality, 267; 
capacities and circumstances, 268; freedom in using 
the dynameis, 269-70; d.ynameis as controlling 
virtues, 270-71; their effect on will, 271-2; 
"'tp~v~·.,uv as one's role in life, 272-3; - as strength 
of character, 273-4; Epictetus' position on 
suicide, 274-5. 
3. Man's relationship with God. 
266 
275 
Epictetus and the religious tradition in Stoicism, 
275; religious terminology: God, 276; divine will, 
277; divine communication;277-8; in education, 278; 
purification, 279; soul, 279; figurative use of 
language, 280-81; sincerity of Epictetus' belief, 281; 
his position comparable to mysticism, 281-2; aspects 
of freedom in his religion, 283; knowledge and 
prescience, 283-4; a harmony of wills, 284-5; 
4o Knowledge and education. 
IncH vidual responsibility for knowledge 9 285-6; 
two aspects of knowledge, 286; education in 
XV 
ch~pter six (contd.) 
philosophic principles, 286; education in self-
knowledge, 286-7; moral application of knowledge 
by askesis, 287-8; self-exAmination 9 288, 
knowledee and desire 9 288-9; habituation 9 289-90. 
5. The inner virtues. 290 
Aides as moral self-respect, 290-1; - as conscience, 
291; faithfulness (To n•trT~v), 291-2; additional 
inner virtues, 292; relation of inner virtues to 
social virtues 9 292-3; the will rumd nrohairesis in 
virtues, 293-4; the social virtues, 294. 
Summary of chapter, 295. 
Chapter seven PROHAIRESIS AND FREBDOM 
1. Prohairesis a new term. 
Prohairesis in the Greek language as'choice', 312; 
special philosophic use in Aristotle, 31:3; 
1tpooupe.T IK:C. in the Stoa, 313; originality and 
development of the term in Epictetus, 314; its 
relationshi:p with the adjectives,wpooc•pCTu<.:s and. 
~trpocf,pn-ot, 314-5; comparison with Aristotle, 316; 
its a~plication to the Stoic freedom, 316-7; a 
further development in Epictetus as moral 
312 
312 
character 9 318; reasons for this developmnt, 319-20; 
its significance, 320-1. 
2. Function of prohairesis as decision. 
Distinction of what is, and what is not in our 
power, 321-2; the three T~"nOI, 322-3; the chief 
characteristics of nrohairesis, 324; its freedom, 
324-5; rational nature of prohairesis, 325-6; 
321 
Chapter seven (contd.) 
nrohnirosis in CTuytcO(T~ 9ea•s; follows reason and 
nature, 327-8; resignation to circULlBtanccs, 328-9; 
the fi~ld of choice, 329; the field of desire, 330; 
desires restricted~ the inner self, 330; criticism 
of tho 'Stoic wheel', 330-31; the place of de~iro in 
reason, 331-39 freedom v0rsus action, 333-5. 
3 .' Function of prohairesis as moral character. 335 
Good and bad character depends on prohairGsjs, 335; 
nrohairesis provides the freedom of self-identity, 
336; training in prohairesis produces men of good 
character, 337-8.; the reciprocating aspect of 
prohairesis as choice and character, 338; habit-
uation, 339; the self cannot surv~ death, 339; 
prohairesis,the totality of self, 340. 
4. Prohairesis and freedom. 
The meaning of inner freedom, 341; three levels of 
freedom in Epictetus: a.Freedom of choice, 342. 
340 
b.Freedom from anxiety, 342; 
its negative quality, 343; achieved through 
discipline, 343; act of freedom and state of 
freedom, 344-5; resignation, 345. 
c.Frcodom for rational 
existence, 346. Freedom as a moral value, 346; 
self-responsibility, 347; free for the positive act 
of willing, 347-8; prohairesis is active in anticipat-
ine God's will, 349; freedom of the self-identity, 
349-50; the sphere of freedom extends through self 
to the whole universe, 350; the relation of the 
theory to earlier thought, 350-51. 
xvii 
chapter seven (contd.) 
5e Social responsibility 
A utopia of perfect prohaireseis, 351-2; importance 
of self-responsibiltty, social virtues dependent 
on prohairesis~ 352; attention to field of choice, 
351 
e. , ( c::>pf"'J ) , 353-4; duties must be treated as externals, 
~ I 354-5; the use of &KAOY~f'l in the process of delibera-
tion on duties, 355-7; no place for the correction 
of others 9 357-8; criminals are punished by the 
destruction of their prohairesis, 358-60; a difficulty 
in the determinist outlook, 360-1. 
Chapter eight CONCLUSIONS and an EPTIJ0GUE 379 
General summary, 379-80; relation of Epictet~s to 
the earlier theories, and to Marcus Aurelius, 380-1; 
weaknesses in the Stoic rationalism, 381-2. 
Freedom through reason, 382-3; the consequences of 
the material aspect of reason in Epictetus' doctrine, 
383-7; the rational aspect of will and the practical 
syllogism, 387-90. 
The uncertainty principle in will, 390-1; will 
reTiated to the active personality, 391-2; function 
of desire in will, 392-3; elusiveness of will as a 
philosophic concept, and the determinist problem, 
393-5. 
Responsibility to oneself,and the oikeiosis doctrine, 
395-7; the position of 'retreat to oneself' 
criticised, 397-8; 
Considerations in support of Epictetus' theories of 
xviii 
chapter eight (contd.) 
personal inner liberty: it provides the fullest 
realisation of the self, 398-400; freedom for 
intellectual contemplation, 400-1; freedom for 
the mystic sense, 401-2; the 'feeling' of freedom 
as a personal value, 402-3. 
The special position of Epictetus' theories of will 
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A NOTE ON THE TRANSCRIPTION OF GREEK TERMS 
In order to avoid an abundance of hand-written 
Greek, I have transcribed the following Greek terms: 
:t ' 0( I( pO(.C1' 0(. 
~· o( 0" tc '1 G' ' t; 
OoltfA-WV 
S~vcc ...,,«; 
c I 
'1 y E. fA. 0 V H< o v 
'A6yo~ 
:l , 
oaa<e.u.:>cr '~ 
I 1rpooc.1p£cr1s 
lfp~A..,ta~ 
adiaphora 
aidos 
akrasia 
apospasma 
askesis 
daimon 
dynamis, dynameis (pl) 
hegemonikon 
logos 
oikeiosis 
prohairesis* prohaireseis (pl) 
prolepsis, prolepseis (pl) 
phantasia, phantasiai (pl) 
*In chapter seven, I have retained this word in 
Greek script, when referring to the term itself. 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. Pur~ose of the Thesis. 
The purpose of this inquiry is to provide an interpretation 
of Epictetus' Discourses which is philosphically useful. In 
doing so, I shall not-be lead. to examine a diversity of 
teachings on different subjects since the Discourses are 
outstanding for· t~eir singleness of theme and intent: the 
message of freedom, and dependent directly on it, the limits 
of man's moral responsibility. 
Freedom had been an important aspect in Stoic ethics 
from the beginning of the movement, but in Epictetus it becomes 
the essence and one absolute aim of moral conduct. My task is 
to find whether the Stoic-freedom as contained in Epictetus' 
~ork, which is its final and(~ffuse~development and presenta- / 
. ----- -- __, l 
tion, is based on firm philosophical principles and is valid 
as a moral goal, or whether this 'call to freedom' is an 
empty cry, the last hope that man has to preserve himself from 
the troubles of the world. 
Freedom, (~AtuY1E.p/o<, libertas) was known to the ancient 
world in two aspects: first as political and social freedom. 
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This is the freedom commended by Peric.les and Thucyd:l.des. 
It entails the freedom of one state from being r.uled by 
another,1 and the lack of coercion within the city-state, 
where each citizen knows his function in the sta~e and 
fulfils it in a free spirit. Those without political 
freedom were the servile class, and the notionof freedo.tl 
includes the social distinction between free-born and slaves. 
The second aspect of freedom is inner freedom. This concept 
puts freedom within reach of everyone, since the freedom is 
contained within the thought and will of the individual. 
2 It is the freedom of the 'unconquerable soul'. · 
Today, a greater number of meanings is covered by our 
word 'freedom'. Particularly we may note a mid-way aspect 
between political and inner freedom, namely freedom of 
action. We can have a notion of freedom or lack of freedom 
in performing our everyday actions. Modern thinkers, 
especially those concerned with the philosophy of action, 
regard this as a fundamental freedom. This mid-way use of 
'freedom' emerges partly from the struggle between free-
will and determinism in the philosophy of the Christian Era, 
but which in the ancient world was only just a- beginning 
to be a problem in the Stoic period. This freedom of the 
will in action should not be confused with the freedom of 
the will as the inner man. Freedom from passions affecting 
our will is also an area of freedom not immediately 
;) LJ I 
translatable by a A e u OG.p 1/X. • It is true that inner freedom 
embraced freedom from the passions, but this is only derived 
from its essential quality of having its authority within 
itself. 
That l>..eu8eproA.. was not applied to such notions is 
no sign that the Greeks did not recognise freedom of action 
or freedom from passions,3 but they did not think of these 
as e.AeuB&piO(, as notions resembling political tr.eedom. 
For the use of £A.euBe.p1~ for political and social freedom 
was prior to its application to inner freedom, which was 
adopted by the Stoics, perhaps first as a metaphor, as we 
say, using the converse, a man is 'a slave to his passions•. 
Why did the Stoics adopt this term from political 
freedom for their inner freedom? The idea common to both 
is that of feeling free, enjoying fr~edom not necessarily 
from anything or for anything, but in existence, either as 
a state, or as an individual playing a part in a community, 
and in the case of inner freedom, the feeling of freedom 
enjoyed when the individual feels master of everything that 
is properly his own; and if this has to be reduced to his 
'unconquerable soul•, 4 it need not necessarily diminish the 
sense of freedom. 
4 
It has often been remarked that the notio~ of inner 
freedom became more intense as politica1 and social freedom 
became eclipsed,5 This is true only in part. The adoption 
ot the word G.AE ueG.fl« for inner freedom at the beginning· 
of the Stoic school, did coincide with the breakdown of the 
city-state ideal under the Macedonian Empire, and continued 
with greater intensity under the Roman Empire, which in 
certain periods displayed keen oppression, destroying 
6 political freedom as an ideal. Accordingly the ideal 
contained in €A~u&~f;"' shifted to the inner freedom where 
it could be maintained as an ideal. To this extent the 
adoption of the term £). E uB~p;ac by the philosophers reflects 
an age of autocratic oppression. 
But the concept of inner freedom, though not denoted by 
GA£UB€p~(J(., had already emerged in the fifth and fourth 
centuries B.c.7 with the Socratic teaching that virtue is 
knowledge, and the Platonic dualism of body and soul, where 
moral perfection consists in possessing a soul unfettered by 
earthly associates, and Aristotle's vision of happiness as the 
contemplative activity of the soul. Thus the emergence of the 
concept of the inner man and inner responsibility (which is 
very near to a concept of inner freedom) coincides not so much 
lr.lth a breakdown of political ideals, but with the recognition, 
5 
clearly reflected in the fifth century sophists and drama~ists, 
that the accepted foundations of morality, the State religion 
. ' I 
and the traditional moral code (or VOI-'01 ), were infirm. It 
was not the catastrophes themselves, for these were·nothing 
new, but the intellectual awakening to the causes of catastrophe 
that led the fifth century Athenians to re-think their ethics, 
or rathe·r to think them for the first time, and to discover 
that the true basis for a man's responsibility is within himself. 
The Stoics could develop their concept of freedom readily 
from their philosophical background of fourth century Athens. 
It was a natural intellectual step that their teaching should 
develop from an inner based concept of moral responsibility, 
irrespective of the loss of political freedom. Similarly in 
the comparatively liberal age of the late-nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries the interest in inner freedom by the 
existentialist school is due to an intellectual awakening to 
the limitations, not in this instance of the traditional 
I 
VOfJ-01 1 but of the thorough rationalism of the philosophy of 
the previous age. 
It cannot be denied t4at the Hellenistic era was dogged 
with philosophies of retreat, not primarily though by the 
Cynics, but by the Epicureans and Stoics. And where the inner 
freedom is proclaimed as an adjunct of the Stoic way of life, 
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that is of the purely rational life, we may discern the spirit 
of escapism, and fail to find a useful philosophical concept. 
But in the later development of Stoicism, when the rational 
do~atism is beginning to weaken very slightly and freedom is 
made the essence of moral li~e, its exponents had need to 
analyse this concept more closely, and have reCOUJ'Se to their 
roots in the fourth century Greek philosophy of Plato and 
Aristotle, .and depend less on their avowed certainty in the 
rational monism of Zeno. 
Stoic freedom is never concerned with the political and 
social freedom. The second aspect, inner freedom, is 
. 8 Epictetus• sole concern, and for the reasons I have shown, 
must not be considered unimportant at least to Ancient 
philosophy. This same aspect of freedom is commonplace in 
many ethical and religious creeds, and in popular morality. 
In its outward appearance as 11 I resign myself to Fate", and 
11\·lhatever circumstances demand, that is my will", it may 
seem, and doubtless was to many of its followers, a form of 
escapism from responsibility and anxiety; but in its inner 
feeling of a sense of freedom, of feeling responsible for 
one's moral e,xistence, in 'the service which is perfect 
freedom•, in the "mea. virtute me involvo11 , rather than the 
11resigno quae dedit", 9 is it enough to dismiss it as Isaiah 
7 
10 Berlin does as "s9ur grapes11 , or might there not be here 
something philosophically significant in the concept of 
freedom and responsibility? This freedom is the centre of 
Epictetus' teaching and he bases it on a consistent 
philosophy of nature and mind, and as such the Discourses 
deserve study. 
In the examination of Epictetus' teaching on freedom, 
two other important id~as emerge: the concept of will, and 
the Stoic rationalism. The notion of liberty 'is t·he more 
interesting in Epictetus because his doctrines-are based on 
the material determini.s~ demanded by the Stoic rationalism. 
The conc~pt of will becomes first significant in the Stoic 
period because the dilemma between tree-will and determinism 
lay exposed in their rational system; this is particularly 
true of the ~addle Stoa. Pohlenz correc~ly observes that 
the problem of free-will did not exist for·Epictetus11 since 
he took freedom of choice for granted, observing choice or will 
to be meaningless unless it was·free. But the concept of will 
and its key position in moral behaviour is very prominent in 
his teaching on liberty, and against the background,of 
determinism, it i.e cast in strong relief. 
But again, Epictetus is using and developing what was 
already implicit in earlier Greek thought. The will, and the 
8 
struggle of will a5ainst rea(:lon, of passion against knowledge, 
was a vital sourc·e of Greek tragedy •12 In Pia to a concept of 
will is' seen behind the desire for the Good and the orientation 
of the soul in the Symposium and Republic; and Aristotle returns 
to the question particular~y in his study of akrasia, and in 
the part played by will in acquiring knowledge. The spontaneous 
will, which is here conceived of by the Greeks as something 
unca~sed, proceeding from the man himself, is to become a 
formulated concept 'in Epictetus, and it is an a:im of this 
thesis to see how far and how adequately he develops this 
concept. 
"The gods being no more aX1d Christ being not yet, there 
was between Cicero and r~rcus Aurelius a unique moment in which 
man stood alone". So states Flaubert ,, 1.3 in critj.cism ·of 
Lucretius• physics as .being too positive. He might equally 
have said it of Stoic ethics for the same reason. In the 
place of religious belief and faith man takes refuge in the 
certainty of rationali~m. For the Greeks, the atheistic period 
14. 
extended from the time of Euripides, but for fifty years, 
because of the keen sensitivity of the Athenians, and because 
of the interest in the ~~stery religions, the Greeks hovered 
before plunging into the thorough rationalism of Zeno or 
Epicurus. If God does not rule, man can choose between a 
9 
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belief, ofte:p- iii spite of the facta, in a life c.ontrolled by 
reason, well-ordered and systematic, or in an irrational 
exi~tence where some events remain unexplained. The .first 
choice offers security through the certainty of understanding 
the world, and leads to an idealism centred on thought; the 
second is more faithful to the phenomena of human feeling and 
suffering, and offers realis.m, and with it the hazards that 
occur through a fulness of existence. 
In the thought ot Plato and Aristotle, desire and 
spontaneous \~ll have their place, and the combination of 
desire and reason working together is frequently found. The 
systems of the Hellenistic period were not so comp:z.o~ising·, and 
everything was to be explained or controlled by reason. But 
because in Epictetus the concepts of will and fre-edom are so 
essential to hi~_.teaching, the irrational again demands a 
place. Accordingly we can expect to find Epictetus on the 
brink of the 'rationalist dissolution•15 and need ·show no 
aurpri~e that apart from Marcus Aurelius, he is the la~t of 
the exponents of Stoicism. It is an aim of this thesis to 
see how far Epictetua can contort the rationalism on which 
his teaching is baaed, to embrace the irrational factors that 
are inherent in his theory of will and freedom. 
In Ep_ictetua' Discourses., therefore, I look for evidence 
. . . ._ . 
.. 
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on thr~·a questions of philosophica;t signif:tca,nce: 
1. The validity of the Stoic freedom. 
----: . 
2. The extent of the development of the notion of will. 
3• The weaknesses of a rational system as a bas.is for 
practical ethics. 
It is not my intention to discover, from my study, the 
originali.ty of Epictetus, and his personal contribution to 
Stoici-sm. I treat his writ;Lngs as the final stage of a 
movement in phUosop~y, and do not attempt to discern in detail 
the innovations he made upon h;s immediate predecessors. 
Because o~ the nature of his writings, any such ta~k would 
present immense difficulties. His extant writings-show the 
marks of well-worn. reitera'tfed doctrine, as one would expect 
of any lecture-room teaching. Throughout this thesis there 
will be mention of Epictetus' originality oli specific points, 
but now~ere can' the~e be __ certE,lint;r. I· wish to study the 
importance of the Discourses,to philosophy as a whole and 
particularly to Greek philosopl;ly, anci in so doing it is 
sufficient to recognise that in the deveJ.opment of Stoicism 
the b~sic principles rem~'in constant, whi~e the· emphasis and 
orientation of the teaching changes: the.re is a gradual· 
development from the teaching being less concerned with nature, 
11 
more concerned with humanity; less concern~d with reason, 
more concerned with will and moral responsibility. Epj.ctetus 
stands at the end of this development. 
2. Method of the Inquiry. 
In interpreting the doctrine of freedom in the Discourses, 
I have extracted a key, namely prohair.esis, the .faculty of 
cho:i;ce, and baaed the study on an examination of this. The 
concept is a useful key for three reasons: first, man's 
freedom is contained in prohairesis alone, and depends on 
nothing outside it; second, it is the outstanding original 
contribution of Epictetus, as the formulation of a concept 
which probably existed before in Stoicism, but had not been 
expressed by a single term. Thus the s_tudy of the term would 
reflect the important developments in l~ter Stoicism; third 
the concept is used so frequently in the Discourses that 
although little is provided in the form of analytical 
definition, in the course of the \'IOrk it becomes a comparatively 
clear concept amidst a rather vague psychological and philoso-
•" 
phical vocabulary. 
On account of this lack of definition in the niscourses, 
and· because as we have seen above, there is in the concept of 
' . 
.. -
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the inner man, a connection with Plato and Aristotle, an~ ~ 
continu~~ion of the teaching of. the. Stoic movement, knotJledge 
of certain aspects of these phi+osophies is indisp~llsable ·t'o 
the pr_esent study. Accordingly, I have devoted about one 
third of the thesis to the background chapters on Aristot.le 
and Plato, The Stoics, and Seneca. Most of the terminology 
of the Discourses, especially in the psychology, is that of 
the Stoic school, where it is dealt with more definitively 
than by Epictetus. A great amount of his teaching-is also 
identical with their rationalistic concepts of kriowled,ge and 
reason. I have said though, that the emphasis changes, and 
that rationalism is str.etched to its limits. In understa11ding 
the difficulties and tension involved in this change of 
emphasis, the work of Plato and Aristotle on the coordination 
of reason and destre is instructive. 
It was however, the particular concept of prohairesis 
itself which first lead me to consider the Athenian philosophers 
in connection with Epictetus, since this term is adopted by 
Aristotle in his discussion on voluntary and involuntary 
actions in the Ethics, and certain areas of the meaning of 
this term recur markedly in Epictetus. 
I have included the chapter on Seneca as representing 
Epictetus' immediate predecessor whose work is extant, and 
·' 
the period in which the change of emphasis, so marked in 
Epictetus, begins to be established. 
Again I do not intend to state what Epictetus derived 
from earl-ier philosophies as direct borrowings. The importance 
of the background chapters is .to provide material trom the 
comprehensive and analytical treatment of the Athenian 
philosophers and the Stoic school, in the light of which facets 
!--:j 
of Epiotetus' teaching may become clearer. !.cannot demonstrate 
that he was consciously aware that he was substantially follow-
ing, in aspects of his theory, Plato or Aristotle, 
There is little in Epictetus' writing that does not 
'· 
contribute to the central notion of probairesis. Consequently 
an investigation of his psychological and philosophical 
doctrines is necessary before a full consideration of prohairesis 
can be given. Chapters five and six~ on the concept of mind, 
and the concept of man provide an account of this general 
teaching, in order to reach a definition of prohairesis in 
Chapter seven, upon which the doctrine of freedom and 
responsibility is immediately dependent. The philosophical 
significance of the doctrine is discussed in the conclusion. 
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3. Epi.ctetus• work, character and writings. 
Born about 50 AD, a slave, at Hieropolis in Phrygia, 
Epictetus spent his formative years in Rome in the service of 
Epaphroditue, a freedman in Nero's secretariat. Still a. 
slave and now crippled, possibly through ill~treatment at the 
hands of his master,16 he was educated at Rome by the Stoic 
teacher and Roman knight, Musonius Rufus, and continued a 
pupil of hie after he had gained his freedom. He himself 
enjoyed the reputation of a philosopher and teacher sufficient 
to warrant his banishment under Domitian in about 90 AD., 
when he settled in Nicopolis {Actium) in w •. Greece. There 
he founded an educational establishment, and until his death 
in about 120 AD. he devoted himself to the formal teaching of 
the Stoic philosophy. 
For the main-stream Stoic teaching, Epictetus was 
de~~ndent upon Musonius Rufus. Substantial fragments of 
Musonius• teaching remain. These stress that moral progress 
is within reach of,and should be undertaken by everyone.17 
Practical ethics seem to be given considerable prominence in 
i8 \ MUsonius, following Panaetius, and the notions of "TT'ICTTI'. 
~ (' I 
and cC I oW~ , so common in Epictetus, and the askesie 
programme, are probably inherited from h~.l9 Evidence that 
.•.> . ,'. 
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f1usonius gave special attention to :lnner freedom is lacking, 
and he seems to be nearer Seneca than Epictetus in his 
genera,l orientation. This may be due to his Roman nationality . 
20 demanding greater .. social conscience, but we cannot assume 
that the fragments in any way represent the totality of his 
teaching. Pliny and Tacitus speak of him w~th high admiration, 
and the latter alsO describes his missionary spirit in the 
21 
army. His genuine concern and practical devotion stand in 
contrast to Seneca, and 1-1ere transferred to Epictetus, who 
himself admires the assiduous attention of his teacher. 22 
He is noted by De Vogel as being more a man of character than 
Seneca. 23 
There are three aspects of Epictetus• character which 
should be mentioned as particularly relevant to the study 
of his teaching. First is the prophetic nature of his message 
of freedom, and the missionary zeal with which he propounds it, 
He himself compares the philosopher•s.taak to an interpreter 
. 24 
of oracles. He regards his work as practical rather than 
theoretical. In the day to day teaching of hie school. he 
emphasises the need to progress from distinguishing the false 
and the true in logic, to understanding the good and bad in 
practical moral conduct. 25 His lecture room was a hospital; 26 
hie atm, moral conversion. 
· .. 
16 
Seco;nd, commentators have been quick ~o noti.ce a religious 
sense in Epictetus• writings. 27 A sen~e of submission and 
gratitude to God is apparent, and much of his Stoic teaching 
is couched in religious terms. How far this is a natural 
result of his missionary zeal, to fix a message with certainty 
in his hearers• conscience by adopting religious formulae 
almost as a rhetorical device, and how far it reflects a 
profound religious feeling .in his philosophy,is a problem 
that may never be solved. I have considered this development 
in Stoicism in Chapter four, and Epictetus• position in this 
respect in ~hapter six, and will refer to the bearing this 
aspect of his character has on his theory of freedom, in the 
conclusion. 
Third, Epictetus• teaching is marked by a sincerity and 
genuine devotion to the cause he preaches. Philosophy is not 
the babbling ( Ao<A ouo- I ) of lofty maxims (TC:C K Of-' r~), 28 
but the actual wrestling with real situations.29 The only 
advantage in set.tiilg, forth principles is the knO\'ITledge that 
they \'!Till work in practice, and Epictetus despised those l'rJ?.o 
acted the part of Stoics without applying the teaching they 
propounded.30 Similarly he despised the pseudo philosophers 
who believed that a rough cloak and long hair would engage 
the attention of their audience.3l Epictetus, preaching a 
r 
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message whi.c'p was his own personal conviction and devotion, 
' ,' . -- . 
. saw himseif·as ·standing out from the number·of such pseudo 
intellectuals which t'hronged the large cities. 
·The '\'!Ork·of.Epictetus comes to us through the notes made 
by his devoted pupil Flavius Arrian. Comparison of the 
Discourses with the style of the rest of Arrian 'a \'Iritings 
show beyond' dispute that the Discourses written by Arrian 
are a verbatim version of Epictetus' original expositions. 32 
There were eight books of Discourses, four of which are extant, 
l:n addition to the Discourses, Arrian compiled the Manual, 
orEncheiridion, as a formalised summary of the teaching of 
the Discourses. This small manual \'tas a very popular hand-
book from the time of its publication. Oldfather, 33 rightly 
comments that Epictetus' philosophic stature suffered because 
he was known to many only through this work. Anyone who has 
made the attempt will realise the difficulty of making an 
adequate summary of the Discourses owing to their loosely 
composed styl~ and the practical purpose for which they were 
written• As a handbook of maxims for moralists, particularly 
Christian moralists, the Manual has been of use. As philosophy, 
it can be of little account, since it lacks the basis of 
doct~ine. This basis can be gleaned from his more substantial 
wr~tings, yet because even in the Discourses it is so often 
1:. 
I : . 
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only implicit, it hl;l.s not been adequately re.pr.esen~ed in 
Arrian 1 s summary. The Manual is he-lpful ·in that we can be 
reasonably certain that no major part-of Epictetus' teaching 
has been lost in the Diao~ourse,a which do not survive. There 
are also a number of collected fragments from various sources, 
some from the non-surviving books of Discourses, which are 
sometimes illuminating. 
The Discourses, or diatribes, were not. the formal. 
lectures of Epictetus' school. They were designed to be 
given after the formal teaching, to emphasise points the 
teacher believed to be important, and in particular the 
practiqal application of the teach1ng.34 Hjmans, in 
considering the purpose of the Discourses in the teaching 
programme, stresses their extemporary nature, as being 
sometimes the chance conversation either with his own pupils 
or with temporary visitors to the school.35 
Consequently, we cannot expect to find in the Discourses 
the complete teaching of the school, but rather an extract and 
impressive presentation of the points of the teaching 
essential for moral conduct; it has to be conceded too, that 
Epictetus' strong orientation of Stoicism toward inner moral 
responsibility, in comparison with the more objective writings 
of earlier Stoics might be only apparent because of this very 
19 
pedagqs-ic nature of his extant work. FUrther, this purpose 
and nature of th;e Discourses explains the lack of system and 
reasoned argument in the exposition of the doctrines. There 
are many repetitions even within the same Discourse; the 
same anecdotes and stock illustrations recur. School-room 
drill in dialogue form is frequent. They are personally 
directed, and full of e~ortation and urgent advice. The 
closely reasoned l.ectures which preceded these homilies are 
not preserved, and this makes the task of interpretation more 
difficult. 
Possibly this difficulty has veered commentators away 
from <;levo:tiJ:~g much space to Epictetus. Criticisms in the 
English language are few, and scholars generally have given 
him scant treatment. They catch his candour and zeal and 
'magic words',·and rarely seek to probe the validity of the 
'call to freedom', and 'shout of joy' contained in his 
~itings.36 In this introduction I have attempted to show 
what items of philosophical importance we might expect to 
find in the Discourses• ::~?erhaps this s~udy will demonstra-te 
that they can contribute little that is useful, - it t·l~ll 
certainly indicate some weaknesses in his position, but 
Epictetus, standing at the end of the tradition of Stoicism 
t·1arrants a re-appraisal, - o.nd a caution: 
.. ·, .. 
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Epictetus' servile background was not a happy one. As a 
philosopher in Rome he experienced at first hand the tyrann,y 
that was open to the Roman Emperors. His examples and 
anecdo.tes frequently refer to the petty duties that men .had 
to perform for their superiors. The evil attractions of the 
~ and the difficulties of leading a moral life were well 
known to him. His practical advice is to resist temptation 
an·d behave \'lith endurance in hardships, to the extent that 
certain concepts, (e.g. the dynameis) cannot be traced to a 
general application. Theories are given a twist in the 
direction of helping man oppressed by a~iety to achieve 
happiness. Thus t~ill may appear as resignatiQ~; theory of 
knowledge, a theory of sympathetic understanding; virtues as 
attitudes of mind rather than expressed activity; and freedom 
itself as undisturbedness. Yet if Epictetus was poor in his 
social and material background,·he was rich intellectually 
from the teaching of MusQnius Rufus and his reading of the 
Stoics and Plato, and although his theories are undoubtedly 
influenced in part by his circumstances, it is important to 
remember that he devoted his life to philosophy, and was 
continuing a tradition substantial in its dogma, and he was a 
sincere eDough man to base his unshak~ble moral consciousness 
and conviction of inner freedom as much on this intellectual 
: ·-~ 
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riclinese;·as c;>n· his· material wtetc.hedness • 
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NOTES TO.CHAPTER ONE 
1. The finest exposition of this freedom is the Funeral 
Speech of Pericles (Thucydides, II 36ff.). Pericles 
see·s the freedom of the State extending to freedom in 
d l"f ~ \- Q! <-' , ' ' ' , every- ay l. e ,.. 6~uuapWLol T.t T6. 'l'fO,$-TO "OHIOV _'fto).fTI_UOf"l"' 
' , ' ~ ' ,. nu· ' ' ·c ' • .L 1 .lC~L6( '""''V ~\..,).ous TWV .. ItrJ. V 9JfA&pDC.ll_ ElCfT:"qOSU~ aiT.C .. t'L U_'fto y· ltl V• • • 
(37). Athenian self-sufficiency (36,3), and their 
educational system (39 .... 40) \otere characteristic marks 
•\ _ .n-: ll 
of this freedom. A liberal education ( 6iiE!llZEPW-S _ TE opo<p.-
"' JlE~ou..sJ _is also commended by !socrates in Paneg;yricus,49 
(cf. Areopagiticu~, 43). _e).e:uB~p..Mc_ is frequefltly 
;;) , 
conjoined with o(UTOVOf 10( (political independence~, aa 
in Brasidas' speech to the Acanthiana (Thuc. IV, eap. 86), 
and in the more formal language of the Charter of the 
d t "JI A'~ . .... cf-'\ .. , Secon A henian Confederacy, £c;(V 'TIS rOI11\1')Lo(l 'f'..,V ~).N,'JVWV....., 
rtJv /3d.f{j~pwv .... :49'JVClC•IWV trJUJA-rl..'iOf, ~V(II.J I<,} I 'T"wv VVfiL~X"'V 
" ~ .. .. ,.. > \ n, ~>I r (' ~ , r· . ' -e~·EIVo( I 0( llTtp .£ A€1Jv~p!f'· OV{I l(o(l o(CJ~DVC,.,.'f• 
(Tod, Greek Historical Inscriptions, No. 123). 
2. William H~nley, Invictus. Cf. cJiorace, 11 Ille potena sui 
laetusque deget ••• " ~III 29, 41. See also notes 
4 and 9 'below. 
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3.. The trageqies of Euripides freq-qently ilivQlve a. struggle. 
between the r~tional and passionate aspects of a 
character. The example of Medea is perhaps the most 
notable, and is twice quoted by Epictetus, (Medea., 
' 
lines 780 ff. in II 17, 19-21, and lines 1078 - 9 in 
I 28., 7: 8uf-'~S $E ~p~ttTtTWV Twv f:.p.wvfiou~e_U/-'~TWV). 
4. This memorab1e phrase is from 'Inviotus- 1 by t'lilliam 
Henley, who is one of many to have given poetical 
expression to the inner freedom. In this poetry, 
prominence is given to the feeling of freedom. Much of 
the- popular~ty of Horace's Odes springs from the same 
feeling. 
5. Pohlenz, Freedom p.3; Dodds, The Greeks and the 
Irrational p.237 - 8 and 252 - 3. 
6. There still was a certain measure of political freedom 
under both these empires, particularly in the privilages 
of self-government, (:lrmnunitas and freedom by Foedus) 
to the cities of the East, especially in Asia Minor. 
<The extent and degree of freedom is examined by A. M. H. 
Jones, The Greek City, esp. pp.l32 ff, and 171 ff. But 
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the replacement of democracy by autocracy, no matter 
hot-~ dist_ant or hO\·r indulgent destroyed freedom as· an 
ideal. 
?. Its growth is well traced by Pohlenz, Freedom pp 45 - 101. 
_ B. Much was made by the Stoics of the paradoxical states of 
freedom and slavery. Political and social freedom was 
often seen to exclude personal freedom, whilst a slave 
is yet free to attain inner freedom. This gave rise to 
the famous Stoic paradox, 11 0nly the \"tise man is free, 
and every fook is a slave" (See the Stoic Paradoxa. in 
Plutarch and Cicero). This paradox frequently finds 
expression in Epictetus, e.g. II 1, 22: socially, only 
a free man can b'e educated, but in fact, only the 
educated·are free. Cf. IV 1, 8. 
9. Horace, Odes III 29, 54 - 5. The ode well illustrates 
Horace's Stoic leanings, in its attention to inner 
virtue, which can be maintained irrespective of outer 
circumstances. 'Virtue' here is very close in meaning 
- -~ r ' . to the oC 1 ows of Epictetus, or even to prohairesi.s. 
. ( 
2.5 
lOe Isaiah :Serlin, Two concepts of _Liberty p.. 139. Th.e 
examination of the different aspects of freedom by 
Berlip pertains closely two the present study, and 
his work will be referred to in my conclusion. 
11. Pohlenz, Freedom p. 152. 
12. Again Euripides provides the best examples, in Medea, 
especially 1075 - 80 (see note 2 above), and 
Hippolytus 375 - 88, in Phaedra•s struggle between 
knowledee and passion. Hecuba sees man's freedom 
impeded by desire of wealth etc. causing him to act 
\ ' , 
against his rational nature, 1"'"7 K"'TQ( yvwf''JV _(Hecuba 
867). These verses are perhaps the earliest formulation 
of the Stoic paradox, "Only the wise man is free" (See 
Note 8 above). 
13. Gustave Flaubert, Correspondence troisi~me se'rie 
1854 - 69. Paris 1910. The quotation is made by the 
scholar and theologian Miguel di Unam~o in his 9hapter 
on thb Rationalist Dissolution in "The Tragic Sense of 
Life". The earlier chapters of ~his book, even 
disentangled from the persuasive rhetoric, offer some 
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of the most convincing arguments known to me for tbe 
limitations of a rationalist philosophy, and first 
leaL.' me to examine and appreciate "the significan-t 
part. played by the irrational in G.reek Philosophy. 
Or, that this fancy false we vainly hold 
For nought, who deem there is a race of gods, 
While chance controlleth all things among men? 
(Trans. "'flay. ) 
Life is not subject to the good ordering of the gods, 
I 
nor to the dictates of reason, but to TU)\ ?'[ 
(chance). ~)Xides is led{,~ . to consider the force 
of the irrational in man's life, notably in the 
Bacchae, seeing reason as insufficient to grasp the 
full truth about the forces that govern life. (see 
Dodds, Bacchae, Introd. xliv, and Greeks and the 
Irrational p. 185- 9.) 
15. See note 13 above. 
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16. So Celsus (Schenkl,, Testimonia no:. -mt ) On the 
cr'edulity of Celeius' statement- see 'Oldfather I --
Intro. ix, note l. In the Discourses Epicte-tus r3ays 
little about his own life. Ancient sources therefore 
consist_· of \'\ scattered testimOnia, now compiled,.:i,n 
Schenkl •.a edition 1 iii-xv, includin~ an inscription 
from _Pisidia (see note 27 below) and a notice in 
Suidas (De Vogel III, 1231 a). A good modern suiill!lary 
of his life appears in Souilhe's edition, Intro. 
P• i-ix. 
17. De Vogel III, 1227 a - c. 
18. De Vogel III, 1229. 
19. Hjmans, Askesis pp. 5 - 6, notes an important 
difference in the training programme of the two 
philosophers: Musonius recognises a double tra~ning 1 
of body and soul (De Vogel III, 1228), whereas 
Epictetus nowhere concedes this dualism. From the 
evidence of the one fragment it is probably incorrect 
to regard a dualism at the basis of Musonius' teaching 
programme. 
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_ 20., This view is put by Po}Jlenz, Die-Stoa p.303. But 
see also Hjmazis p.6 and footnote 6. 
21. Tacitus Historia III, 81. 
22. Epictetus, III 23, 29; I 9, 27 - 31. 
23~ De Vogel III, 1226 b, note. 
24. I 17, 19 - 21; III l. 37. 
25. III 20, 3; IV 4, 13. 
26. III 23, 30. 
27. An early inscription from Pisidia (Schenkl, Testimonia 
No. ,~XU; edited by J. R. s. Sterrett in Pa~ers of 
American School of Classical Studies at Athens 
1884 - 5, 3, P• 315 ff; discussion in Hermes xxiii 
(1888) P• 542.) suggests that this aspect of· his 
character w~s quickly recognised in his own lifetime: 
He shotred a 'divine nature' ( 9e.1 o S ) • 
..... ,-._' 
· .. : 
. -.,. Z9· '',.· ·. •. 
. .... 
' ,. 
_,..· '. 
~9. e.g. I 4, 5 - 12. 
30. II 9, 20. 
31. IV 8, 5. 
32. For a full discussion see Hartmann, Arrian und Epiktet. 
33. Vol. 2. P• 479. 
34. See Oldfather, Intro. xiii - xiv, and Souilhe, Intro. 
xxx - xxxvi. 
35. Askesis,_ pp 47 - B. 
.. . 
36. The principal studies are the works of Bonhoeffer, . 
Th• Colardeau and Hjmans {See bibliography). In the 
:··· 
··' 
; , 
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past, much attention was given to the parallels 
between Epictetus and St. Paul, especially in 
England, and these studies are not useful for a 
general survey of Epictetus' psychology. Bonhoffer's 
conclusions in 'Epiktet und das Neue Testament', that 
there was no direct influence between St. Paul and 
Epictetus, are now generally accepted, and more 
attention has since been given to the moral and 
psycological basis of his work, notably by Jeanne de 
Hir, Fondemento Psychologigues et Religieux de la 
, . ' Morale d 1Ep1ctete. 
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CHAPTER Tt'IO 
·ARISTOTLE 
1. Purpose and Scope of this Chapter. 
The orientation of Epictetus' teaching is towards a 
philosophy of freedom of the individual. Man's end is. 
~I 
EUfOlot, a serenity undisturbed by anything exterior to 
himself, and by virtue of his moral adjustment, free from 
any conflect within• Perfect freedom, if it can be attained, 
. ')/ 
will achieve thi.s state of eu p 0 ~~ • The source of freedom 
lies therefore in the individual and nowhere else, in his 
freedom to choose. Goodness and good action result from 
the correct use of this freedom; and man's function of making 
moral choice, or moral decision, is given the term by 
Epictetus, 'prohairesis'. The prohairesis is the only 
completely free aspect of the individual; thus good and bad 
have no significance outside the realm of prohairesis. 
A thorough investigation of prohairesis.i.s therefore necessary. 
for any interpretation of Epictetus' doctrine of freedom. 
This preliminary chapter stems from the importance 
played by prohairesis in Aristotle's accou,nt of the psychology 
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of right action. Th~re will be opportunity at the end of this 
chapter to see how far there is common meaning in the use of 
this term by Aristotle and Epictetus. The fact that the same 
term occurs in both philosophers in accounting for moral 
conduct, and is not employed significantly to this purpose 
. 1 
by the Stoic school earlier than Epictetus, is suffi~ient 
justification for this chapter; and it is hoped, as I remarked 
in the introduction, that the close account given by Aristotle 
of the psychological basis of moral action will at any rate 
illum1nate the less formally presented ethico-psychology 
behind Epictetus' doctrine of freedom. 
In this chapter then I shall first consider Aristotle's 
remarks on deliberation and choice in Book III of the 
Nicomachean Ethics. From this l'lill develop the problem of 
0 
how far reason and how far desire contribute to choice. This 
problem is basic to any study of ethics particularly when 
applied to questions of responsibility and social ethics: 
whether an action is wholly accountable in terms of reason, 
o~whether the irrational in the form of impulse and desire 
plays a part; if so, how far can the irrational part be called 
voluntary, and if an action is found to be involuntary, how · 
far can the individual be held responsible for that act: to 
what extent is he acting freely? 
. ~ ... 
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A significant contribution to this p~oblem is made by 
Aristotle both :in his treatment of prohairesis in Bo_ok III, 
and in his consideration of prohairesis in relation to 
c_fpo-~-'1-crts in Book VI. 
"· 
A consideration on the position of the man of ill-
restraint in Book VII not only affords a further c.omment on 
prohairesis in demonstrating its essential moral quality, ' 
but also entails the whole question of man's control over his 
desires and passions. This question on how the free man 
should master passions is prominent in Epictetus, and the 
analysis Arist~tle gives will be useful in forming an 
interpretation. 
The coordination of reason and desire, manifest in 
Aristotle, is considered also \'lith reference to Plato. 
Professor E. R. Dodds2 sees in the philosophy of Plato a 
reaction to the fifth century rationalism of the Sophists, 
and notes that a recognition of the irrational takes 
increasing prominence in his philosophy. A comparison can 
be drawn between this ahd a similar reaction to the stern 
Stoic rationalism inaugurated by Posidonius,3 and developed 
by Seneca and Epictetus. 
My principal purpose in this chapter is to show how 
34 
points of difficulty in Epictetus' doctrine ~e covered in 
Plato and Aristotle, not with the same intent, but with far 
i: 
greater analysis and comprehE"nsiveness of thought. Epictetus' 
teaching on seeking a life of freedom does require an 
e~ation of the problems of right thought and action, 
and therefore I have chosen the most lucid and careful 
exponents of a full and unrestricted ethical theory in 
Epiotetus' philosophical ancestry, to act as a standard for 
the interpretation of Epictetus himself. Beside them he is 
meagre in his own output and mean in stature, neither has 
he enjoyed an equal weight of later criticism. For this 
reason there may be some value in a fuller examination bere. 
2. Prohairesis in Book III of iihEdf:i,.cQrnao)le&n:; Ethics. 
'· ... ';'' . ·, . ' ' . 
Books I- III of the Ethics arei.ritrod'l,lctory to the 
principal material of.the work, beginning at 1115 a 4, which 
is an examination of the moral and intellectual virtues. 
In Bk. I the conclusion is reached that happiness, the supreme 
end of human life, is an activity of the soul in accordance 
with virtue4• This justifies an examination of virtue, which 
in book II'is seen to be concerned with states of characte~ 
dt The kind of E s I <;- which constitutes virtue is given in 1107 a 1 
as !!a state of character concerned l'llith choice l.ying in a 
mean, that is the moan rel.ative to us, this being determined 
6U by a rational. principl~ Books IV - V are concerned with the 
states of character, and book VI with the.rational. deter-
mination of the mean, in the theory of tP~V"'].ffiS. It is the 
purpose of book III to examine the nature of activity which 
constitutes virtue. Al.ready it has been said in book·II 
that states of character correspond to certain kinds of 
activity7• Virtue is the resul.t of action since there is 
not a previous potential.ity8• 
Littl.e .need be said on the section of book III, 
1.1.09 b 30 to l.l.l.l. b 4 in which vol.tintary and invol.untary 
actions are anal.ysed. The most important concl.usion is the 
expl.anation of a vol.untary action. First, in discussing 
'mixed' actions, (those combining vol.untary and involuntary 
el.ements), these are vol.untary in so far as the moving 
principl.e, ( ) instrumental. to the action 
l.ies in the agent, and when the origin of an action is in 
onesel.f, ( ), it is in one's own 
power to. do it or not9• Second, a vol.untary action is further 
defined at a 23, as requiring ful.l. knowl.edge about the action 
on the part of the agent: A voluntary action therefore is 
an action whose origin lies in the agent who knows the 
particul.ar circumstances in which he is acting. An important 
- ,. . •'. ·.~ .. 
.... -· ,. 
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note is added, to this .definition, that .it is wrong to speak 
of actions 'prompted by desiie or pas-sions as involuntary; in 
most ca,~es these are a branch of voluntary-actions. 
The main concern of book III with reference to Epictetus 
is the dis,cussion on prohairesis, or in its fuller context,. 
~h~ treatment of wish ( ,So ~A'J D"JS ) , deliberation ( ,So~ASOD'IS) 
and choice·(prohaireeis) ae precedents to action. Virtue was 
' - . . . ' -
. "' defined a·s a state of character 'concerned w;i.th choice, ( t SIS 
npoe~upsTi~~), 1(>_~d a definition of TFpot4•peTO<~ and 
its noun_;erohairesis has now to be established,. Th~s 
I , -
definition is reached through the foilowing stages:, 
1. Choice and voluntary act~on, 1111 b 7: Choi.ce falls 
into the category of voluntary acts, but not all volunt~y_ 
acts are c4osen. Two examples are given of acts which are 
voluntary, ~ut not from choice: acts of children, and sudden 
\ :. ' J. 
actions ( Tt:A (; ~ o< I "f' V "7 ~ ) , i.. e~ done on the spur of the 
.. t'll ~omen .. • · _ 
2 .•.. ~lhat choi.ce is not, llll b 11 - lll2 a .16: Choice 
-· 
.. 
be neither desire, . < c.n ' eufl ; ~ >, passion .. . ~ is, shown-to 
c BLIJJ-_6s >, nor wish ( {$~ ~A-rytrtS); i..e. it is not purely 
,, 
( Of6SIS ) ; neither is it opinion, ( 6 0! CC ) • appetition, 
Three points might be noted here for reference later on: first; 
prohait'esis - choice - :ls q.uite a distinct notion from t1ish. 
•. 
·.,.·· .. · 
.C:·-~ . 
'. 
Second., Arietot~e carefu~~Y usee Ouf' .o ~· as the term that 
may \le c~·nfueed with probtid.resis, ··rather than p-assion ( n:C.9os ). 
-~tJ,... ~~- is ~ways regarded as approaching nearer to the 
rational self: than the 'Tt'd..8'7 12 or emotions. Third, choice 
cannot be a j~dgement because judgements. deal \'lith the true 
! .• 
and f~se, but prohairesis with the ··go6d and ·bad. A similar 
distinction will be found in Epiotetus. 
. . . 
3. Preliminary def:i.n~.ti~n of' o!t:oioe, -1112 a. 14: 'Choice 
may be def'iried as a voluntary action preceded by deliberation•. 
This clearly relates it to reasonina (Logos) and intelligence 
( OI~VOI~ . .y. 
4. Deliberation, 1112 a 18 - 1113 a 14: · A definition 
I. 
still has to be reached on de·liberat.;Lon. Two main points are 
made. First, that we deliberate about things in our pol>rer and 
which_ are possible to be don~3 Second, we deliberate about 
means not .ends.14 Deliberation is therefore here distinguished 
from a. wish, ( ~ o uA "] crts ), which is concerned with the 
end and can have impossibilities as to its object. Deliberation 
. " ll J..., ~.. 15 i.e about ·things in our control, ( To(. £ 'f' /'#-'IV ) and is 
concerned with events that follow in accordance \11th certain 
4 
. 16 
rules and happen in a known \'lay for the most part ; by a 
process of analysis it works out a sequence of actions for 
obtaining an end: A is a means for obtaining end'Y; B is a 
'· 
't'•·. 
. ~ . -' 
means of obtaining A, etc. 
5. Firtill. definition of Choice, 1113 a 12 - 1113 a 14:17 
Choice is concerned with deliberation. Both have the same 
thingas their object: a thing chosen is something that is 
selected as a result of our deliberation18• Choice is a 
. ~ 
in our power, ( pouAeu..,..II<'Y] deliberate .desire of things Df!t~ I~ T~v ~4>~). we deliberate.and select, then fix 
our choice according to the result of our de.liberation.1 9 
~
From ~his definition it is important to note two poin~s: 
first, that in Aristotle, prohairesis involves a rational and 
irrational element. It is ±rrational in so far as it provides 
, or impulse, to act on what is yet inert thought. l 
-----------~-~· ---·"'--·''""'---~I 
What kind of 0 f £ ~ IS it is, is not stated, and, as Joachim 
points out, it could take any form, but not the form of 
,/ \ 20 ~OUI\']d'IS• The prohairesis is rational in so far as it 
is fouAeuTIK~, that is, followtng the lead of rational 
deliberation. Second, in so far as prohairesis is already 
determtned by deliberation, little room is left for any real 
choosing, but rather to give assent or not to what is already 
rationally determined. This latter point is important in 
considering Epictetus' use of the term. Prohairesis is 
merely the trigger, t.he gun is already aimed and loaded, 
though.the strength of the gun-powder poses an interesting 
!. •· .• .. : 
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. 21 ;problem, but in the realm of akrasia • 
6, _!l,~eh; cpouA")Crl$), 1113 a 15 - 1113 b 2: Aristotle con-
tinues with a passage on pouA'7~'s, repeating that wish is 
concerned ·witJ:l ends. Joachim remarks that it is a species·· of 
22 
reserved for ends, and adds an important 
observation that the end is not on~y desirable, but also 
revealed ~to our intelligence: V~'-lD-'s and p~UA'Jtl'l$ are combined 
in our g1;-asp·of the end. Therefore it may be asked how is 
• D-; 
. ·. . . ;: : 
~ deliberation disconnC3cted from the vtJ'?trl S which suggests 
the end, Since the first step in deliberation must be an 
appreciation of the end. This helps close the gap between 
proh~iresis and ~ t>~'A "1 t11 s , and further strengthens the desire 
plus reason·aspect. 
The problem is stated again by Ando,23 that "deliberation 
may be t'he efficient cause of desire as well (as the material), 2~< 
and the .d'Efsire which presupposes such deliberation :was called 
not a prohad.resis but a ~oOA"Jf1"15. This wish, being a 
~ 11 I' 
calculated desire, was more highly estimated than €nlvV~I~ or 
9vp. 6r, • 11 In a previous chapter of Ando 1 s work, 25 the function 
of wishing ~as examined in detail, and this distinction between 
the two meanings of deliberation was made: 
110n the one hand deliberation, or reasoning is an 
estimation about the end; on the other, the search for 
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·the means to realise a desire. Wi_sh presupposes 
del±beration in the former7sense, but deliberation 
in.the latter sense presupposes wish, and through 
the: co-operation of this deJ,.iberation and thewish, 
results the will (prohairesia),, which,~e cal~ed 
deliberated desire.o Will and wish are ratiollt;\1 in 
different senses and both co-exist ·wi.thout contra-
.' .. 
. 26 diction". 
7. The-bearing of prohairesis on goodness and vice, 
1111 b 3- 1115 a·2: Aristotle now proceeds to apply his 
defiinit:ipn of choice to his main subject, virtue, and the 
re;~~t ai~ord~ an. interesting comparison with Epiotetue. 
Activities in which vi~tues are exercised deal only with means 17 
to an end; actions dealing with m~ans are done by choice, 
( .J('!(:r~ TtfO,d.~fE.t1'1V ) 1 therefore virtue and vice are the 
resu~t of pronair~sis, for prohairesis is trhere we are free 
to ~ct, ( ef-!»v "TO 1Cp,fT161V) a~d have responsibility, a·ince 
27 ita objects are within our power to say 'yes• or 'no' to. 
~ I 
Thus ·an· action do~e . EIC Trf!0.1Mp_E.cretJ.S is an action for which 
the agent is responsible in that he is exhibiting moral 
vi.rtue or vice. Because of this, prohairceeis is the essential 
function.· c;':f· a man, and that which displays character; thus it 
ie h:is most essential self, again a dominant notion in Epictetus • 
. • 
.. 
-·. 
• !...."- -· _._ .... 
',, 
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.This has already been shown in the act of prohairesis:28 
for to make 'the· thing del.iberated·into choice, the agen't· 
'- .-. e ) . , 
< -, c<p X"'? ) into himsel.f brings th~ moving principle 
~ .. ; ( Qrs 6~UTOV ) and to the 
. \ 
rul.ing part of himself {~IS -ro 
c I 
.,)' 0 LJ f-' SVOV) • 
Aristotle adds an interesting concluding note to this 
section29 which again has bearing on Epictetus' teachin~-. 
that our disposi~ions {E.'~ 6 I~ ) and actions are not voluntary 
in the same way: we can control action from beginning to end; 
et.f! but with €JE15 we control. the beginnings but they are added 
to imperceptibl.y. Yet in so far as we are free to use them in I 'I 
a partic.ular Ttray or not, they are yoluntary. This is to say " 
that virtue lies in 
~·-e . , 
.E.)€15 npooetpET'II(D(/_ .rather than in 
single virtuous acts. The ~'§E'~ • which amount to our own 
character, are such that they tend to prompt a choice; this 
~ , . 
,. 
added qualification causes prohairesis for Aristotle to 
approximate more closely t.o. a state of being free to choose 
good or evil., and this is its meaning in Epictetus. 
3. Desire and reason in Prohairesis. (N.E. Book VI.) 
} '2 
From the above account_, it may be concluded that proha:iresis 
1 
is for things in our potter, and as such, is responsibl.e for 
--" ...• -!· ' .• -
gO'o.dness and Wickedness, and also that · in pr~hairesia there is 
a combination·of reason and impulse or desire. In this section 
o't~er passages from boo:k VI o(-_the Ethics_,. wbich_ de~ls with the 
intellectual virtues, will be considered in ~h~ iigh~ of the 
account of proh.airesis given iii book iii. 
""' Whilst much of book VI is an analytical accoUJlt of .the 
intellectual virtues, which ·~do not concern the· presE)n_t study, 
. t 
> n' the ,purpose -of the ·Qook is to give ·mean_ing to ~4e phJ;'ase Ofr:T"S 
X 6yos, -which is the determin~g fact·or of the mean which 
' 
wi.des 0\1%' cond~ct in moral v:i.rtue. 30 · The (3e•.s 1fpo~tpe;r1Kcil which 
constitute virtue consist in the observing of a mean, that is, 
discr.:i.p).i~ation ·about passion and conduct, determined by a 
- l I . . , AJI 
,principle, ( " 0 Y'J' ). I~ow this logos becomes DfHJOS if it is. 
· •e»\~ I ···el 
as a prudent :;man would determine, (ws "'~~" " fptwti'DS op1trtltdv ). 
. I Thus the cM.ef ai.m·of book V!_is to single ou,t -tpov'J']triS from 
the other intellectual virtues. 
The in-tellectual virtues are the virtues of the rational 
soul:, ~d the rational -soul has two funct;t..ons: it is the 8 
of contempl_ating, (i) invariables; this i.s the l!~t~"'$ 
,fJtt~lect,( 1:; __ ~'it, cf 1'"7 ,u o "', • "~"" ) !)J. ~4 {4-i) ~blea, this ie' the ~®l~ting. j,nteU~ct, (To ;.. oAy;' :r:r'1:'1 1<. d'v-).31 · 
Three elements in the soul control action and attainment 
' 
of truth:J~a;:-~its (sensation),VoLJS (intellect), and ~1f&(tS 
(impulse ·ox:. de~ire). Affirmation and negation, (HCI("f'rlc/>ct.~IS and 
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···' -, 
:> I J.. ,.. 
D(1t o'fctlfiS) are to vou S 
, .I. I 
what pursuit and avoidance (bu~JIS ~ 't' "Y1J ) 
,, . o6 32 
are to d p a. ~ I c; • t;{{ c:f~tfiS plays no direct part in moral 
action. Hence, from the conclusions already reached in Book 
III that moral virtue is a state of character concerned with 
cho;Lce, and that choice is deli'berate desire, it follO\ITS that, 
if the choice is to be good, the reasoning must be true and 
the desire right, ( 6pe~ ). The good and bad state of 
' 
, ' I 
speculative thought (TO ~ n r t'J' r '/ Jt tJ v It< tJ V) is truth and 
falsehood, but the good of the pract~cal intellect, which is 
I \ · I 
the tPF>t>V"J~lS of the "oy•trTII<Dv is the atta:U:iment of tru~h 
corresponding to right desire.33 j 
Next follows a definition of prohairesis, and the context 
is important: in book III pl,'ohairesis was defined with respect 
to the voluntary and possibilities, hence its closeness to 
Here in book VI it is defined directly in relation 
, 
to thought and action. Thought alone cannot be a K•V'7D"Ij of 
, e' 
action, for an action iJI1plies a good or an end ( £." "'P ct.) I g~. ) ' 
c ~ I 
and this is the aim of desire. Prohairesis is the cause (, ~PX~) 
of action, and the cause of prohairesis is desire and reasoning 
'' ' ' c:- tf!j~ · 'I 34 L directed to some end, (-ope.~IS I<P(I Aoy.os Q_e~~fl( ~IV~S >-~- ~(i0f• 
Therefore prohairesis involves thought and a·disposition 
:I() c'e 3.5 
of character, ( ~ IK?J E~IS ). Thus prohairesis may be 
, ' ... 
either desire bearing on thought, ( opt:l<TII<OS vous ), or 
. ~ . . 
- I 
""' ~ (" thought bearing on desire ( opa 1•s otrlVO"]TIK? ); and man as 
) " Cl(. PX- "7 (oause of moral action) is a combination of desire 
and intellect, that is, proba~esis.36 
Greenwood remarks37 that the view of prohairesis as 
&pb§s Aoyos and op 9~ O'ps ~IS was a major advance in ethical 
psychology on Aristotle's part, other philosophers having held 
that prohairesis could be explained totally by logos or by 
~I /l .,4; I ;H ,g op<£.~ 1; • The struggle of 1 pov"']triS against cpG~t~. was 
a common theme in Fifth Century tragedy. A striking example 
is the contrast between the attitudes of Crysothemis and Electra 
, 
in Sophocles' 'Electra', the one following and advising 'pov?~S. 
the other carried along through natural filial impulses.38 
I now ~urn briefly to the question what makes choice good 
choice, since \~Te have seen as a characteristic of prohairesis.:,. 
that it is responsible for goodness and vice. Goodness and 
badness of an action must depend on the goodness and badness 
of both reasoning and desire. Therefore the kind of reasoning 
, . 
that has to do \'tith action, tf>pov'}d'.l$ or f3C:uAWtTIS., can never 
be called good in itself, whereas other kinds of reasoning 
can be good in themselves if they attain the truth, The former 
kind of reasoning can·only be good when harmonised with good 
desire. The two functions in combination: l<!!l.~ftltr1J1 the 
attraction of reason, must correspond to, i.e. have the same 
. 45 
object as, 0 { w ~-15 (attraction of desire). 39 But before there 
is taood proho.iresis, two further conditions must be fulfilled: 
. -· --. . 
. 40 
the logos must be true, and the desire correct. .The correct-
. I 
ness of reas·oning occasions Aristotle •s account of· fpov.,.., errs 
though even there, as \·lill be seen later in discussing the 
practical syllogism,· this canno.t be done, because of its very 
nature, without reference to the desir~g elem~nt. For the 
moment considera-tion wi+l be given to the correctness of· 
desire and in part.i.c~lar t:hE! relation·of correctness ot desire 
to correctness of reas.on. This discussion occurs at 1144 a 20; 
Greenwood comments on these lines: 
~ 
"Real goodness or bE;idness of logos and "pe. ~IS is 
determined in part by the character of the end to which 
they lead; and as the character of the end is determined 
by the character in itself of one of the means combined 
with.the character in itself. of·the other means, it follows 
that the character of the loees in itself determines the 
~~ " real character of the o p s.;:i 'S , and the character of the 
)I Dp£.~15 in itself determines the real character of the 
logos "• 41 
This demonstrates that whilst for the purpose of analysis 
prohairesis or f p &v"J~IS 'til can be divided up into op€~1~ and 
. ,; '· 
46 
lQG~s, in pract~ce they are inseparable. Aristotle helps 
to clarify the position' by splitting the elements iirid exan1itliri.g 
. ~ 
their f'\lllctions when no longer org~ically fused:·· ·· When 
, ~ ~ ~pov't7c7"1S is dissolved of its virtue eleme~t, (i.e. o~~ ~IS ) 
I 
it becomes· S£tvo1'"1S (cleverness). Similarly when virtue is 
I 
deprived of its f'pov't"Jtf'S element, (i.e. the logical), it 
\ ~ " becomes natural virtue, ( cf>u<rtK""J o<pe:r~ ). That is, 
moral virtue and practical.knowledge are what they ~e because 
they are two things co-operating. Natural goodness is the 
kind of ''goodness 1 displayed by animals, doing the. right 
things by instinct, but since they do not do them by choice 
or will, (prohairesis), they are not. good in the true sense. 43 
Cleverness is a ration~lly thought out cout'se of action just 
I . 
as j3ouA6.UC1'lS is. It is means directed towards an end, 
but cut off from any idea of willing or choosing this course 
of action for a particular good; cleverness is the mere 
capacity for doing things to the aim proposed, (as a computer 
could work out and follovwa means to a proposed end); the a:i.m 
may be good or bad. But with the fusion of moral virtue and 
cJ>p ~V'7 cr IS·, will or determined choice, (prohairesis) makes 
it·a appearance, and the resulting.action can be said to be 
good in the true sense. 44 
This definition of cleverness is pursued by Miss Anscombe 
47 
•45 in her essay, Thought and Action in Aristotle as a means 
to a possible solution· of an ambiguity she discerns in 
Aristotle's use of the term progairesis. She states the 
inconsistency as follows: Prohairesis is what is determined 
by deliberation, (Book III); the man of ill-restraint does 
not choose, ( 71' pcoe.• pob~Jo&VOI ) the actions into which his 
ill-restrained character leads him; the man of ill-restraint, 
though acting against his convictions, does on occasions 
. .· 46 
determine what to do by deliberation. 
Anscombe's resolution of the inconsistency displayed in 
these theses, is to say that choice ~a of something determined 
not by any sort of deliberation. In other words choice and 
deliberation are not inseparable: there can be deliberation 
that is not adopted by choice. For as well as deliberation 
in forming a choice, there is deliberation in executing a 
choice; this is cleverness, and also (which the essay fails 
to notice), deliberation in falling from the pr~hairesis to 
the position of akrasia. 47 
This solution for the most part corresponds with the 
account of &etv6T'1S given above. But Miss Anscombe finds this 
solution imprecise and not entirely satisfactory. Whilst 
much of the essay is a criticism rather than an interpretation 
of Aristotle •s position, it is wo.rth noting that the main 
-· ••• J' 
:,. 
'·· 
difficulty is that Aristotle seems to place choice arbitrarily 
in the chain of deliberation stretching from deliberation of 
) 
'l;'hrougbout this eection there has been so.ce .difficulty, 
(and Mise .Anscombe 1s essay bears this out) in'seeing prohairesis 
as the kind of activating principle :lt was seen to be in 
book III. It is not' easy from the discussion in book VI, to 
put one's finger on a point in the line .of thought and action. 
where· ;erohairesis or choice occurs. It rather seems to ·b~ a 
necessary concomitant of 4' p6v?]trl5 and virtue. Our prohai.resis 
is our own character, for through it we are free, or self-
determined. But it is unclear where th~ start of this self-
' 
deter~inism lies. ·. . 49 The problem is examined by Joachim.- : 
He uses as a basis for his discussion the distinction 
between non-rational and rational capacities given.in the 
50 t: \ - ,. ~ I 
t-letaphlsics. Man •a character is at first e>IJV«.~A-StS .,.t-JV 6Vr;l.V'1114>11 
(i~e.· he has rationa.l capacities). These are capabilities for 
realising opposites; and in ord.er to decide which of the 
opposi tea is to be realised, Yp e f 1 S or prohairesis is 
necessary.5l This purposing factor therefore, according to 
,,.· 
49 
Joachim's first interpretation is the •all important factor 
determining the issue•. The prohairesis is not mere 
capricious will, but the 'expression of man's nature, the 
nat~e, that is, of a reasoning and deliberating as well as 
desiring being 1 • Thus oan is self-determli.ned from an 
established character.52 
It is not within the scope of this chapter to discuss 
at length the practical syllogism,53_but attention needs 
to be drawn to the practical syllogism in so far as it is 
precisely in this mode of reasoning that bpe~l~ appears 
to intrude into logos. cf>pov'111'1S is defined as a truth 
attaining rational quality concerned ~dth action in relation 
to things that are good for human beings.54 It expresses 
itseLf in practical syllogisms whose conclusions are 
prohaire~, (purposes) wHich immediately become actions. 
But cppov'Y/t1'1t; is not only a rational quality.55 Nor 
conversly are animals capable of it since it r~quires the 
power to form universal concepts.56 
The practical syllogism cannot strictly fall iJJ.to the 
class of logical syllogisms, since individualising particulars 
and individual values are involved both in the minor premise 
and conclusion. The mode seems to be: 
50 
Major premise: a general concepti9n. A thing X is 
good and should be done by such and 
such a man. 
Minor premise: Particular. I am such a man and 
this particul.ar is sw:h and s~h a 
thing. 
Conclusion: I should do X here and now.57 
The individualising of the log9s in the minor premise, 
converting it from the abstract rule to the singular object 
sho~s the intrusion of ope~·s ' since impulse is directed to 
particulars rather than to a type of object,5~ for the 
particular of the minor premise can only be apprehended by 
£~a- 8"1 ti"IS • 59 
~ ~ . Greenwood urges thatop£~1S is present already 1n the 
formulation. of the major premis,e, and brings the fusion of 
logos into this major premise formulated by 
It is sufficient for the present purpose, 
. :If however, to conclude that the combination of o~~'S and logos 
can be traced to the function of fP;V?~'5 through the practical 
syllogism. 
Here I may add a note on Aristotle's concept of 
and phantasia61 (image~), especially as.the s~e terms are 
. 
~~ ? 
fundamental to understanding the Stoic theory of knowl_edge 
- ~. • r . . · 
51 
which was adopted in principle by Epictetue. Generally in 
Aristotle, ttJC• v6t4-evov is a middle term between the receiving 
of a sense impression· and intellection, in the form kno\·Tledge 
62 
of thinking, sometimes described as inert sensation. The 
are accompanied by ple·asure and pain],: and 
thereby arise desire. 
Now it is the ~pe~IS that accompanies the phantasia that 
in the first instance is responsible for conduct, thus making 
desire more necessary than intellect. The obje.ct o.:t' desire, 
(the phantaeiai) will be either the good or the apparent good. 
, I 
But through the functioning of +POV<f161$ only the true good 
I 
will be accepted and. posited as an end or f3o1JA17 trl S. When 
,I, I ~~ .j}_ 
the .,.pov"']C1'1S fails to function, the "P6:s-IS will. 
manifest itself in the form of passion or appetite. 63 In 
'' I oth·er words through moral virtue as e.1EIS 7r P Oil(' ptaTif<~l we 
are responsible for what use we make of the p~antasiai. 
is the'argument with which Aristotle counters Socrates• 
paradox, no one is willingly wicked, in book III. 64 
4. Akrasia. (N.E. Book VII). 
This 
In this section will be considered the account of akrasia, 
(ill-restraint), which begins book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. 
52 
In view of a possible interpretation of Epictetus• position 
. concerning the n k 8'7 (passions), attention should be drawn 
to three facets of Aristotle's account: 1. The consideration 
of akrasia as a temptation, through the irrational parts, to 
vice. 2. The part played by prohairesis in the man of ill-
. :I ' 
restraint, (the oCI<poC'1'"1~ ). 3. The involvement both of 
irrational and rational elements in the position of the 
·~I< pCP( T,f c; : again the inter-action of emotion or desire, 
and reason. These three concerns are so closely inter-related, 
that rather than discuss each separately, it would seem best 
to follow through Aristotle's account to appreciate what 
contri~utions are made to each. 
Moral virtue is concerned with feelings and actions, 
/ ( nep) ·1'1~'7 ~. npl<f6./<)_), 65 and this is combined with a rational 
estimate of the mean as regards passions. That is, it is 
right ( S ~~ ) to feel anger or fear for some things and 
to desire solp.e things up to a certain limit. 66 Thus voluntary 
actions must. include actions done in giving way to passions, 
for the irrational passions L T'~ @A.oy« rr:CB~ ) are no less I 
part of man ~han reason is. In this passage the position of 
akrasia is fore-shadowed when Aristotle asks what difference 
there is, as regards their voluntary nature, between wrong 
acts committed deliberately and wrong acts done in anger, 
~ ; . '
53 
( _T~ \ \ .~u " 8 ' e /}_" r.~' 67 
..., J<(I(:T__i!< __ l\fJY-Ul: .. J-l----!t] _ IJj-A--0 V fl(.ft-4-(Lr_~ .. 6.V.. _rA..J • 
These two types of wrong-doing, though both voluntary 
actions, are distinguished further in Book V. If a man does 
• , ' 68 
an injury from choic.e or set purpose ( £1< Tr p o ~ • ps.cre ""S ) , 
he is guilty of injustice,,~ The man who acts from a fit of 
passion or anger is guilty of a lesser kind of injustice. It 
is worth noting that Aristotle does not state that actions 
done from passion ( ~~ 6. K.. 8 u f-l- ·;-&J ) , are done without prohairesis, 
:> l> I but merely ov~e 61< npovoi(I(.S , not from fore-thought. 
Such passages as this look forward to the full account 
of akrasia in book VII, where the man of ill-restraint is 
defined. > I He is one who gives way ( E.K,.7'li(TIKOS ) on account 
~~> c' \ I 
of passion contrary to the o p vo~ "a yo~ , but his passions do 
not over-master him to the extent that he believes it right to 
pursue pleasures in a reckless manner. 69 Thus the man of.ill-
restraint stands mid-way between the virtuous man who stands 
firm by his choice, and the truly wicked man ( c§ ;_1<. ~A~O" ros), 
who deliberately makes a vicious choice. "t , In the tJt K pot'T'., ~ the 
.:t ~ 
o( p X "1 is still preserved, and the ~ , t:<p X"] presumeably is 
the principle governing his choice.7° Thus there are two 
degrees of wrong-doing, :C 1< o,\-tcr•~ and akrasia, the forme~ 
being due from the beginning to wrong appetition 1 ( 0
1p ll (I .S ) 1 
the latter due to the mastery over a good will by desire. 
•1 ~: • 
···&- ·• •· 
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~ , 
The first part of Aristotle's explanation of the ~Kp~T~~ 
. - .. - - , , . 
position concerns the question of whether the ~Kp~r~s fails 
knowingly, and if so, in what sense of knowing. Aristotle 
significantly abandons the view that the virtuous man acts 
::t , 
with knowledge but the «Kp<JC.'T']fA witl;l mere opinion. It is 
rather the degree of conviction that matters, and there can 
be as much lack of conviction over knowledge as there can 
'71 over opinion., 
Aristotle therefore analyses knowledge, dividing it int.o, 
-1. the ~ j r s of knowledge; 2. the (}EJ,Jp;,_ of }Qlowl~Q'ge. 
Cl 
The E~IS is a state of having knowledge; it is a potential 
rather than an actual. This kind of knowledge, which tends to 
be general and latent, the :C.~tp..cr~ s has. The 9e.w pro( is the 
consciousness of knowing in its application, the actuality of 
knowing. Henc·e it is knowing involving particulars and the 
self, me here and now. fails in this. Thus 
he knows the right principle,. but is not actually realising 
Cl~ its meaning. Now he can act against an £~•s, a general 
knowledge which remains abstract, though he could not-act 
against a ·realisation of the pr~ciple in its particular 
aspect.?2 
Aristotle next illustrates this scientifically, (~UCI'"IKWS) 
in the light of the practical syllogism.73 Briefly the argument 
,· .. · 
'.· 
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is th~. There are two major premises in the f~rm of universal 
concepts: 1. All sweet things ought not to be tasted; 2. All 
sweet things are pleasant; and there is a minor premise: This 
thing here is sweet. :t I The ~Kp~T~s reaches the conclusion, 
'this thd.ng is pleasant and so must be tasted', since the desire 
involved in-major -premise 2, overcomes_the natural cot1-clusion 
of the restrained man, 'this thing ought not to be tasted'. 
Thus the opinion of the :C~tfG""~~~ in the· conclusion, fails not 
in itself, (this tlling is plea:sant), but in the desire, (and 
so must be tasted). . ~ , Thus in the case of the cUCpart'IS it is 
possible for a syl;Logism, _the cqnclusion of \"lhich is a bad 
act, to exist side by side with :the knowledge of the major 
. h . ?4 premise, that is, a practical principle whie the act violates. 
The problems raised by this ~yllogism are discussed by 
Joachim?5 who concludes that the error of the :C~ep~~s arises 
from a collision occurring from the minor prep1ise being a},\ 
f .S~" .l. " 9orrto~ 16 which i.s enforced by an , £,. o 9111' f,. (de sir~), 
and the desire to taste collides with the major premise. 
Akrasia has been interpreted as a confl~ct of desir~s, 77 
that is, the desire of the good c_onflicting \.,ith the desire of 
the pleasant, this conflict being decided ·after an interval of 
hesitation (which might entail secondary deliberatio~; see 
below), by the strength of contending imaginative pictures, 
.. 
-~ . -
.. -_' 
_, ., 
), ·. 
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(phantasiai). This interpretation is notable in that it 
. . 
comes very near to Epictetus' theory of.persuasive "pllantasia.i 
overmastering reason, (i.e. reason as Aristotle's ~ationa~, 
~ o ~A"' cr IS of the good); 78 it does howe~er seem to omit 
., , 
the part played by prohaireeis in the CI(#C pCif.T"'] s • 
After an analysis of "the objects of attrasia, Aristotle 
. . , 
distinguishes two kinds of ak.rasia, impetuousness, (trp oli"sr~'"' ) 
, 
and weakness, ( ~(1'(/)£\ISIGC. ). The-weak deliberate, but are 
prevented from keeping to their resolution on account of 
passion. The impulsive are led on by passion without stopping 
to deliberate, 79 There seems to be a difficulty here as 
P I 
regards the notion of prohairesis. The oe I( p o(T"'l ~ is one 
who acts against his prohairesis ( .,-.cp~ 'ffp4«~p6tr1'11). ao· 
In so far as he has made a choice, and a right choice, he 
must have deliberated, (book III), but now it appears that a 
~ I . 
certain class of o<t<potrrys , the .impetuous, act without 
deliberation. There could possibly be reference to secondary 
deliberation here, that is, deliberation onwhether to depart 
. 81 from the prohairesis. This kind of deliberation is not 
·0 
accompanied by prohaireais, and therefore does not negate the 
former prohairesis. 
This explanation would contradict Burnet•a·note on 1148 a 
6, ( 1-'~ 1"~ trporA1pe68ott), in which he states that akra.sia is 
~ fl I 
caused by E."tl' 1 t7Up·coc. which excludes ft o'.JA£v tr I~ • The 
impul.sive type -of akrasia is therefore still acting .:contrai-y 
to a prohairesis. A further difficulty however occurs at 
r , ., 
~151 a 1 where the .term, 01 €t<tt1'"Q(TII<OI, (preswneab~y referring 
to the impuls.ive) is used, and contrasted with those 'who 
know the right principle but do not keep it, whence it appears 
that the impulsive, (if the identi~y is correct) have had 
. 82 
no prohai.r-esis·, and here we must concur with Burnet · that 
C :J I II I 
o 1 a 1<. tr 'fl1(T 11<01 are not the ce Kp« T'7 s as studied in the 
previous account. 
5• Reason and Desire in Plato. 
It has been·reJJarked in an earlier section that Aristotle 
made an important advance in the theory of conduct by 
accepting a fusion of desire and reason in the very act of 
choosing the good. In so far as Aristotle explains his t~eory 
in manageable psychological terms, this is a significant 
contribution. 
Yet before him Plato .had already appreciated the 
ditficul.ties of assessing the roles of reason and desire; for 
as with Aristotle, and in ~ontrast to the Stoics, he was ready 
to assess the whole soul in all its parts. Thus he was forced 
,· 
5'8 
to take account of the irrational as well as the rational. 
This is shoWn, as far as the human soul is concerned, in the 
account of the tripartite soul in the Republic, 83 and the 
same is true of the world soul whose motions include the 
rational and the irrational: reflection, forethought, 
d 1 b t ' d j f 1 'd th .oil ... •• • t . 84 e i era ion; an oy, ear, ove an e.u.- opposJ. es. 
Whilst the mutual functioning of desire and reason is an idea 
. 8 
already present in th~ ~:mPosium, 5 a number of critical 
studies on Plato have shown that in the later dialogues, notably 
Philebus, Timaeus and ~~ there is greater consideration 
given to the importance of the irrational functions. 8~ 
In assessing the parts played by r,eason and desire in 
Plato's concept of the good life, it is convenient to consider 
the three stages in the development of his ethics as given by 
Walsh:87 1. The cognitivist stage; 2. The psychological 
stage; 3. The habituation stage. The08~nitivist stage, 
represented chiefly by the Phaedo, rega:rds moral conduct as 
dependent on knowledge. ~his.is largely the Socratic position, 
'virtue is knowledge', with little psychological awareness; 
Socrates accepted no position of akra.sia. The only desire 
present in Socrates is the noblest: desire for the good and 
love of knowledge. 88 
The psychological stage is that taken up in the~epublic 
r.-..' 
by the tripartite division of the soul, 89 The rec_ognition of 
conflicting motions in tthe soul causes Plato to di.vi"de the 
soul into a rational (A oyurT'IK~v) and a desiring . (.!n,9up '}TIK~v) 
-1 par~. This has arisen from the discussion of trw +poa-uv'1 
(tempe;rance),9° by·which virtue the better part of the soul 
holds mast~ry over the worse part. 91 The actual psychological 
confl:f;ct is expressed in the anecdote of the thirsty man,.92 
from which it is concluded that impulsive desires.( trGC.9~,_.,.~..,.« )93 
are sometimes curbed by reason. 
Having established·that there are these two elements in 
the soul, often conflicting, Plato turns to the third, the 
· spir~ted element ( -r~ 9ufA061l,Js ). For the present study, this 
is the most interesting part of the discussion, since this 
element is neutral as regards reason and unreason, yet it is 
clear~y not reason but some driving force, comparable with t~e 
guardians of the ideal state. Its natural function however 
is to ally itself with reason,94 but through bad upbringing 
( ~1tO IJCc1CKf1s Tpof'?s) it could help unre~~oJ?-.9.5 The idea 
of a driving force behind what reason·has deliberated is 
similar to Aristotle's prohairesis, which was seen to be a 
partly irrational concept putting into action the conclusions 
of deliberation,.which as yet remained inert thought. Thus 
BLIJ-L ,;~ may represent an approach to the will, and lead to 
J-··r; 
the part of desire in prohaireaia. 96 In Plato's account however 
there is more emphasis on division in the soul th~.n .. ~nity of 
function •. Aristotle attempted to redress the balance in his 
account of fpC:v"7''5' where his logical, or scientific (fCIO'II<~S) 
approach97 is more amenable to unity than Plato's analytical 
and diagrammatic method. But in each can be discerned the. 
three functions: thinking, reacting emotionally, ~nd desiring 
appetitively. 98 
Plato reaches no solution on the psychological details of 
the parts functioning together, yet he seems to recognise that 
once a psychic act begins, the entire soul is thereby fttnction-
. 99 ~ , 100 ing. The passage on temperance and the cyHp.-..,.,s, 
recognises this virtue as essentially that which produces the 
101 
correct harmony between the different elements. · The 
i.Inportance of the tripartite division t~erefore is that Plato 
recognises an irrational factor in the mind itself, and can 
develop a view of moral evil being the result of psyc~ological 
, 
conflict ( crrotcrfS ),102 and that tends to make 
, 9 , 
all E.1T I lit' let( a dangerous rival of reason~ though when the 
soul is really acting in harmony under the control of reason, 
the desiring element also finds ita fulfilment. 103 
The P.hilebus presents a closer account of the bl~nding of 
desire and reason in the good life. I believe this to be a 
key dialogue in the present study, on three scores. First it 
considers certain pleasures to. be an essential part of the good 
life. Plato •s analysis of pleasures shows that- t~ey are very 
closely re·lated tc the objects of the desiring element :Ln the 
Republic. In the Republic, desires were held to be necessarily 
human, therefore the reason in the soul must accommodate them. 
In Phil.ebus, pleasures are seen to be necessary for the -proper 
functioning of any organism, therefore even human goodness will 
not be complete without. them. It is as if there is now a 
welcoming of pleasure by Plato rather than a toleration of 
desires, (which are necessary for the attainment of pleasure). 
"104 Only the Gods can live a life of pure thought; man should 
follow a mixed life of pleasure and intelligence: "Imagine one 
of u·s choosing to live in the possession of intelligence; 
thought, knowledge and a complete memory of everything, but 
without an atom of pleasure, or indeed of pain, in a condition 
of utter insensibility to such thingsn.105 
Hence in Plato there now appears a combination~_~eason __ 
for the good, and desire for the pleasure, that was seen in 
~-- I 
Aristotle 1s concept of ~poV?]cfiS ; moreover, by combining the 
two lives, the mixed life has an end, it is T~Aeos (whereas the 
two lives severally have no end), and as having an end, the 
notion of choice-worthiness ( T~ J,psTC:v ) can be applied.106 
-. ~ .. 
•. ,J 
..... 
The second re(:lf3on for attaching importance to the ~ilebus 
is the dominance given to reason in the blend of intelligence 
and pl.easures. Three points may be noted. Fiir;lt/~li~t in the 
blending, the pleasures that be admitted ~~· those amenable to 
tho~ght. These ar~ the pleasures t,hat require intellec:tual 
. 
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capacity, and particularly the apprehension of beauty. 
Second, there is an approach to the Aristotelian doctrine of 
the 'mean'., in considering pleasures as part of the :c'11'~1po,( the 
unl~ted),108 upon whicA intelligence must set a ~imit, and· 
the combination of the limit (reason) upon the unlimited 
(pleasure and pain) produces the ble,nding, or the mixed life. 
Thus the four factors defined in 23C-26D, intelligence, the 
unlimited, the limit and the mixture are involved. This ~ives 
rise to the third point, that the two ingredients of the blend 
are thought and ple~sure, and the blending agent is itself 
thought or intelli~ence.109 Thus the good life seems heavily 
weighted on the side of reason, but of a reason and intelligence 
that is fully aware of its environment, and which man has as 
his distinctive power for the intelligent ordering of life with 
respect to environment. 
The third and final reason for the importance of this 
dialogue in relation to later philosophy, is Plato's classifica-
., 
tion of pleasures. The sections of the dialogue on true and 
-·r·. 
'.r-;• 
..... :; -~. . 
'. ~ ~· -~. 
t~se pleasures:.. and the judgement of them hav~ much in common 
with the Stoicl!notion of phantasiai as conceived-~~~, Epictetus.110 
111 The notion of pleasure being dependent on memory in 
pleasures of anticipation is particularly relevant. Moreover, 
the other class of false pleasures, those where pleasure is 
acc~mpanied by pain, shot'IS Plato 'a awareness still of psycholog-
ic:al con,flictl and that i.t is easy to acb,owl-Efdge such pleasur.cs . 
,. 
as good, thereby being led .i.nto a position of akrasi!}• 
Before leav~g this psychological stage, a comparison of 
the :tts_e of-/3o~~"'"'S (wish) in Plato and A,riatot~e may be observed. 
The ob~ect. of f>o uA't']triS 112 is a man • s true happiness, though 
man can fail in achieving thi.s throu~h temptation from desire. 
Thus moral conduct' involves correct reaction in the -~~ce of: · 
emotions i.n order. _,to attain the end he fundllliientally wishes, 
hie ~:~VA"7ti'IS. There·fore what he wishes ( :( ~fJ'v)\_f}T'iii.·a ) 
. . . ~ )\ ,6\, /J. ~ \ . 1' 
and what seems best to -him· <q1 .. ~~tv ~~-~ ,...U\TI.tr.TOV:.SIYD(t) are 
identical. To Plato therut instinctive or irrational reaction 
to moral sit'uations -:is as essential to ~nurt4rJI'l as is a purely 
intellectual attitude·•ll3 
It remains to examine Plato's final stage of ethical theory, 
that of habituation presented i.n the La!'s• Here the vi.rtue of 
the common man is not based on knowledge, nor on the reasoning 
responsibility to control desires, but rather on a process of 
conditi·oning. Plato in no way diminishes the role of desire: 
:) . 
.:.: ....... . : ·' ~·. . ._:·· 
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on the contrary, desire is .seen to be such a strong factor in 
·,_ 
human be~aviour that Plato now sees that his earlier eXpecta-
tion that reason, if' properly nurtured, \'lould find the right 
harmony in accommodating itself to desire, had proved to be 
too optimistic for the' majority of men. Further, it was the 
conditioning of desires which was the focus of' his education 
programme. This education of the young should not be compared 
~rith the popular teaching of' the Stoics, who exhorted men to 
lift themselves above desire and to obey reason. Plato's 
education system was an attempt to discipline the emotions but 
not abolish them. 
There is in this respect a certain amount of' correspondence 
with the Philebus. The mixed life is again advocated,114· and 
in pleasures and in pains it is necessary to embrace the mean 
( ' , TO J.Lea-ov . ), and in Laws 653 B the emotions, 
pleasure, -love and their opposites are said to spring up rightly 
( ~p8w'l ) in an infant·•s.soul. It is the purpose of the 
education to produce an agreement between the feelings of' 
pleasure and pain, and the law, l'lhich is baaed on reason. ll5 
This education is concerned with controlling the mean in 
pleasures and pains.116 Music and dancing, for instance, should 
be regulated to provide just the right amount of pleasure. 117 
Yet this habituation stage does in one respect at least 
. r 
come near to the Stoic concept of tli.ll, th~t it should be in 
accordance with nature. The education process is designed to 
condition a person to desire of his own accord action in 
obedience to the laws. In the ~ the individual does not 
have unrestricted freedom, but his feelings, therefore his will, 
if properly educated, will be content to follow the laws. This 
is clear from a closer look at Plato's definition of education 
·, 118 
at ,65,,A -·C. He first remarks that in the infant, goodness 
and badness first enter t.he sou1 through pleasures and pains.119 
Eventually a rational account (logos) is grasped, and the child 
assents to it. This assent as a whole ( JuJATT;<.croc. ) is 
goodness, while the part of it that is rightly trained with 
respect to pleasure, is education. Education therefore mou1ds 
our feelings to accord with the law. The Stoics, however whilst 
ag~eeing that the will should accord with the law of nature, 
did not follow Plato's psychological appr~ach to conditioning, 
but ~elied on verbal precepts and maxims of the Stoic school. 
Plato •s theory is more akin to the i.'~,S 1fpoc<•peTIK~ of 
Aristotle, but where the prohairesis is conditioned in child-
hood and infancy, and even further back than that. This early 
psychological conditioning is noted by Morrow120 as an advance 
on Spartan upbringing in recognising sentiment as the mainspring 
of action in the majority of men. Habits, before they really 
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become part of the individual, must be acQompanied by the 
ap~ropriate feelings of pl~asure and pain; mere discipline is 
not sufficient. 
6. ·other Platonic trends of thought recurring in Epiotetus. 
At this point it is convenient to list the· principle 
Socratic elements found in Epictetus' teaching, as collected 
" 121 by Souilhe: 
1. All men sin voluntarily. 
2. Knowledge consists ~n the understanding of oneself, 
" ~ e ' and a life without refutation (refutation, o<ve. J e 7"oCD"70S) 
is not worth liv~g. 
3. The understanding of concepts is closely conjoined 
to the understanding of oneself. 
4. From the correct understanding of oneself comes the 
correct relationship to things exterior. 
5. The belief in Providence, which demands on the part 
of man obedience and submission to the divine will. 
6. Man mus~ have a kno\'rledge ot: his~::relationships 
with God which give rise to feelings of divinity and 
holiness. 
7. Self-sufficiency. 
8. True knowledge not only guides men to _live their lives, 
but to live them correctly. 
9. L'eudemoni~)lle (the spiritual happiness of one's l'lhole 
composite being). 
Several of these points are embraced by the So¢ratic 
position~ •virtue is knowledge' and his concept of personal 
morality. In the fifth century, confusion arose over what 
comprised the good life, and with it, the criticism of 
traditional·values. Socrates was the first to teach that there 
was a good as an objective value, both above the individual 
and at the same time determining the value of the individual. 
Man must be neglectful of external good things and become 
conscious of the principal good and strive to acquire knowledge 
f •t 122 0 l. • 
However, on the subject of knowledge and right conduct 
(Sou[h~'s points numbers 1, 2 and 8), enough has already been 
said in considering the Arist_otelian and Plationic position 
on akrasia and knowledge. 123 Sotiahe's remaining points fall 
into three groups: 1. Those dealing with the importance of 
the essential self .<points 3 and 4); 2. th:ose dealing with 
the concepts of God and Providence (points 5 and 6); 3. those 
dealing with the end of life, happiness, a condition of which 
is self-sufficiency (points 7 and 9). I shall treat these in 
68 
o;!:'der: 
1. It was essential to Socrates• teaching that man's 
interest was ultimately in the self, where alone his good 
- I 
was to be attained. A new meaning \'las- given to crw;poctiJ v"1• 
no longer •common sense•, but self-control, and with it the 
" I terms E. y K p D(. T61 rtJ. and akraeia were adopted: mastery of 
self, and the opposite. This love of self, love of one's 
personal goodness, and therefore love of knowledge was the 
one4 kind of desire th~t Socrates did allow.124 
This point of ethical teaching is continued in the Platonic 
di~ogues, with just a hint of modification in the ~. that 
the majority of men should recognise the limitation of the~ 
own knowledge and trust their betters. These people are 
criticised for excessive love of self (T"'JV" rr+£6p~ ~1.1TOII ~,Afatv), 
- 125 
and that iE! love of a badly adjusted self. 
The point is taken up -by Aristotle in the Nicomachean 
Ethics. 126 Be justifies f -,A tl( u T! c:( (love of sEI'lf) provided the 
love is qf _the essential self, that is,the most dominant part, 
just.as the moat perfect friendi'Jhip is when the whole character 
or personality of. each is comprehended in the union. This is 
also the moat permanent sine~ _moral character is the most 
. 127 permanent possibl:-e bond. The essential self, the dominant 
~ ·' ' p ' ' 'n part, is 'JO..I'DlTc:( )\oytw:,~v, (as opposed to -ro KdTot.mcoD.S), that 
. ..~ .. · 
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is, our reasoned acta are felt to be iD the fullest sense our 
own voluntary acts. It has already been shown frQm Book III 
of the Ethics that in any moral action, the responsibality lies 
in prohairesie, and eo prohaireeis must exhibit the self in 
its fullest sense; that is, the self as a responsible person. 
"" Han 'a real self is vo uc; , for when we talk about being self-
restrained or unrestrained'· we are ruled or failing to be 
ruled by rational I \ ,... \ ""' ll\ intelli,gence ..___TC> l<.p_oe_T~E_I_V __ T.QV. VOIJ.V "7 
The importance of 128 this passage and its connection with 
~~ctetus is the emphasis on the rational part as the ruling 
--·.··' . 
and in every way the highest part of man, in fact the man 
himself. This is in Epictetus, the prohairesis obedient to 
. 129 
a rational hegemonikon (ruling element). 
2. The concept of a ruling providence, which is accepted 
by Epictetus is largely Stoic doc.trine. The notion of the 
divine plays little part in Aristotle's Ethics, apart from the 
discussion of v o"v s in Book X, which will be considered under 
3 below. 96wp1C~C is the activity of the Godl30 which humane 
can only partake of in so far as they share the divinity. 
Whilst this theory does approach the Stoic belief that the 
highest part of man, hie reason, is an (a portion) 
. '' 
of the divine reason, it does not come very near to the concept 
of divine guidance of the universe. Moreover the ~istotelian 
). 
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I doctrine of. 9Gwptd. is generally viewed by scholars as a 
Platonic interlude, ~d it is to Plato we must turn to find 
clo~er .corre~ation with the Stoics on this question, and 
particularly to the later dialogues where the idea of a world 
soul g~ins prominence. 
Crombie s~gest~131 that the development of ethical 
teaching from the earlier to the later dialogues is that in 
the earlier works, goodness is what is required by human 
purposes, whil~t in the later works, it is what is required by 
nature's purposes, 'What is our place in the Cosmos?' Thus 
Plato comes near the Stoics in regarding a cosmic reason 
operating on our intelligence, as we .have already observed in 
the Philebus,132 making the 'mixed life' good. A number of 
passages in the ~ demonstrate similar doctrine, that man 
must regulate his life to accord·with what God has ordained. 
It has already been remarked that the Laws proposes a solution 
o·f habituation to the conflict o~- desires and altrasi:a, but now 
further, it seems Plato regards the tru~st form of human 
goodness as good only in so far as it obeys a cosmic goodness. 
How far this two-tier habituation is a result of the· growing 
conviction of -human worthlessness, or at least helplessness 
forced on Plato by experience of contemporary Athens or Syracuse, 
. '.: 
or merely a logical development of Plato's metaphysics, is in doubt. 
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We may compromise and suggest that the first habituation is due 
to the former, and the second, the cosmic, to the latter. 
Two passages might be·noted in this connection; the first 
at Laws 715E - 716D. Here God is regarded as the measure of 
--
all things, and man must become of like character to God. 
Before Him man should be Toursov~~ (abject) and occo<OdJo'~~s 1~~ 
(properly minded). In being a rhetorical passage, this approaches 
very near to Epictetus in tone, but there is in addition a 
great deal of common thought.l33 The second passage is at 
~ 903 B - c, where God is the one who cares for the 
preservation and ordering of the whole.134 l4an's soul is joined 
with this one body, and what is good for the whole is good for 
man. 
The reasons that led'.! Plato to believe in a Cosmic reason 
may well be different from those which motivated ~he Stoics, 
whose physical theory in many ways does not corre.spond, but. the 
fact that Plato did hold a doctrine of a permeating world soul 
in certain later dialogues could account for the later Stoics, 
particularly Posidonius, for reverting to Plato rather than 
Aristotle. 
If Plato's final ethical position was that man should 
regulate himself in accordance with the guiding Reason, what 
was his position on free-will? For Plato, the question of will 
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did not exist as a problem,l35 and nowhere are we· left in any 
doubt that man has the responsibility, therefore the means 
within him, of attaining the good. In Laws X,l36 it is stated 
-
that the will of each man is responsible for the generation 
of hie kind of character. Once the kind of character is fixed 
by our will, then God has an appointed position in the universe 
for every different kind of character. Character is the 
result of the direction of our desires and the nature of our 
souls. In a p~allel passage in the Myth of Er the herald is 
pronouncing the procedure of the souls choosing their new kind 
of embodiment, and firmly states that the blame rests with him 
who chooses: God is blameless.137 Yet there is in the choosing 
of lives, a combination of choic9 ·and fate, since the order in 
which the souls choose is determined by lot, but the number of 
138 lives exceeds the number of souls choosing. 
A similar combination of choice and fate is contained in 
. . 
the game of draughts metaphort at ~ 903 D, where God is the 
, 
celestial draughts-player ( n £ -rTe &J"'""l s ) , who . can only move 
the piece according to the way the dice falls, the dice in this 
case being men's wills forming their characters. The reversal 
here should be noted of the more comoon and Stoic use of the 
X metaphor where man should aqjust his life according to the fall 
of the dice which is God's will.l39 In either case the dice 
holds the significance observed by Thomas Hardy, "tlhat curious 
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creatures these dice be - p0\'11erful. rulers of us all and yet at 
140 my command'J 
The question of celestial puppetry is not so obvious. It 
lU 1~ has been argued that where the puppet metaphor is used 
man is seen to be a plaything at the mercy of God. I belie.ve 
closer examination of these passages will show that Plato is 
here concerned with stage one habituation, that is, habituation 
< of desires through education, rather than stage two, the 
habituation of human goodness to the divine good. Both 
instances of the metaphor appear in tho oonte:x;t of education 
rather than theology, and the child is seen to be at the mercy 
of his desires and emotions. This is clearly the case at 644D, 
to which reference has already been made,143 and the correspon-
144 dance of terminology in both passages is so close to suggest 
that this interpretation should be applied also at 804B. It 
may be remarked that in Epictetus man is clearly given the role 
. 1~ 
of playing a part in a game controlled by God • 
. 146 Professor Dodds draws attention to a striking diff~rence 
between .Plato's view of the natural cosmos, and the Stoic 
l I :» I 
concept •. He points to the errant ·Ca~se ( lTI\CI(.IIWp.&v"l ~1T1oe. ) 
of the Timaeus, and to the concept of TIJX~ (chan~e), 
\ ' ll ,.. ( particularly in Laws 709 A - B, _ T_VX;-"1--fleTo<- u€_o IJ chance 
cooperating with God), and also to the much discussed passage 
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about the good and evil souls in Book x.147 Be suggests that 
from these, ·reason is not alone in its governance of the world, 
but that a njunior partner" characterised by its irrational 
behaviour is also present in Necessity. If this interpretation 
is correct, then it appears that Plato did recognise an 
element of irrationality in the Cosmos as well as in man. 
This would strongly contrast with Epictetus and indeed 
'. 
Aristotle's position, who throughout insist on the rationality 
of the Universe, and in Epictetus it may be a thorough-going 
rationalism that inhibits a fully satisfactory concept of will. 
Plato's position is here more accommodating to the irrational, 
having established it back in the Cosmos. 
Finally, in considering the question of a guiding divinity, 
there is a more patent and purely Socratic element to be found 
in Plato, corresponding with Epictetus' view of the divine, 
namely the belief in a daimon or personal guardian spirit. 
Socrates' daimon is represented as a personal communication 
\o'rith God, as the voice of God speaking personally, similar to 
the voices experienced by Joan of Arc, and some religious 
mystics. Normally this phenomenon indicates an advanced stage 
of religious experience and awareness, and there is no reason 
148 to believe that tbis was not the case with Socrates. 
In so -far.as there is consistency :ln Plato's use of 
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daimon, its prime significance is as a force intermediary 
between man and the divine, providing guidance which clarified 
by a certain convincing apprehension, overlilasters or confirms 
the power of the intellect. It is interesting to note that in 
the ~~th of Er,149 the souls waiting for their new lives, have 
the power of choosing their daimon; thus daimon becomes the 
"innate human form, the element that remains constant through-
out all the accidents and flux of life, that which makes any 
action of mine !l action~l50 Accordingly, by acc~pting a 
daimon we accept the "mysterious bond between human life and 
beyond", and man can realise his freedom in obeying his daimon; 
that is, his freedom in choosing his thereafter binding link 
between himself and the di-vine. This conclusion on freedom is 
important, and it is significant that the later Stoics used 
the same term, daimon, to refer to the guiding spirit i~ man, 
which is man's reason, and this is, in the Stoic system, man's 
direct link with· God as the reason of the Universe.151 \"/hether 
for Epictetus the daimon recovered its Platonic religious . 
significance will be discussed in Chapter six. 
3. Throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, happiness has been 
considered the final end that is desirable in itself and is 
self-sufficient.152 Similar considerations of the good life 
are given by Plato in Philebus, that it must be perfect 
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The notion of happiness is closely allied, both in Plato 
and Aristotle to 9ew pi« , or contemplation of reality, 
This is most clearly seen in Plato in Books VI and VII of 
the Republic. Iri Aristotle the relationship·is brought out 
iil Book X of the Ethics. 1~4 Happiness is a,n activity desirable 
in itself. Such possible activities are actions in accordance 
with virtue, amusement~ and contemplation.155 But the highest 
virtue will be the virtue of the best part of us, that is, 
11t~e part which is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and 
to have cognisance of what is noble and divine, either as being 
itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the 
156 ~ divinest part of us." This part is voLJS (intellect), and 
its activity is Os wp:D( , which fulfils the following 
conditions of happiness: it is the most continuous ( crvv6 xZ>s ) ' 
the moat ;leasant ( ®'' rr """1 ) , the most self-sufficient X' 
:> I . c \ ' (" C. \ > ,. 11. 
( t1( LJ'f'oA. (J KGII!Il ) , loved for its own sake ( oeuT"l J'O '"7 o • 'oC.UTtp' oeyti(Jfottt''*l), 
I 
the most leisured, and the highest thing in us ( l<poCTit:rTDS 
rwv GV ~1-"-iv); it is indeed the divinest part ( Blio v ),.157 In 
Epictetua the highest good is also seen to be a contemplation 
of the divine reason, to which one adjusts the prohairesis. This 
is the process referred to by Epictetus in the purification 
158 ) of the prohairesis. 
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::;, ~ I A further point about suoo<. IJ.LO\fJo( in Plato is its natural 
c / 
and universal desirability. As 1 Ka<. vov , it must satisfy the 
-whole man, that is, man as a feeling and desiring being. This. 
Cl(' \ ~ \ I 
is indicated by Ar~stotle's phrase, '70itrT'.-l J(t/1 IIC&JT"7 ,....Oil.'7 
6 ) c ' • ,. Ll 
_. 1 flv_T"}V ti(Y-~Tf'Dl.trr7oll : the happiness of contemplation is 
pleasurable and to be loved on its own merits. Happiness thus 
becomes the realisation of an ideal, the ideal of the good. 
Man's ultimate wish, his ~ oGA.-,r•j is for this good and his 
happiness. So happiness is only possible through desiring 
the good. Without desiring, goodness would be achieved, but 
happiness would have no meaning. For Plato, and the Greeks 
in general, there was a natural attraction or love of the 
truth, and knowledge of gqodness.159 Significan'J;ly, two of the 
most poetic passages of Plato illustrate this striving towards 
the real good, which man-'s nature ultimately desires. The 
first is in the Symposium where Diotima descl"ib'es the highest 
love to be a love of beauty ~ its divine goodness. Contem-
plation is possible because there is first the love of contem-
plating the'ideal. 160 
The second passage in Republic Book VII, shows the 
happiness of those who have ascended from the cave and have 
seen in their vision of the sun, goodness itself. Although 
here the approach to the truth is a painful and forced process) 
once the vision of the truth is contemplated, the soul recognises 
t.Q.is to be its happy state, and would be reluctant to depart from 
his state of c~ntemplating reality.161 
I believe Epictetus follows this characteristic Greek 
doctrine of the soul's natural attraction to the good, in 
referring to a 
162 the good. 
.-· 
J. , "' " 9"' 
'fDCVT"ol.trl"' .,-ol) tty~(. .0.11 _ , an impre·ssion of 
In connection with this desire to attain.soodness, it seems 
'·· 
worth quoting J. P. A. Gould's interpretation of akrasia in 
Plato: 
"It is precisely the absence of a sure and personal 
spiritual driving force, which, certain of its direction 
and foundation, is the spring of action in the really 
moral individual. Such a force is no more intellectual, 
no more emotional than faithn. 163 
Plato usee a concept of epiritualieing love, but expressed in 
the more concrete te~~in9logy of Aristotle, this could well 
describe his concept of prohaire.sis. Certainly the driving 
force here described is closely similar to prohaireeie in 
Epictetue. 
7• Aristotle, Plato and Epictetus 
In the foregoing sections, I have covered aspects of the 
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philosophy of Plato and Aristotle which involve similar pro~lems 
to those raised by Epictetus' t~ach~g on freedom. The outstand-
ing contribution from these sections is the coordination ·of 
reason and desire in the attainment of goodness and knowledge. 
Because both Epictetus and Aristotle \'/ere assured of the inner 
nature of virtue, it is possible that the similarities in the 
approach to the problems of w~ll and desire are coincidental. 
The influence from Plato, however, may have been more direct. 
Frequent allusions and quotations from the Apology and Phaedo 
by Epictetus, suggest that the library at Nicopolis contained 
a number of Platonic dialogues. Chiefly however, the direct 
influence must be refiarded as Socratic rather than Platonic, and 
acquired not only through_the Platonic dialogues, but also 
through the resurgence of Pythagoreanism in the Hellenistic 
period, and the Socratic schools of the fourth century164 
(Magarian, Cynics and Cyrenaian), from whic-h grew the systems 
of Zeno and Epicurus. The teaching on pleasure by the 
Cyrenaian School was possibly more important than the Philebus 
in helping to form the Stoic theory of knOl'lledge and false 
)?hSntasiai. 
'· 
How far there was any influence from Aristotle on Epictetus 
is a questionon which there is little evidence. Certainly 
Aristotle's Ethics are not referred to or quo:t;led by Epictetus. 
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Parts of the Ethics might have formed a basis for the later 
Stoic teaching on duties, notably the discussion .on·· friend-
ship in Book IX. The position of Aristotelianism in the 
Stoic school, .especially the later Stoics, is a worth while 
study, but not within the scope of this thesis. 
The occurrence of prohairesis in both philosophers as 
a term of philosophical importance affords some marked 
.. 
parallels. Basically there are four similarities in the use 
of the term: first, prohairesis is choice that determines 
go_od or bad actions; it is the peculiarly human act that 
produces moral action, by putting the origin ( ( , I "7 11(P X~ ) of 
the action within the agent himself. Second, proha±resis 
gives assent to a course of action that is already d.eliberated. 
In Epictetus the prohairesis judges between true and false 
phantasiai. The instantaneous act of each indiv.idual choice 
is not an act of deliberation but of acceptance or reflection. 
Third, ;erohairesie in Epictetus has a fullermeaning of the 
total character of the individual, which in turn is responsible 
for the act of choice, that is, ;erohayesis in its narr·ower 
meaning. In Aristotle, this flJ.Uer meaning is present in his 
theory Of ~~GIS. d iall th ''I . 1 v l an espec y e _ £ l'S 1t po« •p&.T.U<YJ- , 
which shows choice as being dependent to a degree, on character. 
. 6 
Fourth, the elusiveness of the term, noted by Miss Anscombe,1 5 
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reappears in Epictetus. Just as in Aristotle166 choice is 
deliberate desire; and we :fix our choice as a result of 
deliberation, so in Epictetus, prohairesis is ill-defined and 
at times seems a superfluous term :ln his. psychological theory, 
I 
embracing little more than the term hegemonikon and K p' tr' 5 • 
Could it not be that in both philosoph~rs this very elusive-
ness signifies the final intrusion of· _the irrationa,l in an 
act of choice which could otherwise be adequately be described 
in fully defined terms? Is it the indefinable yet not 
incalculable167 element through which choice becomes will? 
These similarities are striking, but not so dependent on 
any specialist doctrine that we need ass~e any direct influence. 
Yet this does not invalidate the usefulness of this chapter 
in examining Aristotle's approach to the problems of choice, 
as a means of elucidating Epictetus. 
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NO!rES TO CHAPTER TWO 
l. 
.. , 
See Ch. VIJ;;t: • and note"'·._ 
~ ~ 
Dodds, The Greeke.and the Irrational, Ch. VI. 
See Ch. III, 5, and Ch. IV, l. 
4. Nicoma~ ; Ethics 1102 a- 5. 
1106' a 10. 
6. 1>1 ,, c. ~ ' (J I <» - I 'J £crTtV c1.p..c. __ , ~P''T'"J 'l'S npoou.p.£T.IIC'll_1 £Y f".Etr01'11'LOJJ~a( 
1?J "'P~S -~,..:Cs, t!JpurJA-lv;, >.:Y"J· Ll;lrW a 1.) 
1103 b 23 - 25. 
8. 1103 a 32. 
1110 a 16. 
10. 110? a 1. 
11. These .-n~y possibly be eq\lat~.d w±th the impulsive kind 
·,·'. 
, 
of akrasia, i.e. Trpt>YreTettJl bk. VII, 1050 b 20. 
12. Compare the passage in bk. VII on f) up.~ S , 1149 a 26; 
(\ I ~ (\ / 
__ t[Vf.l-_o_s~(as opposed to E.TTtC7UJ-L-IoC. ) hears reason. Cf. also 
Plato's 'spirited' part of the $~ul 
13. 1112 a 31. 
14. 1112 b 13. 
16. 1112 b 8. 
17. A parallel account appears in Eudemian Ethics, 1226 b 
16 - 30. 
. ' n' 18. 1113 a 1.11:; note the intrusion of tep1Vti.VTES and ltpot<p• vt;v; 
this is for selecting between alternatives that have to 
be deliberated. ' The I<P rcr"•S is part of deliberation, 
not part of choice. 
19. ll13 a 12. \The, p,rol;llems ~;-aised, l.>Y Ari~totl~-~~ discussion oni· 
•· • • ~-~ -~ '.-'< • • ,. • ';•', .:~ •.' .;' •:. ' • '.',,"I l•o· ·~.-' .~ 0 ' '·':\.:~ ,,/ • ,- • 
· . o:P,o'ic~_~and .antic*• .,ha~e mo·st ~eerrt.l1r bee)1 exalll~n~~- b,lr-'W•U~~e, 
~ • '" •-\ ,-" .. 'L . ~-- .f' ','.-'".~: • ,,. ..\---. ,. , :,.. · ..• •· ·,-: • ·-~ -•' . ,, ,__· . ~-:-' i~· 
/Arl:st.6t1.e• s 'Ethical- 'Th'eorv,-: \1968),pp.60;o.:a;l.,._ · 
."~·-. ,.· •·-· . • ,, -~-':""·.., ___ ~.:..-'.. .. ·-- '-r~- .. '-·"'=-~- ;;·· .· .•. __ ,-.' ·· . ..,}··::1····'-, ~ -~-~ ....... -... ;~-- ..... -~-' ~ -/·· 
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20. Joachim, Commentary p. 104. 
21. See section 4 of this chapter. 
22. Joachim, Op. cit. P• 104. 
23. Ando, Aristotle's Theory, P• 267. 
24. My brackets; cf. Joachim, Qp. cit. p. 107 - 8: prohairesis 
is the formal, final and efficient cause. 
25. c~. II, 2, p. 132 ff, esp. 134- 5. 
26. Ando, P. 135. This is the 'double version' theory 
referred to and further elucidated by Walsh, 'Aristotle's 
Conception of Moral We.akness ' , p. 131 - 4. 
27. 1113 b 3 -. 13. 
28. 1113 a 4. 
29. 1114 b 30. 
30. 1106 b 36, quoted in note 6 above. 
I',.'·. 
3~· 1139 a 1 - 15. 
32. A comparison may be drawn with the areas of a·ssent 
( cruy .t<tA.1:,_ge,v,s ) and desire ( ,, 'l ope. I.S )in 
I 
Epictetus, i.e. the three TOTTOI , see Ch. V;t;I, 2. 
33~ 1139 a 21 - 31. 
34. 1139 a 32; again Rrohairesis implies means not ends, 
cf. 1112 b 13. 
From this it follows that 
elf! 
e 3' ~ is the 
contribution to prohairesis that habituates or moderates 
desire, just as ~ o~~ t.uti'IS is the contribution that 
suggests rational possibilities. 
36. 1139 a 32 - ~ 2. 
37. Greenwood, Nicomachean Ethics VI, Introduction p. 49. 
38. Sophocles, Electra; esp. lines 1021- 1059. Note the· 
recurrence of E.u cf>povfJs (1038), ffDVEIV (1058), and 
the contrast 4{/atv : vovs (1024). t'larLsh, Aristotle •s 
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·conception, p. 16 - 20, notes some Euripidean examples. 
39. These are the terms used at 1139 a 20 ff. On this 
aspect see further Anscombe, Thought and Action in 
Aristotle's Ethics, New Essays, ed. Bamburgh, p. 156 - ?. 
40. 1139 a 24 - 26. In this paragraph I have followed 
Greenwood's Commentary, Op. cit. P. 40 - 41 •. 
41. Greenwood, Op. cit. P. 56. 
42. 1144 a 24 ff. 
43. This concept of_ fUtrll(~ ~pe.r~ .is most clearly 
explained in Historia Animalium, 588 a 18. 
44. This is stated perhaps more clearly in the discussion 
~ I 
of akrasi.a at 1152 a 10 ff, where the, CI(KP"'.,..,S (man 
of ill-restraint) can be, said to display L 
not.- fpOYYJif•S • For +pov1']6"1S- involves deliberate 
but 
r / \ I I 
choice, (- o•cttf'apew 1<.114.Tol T1JV. npo~1pe.tr1V ). Thus 
the virtuous and wicked man, acting from choice, 
~ / I ( &I' tt_p_o_Q{,_p e.cc.s_ws ) displays qp~v'7 O"J,s _ _,_ but not 
::» I 
the _vt__f( p _o( T 17 s. • 
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Anscombe, Thought and Action in Aristotle's Ethics, 
. ; . 
New Essa.ys, Ed. Bamburgh- p. 143 - 1,58. For a criticism 
of this essay, see Hardie, Aristotlet-:s Ethica,l Theory, 
p. 180 - 181 
46. Book VI, 1142 b 18. 
47. This·I have later termed secondary deliberation; see 
discussion.on akrasia, section 4, below. 
48. Anscombe, Op. cit. p. 145 ff. 
49. Joachim, Qp. cit. p. 108 ff. 
50. MetaRhysics VIII, 1045 b 27 - 1048 a 24. 
51. 1048 a 11. 
52. Joa~};lim, Op. cit. p. 109 - 111, admits of a second 
interpretation, that prohairesis could occur without 
intelligible development or connection with t_he rest 
of man •s nature. But the ·body of evidence., at any 
rate from the Nicom~&chean Ethics· seems not to suge;est 
. . ~ 
88 
this second interpretation, especially when prohaireais 
is seen in its relation to +p&,,cr,s and inoral 'virtue 
(Bk. VI). This interpretation of Joachim is discussed 
by Hardie, Aristotle's Ethical Theory, p. 178. 
53• Full discussion will be found in Ando, Op. cit. 
p. 274 - 290; Joachim, Op. cit. p. 207 - 213; Greenwood, 
Op. cit. p. 50 - 52. Anscombe, Op. cit. P• 151-156, 
and Hardie·• s lengthy note on, 'The Practical Syllogism', 
Op. cit. p. 241 ff. See also discussion on the practical 
syllogism that is stated in Bk. VII in connection with 
akrasia 1147 a 24 ff, in s~ction 4· of this chapter. 
54. 1046 b 20. 
56. 1141 a 27; 1147 b 4. 
57• This gene~ally seems to be the form adopted by Ando, 
01?• ·cit. p. 280, and Joachim, Op, cit. p. 209. 
58. Joachim, 0~. cit. P• 175. 
59. Burnet, Nicomachean Ethics, note P• 269 on 1141 b 1?; 
on >I e Q(tcf ,triS see Ando, Op. cit. Ch. II, 2, 
esp. p. 122. 
60. Greenwood, Op. cit. p. 51. A sim~ar view is put by 
Burnet, Op. oit., note P• 269 on 1141 b 15~ that the 
function of the understanding of general concepts 
• ,f. I ,. g.t\ 'I ( "} 1pov'1d''~ -rwv Ko( M 011 fi-DVtW') is to frame rules for 
the attainment of the true good, which is given as an 
Opei<.T.~V 1 having been presented as ~a(JV';,...6Y-OV 
:II ll I 
«.ytJ(fl 0 v ; cf. Burnet's notes on 1139 a 22 and 1139 a 32, 
Op. ci~. P• 255. 
61. See note 60 above. Ando, Op. cit. p. 120 - 1. Walsh, 
Dp. cit. P• 123 - 8 also gives a lucid account. 
62. . There is an important difference here between Aristotle 
:~~ a' 
and the Stoics. In Aristotle, as the stored up DCJc1fi'Jd'~IS 
or experience, the phantasiai had a function in the 
intellection process. In the Stoics they were the primary! v~ 
,! jl 
material occurring from the external world for intellec-
tion to work upon. From Posidonius onwards there is a 
gradual return to the more subjective Aristotelian 
position; and it is significant that in Epictetus, they 
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have developed ethical connotations, as presentations 
of good or bad courses of action. Both in Aristotle 
and the Stoics, they had a purely epistemological 
function. For a full discussion see Ch. V, 3. 
63. Ando, 0~. cit. P• 158-9. 
64. 1114 a 13 ff, and Burnet's note, 0~. Cit. p. 137. 
65. 1106 a 17. 
66. 1111 a 30. 
67. 1111 a 35. 
68. 1136 a 1. 
69. 1151 a 20-24. 
70. cf. Bk. III, 1113 a 6 on prohairesis. 
71. This idea of conviction, on which one can base determination 
or will-power, receives little treatment in Aristotle. 
·· •. · •. :: .... ·1 
. • . . '") ··•..r 
.-:;.._j::. 
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The Stoa thought more of it, especia1ly in the theory 
of phari.tasiai, and: foc111"ctttfrt Kcn'aC~'JlfTU<~. Aristotle 
fails to see anything in the nature of the p~ohairesis 
as weak will, to cause it to be neglected by the 
~ , 
~Kpa~..:T."]-S ; the causes for its abandonment are treat,~d 
as external to it, as 7f ~ 91'] • 
72. 1146 b_31- 1147 a 24. 
73. 1147 a 24 - b 19. 
74. See Burnet's note at 1147 a 21 ff• Op. cit. p. 302 - 3. 
75. Joachim, Op. cit, pp. 226 - 9. Objections to this 
interpretation are given by Walsh, Op. cit. pp. 107 ff, 
and the matter is fully discussed in this work. There'' 
is also a detailed commentary in Burnet's notes at 
1147 a 33 ff. 
76. 1147 b 17. 
77. By D. T. Allen, quoted and discussed in Walsh, Op. Cit. 
P• 124. 
.' 
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78. For· the division of appetite into ,_~o'v'A "1-trlt; • 9uf'o-; 
~ /} I 
and £1f 1 elf··"~ ,·see Walsh, Op. cit. P• 88 and footnote. 
79. 1150 b 19 - 22. 
So. 1151 a?; cf. 1148 a 6: 7-'~ T~ 7rp()t1(Jpsu:t9o(, • 
81. It is surely this kind of deliberation which Ando refers 
to, Op. cit. p. 2?4, as being on a l~vel with bew~""'IS • 
in his conclusion on deliberation; "Deliber~tion must 
contain a moral estimation of passion and conduct besideg 
pure technical cognition such as clevernea·s or the. 
deliberation used by the incontinent man". Cf. the 
distinction between 9 u,.... ~ S and desire, 1149 a 26 ff. 
82. Burnet, note on 1151 a 3. 
83. 436 A - 444B. 
84. ~ X, 89?A. 
85. See below, Section 6. 
··. 
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86 T)le main studies are in t·Jalsh' Op I cit. Ch. 2; J. p. A. 
Gould, The Development of Pl'a~o's Ethics; and E. R. 
Dodds, Plato a·nd the Irrational, p. 16, much of what 
is said here is to be found also in his work, ~ 
Greeks and the Irrational, Ch. 7, where there are also 
some additional points, Plato's later philosophy is 
here intended to refer to treatment later than Republic. 
87. Walsh, _Qp. cit. p. 28. 
88, For the importance of this basic Socratic desire see 
Section 7. 
89 • Republic. IV, 4 36A - 444B. 
90. 430D. 
91. 431A. 
92. 439A - C. 
93. 439D. 
·r ·.· 
94 
>I .:ll\ "').._ ,. J..l 94. -~TfiKOUpo_v_ t:iv "L!;> oyttST_f_f<._"J rfl~e'-, 441 A; also 440E. 
95. 441 A. 
96. · \'lalsh, Op. cit. p. 37, seems to dismiss this possibility 
without fully examining all Plato say~ on __ /1u,._.. OS in 
this passage. For a much fuller discussion, see 
Crombie, An Examination of Plato's Doctrines, pp. 344-
359. 
97. See section 3 above. 
98. The question of unity is examined by Crombie, Qp. cit, 
p. 350 f. 
100. 4'iD and following. 
101. 431E - 432A. 
102. Dodds remarks that this adva·nce in psychology was 
95 
recognised by 1ater schoo1s, especially Peripatetics, 
(Aristot1e, Mag. Eth. 1182 a 15f), and. Posidonius; 
Greeks .and the Irrational, p. 228, note 30. 
103. 434E - 435D. 
104. Ph11ebus, 33B. 
105. 2l.D - E; trans. HS.ckforth. 
106. Hackforth, Commentary, p. 32. 
107. 50B - 52B. 
108, 27E. 
109. 28C - 32B; the difficu1ties in the b1ending doctrine are 
we11 noted by Crombie, Op. cit. p. 253 - 4• The 
metaphysioa1 aspects of the b1ended 1ife receive fu11 t.o rr ·(' , "' discussion by Professor Bo.~onis .. ) ~1 l·pgg_o..J.opa crp.os... 1" OU 
,AA,B .. ou .. 6~\LrcJ_~,-~-?iR-w . .,.;u.lfA~1'w\los, ch. 6, p. 46-51 • 
. :1 J 
llO. Seenot.e 62, above. and Ch. 5. Section 3. The relation 
.-: - ,. 
o'f· true and fals.e pleas~:es to goodness is examined by 
Professor Bu~onis: Op. cit., Ch. 7, esp. P. 57. 
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111. 33B - 36B. 
112. Discussed'by J. P. A. Gould, Op. cit. P• 47 ~55. 
Cf. T. Gould, ~ P• 113. 
I 113. Again, cf. Aristotle's ;pov_,.,,.,s. 
114. ~~ 792C - D. 
115. Whereas in ~he Philebus we observed that the factors of 
mind, unlimited, limit and blend were to be applied to 
intelligence, emotions, reason, and mixed life, in the 
~. 653 B - C (quoted in note 118), the correspondence 
I c; (" I 
must be _,._cHi QICIC (education), "'1 o o vot 1 _(pleasures), 
I # I 
v o ,..._o 1 (laws) and ..(per"? _(goodness). 
116. 792D. 
117. 812D - E. 
118 • 
. -~~ . . ::. ' . - ' . . ....-· 
.. '-·- .... 
~ .. \ 
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119. As in t·he Philebus, these pleasures as having moral 
sig~ificanqe can again be compared Wi.th Epictetus' 
good and bad.phantasiai. 
120.' 792E. Soe Marrow, Plato's Cretan City, p. 300 - 301. 
121. Soub.h6, Op. cit. Introduction, P• xliv, footnote. 
122. 
123. 
See also my Appendix II. 
A br~ef but illuminating account of.Soorates' ethics 
is given by Poh~enz 1 Freedom P• 60-68. Wp,R,I!lOC)J1;- .~cAnt 
: '~~~-o~, OK -~;~~~s?;orat~~:~p·e~oru¥11JY. f:. a~pe~ i~ d.erv9g9.l, 
1>hilciSOplii~ 'I<h97CY) Jj· .109-o154 ' . ' · ' ·:... . .. ''· '" '· , . 
!1.·,,: .. ~.'··.-~"·\\'; .. :,.;,_>'"·~''-:·-,y· •- • \ o I 
See section 4 above. A comment on .oubt•s 4K14V.~#J.~pT~~'' 
is to be found in J. P. A. Gould, Qp. cit. p. 52 - 54. 
124. In this connection Pohlenz, Freedo~ p. 66, remarks that 
Socrates took no account of the wiLl beaause "for the 
Greeks the ~l is not an independent function of the 
soul expressing its urge towards active engagement, but 
a reaching out to some more or less clearly defined 
goal that is or will be shown to man by his intellect". 
Thu~ already in the desire for goodness there is the germ 
of Aristotle's worke~ out theory of prohairesis. 
125.-
126. 
127. 
128. 
129. 
·:· _.' 
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Laws 731E - 732B. 
-
1168 b 25. 
1156 b 1 - 18. 
1168 b 25 - 1169 a 7. 
.; 
The fact that Aristotle stresses the rationality (Y~~V 
in action does not gainsay what has been said previout,31y 
on the import~nce of a combination of reason and desire. 
~he vou~ referred to here is the thought inherent in 
the prohairesis. ~he difficulty is noted by Burnet, 
. 
p(thics, note at 1168 b 35, P• 423. 
1,30. 1178 ~ 22. 
131. Qp. cit. P• 272 - 3. 
132. Philebtis 28c. See sect~on 5, above. 
133. Cf. Epictetus, Ill. 26, 30-'~ (t;tlso1 .11.14,: 2~29).; ~- Epi~tE}tue 
.. , . . _. .. .. . . . . . . ·,· ·.-
,howeve~t' the worcf '1'Gt1Teivos 1-te~lf (cf. nr· 24, 58)/ :i& ri~v~r . 
. ': . . . . . . . . . ,. ·. . . ' .. ,. ··;; . ,.. . 
. use!l.~frir a ~rtuoua state, but ie ioather· the oppod.te. of.~ullipos. 
· Xn thia J)assag~' -re~v &,,.ttl"wlt :~a .. llk~~: to_ Plato ie T.q('lfeiV~ s • 
' I I' ,· ' . ,· 
.,. -
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,. .... ' \ , ' ' , 134. 'Y'f T.CllL1id._VT_0$ __ £'1f1-JoA>61\0f'fA-'-\l'f- _1f'pD.S T'J v_ €..~ T" ?'/pI Q( v 
' ~ ' "". c~, , J , . ' , ( ) K9tL~ PE.TfJtl -rou !11\DIJ "'n"o< vT (;tfTI_ 4:.11_\[T£:-r.,._c_y~6Jfot. ,, . ~ q_o~ ~ 
,, 
135. The question is discussed by Pohlenz, Freedom p. 124 - 128, 
and Crombie, Op. cit. p. 2?5 - 2?8. 
136. ~ , ':~64 B - C. 
~' c. \ , ll ' ~ , 137. Republic 61'7E.,oli'Tiot EA_OfA-6VOlJ, UEOS«VoCI'TibS • 
138. Republic 619B. 
139. For example in Republic X 6040 
1.40. Thomas ~dy, Return of the Native, Book Th:ird Ch. VII. 
'" 
1.41.. Dodds, Plato a~the Irrational., P• 1.9. 
<::::. 
142. ~ 804B and 644D. 
'· 
1.43. See section 4 above, and note ·1.18. 
"·,. : 
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145. Epictetue, I 24, 20; I 25, 7 - 8. 
146. Greeks and the Irrational, p. 20 - 21. 
148. Riddell., in Append~ A of his edition of The Apology, 
c 
collects the d~ta from Plato and XenOphon and later 
sources, which describe the phenomenon. The interpre-
tation which he gives, however, is a rationalist one: 
"That the voice iG a ref~exive judgement on proposed 
actions, bllt does not supply motives of action" (p. 116) 
\thilst this conclusion is closely argued, he appears to 
neglect the religious side o~ Socrates •- character as 
portrayed in The Apology, Crito.BJld Phaedo. Moreover 
• ~ • .·-. J •• ' L.· 
it is a littl~ pr-e.sumptuous to a~low that Socrates might 
regard mental acts which were "beyond his kentt as divine, 
and ourselves to regard them as 11unanalysed acts of 
judgement" (p. 116); and especially so when Socrates iB 
accredited as having a mind "so purif;i.ed by temperance 
and self-knowledge, ••• endot--sed with such powerfu~ 
faculties especially those of observation and causality" 
(p. 114) Ridd-ell •s interpretation is better suited to 
--' 
149. 
150. 
151. 
. ~-. 
'• ": 
' . : ~-
101 
Aristotle's c~ncept of pro~iresis, in its rational 
aspect, when he says the voice had a· noritical or 
reflexive function; it did not contribute to form a 
purpose, but pronounced judgement on a purpose already 
in being11 (p. 116). This is also close to the function 
of prohairesis in Epiotetus, for where Epictetus Ibfers 
to reaQon as the divination within us, as i~ I 1?, and 
II ?, the religious or prophetic element does appear 
to be fully rationalised. The religious significance 
of the term is discussed by Friedlander I, p. 32 - 44. 
' J)e_ v~.ae~;,,i ~ilosophi~, ~·~ <:~~?0)/- <es~.-·;pp:~3.? ... ~·c ~~~ t_n~, ~vidW!~e 
· for a n,9~~ra~iq~~t. ~t~~re~~t~o~ o(S9.~t~:t1c ,·d9o.t,~e~ -
RePublic 617E~ .. : · - ' · ' · ·-- · 1 
Friedlander I, P• 38. 
See Chapter 3, section 5 1 and also Pohlenz, Freedom 
P• 142, and Friedlander I, p. 38. 
152. 11?6 b 4 - 6. 
1.53. Philebus 20D - E; Jla.ckforth, Qp. cit. p. 32 1 compares 
this with the passage from the Ethics. 
.r' .. ·~ . 
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J.?4. The passage,·- i177 a 12 ff, has been generally regarded 
as a Platonic interlude •. 
155. 1176 b 5 - 9. 
156. 1177 a 15, trans. Raokham. 
157. 1177 a 20 ff. 
158. Epiotetus, II 23, 42: 
159. Republic, 501D: 
16o.' S;ymposium, 210A to -?<~; Throughout Socrates' speech 
6pws is regarded as a bO:,I'wv , mediating between the 
individual and pure goodness and beauty. T-he function 
">' 
of E.pws as leading to goodness is noted by T. Gould, 
Love,p. 115 - 6, in reference to Phaedrus 237D - 238c. 
-
161. Republic, 516C - 517C. 
162. Epiotetus, DI '' 4. 
163. J. P. A. Gould, ,O'Q• oi.t. P. 54. 
_..1 •. 
164. The importance of- these schools is desc.ribed by Brehier,. 
Hellenistic and Roman Age, Ch. 1. 
1~5. See page 80. 
166. 1113 a 4. 
16?. In both philosophers the prohairesis is essentially 
rational. It is not to do·with emotions, anger and 
appetite (Ar. Ethics, 1111 b 15f); and Epictetus 
almost identifies it with the hegemonikon (See Ch. 5.5.). 
The rational embraces the irrational so perfectly 
that oboice can be left to the irrational in·full 
assurance of its rationality. 
·: ·. .· -' 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE STOICS 
1. The New Era. 
In this chapter wi~ be considered the new era of 
philosophy that began in Greece in the fourth century B.C. 
The significant change of approach and purpose that occurred 
in philosophy from the time of Diogenes the Cynic has direct 
influence on Epictetu,s who was writing in the Stoic tradition• 
Attention will be given to some of the characteristic obstacles 
of the Stoic system. to one endeavouring to teach a convincing 
theory of the individual's freedom. The chapter therefore is 
not a comprehensive survey of the Stoic system, but· a general 
appreciation of its distinctive approach as compared with 
earlier philosophy, and of inherent problems occasioned by 
this approach. 
Certain Stoic theories, notably cognit1on wil1.need 
more detailed examination in view of their importance in 
Epictetus' concept of prohairesis. Because of the lack of 
continuous extant texts, and the dit'f.icul ty of distinguishing 
·,. ': ... 
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commentary from original contributions, the questi.on of t;he 
development of the Stoic system will not concern us here, 
except where there are clearly two conflicting views on a 
theory. But one aspect of development will be considered, 
namely the traces of influence from Plato and Aristotle to be 
found in the period of the Fourth Academy. The change would 
seem to have shaped Stoicism to Epictetus' advantag~ in 
considering freedom of the individual. 
The age that s~ the inception of the Hellenistic 
philosophies was characterised by an immense increase in 
freedom. Cosmopolitanism was probab~y the chief cause. Local 
traditions and values, which were the only ones men knew and 
respected, were no longer significant, nor was it considered 
important to build on the tradition of the immediate past. 
Political.ly, for Athens at any rate, the ideals of the past 
generation could not guarantee much confidence. In this new 
situation of the empire of Alexander, man was ready to explore 
new fields in literature, philosophy and science, free from 
the inher~ted traditions of the preVious century.1 
A second characteristic of the age was its rationalism, 
reflected in the attention to literary technique, and in the 
interest in the practical sciences, astronomy, geography, 
i_. 
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mathematics and engineering. The age was immediately attracted 
by the analysis of verbal reasoning displayed in Aristotle's 
logic. 
Under such conditions, philosophy might be expected to 
flourish, and could well have done so had philosophers 
continued to interpret human life as they saw it around them, 
objecti'vely with a view to the truth as each one imagined it 
was, hoping their conclusions would benefit mankind, though 
not too concerned if the masses passed them by. But in the 
new era philosophers had become public servants and they had 
a job to do, and eo had to fulfil their mission wit~ expediency. 
The complaint of the public they wer~ serving has been 
described as a 'failure of nerve•.2 The sudden enormity of 
freedom had the effect of producing an in·stability in knowing 
what was right. \'ihen the mores of different regions b·egan to 
manifest themselves everywhere, it was diffi~ult to apply 
right or wrong to certain kinds of behaviour. Yet the sense 
that something must be right was still very strong.3 
This moral insecurity was one cause of the failure of 
nerve. A second cause, to which the former is related was the 
r fear of freedom. 4 The increased freedom had caused the future 
to become suddenly more unpredictable. The possibilities of 
. what might happen the day after were :increased, and fe·a.r of the 
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Unknown· took.its srip.5 Circumstances could no longer follow 
a course more or less prescribed by the institutions and 
traditions of the city-state. 
For these two reasons the majority of men were no 
lQ~ger happy. So the philosophers, instead of standing apart 
from the people and contemplating the nature of the truly 
happy life in the light of an interpretation of Truth, with 
the people ooiitent to live as they had always livedl, now, 
. ... . ,, 
with the masses no longer content, hud to m~e them happy, and 
schools f_or attaining happiness were established. Thus it is 
not far from the truth to describe Stoicism as 'a system put 
together hastily, viol.e~tly to meet a de·sperate emergency. 
. h 6 Some ring wall -must be buil-t against c aos•. 
The attempts by the Hellenistic philosophers to 
restore confidence in the worth of a man's own character, 
that is, his happiness, were characterised by three elements: 
. J I 
dogmatism, ot.Tr'!C,.fl~ ~-l.oC_, and rationalism. Dogma_tism was 
essential in order to carry conviction to the masses; the 
object could not be achieved by leaving questions open, 
especially in an age that was so ready to doubt everything, if 
in a system_of philosophy one detail was left;uncertain; 
' I' . 
c( Tee. poe. s--'~~-•--- or freedom from a· troubled mind, was an answer 
to the growth of fear. There was an alternative s6:t;utiont 
'•'' 
.... _ .. _ 
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namely to interp~et human life in terms of irrational factors 
as well as reaso~,? but this solution would at once be lese 
convincing, and it was against the spirit of the age. 
Rationalism was the acceptable method; a system could only be 
influential if founded upon logic. Rationalism clearly helps 
the dogmatic position, and is also effective in making the 
arguments of the system convincing to the generation that 
required it. 
To achieve success in what was demanded of them, the 
schools resorted to a noble lie. Having persuaded themselves 
of a false approach to philosophy, in giving a picture of 
man as he might be 1 the ideal sapiens, rather than making an 
objective study of man as he was, (an ignoble occupation at 
this time admittedly), they proceeded to persuade their 
followers that freedom and therefore happiness, consists in 
living utterly without deeire.or fear, and that such a life 
8 is humanly possible. 
This then was the common objective of the three schools 
with a popular following, the.Stoics, Cynics and Epicureans. 
Of these, Stoicism had the strongest appeal, since it was the 
most positive in that it accepted a purposefulness of life 
with respect -to the absolute: the absolute governing the_ whole 
universe 4-s reason; the reason in m,an, which is his tritest 
... 
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nature, is a portion of the Cosmic Reason; if therefore in 
everything he is inclined to follow his own reason, he will 
be fulfilling his absolute purpose, and \Oihether this brings 
pain or pleasure matters not, because there is no g_ood higher 
than fulfilling the cosmic purpose, and sucb,i<;~<llis inclination. 
So goodness came to be less allied with human ,b;appiness, 
for happiness is a feeling, and more conjoined to the natural 
order. :u Goodness leads to e-v p o toe (good running order of the 
individual within the universe), rather than to happiness, 
~ l' I ( €VOc:(.I~OVIoC ); you are only 'happy' by virtue of knowing 
that you have willed your life to accord with nature. 
Hence it was of prime importance for the fourth 
century Schools to have a clearly worked out concept of physis,· 
' 
nature, that is, the cause and course of things in the universe; 
then to derive logically from this, admitting no factors 
except those inherent in reason, a theory of human goodness. 
Accordingly by ~ailing to take an unbiased view of human 
nature, the Stoic philosophy was built on this false foundation, 
. 
false in its philosophical assumptions which were the basis . 
for all its ethical and practical manifestations. 
For this reason, its founder, Zeno, happened to 
inaugurate one of the most argumentative schools. Reason and 
nature, ita two basic assumptions were not closely defined, 
. ·~' .. 
110 
and were capable of different interpretations. Also £ailure to 
pay sufficient_ regard to man •s nature~ .. led to contradictions, 
and also to circular arguments. The School became :ramous for 
its paradoxes and eontradictions.9 The determined concept of 
nature, colliding with the concept of will in man is an 
obvious example. From the outset, the Stoics recognised will: 
the will must accord with nature; but again until Epictetus 
at least, the concept was ill-defined. It was not his aim to 
find a solution to the problem of free-will and determinism; 
~ n , 
rather he intended to interpret freedom, EA f:.IJ u6p tot. , as a 
:. I!' 
more positive goal, not so much freedom from (De- ~pac.~ ta( . , 
0 9 I 
c(•1fQ(.. '1-S , etc.) but freedom ~' and the essence of this 
freedom lay in the will. But unable to examine the human will 
and responsibility openly, he was constrained by a closed 
system distorted by.the exclusion of all but reason. 
W~y then ¢id the system persist? Firstly, it worked. 
Whj.lst the a·ttainment of perfect virtue was out of reach for 
most men, (all except the self-deceitful, or freaks), the 
Stoic philosophy did set up a noble aim; for the standard of 
morality which Stoicism demanded was on any recko~ing the 
h~hest, and even if men achieved this only in part, they 
found a satisfaction which they might otherwise have been 
without. Second, ·-1;here \'tas no philosopher, until possibly 
lll 
Plotinus, of such eP&libre to detach himself from a system, 
·. ~ ( _. 
and being confident enough in his reasons for rejecting 
Stoicism, able to build up an ethical philosophy on more 
realistic principles. Just as after Plotinus, philosophers 
had the same difficulty in detaching themselves from 
Christian theology. Third, Stoicism in the first two-hundred 
years of its following, secured for itself some of the 
characteristics of a religious faith, engendering a certain 
natural response to its precepts and assumption of reason; 
and a faith dies less quick1y than a mere philosophic system, 
(getpris Paribus},10 
By the time Epictetus was writing, Stoicism had 
interpreted reason in greater fairness to human nature, 
particularly through Posidonius and the later Academy, and 
also the Roman exponents, yet Epictetus never suggests 
abandoning any of the basic pr·inciples of the earliest Stoics. 
His philosophy feels the restriction, if he himself does not; 
but it also indicates a natural development within the system's 
framework towards his own direction of philosophy, the 
individual's freedom, for which the system was not originally 
designed. 
Within the fabrication of this framework, there was 
. 
room for attention to details of psychic functions~ some of 
- i . 
.. 
·' "'i 
which were a signif-icant contribution to thought, apart from 
thair relevance to Stoicism. Yet it is int~resting to note 
that the most significant face"ts of this thinking arose from 
the very problems and contradictions inherent in the system. 
The process of cognition, (perception and action) was studied 
to see how man's reason might interact with cosmic reason. 
The study of the passions was occasioned by their failure to 
be comprehended in a rational syste~, albeit their existence 
~as recognised. The theory of the will, which was developed 
by Epicte~us, was occasioned by the conflic~ of determinism 
with an appreciation of man's willing nature; also the study 
of duties arose from the difficulty of attaching worth to 
things that are 'indifferent• ( C:.,&,~top~ ). 
For philosophy in general, the importance of Stoicism 
is to be found in these secondary theories. The fabri~ation 
of rational assumptions containing these _is not philosophically 
important, except in so far as it demonstrates weaknesses 
inherent in a purely rationalistic system produced by 
reasoning men rather than by enlightened men. For mankind 
suffering fr~m the pessimism, insecurity and lack of_ confidence 
which accompanies an age of newly found freedom, the system 
provided an anchor allowing his moral dignity to be preserved. 
' ... -... ~ ... 
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2. Theory ~f Knowledge. 
A study of the main points of the Stoic theory of 
knowledge and its development is necessary for an understanding 
of Epictetus' use of the term truyi<#(TJ..Ih~•s, or ;intellectual 
assent, which is the chief area of freedom in which prohairesis 
can operate. 
The Stoics based their theory of knowledge on certain 
cri~eria. Of these we may examine first the phantasia, then 
the other criteria. The doctrines concerned with phantasiai 
are in two stages, led by Zeno and Chrysippus. 
a. Phantasiai, (Zeno): For Zeno, phantasiai was the 
starting point of knowledge; they were representations coming 
, 
from without which made an impression on the soul, TUTt'Wtrl~ 
11 
• The process of knowledge is continued by 
an assentio ( ~rvyK«T~Detr•~ ) to certa~ of the phantasiai. 
Zeno attached cred_ulity1 (fidem), that is, gave assent, only 
to tho.se pii~tasj_ai which possessed a certain correct 
manifestation of those things which are seen.12 This assentio 
is unde:rstand:lng, (-t<J~t.:r~_A!IJ.f'-~-. comprehensio ). If the 
und·erstanding thus 'arrived at cannot in any way be criticised 
by reason, then it is kliowledge; if it fails this teste()'? 
reason, ·;.·~-:"~6 lack of knowledge. 
>. 
ll4 
Thus Zeno accepted a process of phantasiai - assent -
comprehension - knowledge. The difficulty in the theory is 
iii the means of distinguishing the true and false impressions; 
how can one distinguish whether they have a correct 
manifestation of the things seen, unless one already has 
knowiliedge, - in which case further knowledge would be 
superfluous.13 The Sceptics were quick to criticise the 
.theory on these grounds, saying that __ Ko<T~)..")'h s was 
unwarranted since every true phantasia could be·confused with 
an untrue one;14 the Stoics did allow that if, as in a large 
number of Ehantasiai, there were alternatives left open, the 
' 
' I truth lay in recognising this and witholding assent, ( e"Tt' oX '1 ) • 
The criticism from the Academy caused the Stoics to adjust 
their theory. 
It is important to notice that in the account of the 
theory of knowledge just referred to,15 the early Stoics_ 
regarded the incidence of Ehantasiai ( 'T~ foC vTd.l' w 9?}V9<• ) as 
involuntary, whereas the agreement ( r~ ~uy KDC.T~ 9~t:J'~c(J ) was 
voluntary, involving a considered reaction from the one who 
has received the phantasia. Thl.s two-fold activ;Lty is clearly 
explained by Sextus Empiricus.16 This recognition of the 
agreement as voluntary provided an opening·in the Stoic system 
which_ E.l~ictetl.!s utiltse.d to good effect in fram.ing his theory 
of the will. Thus for Zeno .. mistakes in knowledge q.re caused 
- ·'' 
- . .,. . 
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by weaknesses in a man's judgement, not from faults in the 
actual data, the phantasiai. 
The theory of knowledge becomes confused in the use 
of the term +fi(VT'oC.crt~ KaCTatATpt'TIK.., • The confusion possibly 
arises from the difficulty in distinguishing from the texts,. 
the doctrines of Zeno and Chrysippus, and from the likely 
frequent change of position the Stoics themselves held on 
this subject on account of the criticism from ~he Sceptics. 
The earliest use of this term was to distinguish between 
phantasiai which are pronounced as true by the assent of the 
intellect, ~d those which are manifestly true, without the 
need of any conscious assent. Sextus Empiricus17 demonstrates 
that of the true phantasiai, some are KcoC.T'aC.A"7l1'T •J• and some 
are not. The. cf•hfntd'•~ 1 16C1'.CA'7Jrr'~' have the power of themsel vee 
to force the judgement to assent, and the assent is always 
correct. At first the 4'ctv1'CJ(d[fl( tC~~CT.C~'J'IITuc~ seems only to be 
applied to sensual impressions, but later, impressions of 
right conduct also are said to come to us with· sttch clear 
distinction ( J I EVCilpy&ta( ) that doubt is impossible: these 
take us by the hair and drag us to assent.18 Yet for Zeno 
is the criterion. 
Wi~h Ohrysippue_ however, the criterion wa~ the_ --cl«v "rct 0' 11o( 
#(ci(Ta(A'111'-TUC~ itself, 19 since these pb.an..taaiai necessarily 
,. 
...... ,,. 
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; these pnantaeiai occur as an 
aiteration in the ·soul (an·_ l<re p_i:f;,.;,_a-ii; ,·see below), or an 
awSkening to knowledge by an alteration of the patterns which 
a 1 
comprise each _E. vvo"1 ~oe. , or ·concept. 
, I 
This interpretation of ___ fC~t-~T'OC.~JJ!C(. .~Tf1!.).'7"1f-riiC"J- has two 
results: first, the voluntariness ~occasioned by~ tru.yt<.ri(Tt:JL.8BtriS 
is no longer applicable to these pbantasitd, since the assent 
necessarily follows. Second, if the phantasiai were bound to 
produce a necessary reaction to right"assent, it seems perfectly 
allowable that there was a kud of phantaaia which produces a 
necessary or instinctive reaction to wrong assent; this could 
lead to an explanation of the passions, particularly to 
Chrysippus 1 re-interpretation (see below), and to Epictetus' 
view of the ph~tasiai as a temptation to evu.20 
I • 
b. &antaaiai, (Chrzei.ppus): De Vogel refers to the 
modifications m~~e by _Chl'ysippus as a positi~n of psychological 
monism. 21 This means that all a person's aotiv:i:t~es, whethe.r 
intellectual or physical, are governe~ by the hegemonikon, or 
ruling principle, being dispose.d in a certain way. Accordingly 
the Ehantasiai are reg~ded less as stimuli from without 
awaiting judgement from the intellect, but rather as an 
• .. 
inclil;lat~~n. w;~tbiri the mental· constitution. They are a changing 
disposi t.i.on: .~ the s.ou1·, not an impres~ion--2!!. the soul, 
( e_r.¢_g oi~ (J' t s ,y "X ~s or_ ~ re.ptfi_~flr.IS _t_\L_~v~fL~V I I(~ ) 22 
,., ..<,' 
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Th:us with all phantasi.ai it now appears that _trvytt.§(r~9uts 
is no longer required, as an independent judging !tinction, and 
with 1~ has gone also the freedom which it afforded. Yet 
I I 
there are cases when a man may reject a +GCvTd.trlll. t<..c.,.C~C~.,lf"7'UC9J 
' ~ " , because he thiDks it is improbable on account of. '"7" eJ,_,v,.v nprt1Tc/.1'IV 
(the circumstances without). 23 
However Plutarch's commentary on this very question, 
shows how .Chrysippus tried to hold that wh12e the phantasiai 
and our mental ~eaction to them were determined, there was 
still ·~=~'£""'19$~~uyK«'T~ 9Ef1'1S and therefore will; a phantasia 
does not Qf itself cause assent, although it is the direct 
cause of action. This leaves room for assent, presumeably to 
the whole phantasia-plus-reaction event. t1e are left ·free 
to assent to this happening or not. Thus it becomes the part 
of will to acquiesce in what is determined through the 
phantasia:t.24 
· Under Carn~s t~e Sceptics adopted a less uncompromis-
ing attitude to the Stoic concept of ~<..c"f:C)."Jt'~ , and allowed 
9 ' , degrees of probability in phantasiai: "'' "'"'7 • YrEp• ...,~4\lt<"-E""f 
and :C"fl'cprcrn~cr-ros, the third being pr~ctical certitude. 25 
Later Sceptics laid down conditions, ( Tp' 1f o • ) for 
suspension of judgement. 
c. Other Criteria: Apart from the phanta~~ai, that 
118·. 
occur specifically, the Stoics accepted further criteria for 
knowledge, that is, the means of acquirilig knowledge, in the 
form of a body of knowledge built up from the years of 
infancy, by which the individual phantasiai could be judged. 
. I 
In the early Stoics there is little evidence to show that the 
body of knowledge was innate, and this would be contrary to 
26 their physical doctrine. Rather knowledge gro\'IS up in us 
' 
through t~e accumulated , the 
phantasiai we naturally regard as true. The term given to 
,, 
such knowledge is.- .£ vv o 1C1C. 1 also 
• 
prolepsis and notities are used in this connection •. ,i~. 
4n acccnmt of the i~vo•ou (concepts) ;-) ·, 
is given by Aet~us: 27man is born with a •tabula rasa• <x~p~v 
~~ ~ o A 6.u.e.pyov ccs «1foypGC.'f'"'JV. ) in the hegemonikon, and this is 
>I . filled with evvo1~1 which come from our perception and 
p~antasiai whenever we experience similar forms of phantasiai; 
, .. 
for example, we form a notion ( avvo1« ) of whiten~ss 
from the accumulated.impressions of white objects. 28 
By combining the accounts of Aetius29 and Diocles Magnes,3° 
the prolepseis appear to be the first conception of an object, 
arrived at "without special mental attention and derived 
either directly or by some simple and unconsciousmental 
operation from the data given by the senaest/31 a:owev-er, the 
-. _,;i 
I' 
'·'.. . . ' .- ·~ 
ll9 
,, 
origin of the knowledge contained both in 4:VVOiaC. and 
. 
prolepsis was.unclear even to the Stoics, who generally 
accepted both terms as referring to commonly accepted knowledge 
~I 
of principles. Thus £vv o '"' 1 are frequently described as 
, 
1<01 V'otf (common notions). Prolepsis, so far as there is 
any distinction, is a more elementary, less defined knowledge 
':'I than (VVOI~ ; for Epictetus at any rate the distinction was 
technical rather than practical. 
Epiotetus g~ves a cloar account of the building up of 
~ .... -. 
'-.VV Of~L. .. The passage may be isolated from any particular 
uses he gives the term, since it occurs in a ~sage giving 
praise to God for the wonders of creation; ~e speaks of the 
wondrous way man acquires knowledge, and strictly follows the 
Stoic theory: man guards in the soul many impressions, and when 
again he is moved by a similar ~pre-ssion, the mind lights 
upon notio.ns corresponding to the first im:Pressions ( _ ro"'1 ~ 
1tpwT~S renJ1tf.JK~CS'1)?2 
A similar-theo~y was adopted by the Epicureans, who 
' 
. 
altogether had ~ ~ . three· Q;r::iteria: .tl(.fd'_ll_tlCJ"'S , prolepsis and 
_T"~ 1f~9'? • The proleieeis were.),veneral notions· of the mind 
I ;~ 
resulting from c{{C'I'li~a-as. Cicero, givillg the Ep~curean 
prooff! for the existence _of God, 3.4 adr;la t_wo · points to the 
.,'•. 
theory, firsJt, .that pr~~e;eais is a common notion, 3.5 second it ts 
·• -. >·· .,. 
·. •,- , . . : .. ' 
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innatt\36, ··~b,e Stoics s_ubscribed to the first,· in their 
? 
' . .,_,. 
J<o•"-11(~. cw.votaCI 1 but not to the second. 
Epictetus holds great value in tl;l.e prolepaeis as a 
mea$ure ot judging phantasiai, and any body of proven 
knowledge, whatever its origin, is covered by the term, but it 
particularly includes the principles and maxims of the Stoic 
school. 
3. Beason and Nature. 
.. 
~eason and nature are key concepts in the Stoa, and 
are both closely related. Logos, or the cosmic reason was 
the power which generates and sustains the whole universe, 
and man's part is to act in accordance with this reason, or, 
as it is more commoll.ly stated, in accordance with nature. 
Both reason and nature are ill-defined in the Stoic system, 
and this haS lead to some of the inherent diff'iculti:es 
encounteredin the introduction to this chapter. The basis of 
the difficulty is that reason was required to embrace more 
than mere causation. To say that reason is the essence of the 
universe may stand as far as scientific explanation of matter 
an,d gen~ration is concer~e~, but to say that this same reason 
is the ~ssenQe of go~dness impl.i&s that reason has values, 
: ~~· · .. .'., 
.. ~. ..... ... 
I' 
<,,'· 
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wherea~ in fact, in the physical theory, the end or purpose of 
the Reason was for matter to return to its original state of 
, 1r v£v f.A.G{.... {s.p:lri t) • 37 
,_ - -
Thus two ideas are confused: reason as a means of 
accounting for causation, and reasoned thought_in working out 
the beat course of action an individual should take. The 
latter could not be simplified to more logos as causation, for 
as Aristotle showed in his theory of tPJ""l r:r IS , human 
reason is an inter-play of all the functions of the human mind. 
In spite of the ambiguity of the term logos, the Stoics 
were able to fuse the two ideas quite convincingly: the whole 
\1 ~ 
of the natural world is enlivened by _,..oyo' fY'ff'e.pJA-atTI~Or 
\ ' I 38 emanating from the. ~ oyos o·"rrcp,.... OC.TIK os • Man is endowed 
with an actual portion of the cosmic reason, all_}i~, which 
on account of its identity with the Reason is the highest and 
best part of man. 
Nature ( +.S_cra5 ) also admits of two interpretations: it 
may be coneidered· afl the divine plan, i.e. the logos,39 or as 
. the normal stat'e of beilig of an individual creature' its 
nature. In the -Stoic system the two ideas were fused, and 
the second~aa regarded as a multiple manifestation of the 
first. 40 To foilow.one'a own nature, is in fact to follow the 
purpose for which he or it exists in the universal nature. 
. ' 
., 
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The basis of the Stoic ethic was the doctrine of~ 
oikeiosis, to live according to nature. A thing is in 
accordance with nature when determined by its own ruling 
principle, or hegemonikon. In man the hegemonikon, this 
highest ruling part, is reason. 
Man's distinctive possession of reason as God has it, 
is often illustrated by the Stoics by contrast with animals. 
Animals act in a rational. manner, with their minds activating 
their bodies;as the phantasiai occur to them, but man applies 
his own powers of reasoning which enable him to see aach 
situation in the light of universal ooncepts. 44 Epictetus 
draws the distinction that animals have the use of the 
phantasiai, but man has in addition $n understanding of their· 
use. 
The reason .in man is conc~ntrated in the hegemonikon, 
and ~a still seen to combine the two ideas: it is the means 
of rat~onal thought and judgement, and as being allied to the 
,. . 
"" c'osmic reason, it is wveuf-'-G' or the life-giving force in man; 
it thus takes on the fqnctions of •soul', and is respons~ble 
for the physiological, (includ1hg psychological) functions. 42 
Of these, only the latter mall;ife.station of reason is pref!ent 
in animals. This function c~ns~sts in receiving Gl phantas~a. 
'·· (impression), followed by inclination or di'f;iinclination· on· the 
-,...,-· '····. -.-'••;.; 
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part of reason to unite itself with the object of the phantasia. 
Thus reason acts in the interests of the being as designed by 
providence. 43 
Human reason has the additional function of distinguish-
ing, as regards the phantasiai, the true from the false, and 
accordingly giving and witholding assenti it must not yield to 
c. I 
the :inclinations ( op,...ou ) until they are known to be in 
accordance with nature. The presentation of phantaaiai then 
. 44 
becomes perception and inclination, (i.e. considered will). 
This judging function of reason, the typically human 
part, works primarily by virtue of being able to form and apply 
general preconceptions, prolep~eis. Plutarch45 shows that 
Chrysippus thought we were being le.ss than human if we merely 
respond to pbantasiaii for since some of the phantasiai 
occurring to man are false, 46 he must bring his own reason to 
, 
be~ ·on them in the form of judgements, ( ~uy K ae. TGl9 £ c:r E: • s ) • 
Thus :i.n the reasonable being, every act is a reasoned act. 
The purely an~ating function of the rational hegemonikon47 
is seen in those passages which describe the he!emonikon as 
controlling a1l the faculti~s of man.48 These physiological 
faculties (the five senses, language etc.) were regarded as 
emanations of the hesemonikon. Brehier remarks, 49 that 
whereas Plato and Aristotle made a l~gical division of the soul 
..... ·· 
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into intellect, desire and a nutritive element, the Stoics 
accepted a principle of emanation, such that all the body's 
activities and drives, though not in themselves rational, 
derive their existence from the rational activity of the 
hegemonikon. Chrysippus compares the hegemonikQn to a spider 
at the centre of its web, or to a polypus extending its 
tentacles in a certain direction.50 In less picturesque 
terms, this was Chrysippus' theory that all activity was the 
result of a ,(a certain disposition 
of the hegemonikon). This is the essence of C~ysippus' 
theory of psychological monism, of which h:i,s explanation of, 
pbaDtasiai was but~one manifestation.5l 
It 'is in consideration of this animating function of 
reason, that. certain irrational functions become apparent, 
that is, irrational ~n the sense_ that they are opposed.to the 
proper human functioning of reason.- In _pa.f.ticular, the nature 
of the 1f:C. e., (passions) were dj..s~ussed in this connection• 
D f . An op,...1'J , or urge, resu1ts through natural reason 
from the occurenoe of phantasiai. A definition is given:52 
\ c ' 7 J. \ .,. • I \ \ , "-'l~ e>f>,.,"'V .,_~"'aU .,opctv -~U-K""''JS &"11'1 -rt "'"'iLT.:.e>-.ysvos-• But in man, 
there are two types of urges, the reasoneci inclination, 
'\ \ c " ... \ ( -~. )_, ,. " ... , ~"'J-1\.o.y 11<.1:J--9.p ~'1- . , wh;i.ch is a 'f~poe. o tot VOl 9CS .e'lfi.TIT~V ev 1~ 1rp.tTTE1\fe 
and .Jp.e,!~•-$-- (desi;o·e h - ... _fp:s..~.Js.,·,."is~, distinguished from 
'. .f.'·. 
. ·:· . . · .. ' .. · . 
,.· 
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A. ' ~ , oyu<?'f opp. '7 since it only has the appearance of a_ Aoyll<~ 
c I 
_r!pJ.t '1 , that is, it convinces that it is rational (sufficiently 
to gain the stamp of rational) when it is not.53 
From this theory arose the definitions of the passions. 
I t "' They were clearly disturbances of the soul (_'J1'TC:IIc=' J1X1J~ ),54 
on account of their irrational charaoter.55 But being 
consistent with his psychological monism, Chrysippus regarded 
c. I 
them as Op}-l 0( J , inclinations emanating from the soul. Either 
a l\'~ 9 oc; was c. \ \ , p 56 OP#"'J 7fi\EOV4't~_D_U_#'Cif. 1 that is, an 
over-bearing reaction to a phantasia, that couid not listen to 
reason, or it was an o p tJ- ~ produced by wrong judgement.57 
This account of the n ~ 9"1 was later criticised by Posidonius. 
In Chrysippus' account, the intrusion of the irrational 
is seen to lie within the functioning of the hegemonikon itself, 
and in the case of -rt~9"J , th-e irrational causes reason to 
yield to bad action. ·However, there is an instance where the 
irrational is seen. to manifest itself in a way that it affects 
neither good nor b"ad; this is in making a choice where each 
alternative i~ equally balanced izt ~he judgement of human 
reason;58 Chr-ysippus challenges those who consider that in 
making a choice between alternatives equally balanced, certain 
adventitious mot-ions ( ~we>..e&icr-ra.c.,v TW~ K:V"]tf'lll) in .the 
hegemoni1fon decide :the choice, but .theseTnotiona are uncaused • 
''• 
_..,..., .. ...... .. 
:..r·. 
' -
_-' ' ~ .. - . . ~ ' . 
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Whilst Chrysi~pus.tends to support .the view, he states that the 
motions must ·haveca cause that is concealed,59 which mov~s our 
inclination one way or the other. Yet at the same time (and 
this is' the point of Plutarch's 'contradiction'), he does 
regard such choices as fortuitous (therefore uncaused). From 
c. , 
this it appears that DPf-'"1 is not always fully rational, and 
certain aspects of inclination must be explained by the 
irrational. 
Yet the important thing is that Chrysippus wanted to 
regard even the irrational factors in choice, or at least in the 
lf ~e...., . as dispositions of the soul, and the whole process 
is described in stages: 1. A weakening of rational power; 
2. An opinion on the good or ill; 3. A juAgement on the 
fitness of the passion; 4. An overbearing state of the soul 
:» ~~ ~~ e. 
resulting from the judgement; Q K K A IC:1'1S or _ o. p e ~ 1 c; 
5. The expression of emotions, (laushter, etc.) 60 
On the subject of the _:ft :C 6 '1 , the intellectual monism 
61 
of Chrysippus was probably adopted by Zeno before him. 
Strictly, in neither is there any mention that there is a seat 
of irrational emotions in the soul. The he'%emonikon, _whic_h is 
basically rational is termed 'irrational' when it "gives way 
before the force of impulse and deci¢es on Sl:)mething ot which 
objective reason would ·not. approve ~tS2 The oonclusi.on that . 
_,. ' ~ 
.:·. ,_ .. •,,._ . <· .. 
,. ,'\_ ·. · .. 
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.1l~.9os is also logos is of vital importance in the concept of· 
wi.ll which was to· develop later, wbere·the irrational and 
rational parts of the willing function are seen to be 
inseparable. 
4. Ethics and Freedom. 
There exists a similar dilemma in the Stoic concept of 
Goodness· to that which has already been noticed in the concepts 
of reason and nature. First, the Stoics required goodness to 
be the absolute perfection of reason in man, where hie wisdom 
admitted of no error. Thus goodness was expressed as 
oikeiosis,63 that is, perfecting one's own nature, which will 
be done only by the constant attention to reason, since in the 
Stoic system reason was identified with nature. 
~'Iatson draws attention to the. function of logos as 
~ 64 TE x~,_,.,-,, ( cr~ftsman). Thus man, as posse.ssing l()gos is a 
parallel craftsman to nature, and through their logo~, t·heir 
own tendency to design and proportion, they 'gradually construct 
a parallel universe•. ~his is man's distinctive oike:Losia, and 
to achie-ve it he must perform his highest function, that of 
, 
- TE XV I T7J t; and this involves knowledge df the logos. Only 
the absoltite].y w-ise man will be absolute;Ly good; and ·goodness 
. \"·; ·. 
.. -·.' .. 
. ~, .... ' 
·.·., 
had no meaning for the Stoics unless it was perfect and faultless. 
On the other hand, the Stoics wished to combine the 
absolute value of that goodness with the relative values of 
the various good things that add comfort or adornment to life. 
The latter involved altruistic action of a kind, whilst for 
the former, it was necessary to have complete inward detachment. 
Goodness was right reasoning, and right reasoning must admit of 
no uncertainties; certainty can only exist with those things 
over which the agent has absolute control, hence anything 
external to the agent cannot have any bearing on the goodness 
of the individual. Accordingly the Stoics drew a sharp 
distinction of things in our pototer and things not in our power. 65 
Altruistic action was concerned with the latta~, which 
the Stoics termed, adiaphora, things indifferent as regard 6ood 
and bad. And although outside the realm of the good, .these. 
adiaphora did vary in value. Those that were considered of 
,) ' ' value were termed .'14 l I.GC • those of no value !c.'11'oc ~I o( • And 
those things of value were aaid to be ( '· prefe:red !! P.P.., Y/4'~«-
that is, they were. to .be pursued by the virtuous man, but not 
in such a w~~ that it involved his own moral character; he was 
not to feel desire to~ards them. 66 ;i1rtuous acts were termed 
\~· 
. , 
J<.li(Top Bw,...«Td.., ci,etermined not by the result of the action, 
s:j.nce tpi~;~ might depend on ext~rnalst but on the state of mind 
. i:.: ·~~- !· .• · . 
.. 
'. ~ ·?'·· ~ ... ~ •' 
), 
. ·: .. 
129 
or reasoning in wh~ch it t1as done. Whereas acts done with. a-
I 
view to adiaphora were termed 
.. , 
tc ~'IJ.'71< 0 \IT~ 1 or duties, 
(offic1a~. 67 
The inner quality ot moral goodness was stressed in 
this system. As in Aristotle responsibility was seen to be 
an essential condition of moral goodness, yet no one could 
be held respon~_ible for anything apart from the reasoned 
function of giving assent to phantasiai. Goodness therefor.e 
had to follow a determined course, .that of reason, and to give 
the agent some kind of responsibility, he had to will this 
necessary assent, (necessary if goodness was to be attained). 
Through the concept of willing, the necessary became good; 
and this is more than saying, (as Aristotle) that voluntari-
ness is a condition of a good moral action. It was due to the 
very basis of their system in the mate~·ialistic, therefore 
caus~tive., doctrine of nature, that the Stoics were forced to 
give a more prominent place to will than previous philosophers, 
in order to account for responsibility in a necessary moral 
action. 68 
The problem of will and ~eterminism then immediately 
confronts the ~.toic position, and -without ever formulating ·a. 
proper concept of will,. (they were content to leave it more of 
a cart1e blanche than even reason or nature), they made attempts 
_.F._' '. 
·.:.·"' . -, ~· 
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at a compromise when criticised on this score. 69 Two examples 
of such compromise may be mentioned, both attributed to 
Chryaippua. The first is in Plutarch,70 where he draws a 
\ 
dist:i.nction between an antecedent cause, ( 'ffprJt<"'TCJCptc.Tik'7 
_..-:· .... 
~ I I A' ~ I 
Cl( IT. lot) which is Fate, and absolute cause ( «UT o T e "') ~ « • T aoc > I 
which is the assent, or will. The same distinction occurs in 
Cicero, 71 when we say each thing happens by fate·, we mean by 
antecedent or initiating causes, not the principal causes. The 
principle cause is in the intelligence and judgement of the 
agent himself. 
The second example occurs in Aulus Gelliua72 where the 
division of determined and willed causes seems to be arbitrarily 
placed in the functions of the mind. We ourselves are 
responsible for the quality of the peculiar properti_es of our 
wands, (ingenia ipsa mentium). When these qualities have been 
determined by the will, Fate acts upon them accordingly; just 
as there ·are two causes of a cylinder continuing to roll down 
hlll, namely, the agent who first pushed it, .and the shape of 
the cyli~er; so Fate sets the mind in motion first, though 
the carrying out of designs is regulated by the individual's 
own will, and the character of his mind.73 The intelligence or 
mind, as a principal cause, has the freedom of following 
possibilities, which may or may not be realised, but the actual 
' ' 
. ' ' 
.. ··.'. 
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events have also an initiating cause, and must therefore be 
according to fate. 74 · 
The discussions, frequent in the mid-Stoa on will and 
determinism are important in so far as they indicate the 
significance of willing in moral action. They saw an inso1uble 
contradiction here, and made it necessary to form1llate a 
clearer concept of will. This taek remained for Epictetus; 
but it was not his aim to contribute to the will and determinism 
debate. Though in forming a concept· of wi.ll in the restricted 
fabric of a fully determined universe, his work necessarily ( 
gives a point of view worthy of consideration. He was helped 
in his work by the debaters, particularly by such passages as 
the second, quoted above. 
5. Posidonius and the Fourth Academy. 
It remains to consider some oignificant changes in 
Stoic doctrines which took place in the first cent~ B.C. The 
chief reason for modification of doctrines was criticism from 
the Sceptics against the manifest contradictions in the system. 
Carneades w~s the main opponent, partiou:larly against the 
Stoic criteria of truth. 
Stoics parried these atta.cks for a period by concer.ning 
... ~. . . ' . . :.-. . .. ,. 
, •• '. , •• -... . . ""'.' t•.'"!-
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themselves with a right knowledge and attitude towards the 
Duties, which were an off-shoot of the main Stoic system, in 
the area of, adiaphora. This was chiefly the work of 
Panaetius, reflected by Cicero in his De Officiis. 
But the criticism eventually had to be met by a 
re-examination of more fundamental issues ~n the system. 
Poeidonius was the first to modify substantially the doctrines 
of Chryeippus. Posidonius ~rae. a scientist and geographer, 
and his modification appears to be influenced by an'understand-
ing of natural phenomena as it actually is.75 He is less keen 
to build a theory on ill-defined assumptions; in this, and in 
his scientific bias, he resembles Aristotle. 
The .chief modification was the recognition that man •a 
soul was partly irrational, in having three different functions: 
, and •. It 
will be s~~~at once that this is a partial return to 
Aristotle's view of the soul, and opposed to Chrysippus' 
psychological monism. This change has implications in consider-
ing the passions, which PosidoDius regarded as irrational and 
yet perfectly natural, adopting therefore a Platonic dualism of 
'76 a rational and irrational soul. Passions are caused by 
folloWing the irrational part of our nature, they do not follow 
upon judgeme~t.77 
., ~ ~ ·' ,, ,, <·.• .. 
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A further consequence is the recognition of a moral 
IJ . \ 
struggle in man, reminiscent of the struggle in the cucpd.T1S of 
Aristotle, the conflict of desire and reason, 78 and Posidonius 
recognises the virtues of cr~~potrGV<rJ and _i_yKp:CT&ICJC 
(self-control).79 Posidonius anticipates Epictetus in 
recognising in man a real self, consisting of thought and 
intelligence, rather than flesh and blood. 8° Connected with 
this was the approach to self-knowledge (see below). 
The abandoning of Chrysippus 1 moJU.sm coul.d also have 
had repercussions on the relation of the senses and the 
intellect in the theory of knowledge. The intellect is free 
to judge on the phantasiai occuring to it from outside. This 
would be a reversion to Zeno 1s position81 which was also adhered 
to by Epictetue. An illustration of_ the independenee of the 
. ·>·,~ 82 
intellect from the senses, is Seneca's account of anger. 
Also d~ing this period there is increasing use of 
, f)' \, the Aristotelian term op os ~oyos • which is common in 
Epictetus. The adoption of this term is not significant of 
any major change in theory, but does indicate influence from 
Aristot~lian and Platonic doctrines. Applied to the Stoic 
system, the ~p &.;s A:Y~-S was the div:i.ne reason .pervading the 
universe. This reason is the standard for man 1s own rational. 
acti.vity .. 83 
' ~ . . •· ' 
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It is worth noting the occurrence of the Platonic ter~ 
daimon in the passage of Posidonius quoted by Galen, wher~ 
the daimon is identical with the reason in us, which we share 
with the divine reason, and which is thereby a perfect gu~de 
84 to right activity. Th~ introduction of the term has been 
noted by Schmekel as a spiritualising element in the evolution 
of Stoicism, derived from Platonism, or more probably Pythagoreanism.85 
This is also suggested by a passage from Diogenes Laertius who 
connects the idea of a guiding-daimon in the in4iv.idual with the 
~ I U O"VtJ- 'f--""VrGC. (harmony) of the whole universe. 
It may also be that the introduction of the term coincided 
with the interest in d'~J"Tr~9EIA.: , or the inter-acting of all 
8'7 the parte of the universe, Poh1enz regards this as an essential 
part of.Posidonius'theory of knowledge and nature. Trusting 
in this -4octrine.; a cult of sympathetic magic gained popularity. 89 
In the Fourth Acad.emy, ~h:iefly represented by Antioohus 
of Ascalon,; a revolu-tion took pl.ace w~c-~ put's an end to the 
purely critical phase in the development of Platonism, led by 
the Sceptics, making it once again a positive and speculative 
philosophy, and the teaching of Antiochus shows the beginning 
of a- philosophy of.ayn~hesis, with Plato and Aristot.le bearing 
up.on Stoicism. And Stoic doctrines were re-interpreted in this 
new light~90 The chief distinction of the new teaching was its 
._ ....... _ 
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consideration of man in hie entire being; there was a lack of 
prejud~~e for appreciating only the reason in man. This led 
to the:~important development of stressing the nature of the 
individual in interpreting the 'live according to natUre' rule. 91 
This is clearly set forth in Cicero in his De Finibus. 92 The 
perfection of each part of man in its individual nature is the 
true good. The whole of life is a process of perfecting the 
parts and realising his endowments, particularly the fulfilment 
of the intellect. This interpretation of man involves concern 
for health, beauty and social activity for their own sakes, 
(propter ipsos). For a time therefore the, adiaphora took on 
greater importance in the Stoic system, but eventually this 
naturalism became fuller co-ordinated into their basic doctrines. ~ 
But more significantly for Epictetus, this new concept 
I 
of man's natur~ demanded_self-knowledge. Cicero quotes the 
Delphic, "noscere nosmet iRsosn,93 bidding us to be aware of 
the powers of the body and mind which we po·ssess; for only by 
. 94 
self-knowledge can we fulfil our complete nature. · Many as~ects 
of this naturalistic interpretation of man's being will recur 
in Epictetus, and much of the change of spirit that appears 
in Epictetus as distinct fro~ the Earl7 Stoios,sbould be 
attributed to this period of Stoicism. 
.. -'··· . .., ·-: 
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NOTES ~0 CHAPI'ER THREE 
1. This is described by Dodds, Greeks and the Irrational 
p. 236f, as the breaking up of the 'inheri~ed 
conglomerate•. 
2. Murray, -~ive Stases, Ch. 4. 
3. This seems to ·be in contrast to the present day freedom 
and permisiveness where belief even in the existence of 
absolute values is weak. 
4. _This theory is put by Dodds, Greeks and Irrational, 
P• 236f. 
5. In Epicureanism, the fear was concentrated on fear 
of t~e Gods and_ ·f'(;)ar of death (Lucretius Bk. III), 
and· the doctrine of living each day as it comes was 
accepted. 
values was 
·, 
But with those whose belief in absolute 
0 
stronger,_fear was far more genera~. 
6. B~van, -Stoics and ,Sc-eptics., p. 32. 
. ,· .;' ... 
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7. Here Plato and Aristotle exhibit their truer conception 
of humanity; and later Stoics followed them in this, 
see section 5 below. 
8. The falsity of this psychology ·is characteristically 
noted by Murray: "To be::;·rfeally without fear or desire 
would mean death, and to die is not to.solve the 
problem of living", Op. cit. p. 121; this same use of 
a fantastic psychology is noted by Dodds, Qp cit,. 
P• 239 and Pqhlenz, Fr~edom, p. 138. 
9. Many of these are to be found in Plutarch, ~ 
Stoicorum Repugnantis, and Cicero, Paradoxa Stoioorum. 
10. Lucretius tried to accomplish the same status for 
Epicureanism, in his De Rer~ Natura. 
ll. SVF I 58. 
12. "Propriam quandam haberent declarationem earum rerum 
quae viderentur ·: ~Cicero, Aca4. post. I ll, 40. 
-
13. !Lihis is but one example of the oiroul.ar kind of argwitent 
charactejj;Lstic of the system, referred to in section 1 • 
. ~ .. ; - - • 0 .:.- -
'· ·~· . ~- ' ~ .. ., . .~ ,, .. 
... ..;_ . ' . :_; ~ -
. ·-_; 
~4. Sextus Empiricus VII, 252. 
~5. Cicero, Acad. post. I 1~, 40. 
16. ~ II 9~. 
~7. SVF II 75. 
~8. Sextus Empiricus, VII, 257. 
~9. Watson, Stoic Theory of Know~edge, p. 36. 
20. See further, Brehier,·Chrysi;ppe, p. 88 f, esp. p. 90. 
a~. De Voge~, III P• 1~9. 
; 
22. ~· II··5~; Sextus ~mpil'icus, VII, 233. See a~so 
.,. 
Brehier, ·Chrysippe, p. 97. 
23. Sextus EI!lpirious't VII 253, quotes the instance of 
Admetua and A~cestis. 
24. 
·10.57 J\ ~9 f, to: end. 
:~· -. .· . . .' ~ : ·, 
..... ~ '~ ,_:_.· ··~ . )' ·.: .. ~. ..... 
:i ... 
.. 
> 139 
25. Sextus Empiricus, pzrrh. H~. I 227 - .229. 
26. ·Plutarch, Qp. cit,. 1041 E, uses ~1-'fUTOS .. of the 
prolepseis, but as De Vogel indicates (III P• 125), 
the word does not mean innate, but rather that the 
mind is naturally predisposed to having these notions. 
Sandbach, ~ VVOID( and P:rolepsis in Stoic Th~o:r.YI 
p. 48 - 9, contends for the more literal translation 
~ 
of e t-L fUTtJS • Reference will be made to ·this view 
in Ch. V 2, below. 
27. .ill II 83. 
28. Th:i.s must not be confused with the metaphysical forms 
of Plato. An ill~at~g account of ·the growth o£ 
.,. 
p •. 23- 8. Evv. Ole::( I is given by Watson, OJh c;J;t, 
29. SVF II 83. 
30. §vF. II 87. 
31.. Sandbaoh·, Op. cit. p. 46 ._ 7• 
32. Epiot. I 14, 7 - 8. Xt is neoesaEU"y to understand ·that 
', ·.-,. 
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I 
the 'T'U'If 01 are the impressions left on the mind by 
the phantasiai. 
33. Diogenes Laertius, X 33. 
34. De Natura Deorum, I 43 - 4. 
35. 1'In. omnium an:Unis eorum notitionem impressit ipsa 
36. 
38. 
39. 
40. 
natura." ( De N.D. I 43,oh.16,.) 
u » Insitas eorum vel potius innatus cognitiones habemus. 
(DeN.,D. 144~ ch.l7) 
This criticism is· well put by Bevan, Qp. cit. p. 48 - 9. 
Diogenes Laertius, VII, 136 and 148. 
Seneca.', De Beneficiis, IV 7. 
Bence arose the 'problem of suffering' and of wicked-
nesa. De Vogel, III Paras. 938 - 942, gives evidence 
of discussion on this problem. For Epictetus' 
contr~tion, see Ch. VI, 1. 
41. C.f. Aris·totle, Nic. Eth. 1147 b 4. 
~ ', ~ ' . ·':,:_· .. · 
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42. For the association of· "JfV&VfA-OC and hegemonikon, 
see Watson, Op. cit, p. 19 - 21. 
43. SVF II 229; see Brehier, Op. cit, P• 167. 
-
44. Brehier: "La representation deviant alors perception, 
. , " et l'inclination volonte reflcchie. 
45. Plutarch, Op. cit. 1057 A. 
46. It seems that all phantasiai occurring to animals 
are true, i.e. natural. Whence Plutarch remarks 
that God ~nd the Wise Man imprint false phantasiai 
in man, 1057 A. See also note 53 below. 
47. It is worth noting that Chalcidius in his Latin 
commentary Timaeus, adopts a theory of two hegemonika; 
'duo principales vires, una deliberativa altera quae ad 
adpetendum quid impellit' H. M. Jones, Classical 
Philology 13, 1918, p. 206, notes that this theory is 
unique and unlikely to be derived from neo-Platonists. 
It could be a development of the two branches of functions, 
one typical of human reason, the other of universal 
142 
reason, both of which Chrysippus puts under the 
direction of a single hegemonikon. 
48. SVF II 879. 
49. B~~hier, Chryeippe, P• 184. 
50. .§!E. II 879. 
51. Sextus Empiricus, VII, 237; cf. B]I II 56. The full 
52. 
implications and varying_interpretations of this theory 
are discussed by Br~hier, Chrysippe, p. 166 note. 
SVF III 169. 
-
This doctrine of Chrysippus may be compared with his 
54. De Vogel III, para. 952d. 
55. 
56. 
57. 
58. 
59. 
60. 
143 
., ' .. L "' t~' \ p~ J.. v',. IV 
_,..J v"1 "1 v ., -U X 17 'i "'" oy o v 1tac 'f 
De Vogel III 952 c. cf. ~III 389. 
.2]! III 377. 
SVF I 208; De Vogel III, 954 b, 
-
Plutarch, Qp. cit, 1045 B - F. 
Cf. Aristotle's syllogism in considering the conduct 
" , 
of the oCKpotT'7S , where stage 2 above corresponds to 
the major premise, and stage 3 to .the minor premise. 
There is discussion on the various interpretations of 
Chrysippus' theory in Brehier, Chrysippe, p. 249 f. 
61. De Vogel, III, p. 168 f, also para, 953 d (note), and 
Pohlenz, Die Stoa I, p. 143 recognise a distinction 
between the positions of Zeno and Chrysippus on the 
, on the evidence.of a text of Galen (§]! 461). 
But see Watson, Op. cit, p. 61, note, 
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62. t·latson, Op. cit. P• 61. 
SVF III 178. 
-
64. Natson, Op. cit. p. 5 - 8. 
Cf. Aristotle, Nicet~ Eth III; but his deliberation was 
over things that followed in a certain way for the most 
part. He saw that deliberation did involve a degree 
of probability. 
66. Diogenes Laertius, VIII 102, 103, 105 •; Again, cf. 
Aristotle's _&, c ,_ v ~_T__"''-li , which is directed tot:-1ards 
something because the end is known, but it is not driven 
b ~ , y any _ __ll!(_p X '1 within the agent. 
67. SVF III 494; 500. 
68. It is interesting to note that Walsh, 'Aristotle's 
Co;aception of Moral \'laaknof!S,', ends his criticism of 
Aristotle's akrasia by saying: 'We may say that the 
absence of the concept of the will produces a serious 
limitation in Aristotle's analysis of akrasia. Perhaps 
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we have here one of the points of departure for Stoic 
moral psychology! 
69. The discussions on determinism and will were numerous, 
and the Stoics must not be blamed for leaving the question 
unsolved, since the argument was to persist in philosophy 
to the present day. But the discussions were hampered 
by the detailed analysis of the process of causation, 
reason and fate, without a comparable account being 
given of the concept of will. Consequently 'will' 
remained as something that was ai~ys felt to exist, but 
always to give way to arguments of determinism. Thus 
Seneca, Epistle 16, when faced with the question, what 
use is philosophy if everything is determined, replies 
that it nteaches us to obey God and endure chang:£~'. So 
characteristically the problem is shelved, though 
Seneca suggests it was a well-\1orn probl-em: "sed non 
est nunc ••• ": It has been argued many times before. 
70. Plutarch, Op. cit, 1055 F, et seq. 
71. Cicero, De Fato 40 f. 
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72. Aulus Gellius, Noctes Atticae, VII 2; cf. l•larcus 
73. 
74. 
Aurelius, X 33. 
II . Impetus consiliorum mentiumque no~trorum actionesque 
ipsas voluntas cuiusque propria et animorum ineentia 
moderantur ." The ar~'l'llent. ~a close t.o Aristotle' a statement 
tha1; ~e ou..'rBelvea are pax-tJ..v 1"!3SP9naibie for our characters, 
(N.E. 1114 b 21-5); .Be~ Ch.2 p.41. 
The degree o·f human possibility as against necessity 
is investigated by Refsor, Fate and Possibility in 
Early Stoic Philosophy, who concludes from an examin-
ation of the Stoic logic and physics that possibility 
inheres in the Stoic logos, which is both a pO\"ler and 
a cause, Man has the power of choice in __ Q'uy t<oC. T~ 9ecr ·~ , 
but does not necessarily derive from this any control 
over circumstances; p. 289 and 296. 
75. He observe~ for example, climatic influences on a 
persons moral character, De Vogel III, para 1184 a; 
Such observations lead to a more naturalistic view of 
man. 
76. De Vogel III, paras. 1185 - 6. Dobson, The Posidoniue 
~~ stresses this dualism; see also note 47 above. 
~I 
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77. Galen, De Plac. 348. 
78. & e1'T~v l.vGte +~c:r•v ~v .;,t'w .Ti:Jv 
cr_Ta(G'IG( ( Ou6C::,v :c~~;,~ot•S ~u~J.JoL e.wv De Vogel III, para. 
1190 a. 
79. Nock, Posidonius, p. 31 recognises an Aristotelian 
tendency here in Posidonius. 
Bo. Plutarch, De Facie, 944 f; cf. Epictetus _IV 1, 32. 
81. cf. De Vogel III, para, 989 a note 3, and also Watson, 
Op. c~. P• 78, who sees here a reversion towards a 
Platonic theory of knowledge. 
82. See Ch. IV 3. 
83. De Vogel notes that the term was probably used even by 
Chrysippus, III, para. 989; cf. lOlla: : vo'l-'o~ ~ tcorv~st 
< f . :1 \ &. ' 8' \ , \ I II I . 
.octn£p etf'-rn/ o op os __ l\o.y~s o•_ot ""'"'v"Twv __ epxo~£vos. 
But Posidonius took op 9~$ 'A·/yo;. as his actual 
criterion, {Sextus Emp~icus VII 54.) 
84. 
85o 
o·-
u:,.; • 
86. 
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1055. The term -'daimon' is discussed by Dobsot~:',On.cit .• "D.193•. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SENECA 
I. The New Humanism. 
During the period of transition from Middle to Late 
Stoics, !twill be useful to consider as.a link the moral 
essays of C~cero and Seneca, since much of the orientation 
of Epictetus' doctrines is foreshadowed in these works-.1 
Throughout the whole period of its deve~oprnent certain 
fundamental aspects of Stoicism remained unchanged: the basic 
physical doctrine and theory of knowledge underwent little 
change,and particularly the Stoic insistence on the supremacy 
of reason continued unassailable. 
Yet against this rigid background there was room for 
. a change of. emphasis in teaching, and notably for a more 
compromising and practical attitude towards the concept of 
virtue. The Stoic paradox~s on moral goodness had been handed 
down through the School, and receive commentary from Cicero 
in his Paradoxa. Particularly illustrative of this concept 
of virtue is Paradoxa III, in stating that any fault is equally 
bad, since all faults are a negation of virtue. No degrees of 
good and bad are allowed.2 
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Ho\'tever, in Stoicism of the late Roman Republic and 
following, although this orthodox position of the sapiens 
alone being capable of virtue persists, the e~phasis in the 
moral essays of Seneca and Cicero is on humanity and on the 
conduct of the ordinary man. It is not surprising to find 
Terence, the Roman dramatist not.ed above all for his sensitivity 
to so many aspects of human behaviour, held in high regard and 
quoted frequently by Cicero in these essays, as 'familiaris meusJ3 
Virtue becomes something more personally felt by the individual. 
The paradoxes were the product of the schools, but 
already, as seen in the previous chapter, many influences_, 
especially from earlier philosophies were gaining strength 
alongside the orthodox Stoic principles. In the present 
chapter it will be seen how these influences are reflected in 
the less scholastic, popular philosophic works of Seneca and 
Cicero. 
Three aspects in particular contribute to the increased 
humanism in Stoicism expressed by these writers. First, there 
was a much broader interpretation of what man's nature was, 
that i.ei his especial nature, or proprium, by which he is 
distinguished from the animals. Man's paramount distinction, 
reason, is seen not only to embrace and account for wisdom, 
but also other aspects of moral goodness, which had hitherto 
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received little attention from the Stoics. These aspects 
were chiefly duties in society, magnanimity and orderliness, 
(ordo et decus). 4 Virtue was thus seen to comprehend far 
more of man's daily actions and aspirations. The duties in 
( \ (J , society _ T~ K cK '71C ov Tf1/C ) had indeed been treated 
earlier by Panaetius, but as something divorced from the 
ideal Stoic concept of goodness.5 
Second, the sterQo-typed personality of the sapiens 
came to be regarded as an unrealistic medium for moral good-
ness, and in the De Officiis Cicero departs from the rigid 
teaching of the Paradoxa, and recognises that nature has 
endowed men with individual personalities and capabilities; and 
it is natural and therefore right that our actions should 
reflect these differences of personality, whilst at the same 
time maintaining recognition of the laws governing human nature 
E), 
as a whole.· The observation is important since it receives 
further emphasis in Epictetus in his treatment of the dypameis, 
(personal c~pacities).7 
Also moral goodness was seen to admit of variations 
in its degree of attainment from individual to individual; 
this trend of thought also recurs in Epictetus, when speaking 
of the different inclinations ( I 1f p 0 0" w 'lt" 0(. ) people display 
in attaining perfection of the prohairesis.8 
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Thii'd, Stoic thought ttas beginning to be taken up in 
the literary circles of the Romans. The practical and 
political outlo~k of these Roman exponents, notably Cicero, 
were not content with a philosophy teaching that virtue, which 
Romans strive to attain qua Romans rather than qua Stoics, was 
only attainable by the perfect sapiens. It was inevitable that 
the Romans should modify the theoretical precepts to a 
practical philosophy of life. Primarily this meant that duties 
undertaken for the state or community should be given high 
importance in moral virtue. But also Rome required that the 
philosophy should give attention more to the \'Thole man. She 
had not been subjected- completely to the rationalism of 
Greece, and whilst reason was dominant, ~ti~dtl~'natural 
" . ~ .. 
responses needed accommodating into Roman Stoicia~. 
~t~~o/f;-;t;;e inclinations towards love, friendship," fear and 
anger needed examining afresh, since these were very real 
experiences in personal relationships deeply felt by the 
Roman living his everyday life. Certain virtues as 
constantia. patientia_and w;avitas were ingrained in the 
Roman ethos, as a means of living thepractical life, involving 
fear and personal relationships. The moral quality of these 
virtues brought th9m close to- the virtue of the Stoic sapiens, 
but differed in that they wore moulded for tho practical life. 
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Stoicism tended to adapt accordingly. 
In this connection too must be conside~ed the growth 
of the religious element in Stoicism, and how this was 
accommodated into the earlier theistic concepts. Also the 
earliest Stoic precept, 'live according to Nature' would need 
further examination, since the Greek and Roman natures were 
not one and the same. Very generally, the Romans were ready 
to give greater consideration to emotive factors at the 
expense of a theory of pure reason. 
The writings of Cicero, and more especially of Seneca, 
best illustrate this modification of the Stoic philosophy 
to the more humanised Roman outlook. Both may be described 
as syncretists; or Cicero perhaps rather as a commentary on 
other philosophers of various schools and periods. They piece 
together thoughts mainly from Stoic writers,10 in order either 
to give his own philosophic position on a particular subject 
of current discussion in the schools, as Cicero did in his 
treatises on Moral Goodness, on Determinism, and on the Nature 
of the Gods,11 or in a less theoretical vein, to give advice 
to friends .on practical matters of life, as in Cicero's essays 
on Friendship and Duties aiid Old Age, and Seneca's Epistles, 
(though some are intensely doctrinal) and essays on Anger, 
Kindness, and so on. 
1.5.5 
It is this latter category that display the more 
humanising tendencies in Stoicism outlined above which were 
to influence the development of Stoicism in the period of the 
Empire. They are characterised by a lack of close dogma and 
reference to the detailed logic of the Stoics. Generally a 
Stoic basis i,s taken for granted, but a new spirit is seen to 
be instilled. 
2, t·lill, Personality and Conscience. 
The inner nature of moral action is stressed in 
Cicero and Seneca. Virtue was to be sought in the attitude 
of mind of the agent, rather than in the appearance of virtuous 
acts. Stoic doctrine had always taught that virtue was 
dependent on the inner state of the individual. The virtuous 
acts, ( Teo(. t«o(T"op84,J-lo<.1"o(_), were not defined by what was 
done, but by the state of mind behind the action. This was 
natural since the Stoics regarded.virtue itself as a bt~9Etr1S 9 
a certain state of mind.12 A great deal of theoretical and 
idealistic teaching developed from this, such as the insepara-
bility of virtues, and the durability of moral virtue.13 
Detached from this idealistic concept of virtue, toTas 
the ability to choose aright in the matter of adiaphora, and 
. . . •· ~ 
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' n, decisions on what constituted duties (.Toe. K~V")ICOVTCI<. ). 
By the time Cicero was writing, the belief in a perfect 
virtuous and wise man came to have ·little practical application, 
and consequently the duties themselves did begin to rank to 
some extenti as moral actions, and yet these actions could only 
be considered good if the will to act was good. 
In De Officiis Cicero states that a right action is 
only just when .it is voluntary.15 The same occurs in the 
Paradoxa, No. 5, in which Cicero considers freedom, which the 
paradox states to be a necessary concomitant of the wise and 
virtuous man. Freedom is the ability to live as you wish; the 
decisions of the will (voluntas atgue iudicium) constitute this 
freedom, and are therefore essential to the virtuous state.16 
The individual's will on each particular occasion he 
acts is given prominence in Seneca, rather than the more 
constant general inner concept of a state of mind or a will in 
accordance with nature. No up~ight act is done by an un\'lilling 
agent; 17 there can only be right conduct if the will to act is 
right (recta voluntas); and there can only be right will, if 
.· 18 
one's attitude of mind is right, (habitus animi). Thus the 
will is seen to be a necessary condition for virtue, lying 
between the virtuous state and the right action. 
15'7 
Another importance of the will in Seneca is seen in the 
general direction of one's li:fe towards the good. In order to 
attain the supreme good, we must persevere; the greater part of 
progress is the will to progress. Progress must be l'lilled t-Jith 
the whole will. 19 In discussing benefits, great stress is 
always laid by Seneca on the inclination to give a favour. The 
important thing is that the kindness is prompted by one's own 
will. 20 In forming the character o.fl pure virtue, unassailable 
from calamities and misfortunes, again it io the will that is 
emphasised, namely a general t~ll or decision (!udicium) to be 
21 
virtuous. 
Seneca's position here is important for two reasons: 
first, he notices a distinction between particular will and 
general will. One can adopt general will in desiring the good, 
or the course of nature. This was the position of will in the 
early Stoa, but Seneca gives the wi11 greater prominence by 
making the \•lilling simul.taneous with if not prior to' the 
rational decision. In the earlier Stoics the will followed. 
The specific will operates in forming a c;iecision on each 
particular set of circumstances, and is in turn.partly dependent 
upon the general will, or the 'habitus animi', for the wishing 
of moral progress in a general way, •mente tota volo', may be 
seen to contribute to the 'habitus· animi'. Thus the term, 
Cl 
'habitus animi' has a similar function to the- ef•s 
22 I c' ~"" in Aristotle, and to the _'lfptt--._tpEt1'1S tHII( _o_e.a_ 
I 
wpf'.c 1pcT"IIC'1 
23 in 
Epictetus, that is, as a general willing basis from which 
virtue ensues. 
Second, the specific will in Seneca is immediately 
bound up with the passing of judgement (iudicium) in making 
a decision. That is the area of freedom assigned by the early 
Stoics to _-fTUYI<fi(T~9Strtt; (assent), and this is now ohown 
to be will (voluntas). The combination of the words 1iudicium' 
24 
and 'voluntas' is common in Seneca, and also occur in 
Cicero's Paradoxa: 25 Consequently they may represent an 
attempt tot·tards a definition of a rational will, which is to 
receive fuller treatment in Epictetus' concept of prohaiTesis, 
and this will be seen to involve precisely this act of willing 
and reasoning. In Seneca we see the idea of the individual's 
freedom in more naturalistic terms of will, in that a natural 
response (voluntae) towards virtue is the basis for moral conduct, 
and this response will be rational (iudicium) because its 
object is virtue. 
regarded as an essential factor in attaining virtue, that there 
was also an increased in.terest in·. personality during this period, 
and in the factors that caused men to vary in the direction and 
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strength of their wiils, that is, in their natural propensity 
towards virtue. 
Nature d~d not endow man with virtue in the same way 
that she bestowed other gifts. Virtue remains for man a 
potential only, to be developed according to each individual's 
inclination and will to obtain the right kind of knowledge and 
to apply it. Nature has provided a mind which is capable of 
attaining virtue if it so wishes: 1mentem quae omnem virtutem 
accipere posset•. 26 The mind itself must seek the logical 
development of the elementary principles;27 this is each 
individual's responsibility, (nostrum est). 
Thus as with Epictetus, the area of freedom is in using 
and developing nature's gifts. Positions of honour and wealth 
are ruled by chance, our role (persona) is decided by our own 
free ChoJ.·ce. 28 · d We may assume whatever attitude we like towar s 
these external.s. 
Again significant was the recognition that reason not 
only functioned through universal laws, but that its working 
is also very much affected by our own personalities. For 
endowments of nature were of two kinds; first, universal, that 
is reason, from which all morality and propriety is derived, 
and the second, individual, that is, the special capacities of 
mind and body of each individual. Thus we should act in 
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accordance with universal law and with our own particular 
29 bent and circumstances. 
Thus in Cicero can be found an area of responsibility, 
both in assuming a role in the face of duties and externals, 
and in deve.loping our own particu~ar capaci tie_s. Both these 
areas of freedom receive fuller treatment in Ep~ctetus' notions 
of .. Trp~awnov and ·dyname:is.30 Accordingly, l'tith Seneca there 
are signs of a gradual: re-interpretation of the 'live according 
to nature' formula of oikeiosis. The Stoics throu.ghout regard 
man's oikeiosis as reason, but in Chrysippus and Cicero this 
is given a general interpretation based on a state of mind; 
reason is a state that satisfies definitions of propri~;3l 
life adapts to this in rather a static way. This is taken 
over by the more dynamic concept of Seneca and Epictetus, where 
reason is more active intelligence, a willing and reasoning 
capacity that takes stock of each situation, adapting it~elf 
to each new set of circumstances to give a decision.3~ 
Consequently, the notion of getting to know oneself 
is common in Seneca. Reason works from a knowledge of the 
inner personality as well as from externals. Its first 
instigation to activity is from external things via the senses, 
but then it must fall back on itself, (in se redit).33 Thus 
as in Epictetus, knowledge of oneself becomes vital to right 
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reasoning. Our own self is reason and must control the passions. 
The prerequisite of virtue iei that our own selves must first 
belong to us. 34 Man is anxious for the future because he has 
not found his own self, (nemo sibi contigit); 35 once we have 
gained control over ourselves, we become free. 
In this connection must be considered the notion of 
conscientia (conscience), which first becomes important in 
Seneca. The word in Latin cov~rs a wide range of meanings, but 
where it can be translated as 'conscience', there were two 
variations of meaning: first, in a popular sense, it means 
an inner guide to help us to do the right thing. It is used 
in this way in Ep;stle 117, 1.36 Second, it has a more 
specialised philosophic usage as conscientia animi, meaning 
either a good or bad conscience. It appears as the latter in 
De Finibus II, 16, 53 f. and in De Officiis III 21, 85. In 
Seneca it is more usually the consciousness of doing rig4t: the 
chief result of a favour bestowed is the conscience of it; the 
glory of the deed and the possibility of a return favour are 
minor considerations. 37 In Epistle 95, 14, the opposite sense 
of a bad conscience is meant: the punishment of wickedness is 
the conscience of it.38 
As Pohlenz observes, this concept of a conscience 
cannot be fitted into the normal Stoic psychological maohinery.39 
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~he Greek e qui valent _rru v {, S .., rr • S occurs rarely in Stoic 
' \~itings, and where it does appear it refers to the awareness 
or consciousness which a creature has of its own composition, 
without any moral element bei~ implied. 40 
~wo possible sources for the appearance of conscientia 
in Seneca remain. It could be a translation from the Greek 
cruvts...,_~u; in its non-Stoic usage, or the purely Roman 
term, to express the inner voice of conscience. The use of 
by Euripidea41 illustrates the conotation of a 
guilty conscience: asked from what affliction he is suffering, 
Orestes replies that it is the consciousness of having done a 
terrible crime. ~his idea grew up, no doubt, independently in 
both o-uv5'•b-"q_O"'IS-- and conscientia. But the Gree4. vuv/..&'11":1S 
assumes more religious and moral conotations: it is born with 
every soul and makes its abode in it, and inflicts wounds which 
know no healing. 42 It puts to shame, teaches and warns. There 
are numerous instances during the Hellenistic period of this 
usage. 43 But the word in Greek does not normally refer to a 
good conscience, as it so often does in Seneca. 
The most probable answer to the occurrence of 
conscientia in Seneca is that he adopted the Roman term to refer 
to a voice of conscience, and allied it with the strong moral 
and religious overtones of guidance from the current Greek use 
of the word. The term may denote the same kind of non-
163 
Hellenistic approach as •voluntas•, as being something basic 
to the concept of virtue, quite independent of reason; for 
the good, says Seneca, comes from a good conscience, right 
deliberation and correct action, in that order. 44 At the 
same time, its use as bad conscience or guiding spiritual 
advisor may reflect Pythagorean influences through contemporary 
Greek sources. 
Seneca's adoption of the term, in whatever form, is not 
followed by Epictetus. Several aspects of moral conscience are, 
however, contained in the term prohairesis. The criminal, for 
instance, suffers a bad prohairesis as a result of his wrong-
doing.45 Again, as we found with •vo1untas•, Epictetus reduces 
the more irrational aspects of the Roman writers to his 
rational 'prohairesis', and whatever hint there is of the 
irrational in Epictetus, is contained in prohairesis. The 
chief virtue to be maintained by prohairesis is T~ of,'.:, JJ-lHI 
46 (self-respect), and this notion of self-respect has definite 
associations with our 1conscience•. 47 
One aspect of conscience in our use of the word is 
common to Epictetus and Seneca, namely the examination of the 
'conscience•, which really amounts to purifying our inward 
thoughts, that is, thoughts not yet expressed in action. Great 
stress is laid on this by Seneca in De Ira III 36, that each 
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evening one should hold this self examination and commune with 
·oneself, then rest peacefully. There 'is possibly a~Jain a 
Pythagorean source here, transmi~ b;r the Cynics. 48 The 
resemblance to Epictetus is striking, 49 but neither writer 
i 
usee the term conscientia or cruva• ''t'J a" r~ to express this 
discipline. 
3• Reason and Emotion. 
The reason why the will became-an important factor 
in Seneca's moral philosophy, becomes clearer with an 
examination of his attitude towards the emotions. In his 
teaching on the emotions, Seneca generally follo\V'S Chrysippus, 
who held that the passions were the result of the soul-'.directed 
in a certain way, ( -*ux-~- lTWCi ). By adopting 
this account, Chrysippus maintained a psychological monism, as 
opposed to Poeidonius who belie_ved in a bi-partite d:i, vision 
of the soul into rational and irrational. According to 
Chrysippus, all our activity, whether rational or irrational, 
can be accounted for by the disposition of the ruling hege·monikon. 
Thus the emotions were judgements, erring judgements, of the 
hegemonikon. '50 
Seneca develops this doctrine a stage further by 
165 
mainta~~~~g that it is the will which causes the judgements, 
which in turncaause the emotions. The will is something 
over which we do have control, and which can be directed to 
the rational or irrational. Seneca explains this doctrine 
in De Ira, II, l - 4, by considering closely and stage by 
stage, the mental processes involved in entertaining anger 
after receiving an injury from someone. These are: 
l. The phantasia (species) of injury. 
2. The desire for revenge. 
3. Admitting that one should not have been 
injured. 
4. Admitting that one ought to be revenged. 
Thus anger is aroused by the mind giving its assent, 
(animo adsentiente) at stases 3 and 4, to the phantasi~i 
received in 1 and 2. _cr_u-yec~'T'~-9 .. G"IS is therefore involved, and 
this requires an act of choice, (iudicium). 
Seneca proceeds (2, 4 - 5), to distinguish between 
fleeting emotions, and the i~ured passions. The first are not 
true passions but motus animi., or corpora pulsus (3, 2), more 
physical than psychological, for instance, smiling when another 
smiles. These are however the beginnings of passion, (principia 
/ 
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proludentia affectibus). The true passions require surrender 
to these emotions and the consent of the will, (adsensus 
mentis, 3, 1.). In 3, 5, he states that the passing emotion 
is the result of impetus, but the excitement to anger is a 
matter of decision of the will, (voluntate et iudicio). 
Reason has no pol'ler over the initial shock of the mind, 
for these impulses are due to entirely external causes which 
produce an involuntary reaction~ But the other kind of imp~lse 
which comes from \'rithin, (i.e. from our own judgement or 
decision) can be removed by a rational judgement.51 Thus the'· 
iudicium itself produces an urge (~~tus), presumjably an / 
irrational urge, which must be counte·red by a further decision 
producing a rational urge. 
The part of the will in emotions again occurs in De Ira 
I, 8, 1 - 3: Once in the grasp of anger, it is difficult to 
return to the path of right conduct, since reason has no power 
when once the passion is E:ldmitted and given authority by our 
own will, (voluntate). Again following Chrysippus, ·seneca 
teaches that the mind becomes one with the passion, not a 
thing apart, (sepositus, extrinseous speculator affectus). 
1 
Passion and reason are a changing of the mind for better or 
worse.
52 For the will itself becomes irrational when once it 
has given its consent to the passion; rational will can then 
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no longer exist, hence there can be no return to the rational 
sta-te whilst the passion persists 1 even though there is ~ 
part which disapproves, as is suggested by per·miserie.53 Here 
Seneca betrays Chrysippue' monism, if he can still recognise 
a 'you' which does not allow the passion. This illustrates .the 
more natural and personal account of the Romans compared with 
the Greek theorists.54 
So whilst -it is true that Seneca's general attitude 
to the emotions is to banish them,55 he does introduce the 
less dogmatic position that they are in the last count \·dlled; 
therefore their extirpation must begin with a re-adjustment 
within. 
Consider~g further the extent to which reaeon·iB 
dependent on impulse, Seneca's threefoilid division of moral 
philosophy is relevant.56 The divisions are: 1. The 
speculative, which decides the function and worth of each 
thing; 2. The part of impulse, which is to acquire a 
regular and ordered impUlse to things examined by 1; 3, 
of action which makes impulse and action harmonise.57 
Seneca's doctrine of impulse may indicate a partial return 
,, (/ ·c. I 
to Aristotle 1 favouring the adoption of ope.~•s and optL"J as the 
incitement to an action, rather than the phantasiai. Again this 
is consistent with Seneca's emphasis on the will. In Epictetus 
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the will remains important, but in a fully rational aspect, 
and consequently, t~ere is a return to phantasiai and reason 
being the prime motivation of action. 
4. Duties and the Good. 
Panaetius and Cicero,58 in placing emphasis.on duties 
rather than the pure moral goodness of the wise·man, caused 
the Stoics of the Roman Empire to broaden their view of 
absolute morality, and to consider the relation of duties to 
moral goodness. The tendency of Cicero's De Officiis was to 
up-gra~e duties to approach moral goodness. He regarded the 
officia (duties) as a second grade moral goodness 11quasi 
secunda guaedam honestan.59 Ordinary people must live up 
to that moral right, (honestum) which comes within their 
f h . 60 range o compre ens1on. 
Virtue was seen to embrace more than aapientia, which 
could be a'ccompliahed and maintained by the sapiens separate 
and aloof from the day-to-day activities with fellow men. 
Thus while Cicero strives to maintain a verbal distinction 
still between pure moral goodness and duties, in fact duties 
are felt to be morally go~d for the ordinary person. 
Panaet±us' treatment of duties could possibly have 
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developed as a branch of teaching quite distinct and detached 
from the main current of Stoicism in a period t'lhen the Stoic 
paradoxes were being attacked, but Cicero, in considering 
one action as being more right, or more expedient than another, 61 
brings the matter of decision making, of reason and will into 
the realm of daily actions: it became right to prefer one 
course of action to another. This is even more true of Seneca, 
who demands that the reasons for conferring any good favours, 
should be carefully weighed against other considerations. 62 
After Cicero, Stoic thinkers reverted to a view of 
morality again more detached from externals, but they were 
never again allol'led to neglect to give an account of an 
attitude to externals, and its bearing upon .the virtuous life. 
And virtue gradually ceases to be confined to the detached state 
of the wise man increasing his wisdom through the in-breeding 
of the precepts of the Stoic logic and theorjy,; but comes to 
have meaning oniy in the constant activity of the mind making 
the right choice in every given situation. The promtnence given 
_to the duties in Cicero is not thereafter found in Stoicism, 
with the possible exception of Marcus Aurelius. Epictetus 
recognised a close, organic, connection between them and moral 
goodness, but they were not essential and never given treatment 
on their own. 
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Seneca too immediately adopts the more detached 
attitude to virtue, and expresses that wisdom brings a state 
that is immune from the blows of fortune. 63 Yet his writings 
lack the technical terminology in dividing the goodness of the 
sapiens from the 'goodness' that can. be achievea with respect 
to externals. He regards externals as not belonging to a 
person, but given only on trust, (a notion that is to appear 
far more prominently in Epictetus). It is not wrong to adopt 
a right attitude to externals for as long as they are given us, 
and indeed Seneca appears to allow a closer moral attachment to 
them than Epictetus. Fortune gives us nothing that is our own;64 
Reason makes external goods acceptable to us, (commendat), but 
we must not pursue them too greedily (avidus); 65 indifferent 
things, the adiaphora, are chattels (serva), 66 and are made 
good or bad by the attitude we adopt towards them. They are 
therefore a matter for moral concern.67 Generally however, 
Epiqtetus and Seneca concur here, in seeing attention given to 
duties as a natural continuation of the concern for one's 
personal inner virtue, which must be placed first. The highest 
and purest soul is concerned only with its own.good, namely 
perfecting its reason. 68 
Much of Seneca's teaching in the Epistles and Essays is 
concerned with involvement with fellow men; he pays much 
1?1 
attention to the true nature of kindness, or an act of good-
will,(to give an interpretation of beneficium rather than a 
trana~ation.) In his teaching on this subject, he allows a 
more benevolent and unselfish attitude with respect to duties 
, . and externals than any other Stoic writer. He almost approaches 
a Christian attitude of sacrificial love in the giving of 
self; 69 real kindness is done by one who seeing poverty forgets 
his own. A kindness is a desire to give when ono:;has already 
given.7° Cicero 'approaches closest to this in De Amicitia, 
58. He regards benevolentia as the essence 2__of friendship,. but 
from a rather more selfish point of view, ·as .f~lf~ll:Lng the 
nature of the self,7l 
5. The Religion of Stoicism. 
A rem~kable development in the Stoicism of Seneca and 
Epictetus is the religious attitude i~ their teaching. The 
developments that begin with these -~iters are l~gely 
,• 
responsible for Stoicism being regarded as less of a philosophy, 
but more a religious way of life. For this was scarcely true 
of the earliest Stoic teaching. 
However, in the early period there was certainly a 
notion of God. God was conceived as being the active principle 
"· I • 
• ' ~ '' i • - • : 
_r..;. 
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behind the constant generation of the universe. He was defined 
-· I 72- d . . d t as ~up -T"CX.vaK ov -. In the same passage, Go is ea~ o 
1 I 
produce the 'Aoyo• Cl"'lf£PfolTIKD I , which are the different 
kinds of spirit that pervade different kinds of matter. 
Diogenes,73 refers to God as the 
I 
cr n€pp..a~-ra Ko~, , 
who is responsible for transforming the whole of substance, as 
air into water. 
From this, God may be seen to subsist in the material 
objects of the universe, so that Plotinus in his interpretation 
of Stoicism regards the Stoics as considering the soul to be 
""' Ill cl\ "' 74 lTVGUfAal.. lf'&.)~ sxov or UM111'wS 'XD.V. That is, a diffusion of 
I 
spirit itself,. undergoing modification through the A oyo• 
I 
crnspf-'o(TIKOI 1 to give life to different existing material 
things. 
The Hymn to Zeus of Cleantheg,75 summarises much of 
this theistic concept of reason and generation. The significant 
po1nts in the hymn are first, that Zeus is the reason, (Lo~os), 
that exists for ever, harmonising all things. se·cond, every-
thing in earth, sky and sea occurs through Zeus as spirit 
(daimon), and the whole universe willingly obeys. Third, Zeus 
is recognised as having many aspects ( l{'oA-u~VcJfLos ), 
responsible for different natural phenomena, as a kind of 
logical pantheism. 
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Then with particular reference to human beings, the 
human race is seen to have an image of God within themselves, 
in possessing reason; and ; men should banish ignorance, 
and strive for correctness of opinion, so as to comply with 
God's will.76 
$uch is the extent to which the notion of God appears 
in the early Stoics, and it was on this basis that treatises 
were produced by Ci~ero, clearly following earlier sources, on 
the Nature of the Gods, and on Determinism. Yet whilst 
religious terminology is employed in accounting for the 
materialism of nature, there is a lack of any truly religious 
sensitivity. In Seneca, the beginnings of a religious aware-
ness of the divine in nature are seen, and this thought 
continues through into Epietetus. 
Given. certain conditions it is an easy transition from 
a theory of pervading divine reason, to a belief in the 
in-dwelling of a religious sp~it within each person and in 
natural phenomena. It would however be false to suppose that 
Stoicism had become a religion in Seneca, or even in Epictetus. 
In much of Seneca there is little progress from the early 
Stoics.77 
But in two passages of Seneca in particular there does 
seem to be a more certain religious attitude. The first 
. -., ·.' 
·. ~ 1 . 
.·. 
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passage ~s De Beneficiis IV, 6 - B. Here nature is defined 
as, "deus .e.t .divina~ratio-toti mundo partibus eius inserta11• 
Such a d~finition could well come from the -early Stoics. 
Seneca continues by demonstrating the different a~pects of 
God. There is no nature without God. God and nature differ 
only ~ function, (officio), and we apply different epithets 
to Jupiter for diilrferent functions, Stator, Liber, and so on. 78 
God is. eve-rywhere. 79 
l·fuch of these chapters then are on the same level as 
Cleanthes' Hymn, but they transcend it in two respects: first, 
an urge to make God, and not nature, supreme; that is, a desire 
to see nature and the·oreator in its personal aspect; second, 
a consi.deration of the context f;JllOws t~t Seneca is writing 
' 
about the unselfish asp,ect o~ human kindnesf!; he introduces 
the sul;>jeot of God and- nat~e ae the finest example .of 
unselfish giving: a beneficium .. is something that is given 
freely, as God gives, This again points· to a clo_ser personal 
relationship of God and man, with God having a conc~rn for man, 
and man feeling an i.ndebtedness. 80 
The second passage is Epistle XLI. Here the religious 
attitude is more convincing still. The subject of this letter 
is the perfecting of the soul in_aocordance with nature. For 
the soul is the s~at of_rea~o~; a ma_n•s own unhindered possession 
.. 
'.· 
•.,· . ·.· . " . ~; .: .. ~. ,_.-, '. . .. r 
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is his soul, and reason perfected in the sou1. 81 The opening 
five sections of this epistle admire the holinees of such a 
soul. Reflection on the nature ·of the perfected soul e·vokes 
an awe similar to that evoked by places of outstanding myst'erious 
natural beauty. It is apt that a verse is quoted from Verail, 
in which he describes the religious awe of an Italian site in 
Aeneid, 8; at such scenes as this the soul is moved by a 
religionis suspicione (3). The use of the word numen, (it 
occurs twice in this passage, 3 and 5), suggests that here 
there is more than a rhetorical elaboration of early Stoic 
theology. There was no Greek equivalent to numen. To the 
Romans it signifies the in-dwelling of the religious spirit 
in different aspects of nature. Here, the soul depends on a 
numen: Non potest res tanta sine adminiculo numinis stare, (5). 
There has been a transition from logical pantheism to mystical 
pantheism. 
For apart from the use of this word, the whole passage 
reflects an ~portation of the Roman pantheistic religion, 
almost a mystic religion into Stoic doctrine; An influence is 
seen upon Stoicism of the keen religious sensitivity of the 
Romans, inherited from their earliest Italian origins. There 
is a reflection in this Epistle of the kind of pux~ Italian 
mystic pantheistic religion which Ver8'il was. endeavouring to 
1'76 
instU~i anew into the Romans, when writing his Aeneid, -
particularly Book 8. 
Seneca's concept of sou182 also often shows a strong 
religious tendency. As our source of freedom (cui non possit 
obstari), it is like a God dwelling as a guest .in a huma.n 
body (deum in corpore humano hospitantem), an image in the 
likeness of God. 83 Vergil, Aeneid 8, is again quoted, 84 and 
this could suggest that Seneca is ·thinking here in terms of 
mystical pantheism. 
In the foregoing account, I have where appropriate, 
drawn comparison between the teaching of Seneca and Epictetus. 
On the question of duties, given so much prominence in Cicero, 
they both adopt a similar course, that duties are to be under-
taken when dictated by the reason in order to maintain one's 
inner virtue. Duties are a continuation, or the outward express-
ion of the inner virtue, which should be our prime concern. 
In other respects, Epictetus_generally adopts a more 
rationalist position. Many of the more irrational aspects o~ 
Seneca, such as will, spiritual teaching and religion, 
conscience, impulse and the like, are prese:n,tin Epictetus but 
in more restrained language. He brings the :irl!ational a,nd 
sp:iritualising elements all much closer to reason. This will be 
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seen to be particularly true of the religious aspect. I believe 
the religious sense in Epictetus is suff~cient for ~im to look 
upon his moral teaching, particularly his teaching on freedOm, 
as something spiritual, and the development of the more thorough 
religious aspect of Stoicism, manifest in Seneca, enabled him 
more easily to think of his work and his goal of freedom, as 
spiritual fulfilment; yet he is careful not to allow any 
doctrine to pass his lips which cannot be fitted into the 
framework of the rational Stoic system. strict rationalism 
was never to return to the Stoic school, but the cloak, or 
strait-jacket, of rationalism was assumed again by Epictetus, 
and irrational elements developed within rather than alongside 
this. This is illustrated further in the concept of will. 
The obsession with will by Seneca is stressed by Pohlenz 
and De Voge185 to be an important contr.ibution to Stolicism, and 
the former recognised it as an essentially Roman contribution. 
. . 
The first condition for being good is to wish it (velle), 86 
and this willing is not taught: valle non discitur, 87 and is 
accordingly within the ab~lity of all human beings, not just 
the wise man. 
Epictetus returns to a more purely Greek concept-, _but 
not without influence from Seneca, or at least from_the Roman 
trend in Stoicism which he represents. Seneca allows the 
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freedom of the individual to consist in will, as almost an 
irrational factor, but the will does not lead to virtue 
without the analysis of reason (iudicium). In EPistle 81, 
unschooled will is not advised. The wise man, because of his 
intellect in the end approaches virtue. In Epictetus freedom 
exists nowhere but in the rational guiding principle, the 
hegemonikon, \"1hich in its more developed aspect is prohairesis, 
and although prohairesis involves will, it is never separated 
from reason, as a concept. Seneca has two concepts operating 
in conjunction, iudicium (decision) and voluntas (Will). 
Epiet0tus significantly has one, prohairesis. The distinction 
is a narrow one, representing influence from the Roman writers, 
who were taking more account of the irrational, upon the Greek 
tradition, which_had hitherto given a purely rational account 
of moral aonduct. Epictetus followed Seneca in recognising the 
importance of the irrational elements in a philosophy of moral 
conduct, but was able to embrace them in a rational system 
centred on prohairesis~ 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER FOUR 
1. The writings to be considered in this chapter are 
primarily Cicero, De AJJi.citia; De Senectute; De Officiis; ""-/ 
I 
and Seneca, The Epistles and I·1oral Essays. 
2. Cicero, Paradoxa III 2, 2. 
3. De Amicitia 89. 
4. Cicero, De.Officiis I 4. For magnanimity and orderliness, 
cf. Epictetus' reference to 1-'-c.y~A~tpov and K:crf"-~0"15 
(see Ch. VI 5). The virtues in Epictetus however, 
receive scant treatment. 
5· To the factors determining correct cora1 conduct, which 
are based on Panaetius, Cicero adds the possibility of 
one course of action being more expedient and more right 
than another, even though neither may be right in the 
absolute sense, De Officiis III 1 and ?. The develop-
ment is typical of the more personal attitude. 
6. De Officiis I 31. 
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7. See Ch. VI 2. 
8. Epictetus I 2. Again see Ch. VI 2. 
9. The adoption of Stoicism in Roman Literary circles 
is particularly apparent in the historical essays of 
Sallust. The two ope~ng chapters of De Coniuratione 
Catilinae are particularly relevant. Note also 
Seneca: 1Philosophia non in verbis sed in rebus eat.• 
(Ep •. I 16) Philosophy moulds the soul, but also orders 
our life and guides o~ conduct. 
10. Not least from those Stoics who were themselves 
introducing into Stoicism, Aristotelian and Socratic, 
or Pythagorean elements. See Ch. III 5. 
11. De Finibue; De Fat~; De Natura Deorum. 
12 • .§JlE. III 494. 
13~ De Vogel III, para. 1031 a; Cicero, De Finibus III 43 - 47. 
14. See Section 4, below. 
' '--':"· 
• 1 ,c ' ' ' 
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15. Nam hoc ipswft ita iustum est, quod·recte fuit, si est 
voluntarium, {I 28). 
16. Paradoxa V 34. 
17. Omne honestum voluntarium est, {Ep. 66, 16). Cf. 
Aristot1e's condition of vo1untariness for a moral 
action in Nic. Eth. III. 
18. . Sene·ca, §.E.• 95, 55 f. 
19. Vo1o et mente tota vo1o, {!£, 71, 36). 
20. De Beneficiis I 6. 
21. De Beata Vita IX 3. 
22. See Chapter Two, 3. 
23. See Chapter Seven, 3. 
24. De Ira II 3 1 5. 
182 
'· 
26. Cicero, .. De Fi.nibus V, 59. Note also, 1virtutem ipsam 
natura inchoavit'. 
27.. 
28. 
29. 
30. 
31. 
32. 
. 33. 
34. 
Nostrum est as ea principia quae accipimu~ consequentia 
exquire, (De Finibus V 60). 
Ipsi autem gerere quam personam va1imus, a nostra 
vo1untate proficiscitur, (De Officiis I 115). 
De Officiis I 110 and 116. 
See Chapter Six, 2. 
Cicero, De Officiis I 100 and 131. 
Seneca, b• 61; for Epictetus, see Chapter Six, 1. 
De Beata Vita, ?4 • 
~- '71,_ 36. 
. -~ ·. 
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35· ~· 32. 
36. Cf. also Cicero, A~ Att. XII 28, 2 etc. 
37. De Benificiis II 33, 1 - 3. 
38. Mala facinora conscientia flagellari. 
39. Pohlenz, Die Stoa I P• 317. 
40. So Chrysippus, (Diogenes Laertius VII 85). This is 
given the term by Epictetus (II 2). 
The reason for this could be because_ a-uve.'•o"'J~'S 
had taken on moral conotations not recognised by the 
Stoic school. All five instanGe.s of vvvf141eii"IJ'1111S in 
Epictetue in~icate that the te:nn. canJ1ot refer to any !3Pecial 
I}L" .· t)~:Oaait:y:: S'Specit- -nor~i;o: ;aro- techpical :function in cogp.ition,. 
\ ·- ' • • •'• ..--:--.•- ·- ~ _ ... ,~ \ -1 I ""! • •· ' • 
I ·. . I 
In .. 2~ 30_ ~e bt41 is inst_antly _a~.J:'e o~ ~s person4l "''aatp«crKE~"J· 
In II. 14,_29 it is used by:potheticall_v of. cattle: .if :they had 
. . .. . . . - . . - ' -~ ·' . 
.,..,.,o(.~9'1crt~ (as _man_has), they wpuld -~aUgh at wo~ld:be 
• ., > '. I 
li2.. 
philosopb~~catt1e., The teltll here. seems .ident~cal to the more 
c... : ·. . . . , :--. . '. . -. '. ' . ' . . . . . . 
,_- ~:~i~ai!J0~~p~~~~~y:~·P!~.S. In l..4;10 .and. II 11,1 1 it. is. 
. . ·, .. - ... ~ ' .· <~ --~ 
~tsed Of Wl'ODg COhd:uCt and. weakness, tJ'Uif,.:11e'l~l$ ofWV cll~e'&l ltaUt.:\v., 
. . - ~ . i ' 
in n~i the;r;- of tb,ese e:xample~ is 
' ~e;r:e rw.y :tdea of the at~ of O()n_eql,~J?.c;:e• . which is _!>.resent 
in the Latin conscientia.. ~en ~s~d ,of the crfm1n4J .• The 
final examp~e, in Il '2t,,:to. ·{_~~w :,~, i~ -~uv."~trl"'.tt•v .T~V-I''rJ~Ev 
{,'~T .c :n-, ou' i v l.S~ .) , a¢n ~fer~;J to . the consciousness of 
. -- ,. _--.;.~ '· ' . ;· ~. - . . . . . 
1;3ome w~ees, here i6fl,oranoe, but 'w1 thov..t .a,ny ~oral. iJltent. 
, I .-- \ ~~ . 1; • : ' , 
In these instances,. Epict~~a OO,ooaes a W9rd wh~ch, '\m,til 
. . ,-. . . . -. . ~ . . . 
Plot~us at least, . app~~ . ~Q be. free froJ!l any per.tic;ular 
J?hiloaophio theory, and to ~~~~ate as 'copJ3oio~~er;~e' or 
'~aation' is most a~e~te. 
41. ~lu~pides, .Q};'estes. 395-6: 
•·. . . . ... - ~ . 
- I ... I I ,., _ I.\\ I , 
_ T • X Pr') lA oe "'toLcr_X c tS.; T.•s crOt'koi\A ulf•v vocro~ J 
C I c,l , ~ ~ I , " ' 
- "') cruv Etr•!, o'T• cruvo•oo& o£1V c•pyoe.~tu.vo.s. 
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43. The use of the term receives thorough analysis by 
Pierce, Conscience in the New Testament, Analytical 
Index, P• 132 1 and chap-ters 1 - 4. 
44. Unde subit bonum? ex pona conscientia, ex honestis 
consiliis, ex rectis actionibus, (~. 23, 7.). 
45. Epictetus, III 18, 4 - 6; and Fragment, Stobaeus I 3, 
50, (Oldfather, Fragment 13). 
46. See Chapter Six, 5. 
47. A fragment assigned to Epictetus in Schweighauser•s 
edition (No. 97), has reference to conscience (_cruv£1t~"'JI7"1~) 
which God has implanted in us to protect us. Other 
reasons apart, the thought is here so remote from the 
Discourses (the nearest approach is the·reference to 
daimon in I 14), that its exclusion from the genuine 
fragments is generally observed. The fragment does 
illustrate just the kind of religious thinking which 
might have influenced Seneca's adoption of the term. 
T~s protecting characteristic of _ cTuve.~ ~-'1 D""IS 
noticed in the fragment is possibly reflected in the 
' C" I single instance of the term To tr uv f..to_OS-- _ in 
III 22, 94, in reference to the moral control of 
the Cynic. Its use here is remarkably similar to 
pro}lairesis used elsewhere. 
48. So Pohlenz, Die Stoa_I, p. ll?. 
49. The passage, Epictetus III 13~ ? is particularly 
noteworthy. 
50. See Chapter Three, 3. 
51. Alter motus, qui iudicio nascitur iudicio tollitur, 
{4 2) Cf i t t I ~ I p I , • • Ep c e us npoD(. 1 pE.v ''- ow·a~.y Kd.~E 1 :rrpt)oup6t1 "'· 
{I 1?, 27). One. act of decision {irrational) can 
displace another {rational). 
52. Affectus et ratio in melius peiusque mutatio animi est. 
53. De Ira I 8, 1. 
54. Cf. Section 2 above, on will and conscience. 
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55. Seneca refutes Aristotle on the point of emotions 
~ 
be1ng useful for giving spirit to actions, De Ira 
I 9, 2 - 3; also !£• 42, 1 - 2. 
56. ~· 89, 14. 
5?. Cf. Epictetus, who adopts in I 18 1 1 T:~ li'JCs_Ettv (feeling), 
as a single origin of assent, choice and desire. 
58. In De Officiis. 
59. De Officiis III 13. 
60. De Officiis III 1?. 
61. De Officiis I 1 f. 
62. Seneca !I?.• 81, 10. 
63. !£· 104, 21 - 4; !£· 95, 10 - 14. 
64. Nil dat fortuna mancipio, (~. ?2), Cf. !£• 61 and 
De Beata Vita 20, 5. 
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66. ~· 66, 23. 
67. ~· 32, 10 - 13. 
68. Soul is reason: Animus et ratio in anima perfecta, 
(~. 41, 6 - 7). The Epistle is closest in spirit 
to Epictetus, (cf. his purity in the soul, IV 11, 5 f.). 
But once a man's soul becomes fully rational, then 
reason will help him to fulfil all the catagories of 
duties, (Seneca, !E• 45, 10 - 14). 
69. De Beneficiis I 7. 
70. De Beneficiis II 14. 
71. Cicero, De Amicitia, 79. 
72. ..§1l II 1027 • 
73• Diogenes La.ertius VII 135 f. 
' ~- i' ' . 
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?4. Plotinus, Enneads IV 71 4. 
75. ..§.E I 537 • 
76. Lines 25 - 40. 
77. E.g. in Naturales Quaestiones, Praef. 13 -·15: 
quid est deus? Mens universi. 
78. Cf. Epictetus I 22 1 16. 
79. De Beneficiis IV 8, 2• 
8o.. De Benefi.ciis IV 9, 1. 
81. Animus et ratio in anima perfecta, (~. 41, 8.). 
82. Commonly 'animus'; the above passage is outstanding 
in using 'anima•. 
83. ~· 31, 11. 
... 
,._. 
84. Evander refers-to the Italian Gods, of whom Aeneas 
must.show himself worthy, by moulding his mind in 
I their image. 
Poh1enz, Die Stoa I, P• 319; De Vogel III, para. 
1216, etc. See al-130, Ri!=Jt, -St.oic- Il,1Josnphv~ -~,229ff. 
·•.· ':· . 
. . ' ··,· 
86. ~· 8o, 4. 
87. ~- 81, 13. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
EPICTETUS THE CONCEPT OF 1'1IND 
1. The Function of Reason. 
Against the background of Greek and Stoic thought which 
has been provided, the p~rticular doctrine of Epictetus may now 
be examined. His doctrine of_freedom is contained in a full 
and proper understanding of the term prohairesis, which is the 
subject of chapter seven. In this and the following chapter I 
examineH the basis from which his concept of prohairesis 
evolved,considering first his teaching on reason and second, 
man's position in the cosmos and society as a rational being. 
This chapter examines the nature of the reasoning faculty. 
Today we may call this the concept of mind or 'psychology' for 
by it we must understand both the mental and feeling activities 
that occur in the individual. 
In general on the concept of reason, Epictetus inherited 
the main points of traditional Stoic teaching: that reason is 
the_cause of the universe; the universe viewed as a whole is 
good; therefore reason aims at the good and is in itself good; 
that there is implanted in man alone of animals a part of the 
,.,..- r' 
·',.;: 
'"f•'".. •. 
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cosmic reason and that this is his beat part; that through this 
relations4ip_with the reason of the universe, man is· able to 
discern the plan of the universe and the plan of his individual 
life and adjust his behaviour to this plan; and that is06o far 
as Ulan has x-ecourse to reason in planning his activities, he is 
free. 
Epictet.us m-itia.g as a visi.~nary moralist, not as a 
scientific materialist, cleaves to this last assertion and 
basis his t4eory of freedom on it. Therefore Epictetus attaches 
greater importEUJ,ce to reason as a capacity, or potential, in 
man, which is essentially human and which man holds independent 
for its function of judging, than to the more materialistic 
concept of reason as a relationship with th.e cosmic mind. 
Materialistic speculations do not concern him as they concerned 
the .lllileaian School and the Stoics and Epicureans of the third 
century and were later to concern Plotinus·. Epictetus' ethical 
teaching wa13 centred onth~ happ~ness of .the individual which 
. .· ·.·_ :.··. 
lay in his freedom enjoyed during .life. T~s, as with Plato 
arid Aristotle before him, his et.hi·cal theory is baaed on a 
concept of man rather than derived from a physical theory, 
although the form and langull$e o.f .th~ system is retained.1 
In this humaniaed concept of ~eason,, Epictetus finds that 
---·-
reason has a double function in man: its p'lirpose_is first 
. --.. ~ .. 
2 
192 
psychol.ogical, requiring c:ruyi<"'T~9€trlS-(assent) and second 
moral as 'ff"-<p«Ko)..o~9?!criS (sympathetic understanding). The 
psychol.ogical. function .. is the judgement of the mind upon the 
ideas presented to it. This is the theory of tTtJyxoeTr;(Oetrl~. 
c.c-1 C\ I In I. l., 4, the reasoning faoul.ty ( "7oUVCif.l-"IS ~ AoyJtc"'J) is 
C: I deso~ibed as the faculty that uses the impressions ( "1 XP7JtrTII<'1 
(.1 _.. J. I 0 UV a(,.,., S TCIC IS 't' G( V Tol. tr I ct 1,) • Moreover in using the impressions 
it does not merel.y react to them in stimul.us and response manner, 
but considers one against the other and makes a decision or 
I judgement ( 6 o y t'CI( ) Good is the consequence of the correct 
decision, evil of incorrect. This faculty, because it 
distinguishes man from beasts, and because it makes him a 
moral. creature, is regarded as man's chief characteristic. 2 
The moral function derives from the notion that reason 
is good, therefore moral. progress is gained·from rational.ising 
one's behaviour, so that it accords with the rational. plan of 
nature. It is the function of man's reason to lead him to a 
correct understanding of this rational. plan. This is 
_n_~p.ouc oA o ~ 9_"'1 cr '--S-· 
These implications of-man's rationality appear in IV 
'-7, 7: man possesses the equipment to reckon up everything in 
the universe ~d to understand it and thereby to act out his 
3 own partieul.ar good. Thus man's reasoning facul.ty is not only 
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. \ .. .1. , \1\ 14 X-f'lcrTIK'r] TaU~ ,-atvToCCf'lotiS, but also li'Cilf!IIC.KO.l\OU "''1--'[uc_"l ._ 
Man is born to view God and his universe as a spectator 
(_ ~ I 5 ) and an interpreter. ( E.f"7Y"7.,.'7S ) 
This special faculty of man is again referred to in III 1, 
25-- 6. Man has the ability to use impressions rationally 
(._Aoy• K ~-'> __ ) that is in accordance with nature and perfectly. 
( f.Jcre.• ~~o,\oyou,...avws "!c' TE.A~ws .). 
outstanding faculty CL!-"'~kp E:TC>V ). 
This is man's 
Such passages place man's 
moral responsibility and freedom in the sphere of reason alone, 
in educating it and using it to appreciate the design of the 
cosmic reason in the world. WQilst it is right t~ emphasise 
the human side of reason in Epictetus,the belief in a cosmic 
guiding world - reason provides the absolute background of his 
ethical teaching. Hence, reason in Epictetus has a triple 
meaning. 
1. · As npt VO.l(l( ___ : the abstract reason or intelligence 
responsible for the good order of the universe, 
its creation, decay and regeneration. 
2. . (' , ' ? "LIV«Jo&I~A.oyu<"J: the reasoning faculty 
is man, which is free to make right and wrong 
decisions. 
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3. As prohairesis: the pO\-Jer, through education, 
of freely being able to make right moral choice. 
The fact that Stoics thought that ~-. was an 
actual detachment ( ) of 1. made 
easier Epictetus' doctrine of prohair.esis 1 which 
is -~~Y.. natural good stat.'e of 2. 
piscourse II, 8 illustrates this position on reason; the 
argument is as follows; the true goodness lies in God; the 
nature of God is intelligence and reason ( vo"'ils 
~p9(,s )\.~yos ). Man's moral commitment is due to having within 
himself a part of God, namely his reasoning faculty,therefore 
this part of us should be our constant concern. 
Epictetus is ablo to stress the independence of man's 
reasoning faculty without neglecting its relationship to the 
cosmic reason. Man's reason, the , is a 
continuation of the cosmic reason in substance but not in 
function. Because it sh~es with the cosmic reason the 
substantial attribute, freedom, man's reason is free to operate 
independently of universal reason. Epictetus clearly says in 
I 1, that the gods put this faculty entirely under man's.control. 
(7 - 9) It is self-sufficient, self-contemplating and ·self-
analysing. Its self contemplating character is seen at the 
II \ 9 - ' ""'\\ , 
opening of I 1: DCU'r"JV ~""p-oucr"' Kotl -r~·""o('ltoll.v_Tb&.(4). 
In I 17, 1 - 3 it is stated that there is nothing superior to 
. ..,:, 
., - .. , . - ,- ~ ~ 
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reason which analy~es it, therefore it will analyse itself: 
~~II.,~ 9' 
oCUTOS CCICUTOV 01~ pwtl'er. 
explained :in I 20, 1 - 6. 
This self·analysis is further 
The opening is similar to I 1: 
reason is found to be self-contemplative; the purpose of 
reason is the right use of phantasiai: moreover the composi-
tion of reason is an arrangement of phantasiai (_CJ'J C1' T'7f4oc._ _ 
iK 1tou~v ctot.vToe.cr•wv _). Thus in a ~ore subtle sense now, 
reason is self-contemplative and self sufficient, not 
subservient to anything outside the individual; it is a body 
of phantasiai considering and discriminating the phantasiai. 
Such at any rate is its nature on a purely psychological 
level. In its moral aspect, another interpretation may be 
given to the self-contemplating characteristic, that in the 
individual an apospasma a substance coextensive w~th the cosmic 
reason, contemplates the works of that cosmic reason displayed 
in the circumstances of that individual's life. 
I now turn to examine in what ways the functioning 
of man's reason may be said to be free in making any particular 
decision. The question devolves on three aspects: 
1. The possibility of freedom in forming the 
material through which reason operat~.s; that 
is the prolepseis or preconceptions which form 
the basis of our judgements. 
196 
2. Freedom in giving rational judgement to the 
incidence of particular impressions, phantasiai, 
that is, the objects of reason. 
3. The possible restriction of freedom by the 
relationship of human reason to cosmic r_eason. 
I consider these in turn. 
2. The Prolepseia. 
Epictetus adopted the term prolepsems from earlier 
Stoic epistemological theory, and gave it great prominence in 
his own interpretation of reason and right conduct. Earlier 
'>f Stoics had regarded prolepseis as a branch of € vv o l~_t __ , 
6 
or acquired knowledge. In Epictetus the term indicates the 
accumulated knowledge which is the material or data to which 
\tte have recourse when making a decision in a particular case. 
The normal usage of the term in Epictetus then is to embrace 
the ethical principles and the accepted dogma of the Stoic 
school; and these are to be used to ascertain correct behaviour 
in each instance. 
t~ilst this general meaning is cle~r, there is some 
confusion on the origin of the prolepseis and the way they are 
used. The confusion probably arose because Epictetus tried to 
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accommodate his different approach to ethics in terms previously 
used for scientific enquiry into knowledge. With earlier 
~, Stoics, the prolopaeis were a branch of evvo•«• , the latter 
being a general concept7 formed by comparing countless similar 
phantasiai, and they covered primarily the knowledge of moral 
principles. Epictetua himself, in two very similar passages, 
describes the formation of concepts of this kind, I 6, 10 and 
I 14, 7 - ·8. Both are introduced as an illustration of the 
skill and purpose manifest in God's creation, and no doubt 
Epictet'ua attached as little importahce .to their intrinsic 
.,,· 8 
contribution to a theory ·;of knowledge as he does to any other 
scientific enquiry. From t'hia concept of :J/ ev .... oaoc. , Epictetus 
inherits two points in his teaching on prolepseis: first, they 
are conce·rned with the general rather than ·the particular. 9 
Second, they comprise, with phantasiai, the s~bstance of the 
rational proceea~10 But Epictetua himself is not so much 
concerned with how we receive knowledge, but in how we apply 
the concepts to particulars. He is concerned leas with the 
inductive process, the extraction of general principles from 
individual phantaaiai, but more with the deductive, to 
ascertain what conatitutea right action in a particular 
instance by applying general princip~ea 9f moral conduct• 
His teaching on prolepseia has three aspects: first, 
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that in the broadest sense there are prolepseis of certain 
abstract terms implying moral behaviour, such as justice, good-
ness and obligation. Second, he asks, what constitutes goodness, 
nobility, holiness and so on. t~at general standards are 
implied by these abstracts? Third, the general standards must 
be applied correctly in particular judgements leading to action. 
The first use of prolepseis implies a belief in an 
abso~ute aim in moral conduct. Goodness exists as something 
11 just and noble and to be sought, similarly holiness. We 
should aim at the right; everyone has a conception of his duty 
{ ).12 This usage indicates 
a firm belief in absolute moral standards. In logical 
disputations the standards of true and false are absolute: 
once the necessary truth has been grasped in a particular 
problem, it is impossible to feel that.the truth should be 
anything contrary to this. So in the sphere of moral behaviour, 
the concept of good is the standard of our actions~l3 If both 
our concept of the good and also the analysis of the moral 
problem are correct then right action will present itself as 
being necessary a truth as the true solution in logical dispute. 
Whilst the Stoic monism, placing reason as the essential \ 
truth of the .universe makes this position more tenable for ~ 
Epictetus than for us today, there is nevertheless a difference 
·. -~­
!:.:-
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in the logic of disputation and the rational approach to 
behaviour. In the first, the enquirer do~es not begin wi~h ·the 
conViction that the trJ,J.th must exhibit CE;~rtain characteristics 
·whi.ch are presented by a certain code. No such qualit~ee in 
the conclusion are assUmed; rather' his approach is t.o analyse 
. : .. 
a problem by deducing a ser;t.~·a of true st-atements.· Because 'he 
is dealing only in words and·n~bers, material in which log;to 
. . - . 
is already i.Dherent, the true or -falee is self-evident at e.i6h 
point of the argument. Now a moral act is not inhe-rel;ltly good 
or bad in the same- way as a statement is inherently true or 
false. The goodness of an act lies outside of itsel£, and,U; 
det,ermined by a code of moral principles. The truth of a 
statement lies in that ve_ry statement, even though it may not 
be evident until the st~tement is simpli~ied .accor.di.ii'g to 
certain_rules. The ration~ mo~ism _of the·stoic~compE;~ls'him 
~· -
. - . . . 
to apply the reaso~ seen in the theory-of logic; and to an 
extent in the creative prpcesses in the universe, to the concept 
of goodness and moral behaviour. 
..:- .,,:. 
It is necessary to accept then,that the Stoics regarded 
man 1 a moral ~ense as necessary since h-e partook of a rational 
universe which was goo.d; and because o-f this, Epictetus 
regards the moral sense, (that is, the pro~~;e~is of goodness), 
as innate: we have it naturally because we are rational beings. 
·,, .. 
;. 
.. -
. ; : ~ · . 
., .,, .· 
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Accord:ingly, he says he has by nature14 knowledge of_what is 
noble and base. In II 11, 3, the concept ( _l'vvo•• ) is 
:>1 J. Q.f-Co 't'IJT'OS -· (inborn or ingrown). l1e are to apply the 
natural preconceptions, _ tucr IK~S lrpoA.~y.ets •15 · 
Thus concerning whether the prolepseis are innate or 
acquired,16 Epictetus regards the prolepseis in the broadest 
meaning, man's moral sense, as innate. But in considering 
the second use of the term, prolepseis as the general rules 
of behaviour which constitute goodness, they are decidedly 
acquired. This accounts for the differing code of morals, 
for example, between the Egyptians and Romans.17 Different 
peoples regard different sorts of action as good. Therefore, 
it is not only necessary to have a moral sense that.the good 
iB to be done, but also to know what is good. 
On this question Epictetua _adopts a Socratic approach 
of warning against following the opinion of the many. Man 
tends to make up hi.s opinion on what is good, without probin~ 
the question philosophically or receiving instruction.18 In 
geometry and music we do not use sounds and lines until we have 
knowledge of their meaning ( e ':~r' c>a )Ao"l 6.1 o CtTC~ ) • Similarly 
in our moral behaviour, we should not rely on opinion 
:J/ ( oa"l 0"'15 ) , but seek knowledge through philor~gphy. By 
philosophy, Epictetus has in mind the Socratic definitio~s of 
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g~neral concepts such as pleasure and virtue.19 
This Discourse (II, 11) thus illustrates a:Q innate stage 
of common notions or preconceptions, and a mo;re ~.efined stage 
that is learned. This double aspect is s~larly seen in II 17. 
We have in the first place vague general_notions of the good 
J. \ \ \ I ,fa 
and the just ( 'fuCS"lKoC.S ~oe.1 'll'POI\'t')'fi'~ ). But before we 
can apply these concepts to our behaviour, we must ascertain 
precisely what kind of actions come under the heading of each 
one. The aim of philosophical instruction is·to attain a 
systematic arrangement ( & .c::. .9pwcr•s- ) of each of our 
prolepseis, so that we have a perfectly articulated and equipped 
knowledge of good action, making easier a moral. judgement in 
any particular situati~n.20 
Epictetus is aware, though reluctantly, that Socratic 
dialectic will not of its own provide the solution to what 
constitutes goodness. In shaping one's knowledge of the 
prolepseis, (which one has always had in a general way), he 
admits of a certain code of moral principles, which.he refers 
to as ~ c( v ~ v £c; • 21 T}?.ese are cert·ain directions that 
we brought with us from Zeus our creator (_ -~V TtfToe).To<l ). 
Philosophy itself must work on a certain 1(0( v~v, or standard 
of judgement. In II 20, 21, Epictetus affirms that these 
standards are from nature, ( fJO"aws ) • 
. . . . 
.... ·.·<.·,· ·, ..•. : 
~·. -' :-. ~. -
- r.=-
·., _ _.". 
·· .. 
' 
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Thus PfOlePsis at this second sta~e appears to-be a 
. ..:;~ . -. 
mixture of philosophic reasoning upon natural_concepts 6f 
goodness, using principles which we- hav~·- -from Zeus arid which 
are +~raws • In practice the principles or canons are the 
precepts of the Stoic schoo1.22 Yet because he calls them 
natural, they are, on account of the Stoic monism,·ratioJ1al 1 
in the sense that, althougb. not adopted through mB.n-•6 reason, 
do lead necessarily to the good life because of their origin · 
from the rational creator.23 
Epiot·etus is chiefly concerned only with erolepsis in 
its third aspect, that is, the application of the correct 
prolepeis to each decision of conduct. Every dec..ision involves 
judgement upon phantasia,j., and the criterion of judgement is 
the system of prolepseis. Correct judgement iS the result of 
the correct application of prolepseis. Th~ is the beginning 
of Epict~tus • ask:esis, or moral training: 11'p_o~,f&•S ~f-"'Pt'~'''V- -_ ; 
T.7•s l ... ~ 140pous or. .. q~-. 24 . i 
It is significant that the training required for 
a~plying the prolepsei~ is not purely logical training, but 
training in disciplining the will. We have seen that Epiotetus 
emphasises the comparison of correct behaviour and correct 
logical disputation, and to a certain degree the prolepseis as 
~eneral ~rinoipl~s can be applied logically to reach a definitive 
·' 
-·· 
-, .. 
) l: 
-----
-· 
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decision on a particular moral act. But Epiotetus, as Aristotle, 
realises a deficiency in applying the practical syllogism. 
Epictetua; training requires two things: first,. that the 
prolepseia should be firmly grasped and constantly rehearsed, 
~ince they are not induced with empirical certt:Linty, as logical 
principles are, they can never carry the same degree of 
conviction, and often weaken in the face of temptation. Second, 
the will must be absolutely rational, in the sense that it will 
not admit to anything contrary to the rational jud~ement baaed 
on correct prolepseia. This involves the development of the 
rational prohairesia; to be discussed in chapter seven. The 
ratio{l~l decision is frequently hampered by feelings, or false 
phantasiai, as logical solutions are not. 
Man's freedom lies in making the moral decision in any 
particular circumstance, that is, in this very application of 
prolepseis to particulars. We are not free to choose in an 
arbitrary· manner, our own preconceptions; these, as we have 
' ' 
sei;m in. stages one and two, were either natural or acquired 
~ ------
through ];earning. In either case they admit of no variation 
or freedom, except in the extent to which each individual is 
driven to gain the correct knowledge and systematisation of 
the prolepseis, and not to be content with mere opinion; this 
!! his own responsibility, and true freedom can never be 
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attained without this material upon which to base a rational 
decision. Accordingly, ~f man accepts the freed~m to hang 
back in his own opinion, he will not have the correct equip-
ment to enjoy true freedom, the key to which is rational will 
and judgement. But it is essentially at the third s_tage, the 
application of the prolepseis, that man's choice admits variety 
of behaviour, since although reason drives him to a necessary 
conclusion, reason may be overmastered by a will not fully 
rational. 
The three stages in Epictetus' conception of prolepseis 
may be compared to coinage. \'le accept as the general prolepsis, 
a coin, perhaps a two-shilling piece. We then learn what may 
be bought with this coin, such as a pint of.beer, or two 
sandwiches, and so on. Th0se are prolepseis in the second sense, 
with the commodities properly arranged, and with a prorer 
knowledge of their value to us. The third stage is applying 
the spending of the two shi1lings to. the commodities that are 
best suited to us as they each occur, and not being tempted 
to buy the beer when we would be better off with the sandwiches. 
3. The Phantasiai. 
Next I consider the particular oper~tion of m.an 's reason 
. . ·. _. -~ ·- ._, . -~ . ' . -- .... \·.: ,,, 
I 
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necessitated by the phaQtasiai, images of various kinds, as 
they occur to the mind. Traditionally for the Stoics, th~ ' 
phantasiai were the causes of action and of knowledge. This 
doctrine was compatible with their theory of materialistic 
determinism, arising from the notion that every psychic event 
has an exterior, or partly exterior cause. When the ~ater 
Stoics were puzzled by the problem of.will and freedom, the 
term phantasia remained, but its use was extended and modifie'd 
0 
to embrace those functions which man feels he is doing·freely, 
particularly in making decisions towards good or evil conduct: 
there can be a phantasia of the good. As a Stoic, Epictetus. · 
has to refer all rational activity to some phantasia. But 
I 
since his interest is more in the moral purpose of man's 
freedom, he is forc~ed to interpret the notion of phantas~ai 
more flexibly, to include rational will; and in doing so, he 
explores many of the weaknesses in the early Stoic use of the 
term, w~ich had al~eady been criticised by the Sceptics who 
found it logicaliy deficient. 
As with other terms, Epictetus gives no systematic 
definition, and in interpretin~·bis theory ~d the use of the 
word, it is best to distinguish four main field~;~ of meaning 
where he applies the term: 
··' 
-·:· ., . 
..... :·;-.. 
.. _ •• • .• 1·. 
'· 
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a. Phantasia and motion (or action). 
b. Phantasia and kno\·rlodge. 
c. Phantasia and right conduct. 
d. Phantasia and emotions. 
It is the last two of these diyi~ions which represent not so 
much a departure. but a significant change of emphasis from 
the earlier Stoic treatment of rational function. Epictetus 
is concer~ed with the ethical and human implications of 
phantasiai, not merely with the scientific cause and effect 
notion represented by the first two fields. 
a. Phantasiai and Motion. 
The use of the term phantasia referring to pure cause 
and effect action in behaviour is seen in Discourse II 8, 1 - 8, 
w~ere the nature of the good is investigated by comparing anioal 
and human behaviour. In the animal kingdom, phantasiai are the 
means of experiencing the external world, that is, pure sense 
data. They are the necessary antecedent of any movement. 
Animals 'use' e~ternal phantasiai in the sense that they act 
instinctively upon them. This 'use' applies to any organism 
that has sense perception. 25 
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Animals hO\"IeVer, do not poss.::ss understanding 
( "ffOC-J>IIC.K oAc{,~9-"]-t1"1S_ _) ~f the use ·of phantasiai. Notice 
. '· 26 is drawn to this important distinction in II 1'1', 15.. The 
mere use of phantasiai produceo action which is not designed 
towards any end or g~od save that of, 1. the animal's own 
survival, ana 2. the service of animal to man in the plan 
of the cosmos. If animals did have _'ff'ol.p_r~uco>...,/..,9'1r'.s , they 
would no longer be subservient, but capable of voluntary 
action, and would choose to submit or not, and so become man's 
equal. Not possessing 1r.cpouco~o'u9'1tt'S animals are classed 
as- , (without reason). 
Because man not only needs to perform the strict 
biological functions of eating, drinking, resting and procreation, 
I but also must achieve each his own ends ( T6""J ) , which is 
his moral function, he has )(.P~-D'"IS- (use) and 1f'at.p.t~.l<o"-o~9'1triS 
of phantasiai. 27 
These passages indicate two t~ings: first, that 
phantasiai are the stimulus to action from outside, which is 
instinctive and irrational in animals, but considered and 
rational in man. In the case of man ho'tlrever, it is not always 
totally external: it is external to the prohairesis, but not 
necessarily to the uhole of man's psychological fUnctions. 
Thus whereas in animals the stimulus is purely objective, in 
·":'-
, __ _ 
_. . .-
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man it is often p_artially at l~ast, subject~ve. This is 
an important point, and discussed furth~~~~below. 
.. --~ - - -
. . I 
Second, man •s additional endowment o~fll.Jbff<o_>..~tu..9_'lr'.S-
has made him an et.t;Jical creature, capable of good. and evil. One 
\ • A I .-:18 does not speak of the good ( To ot.ytJ.vov ) iii plants and animals."" 
The good involves the capacity to choose, abd therefore a 
recognition of a moral end. 29 Man is not content ·to live like 
animals ~nd act on the unreflected prompting of the phantasiai, 
but examines each phantasia, so that he might promote the 
moral and both of himself and of the cosmos.3° 
b. Phantasiai and Knowledge. 
The application of the term phantasia to the theory of 
knowledge was its most promin~nt use in the early Stoa.31 
A1though Epictetus was clearlywell schooled in this early 
Stoic doctrine, h~regarded the purely epistemological 
Implications as unimportant, Essentially,in basing a theory 
' 
of cognition on the received phantasiai, a distinction had to 
be made between true and false phantasiai. In the transition 
fr'om using phantasia in the theory .,of knowl~dge to theories 
!..,,-..,··:: 
of moral behaviour, this distinction remains. 
Epi.ctetus remarks on the use of ._ph~tapia:'.in the strict 
theory of knowledge are not very edifying.· Be is content to 
.. 
' 
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trust the evidence of the senses, and declares that he is not 
concerned with the question of how perception arises. 32 He 
ridicules the criticisms of the Stoic theory by the Academy, 
without seriously grappling with their arguments. 33 We accept 
the impressions of exactly those things which the eyes reveal 
toiua.34 The attention of the philosopher should be totally 
devoted to the inner man. 
The most serious mention of cognitive theory is in 
I.2a, and again Epictetus uses the evidence of the.senses: if a 
,, ... , 
phantasia occurs to us during the ·aay that it is day, this 
phantasia is true. If the impression comes that it is night, 
this is false, because it is impossible to feel that it is 
night and to remove the feeling that it is day. The phantasia 
that there· is an odd number of stars is neither 1rue nor false, 
and we must withold assent. Phantas:i.ai are here presented· as 
ideas or hypotheses, ~hich can correctly be distinguished as 
true or false, provided ·our rational machinery is in prop.er . 
working order. It is notable in this passage that Epictetus 
uses the word feeling (ft~8e;v ) for the mental interpretation 
of the evidence of the senses. Apart from the sense ~ata, there 
can be no further logical approach to knowledge offmch obvtous 
facta, but there is the feeling or inner conviction that the 
data must be true. 
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However 1 reason is more vi tal in aP,pro·a.ch:i.ng more 
sophisticated pieces of knowledge. such as mathelliati.cal 
propositions and philosophical dogma. 35 When phan~asiai _o.~cur 
in these higher constructs of knowledge, that is, as.an 
hypothesis or general statement, ·it is of first importance to 
distinguish the true from the false. Since the notion of a 
false phantasia was the pivot causing Epietetus to adapt the 
cognition theory to his account moral behaviour, it is apt 
that he refers specifically on two occasions to the classifi-
cation of phantasiai. In I 27 1 1 - 2 1 he gives four categories 
of phantasiai: 
1. that something exists and appears to exist. 
2. that something does not exist and does not appear 
to. 
3. that something exists but does not appear to. 
4. that sometlj.ing does not exist but appears to. 
of these, 1 and 2 are true phantasiai, that is, the phantasia 
truly represents reality; 3 and 4 are false, where the 
appearanqe contradicts reality. The awkward concept of a 
negatived phantasia presented by 2 and 3 is characteristic 
of the precision of earlier Stoic discussion.on phantasia and 
.... 
~ ~. -_ . -. . . .. .. •. -
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cognition, but ia not :important to Epiotetus 1 adaptation. This-
is shown by their omission from Epictetus 1 ·second instance of 
classification in I 28: 
l. the ~ppearance of t~ing~ as they are. 
2. the appearance of things as they are not. 
Both discourses quickly pass from the purely epistemological 
opening to consider human behaviour. 
This is the sum of Epic tetus 1 remarks on phantasiEd,-· 
as a factor in pure cognitive theory. T~ee stages_can be 
discerned: l. Animal cognition, where an_experience prompt~ 
an immediate and necessary reaction. 2. Ele~entary cognition, 
which is the perception of the sens~s, e.g. that it is night. 
t'lith these two stages, Epictetus at least, ~s ready to discount ' . .: 
the possibility of false phan~a:aiai. 3. ' Complex cognition, 
which is the knowledge or verificationL()f general statements 
or hypotheses. The phantasia is presented to us as a.statement 
or hypothesis, and Epictetus het'e admits the possibility of 
false phantasiai. But he never questions the truth of 
prilmary objective sense data (he may believe the.t theoretically 
there may be·problems, but not worthy of ·pr:t.ority), and this 
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important conclusion follows: that the only statements w~ich 
can be false are those in which there is a subjective element, 
that is, phantasiai that occur to us through our reasoning 
capacity - the results of syllogisms and mathematical hypotheses -
and not directly from exteriors.36 
c. Phantasiai and Moral Behaviour. 
Epictetus provides a threefold basis for moral behaviour: 
phantasiai,·prohairesis and logos. The p_hantasia in the context 
of moral behaviour (and this is his ~rincipal· use of the term), 
is a fancy for a particular course of action. The prohairesis 
(choice) and logos (reason), working together in the interests 
of goodness, then decide whether the fancy is to be adopted or 
rejected. The problem that presents us here is how Epiotetus 
is justified in employing a term meaningful in cognitive 
theory, to his theory of moral conduct. 
I will first consider the ways this kind of phantasia 
resembles those discussed previously. First, they are similar 
to the phantasiai received by animals in so far as man in the 
first instance is prompted to movement and action by phantasiai. 
This is clearly stated with reference to the Iliad, which is 
said to be nothing but phantasiai and the use ( X p'9cr•s ) of 
' - ' 
••• 1 . 
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phantasia;i. The action of each of the characters depends upon 
the phantasiai occurring to them. Examples ~e given, such 
as the phantasia to Paris to abduct Belen and the phantasia 
to Helen to follow him.3? Accordingly the measure of all 
man's action is th.e phantasiai, his 'fancies'• As the initial 
impulse to activity therefore, these phantasiai resemble those 
occurring to animals. They differ from them in an important 
aspect: they are not purely objective, but arise most often 
from an'inner disposition reinforced by a particular external. 
There is a further difficulty: Epictetus has.shown 
that animals only have ~ of phantasiai, but man has use and 
:rrcpouc.oAo~9'Jt1'-1', or apprecia-tion of their purpose. When 
Epictetus speaks of 1("o(poC-K-DAli-~0-'7,.'S t«'&l rotD":I4v _, he is not 
talking of phantasiai in the sense of 'fancies' or suggested 
courses· of action, but rather the pure objectivity of the 
axternal world: that man sees the world as it is and understands 
ita purpose. Such knowledge of the external wor~d has a part 
in deciding behaviotir, but o~ly in so far a':3, a) it contributes 
to the store of reason or kriowledge (see section one), as for 
instance, proleps~is, from ,which a,; judgement is passed on a 
, I 
suggested 'fancy•, or b) it forma the actual sense data which 
instigates the 'fancy'; for ins~a~ce, I may eee a man being 
put to death, which gives rise to a 'fancy' that I should pity 
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him, then I oppose this 'fancy' with the 'idea' reaped fro!Il 
. education and past experience, that h;is death in no ~~~~te 
. ,· '.···.. •'\ 
. ··-.... 
me. Thus when Epictetus speaks of underetanding the 
phantasiai, he means the interpretation of external pheno~ena, 
not the direct knowledge of whether a suggested course of 
action is right or wrong. 
Secondly, those phantasiai resemble the otP,ers in 
.being partially subjective. In this aspect, they moet 
closely resemble the third type of cognitive phantasiai, 
those conveying knowledge of general statements. For this 
reason I have adopted the translation 'fancy' for phantasiai 
covering suggested courses of action. They are suggestions 
for action which seem to arise from a combination of two 
sources: .an inner disposition and an external phenomenon or 
set of circumstances. Thus Paris' tphantasia to abduct· aa-;~n 
.. 
arose: from both aJc,lustful disposition and .the availability· of 
Helen by divine promise. 1Fancy 1 also has connotations of 
•.' 1 
desire and want, whitih I believe are true to Epictetus• use 
of phantasia in this connection. It is used as an impetuous 
and, as we shall see, often mistaken suggestion to action. 
It is not used of two carefully weighed alternative actions. 
There seems no reason why it should not be extended to the 
considered rationd suggestion to act.ion, but Epictetus sees 
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that the biggest problem in moral behaviour .is in overcoming 
partially irratiohal suggestions, and so conc·entrates his 
teaching on those suggestions which occur from a not totally 
rational disposition. 
Third, these phantasiai again resemble the third type 
of cognitive phantasia in that they·share the possibility of 
I 
being true or false. It is this point, and the following, 
which allows Epictetus to make use of the same term for 
phantasiai of knowledge and phantasiai of actions: phantasia 
of knowledge, 'ideas', can be rationally proved correct or 
incorrect, true or false, or we might say, right or wrong. 
'Fancies' also can be right or wrong, but in a moral sense. 
The word 'right' is used in different senses, it would appear 
to us, in these statements: 
It is right that 2 + 2 cr 4. ('right 1 = logically 
correct) 
It is right that I go to Church this evening. 
(right = morally 
desirable) 
The distinction in meaning was not recognised by Epictetus: 
correct knowledge is good \'lhether it concerns mathematical 
- . - ·~· : 
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statements ·or moral behaviour.38 
There are two philosophic precedents that should 
lead Epictetus to equate the two kinds of right, or the.:two_ 
kinds of knowledge, first the Socratic dogma that goodriess 
is knowledge, developed in Plato and in some measure by 
Aristotle, and second, the rational mopism of tho Stoics which 
caused them to regard reason as the j~dge not only of true 
and false statements, but of go~d-and:bad,behaviom-, and 
' 
thereby to develop the notion of t:he praatical sy-llogism. 
This leads to the fourth point of.· resemblance b.etween 
fancies and ideas: they are both submitted to the criticism 
and judgement of reason. Consequently, logical arguments 
are fit preliminary material on which to exercise the reason 
before presenting it with the more cocplex problems of 
behaviour.39 Reason must 
<"-} 
.-'f· - --- ---. -· ,._ ( 
give assent e~v "~~-~~ /}pt~) 
to a· phantasia representing a course of action as it does to 
a phantasia representing a statement of fact. Right action 
is dependent upon rational thinking, and the appropriate 
canons of reason must be used. These are not the canons of 
" 9"' logic, the true and false, but of duty( .. T.D &<cat 1")1<0\1 ), 
, e~~!'i_e!'l.ce ( _ TO ""Uf-t. t~pov ) and personal appropiateness 
( " ., 40 To IC~T' et'e ). Ther·e is far leas definition attached 
to such factors than to logical principles, such that logic 
,·, ·-
·.--· ··, 
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alone cannot produce goodness, but only logic co-ordinating 
with the personal moral choice and moral state of prohaireois. 
Epictetus is led to adopt this view of moral behaviour 
since he follows the Stoic doctrine in identifying the good 
and reason, 41 and can say that just as the soul mustE~s;.,;~ 
assent to the true, so it is necessarily attracted by the good. 
In eitller case our full rational equipment must be functioning 
properl~, and in the case of judgements on behaviour, this 
must include correct pr6hairesis as well as {assent). 
On these pointsof resemblance, Epictetus can use 
phantasia to cover both suggestions to moral behaviour (fancies), 
and statements of general fact (ideas), regarding both as 
suggestions of knowledge which through reason may be judged 
right or wrong. ~lhilst, as we have seen, Epictetus in his 
day had good reason to adopt this view, today we find it more 
difficult to regard a prop~sition to action as knowledge of· 
any kind. 
If a suggested course of action occurs to me, it comes 
as a statement of future intent, or as a command, for example: 
11 Go to Church tonight;" ··~ow about going to Church tonight?.'' The 
only sense in which we can call such a future possibility true, 
is if the intent is later fulfille~. For Epictetus it would 
be true, if it could be shown to be the right action for me 
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to do tonight. I cannot know from the statement of intent 
whether· in fact there is church-going for me tonight; but 
from the fancy, I can infer knowledge that: 
a. I can or cannot go to Church tonight. 
b. I ought or ought not to go to Church tonight. 
c. I want or do not want to go to Church tonight. 
Analysed in this way, Epictetus' approach is more 
easily understood. The knowledge of wanting, ought and can 
is to an extent verifiable. A knowledge of-self should 
determine what is possible for me to do at any moment. This 
.,. 9 I is the -L-.yvw 1 cre.ocuTov , given as an important part of the 
Stoic askesis. A knowledge of moral goodness will-deter~ine 
whether a particular act ought to be done; this is the 
application of the Stoic prolepseis. The adjustment and 
refinement of the prohairesis determines whether the will is 
correct choice or irrational desire; this refinement, 
producing right will, is the supreme aim of the Stoic askesis. 
There is a further point, that in a system of 
determined rationalism, knowledge of future intent has more 
meaning than in a non-determined system. If, ideally, the 
future can be grasped through reason, by co-extension of hWilan 
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and divine ~eaeon,43 than by comparing the fancies against 
what one 'knows' one must do to conform to the determined 
divine plan, the fancy ~ be shown to be true or ~se; but 
the rational precognition is essential. 
What·ever the philosophical problems underlying 
Epictetus' terminology are, it is clear that he regarded those 
phantasiai whioh I have termed 'fancies' as one of the 
greatest problems confronting his pupils who seek moral 
adjustment. Be :La particularly concerned with the :fancies 
that are false, realising that a fancy is not so easily 
discarded as a false intellectual idea, since particulars are 
-involved; one's particular willing self and one's particular 
44 
circumstances must be the basis for the judgement. Thus 
strict reason as log:i,.c, can onl.y give a probability; reason 
•• •·•• l 
must co-ordinate with prohairesis as moral goodness to give 
certaint~. Accordingly, the ration~ defence to the subjective 
element in the £ancy is weaker than in the case of an.idea, 
and the fancy will continue to convince of its correctness. 
Furtber the subjective element ie bound up with our emotional 
disposition, not merely with our intellectual aide, which is 
reaponeible for th~ ideas. 
Recognising these difficulties, Epictetus first 
examines moreolos&iy the subjective nature of the false phantasia 
·_,' . 
, :1.:- ,. -'r~ .• ·~· .: . -· 
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which l~ads to evil, and finds this to be connected with desires 
and emotions. This is the subject of my next section. Second, 
he considers the nature of goodness in the soul as \'rell as 
reason, finding in the concept of goodness an element of moral 
choice (prohatresis), trained by education and the prolepseis. 
I will consider this in chapter seven. 
d. Phantasia and emotions. 
I consider now those phantasiai of moral behaviour, 
~ 'fancies•, which are false, but which temptingly convince 
of their tru~h; thus leading man into misconduct. If these 
phantasiai can be prevented from occurring, or if correct 
judgement can be given on them when they do occur, theJ1. man 
will not be led into evil •. Such is the aim of Epictetus' 
philosophical training, or askesis, and we can now look more 
closely at its psychological basis. 
It is a charactenistic of the false impressions of 
moral behaviour, that they are accompanied by a forc.eful 
temptation to be acted upon. They have 11'a&ot" o T'rJ'- __ _ 
(pers~siveness), 45 and make a forceful impression on the mind. 
It is said to bite ( S~teV"r) _ ), and is uncontrollable.46 
C~early Epictetus regards such impressions as temptations to 
'- . 
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m:lsconduct. 
We have al.ready seen that the phantasiai of this class 
contain both objective and subjective elements, and in the case 
of the false phantasiai we now find that they can be al.most 
equatew with impulse or desire. In several passages, the term 
1phantasia' and some word denoting desire, are interchangeabl.e. 
A s_triking instance is III 25, 6. Two parallel examples of 
a tancy are given, one of a gi.rl.,-·oL\lTbr.cr 1«. 'J'rauSacr~.cp'.ou t<~'il, 
ll I .Ja''t I 
and one of finding fault withmmebody,--rrpo.VU.f''"'-r:&lQC' TIWC.. 
I 
The urge or desire contained in the parallel word, "ff'po9.&Jf-'U'· 
must be contained in the term 'phantasia' as we11. 47 A similar 
' 
J 9 I :t I 
exampl.e is in II 18, 8: when you desire money ( c_11 1 Uf""Jt1']1S rAPY"PIO~, 
you must bring reason to bear on this irrational impulse. In 
the same sentence, Epictetus speaks of the hegemonikon being_ 
roused by the corresponding phantasiai, that is money causing 
this same desire. 
The irrational nature of the phantasiai is best 
appreciated by considering a fr~gment of Aulus Gellius, quoting 
the fifth book of Discourses. 48 The mind reacts to phantasiai 
in two stages: as the phantasiai occur, the mind is struck by 
the very first species or appearance. The word species itself 
already suggests a subjective reaction. The reaction is 
irrational: the person~ows pale and is beset by all kinds of 
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emotional feelings (motibus rapidis). The first stage therefore 
is emotional activity in the mind. The second s.tage is the 
rational consideration of the phantasia •. in deoiQ.ing whether 
it is true or false.49 
Of interest here is the initial emotional reaction, in 
that the emotional state cannot be separated from'the phantasia. 
I 
Furthermore, Epictetus says of the first stage that it is 
involuntary, not only the occurrence of the phantasia, but the 
emotional reaction also. Now the phantasia here described is 
different from those which I have equated with desire. In this 
passage the most natural interpretation of phantasia is to 
. regard the phantasia as the fancy that something is f righ·tt:.ul, 
whereas the tempting phantaeiai we are considering, is a fancy 
that something is desirable. In the former the emotional st~te 
is produced by certain irrational ins~s, which cannot be 
voluntarily eradicated. In the latter case, the state is 
produced by the irrational desiring or appetitive nature of the 
individua1 1 .which can be trained by habit, and in Epictetus 1 
progr~e of askesis ranks highest in the three fields CT /,-rt. o 1 ) 
of moral exercise.5° The desire for money if ·uncontrol,l~d, is 
seen to bring with it the same order of emotional disturbance 
as that produced by fear,5l but its cause, unlike fear, can be. 
' ... 
-, ~ ' 
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removed, since mainly it lies within the individual • 
. '• 
In a sense, the phantasiai in Epictetus have become a 
disguise for what Plato might call an irrational part of the 
soul, for they are the manifestation of our irrational and 
desiring personality, becoming manifest when a particular 
external, riches, for example, triggers it into a practical 
urge. There follows an immediate interaction between phantasia 
and desire. The phantasiai are.already attract~ve impressions, 
and made attractive by the immediate reinforcement of desire to 
an external. Such externally provoked desires·have to be 
. 52 
eradicated, or if not eradicated, prevented from being ful-
filled in a corresponding action. How is this to be done? 
As soon as the desire-phantasia complex is fixed in the 
mind, (that is the desire activated by a phantasia, becom~ng 
desire for a particular), reason becomes active, and by judging 
or by combatting the phap.~asia it might era~icate the d~aire~ 
The effectiveness of the r.ea·son depends on the quality of the 
rational functions and the strel'lfS'6h of the phantasi~.53 
Two ways of 'dealing with phantasiai are des_cribed, as 
I have suggested, judging or combatting. These are most likely 
two t'lays of describ;i.ng the same thing, the first from a mo~e 
.logical angle, the second more psychological. By judging, is 
meant the, examination of each phantasia by· reason, arid producing 
,• · ... 
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I . 
a r~i.oyfo"Gf. (decision), true or false. If the phantas·ia is found 
not to conform with nature, it is rejected. The prol_ epse_is are j 
to be used as a standard in th:ls rational judgement•- -This 
' . ' 54·. 
exercise of judging is given prominence in the DiscolU'ses. 
The method of combatting deals with im~es. That is, 
as the fancy presents itself, reason finds a counter argument 
with which to oppose it. This is the method most commonly 
referred to when Epictetus is describing his askesis. If ~ou 
desire one thing~ think of the oppos~te:55 eq~ip yourself 
\ :1> I ; 
with the oppooite fancy or idea, -r-es £votvTIGC~ +oe.V'T41tCJ' 1 ~S 
_.. I ll \. 56 
tldUT'f 1t'.POp.CICAe • For instance-, to avoid being drawn into 
too deep an affection for a son as you kiss him, whisper to 
' yourself, "Tomorrow you will die11 • Providing the initial 
phan.tasia is not overpowering, th_e opposing argume.nts and 
phantasiai will defeat the desire.5? 
However, the task of reason is more difficult because 
the initial phantasia or desire continues to produce anticipatory 
images. A string of such images is given in II 18, 15 •.18. 
From the initial desire of a woman arise pictures in the.mind 
of the desired act taking place, with such persuasive clari't~8 
that reason may easily be overcome: I may picture the consequ~tices, 
It is noteworthy that Epictetus 
uses similar terminology~to Plato when describ~g the anticipa-
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60 tory images ot pleasure in the Philebus. If reason does 
not fight desire i.mlilediately, the desire \o~ill form further 
\ !~.,.. ~ \ , , \ , I 61 
images: Tae_ -~"1-S ot"""""O(crcrorJCJ'a&. 1/tl"(l( 9e~e• *' ~s 9~el •- -
The result of the action of reason on the phantasia 
will be eith~r, a. that the desire is cast out by the &6yf'A'tJ&.t 
or overcome by opposing 'ideas•; or b. that the &sire persists 
against all reason, in which case its object is either gained 
and a kind of animal satisfaction ensues, or it fails in its 
obJect, producing a peevish character even more unbalanced in 
reason. If the object of desire is gained, the same desire 
will be aroused again more forcefully as soonat~suitable 
external impression occurs, unless some rational adjustment 
is made. If the desire fails in its object, which generally 
happens with irrationally conceived desires, a state Of 
-Tt~9os (emotion, passion) is induced. These effects are 
expressed in the accompanying diagram. 
11'~9os is defined by Eptctetus as an emotional 
I 
state produced by unfulfilled desire, .L _Sa ~-«-•--" __ T_t 
' ' I 62 k"'' 1-'-'1 ywe~9(1(.1 _). It is turbulent desire in which the 
irrational element is all the stronger and so more easily 
provoked into the practical urge by the slightest of external 
stimuli. 63 This state of 1t c( 9os is well described in II 18. 
I It is compared to a tempest ( X e ,,....wv. ) which eventually so 
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weakens the reason that you do not notice you are doing wrong, 
and causes it to argue even in favour· of your wrong-doi~g 
(29 - 32). In this state, desire is quickly roused and grows 
stronger by habi~. 
On the question of the lt ~ 9"1 there was disagreement 
amongst the earlier Stoics. Posidonius regarded the -nJ,.9,l as 
the motions of an irrational part of man, recognising a kind 
of of rational and irrational dualism. Chrysippus and Zeno 
. I 
maintained a rational monism and regarded 1t Gt9<rJ to be the 
I .f. "' 
result of a negation or perversion of reason, <-~e.•.v'111"'S ,.. "X"'J-S 
d.''h..oy os •. . rot) A:_ you ~lritrTpo~o/.,.). 64 The view of Zeno ancl 
Chrysi.ppus fits Epictetus' interpretation of the '1T ~ 9'1 
\ . 
they are produced by wrong judgements or by desire overmastering 
reason. At the same time, in the foregoing account, I have 
drawn attention to part of man's constitution which iS outside 
reason, namely in the basic desires that occur as specific 
ph~tasiai. when sti.lllulated by an etterior, and in the inward· 
desires formed by habit, which Epiotetus terms • 
Epictetus is concerned with rational and irrational processes, 
both of which are d~pendent on prohairesis, which is choice 
exercised through the whole personality towards the correct 
orientation of desires and reason• In this interpretation of 
the 1r .:. 9"1 , is easily seen the cl.Qseness of Epictetus' 
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paycological position to~~ysippus. The single rational 
hegemonikon of Chrysippus, whereby it was difficult to account 
·for the irrational dispositions, is dev_eloped by Epictetus into 
the single prohairesis, which is more readily adaptable to 
give account of the desiring and willing functions. 
Epictetus t\>lice quotes the example of f·ledea, as one 
acting thro~gh passion. In II 1?, 19, he introduces the 
example in the context of unful~illed desire, of desiring 
something which does not happen. t'lhen her desi~e - of living 
with her husband - was not fulfilled, she entertained that 
kind of phantasia as is necessary in such cases,65 that is, 
a phantasia arising from passion. Her next irrational desire 
is to take vengeance on Ja~on by killing theii- children, which 
\ 
is manifestly against her interests, and realising this she 
utters: 't'lhat do I care 1 , and Epictetus remarks that this' is 
the outbursting ( ) of a soul of great force. 
This would appear to be the stock example of the Stoic 
'Kill.B'] , that the non-fulfilment of a natural desire. (to keep her 
husband), results in an unnatural and utterly irrational pass¢on 
for revenge. In the stage of ~~8os reason is by-passed, and 
again arguments are mustered to· support the desire, as we saw 
in II, 18. 
The same example occurs in I 28, 7 - 9. Epictetus• 
. I 
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commentary here is that Medea's action was mor~ considered, and 
she 'had weighed the profitability of gratifying her own passions 
against the salvation of her children. Thus she is· using 
r-eason, but based on a false premise of \1hat constitutes that 
which is profitable. Here Epictetus uses the example not 
primarily to illustrate TrJ. 9o, , but the importance of 
having correct principles. In the first example we may say 
I 
that the 'ft'Gt 9t>r. was so strong that reason was discarded; in 
the second, the reasoning faculty and prolepseis were too weak 
to judge the phantasiai correctly. 66 
The example of Medea might also have been used by the 
Stoics to illustrate a position of akrasia, that is of falling 
into wrong through failure to overcome a desire,67 and Epictetus 
does regard the action of Medea as demanding sympathy rather 
than blame. But this is inconsistent with hledea 1s considered 
deliberation on her action, incorrect though it ne. 
Medea deliberates and does wrong, (according to I 28, 
not II 1?); the thief, quoted in II 26, 2 does likewise.68 He 
believes that thieving is in his own interest, tberefore he 
follows his occupation. This is a false premise, but he 
assents to the conclusion as a truth. Again Epictetus.seems 
to \·1ant to pardon this man for not doing what he wishes, for 
he \"lishes to act lin his own interest, Again this ·comes very 
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near a position of akrasia, and the Platonic doctr·ine that 
no one errs willingly, is common in Epictetus; yet in saying 
:~ I 
that he assents to the conclusion as true {_ £'11'Ut-&ue.r ) 1 
this must represent an act of choice, since prohairesie is 
active in every decieion.69 
Thus Epictetus is a degr~e lese lenient than Aristotle 
in respect to the pe'rson who does wrong by acting either through 
passion, or without full knowledge of his conduct. If reason 
is properly trai~ there should be no mistake in the premises, 
or in the application of them; and Trat9"1 can be avoided by 
not giving way to persuasive phantasiai in the first place, and 
by adjusting the prohairesis eo that the basic desiring impulses 
are not directed towards exteriors. 
In considering the origin of false phantasiai of moral 
behaviour, I have referred to a desiring capacity directed to 
externals, which can be instigated to specific desire or fancy 
at the presentation of a. corresponding external stimulus. I 
have already noted that Epictebue does not hold a bi-partite 
division of soul into reason and the irrational, as Posidonius 
attempted to introduce. \'le are faced theri with the problem of 
_ including the desiring functions t·rithin Epictetue 1 rational 
monism. This question will be discussed more fully in chapter 
seven, under the functions of the prohaireais. For the 
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prohairesis has a choosing, directive function, and yet is the 
very centre of our rational being. But already we can notic.e 
that Epictetus' concept of desire is wider than desire directed 
towards exteriors, causing the alluring and persuasive 
phantasiai. This is warp~d desire; the correct orientation 
of the desiring function should be internal. 
The soul is not only endowed with reason, to distin~ish 
true and false, ·but also tiith desire·, to desire good and repel 
"' \. ' ~ Jlo\ • "''. ~· .A ,,; ~ '1. . ' ' • \ "" 70 
evil: 11'pOS,.." 'TO itl.yrA.r~ov op&KTUCwS Kl"&acrvcltt•'"" pe' oe.To ICelKov a·ICJtAI.ICTUCWS •. 
It is the nature of the soul to feel moved t'lith desire to the 
good; when the good appears, it att~acts the soul to itself. 
The reason faculty which we have from God_is the faculty of 
t" I \ ~ ' \ I I '7l 
choice and desire o11vott"tV ""''" op,.,.aTUC'JV. •• tcou ••• o pc IC~Ut.,~ .. By 
discovering the essential good, we feel pleasure in the soul, 
( 
' In the concept of aidos:,. the feeling of self-respect, 
which is a principal vir'tue in Epictetus 1 teaching, there is 
a strong el~ment of properly directed emotion, yet we are born 
with this feeling as part of our consti.tution as human beings. 73 
It is interesting to note that aidoe was classified amongst the 
. ~ 9 I 74 -~E,U 'JtoC_ .Etc:l( 1 (good-feelings) by the Middle Stoics. 
Epictetus is able to appeal to this emotion, since it causes 
blushing when involved in certain kinds of misconduct. This 
. ~ .. ' 
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feeling of one's moral worth demonstrates the use of emotional 
states for good ends.75 
Good ., ~ 9'1 as well as bad were recognised by earlier 
Stoics: they regarded w:C.9'1 as right when controlled by 
reason:76 fear becomes caution (a combination of feelings still 
, n ' 
vague in Epictetus) 1 and desire ( 8'1ll vUf41.o' ) becomes will 
( -·-f..o~)\"lcr•s ). Accordingly, in 1·18, Epictetus can say 
that in all men, good and bad, thought and action start from 
a single source, namely, 
\ , IJ 
1" o "It ct_v E IV , a feeling to assent, 
to choose and to desire. 
If then there is this basic and natural desiring function 
in man, what should be its object? It should be aimed at 
acquiring the good .for oneself and for the Cosmos, as demanded 
by reason. It is naturally attracted by such a clear idea of 
the good, :. 7? in the s(UD.e 
way as the baser desires are attracted by an external phantasia. 
The good desires are internally provoked, b~ our own rational 
consciousness, and obedience to God. Our wish should be to 
satisfy ourselt, and to be splendid before God. 78 It is 
precisely in this co-ordination of reason and feeling that the 
concept o_r prohairesis oper.at~s. Just as it is detrimental for 
an'.ill-fancy to be reinfor·ced by externally provoked desire, so 
it is import;;tnt that feeling or desire should strengthen a good 
phantasia or 'idea' produced by our inner reason. 
4. Reason as Apospaema. 
From considering the human func·tion of refl.O!)n, _I now 
turn to the Stoic belief that reason in man is a portion 
(apospasma) of the cosmic or divine reason. This be~ief is 
found to persist in Epictetus, but for a somewhat different 
purpose. In the early Stoa the belief supported a system of 
materialistic determinism: the cosmic logos pervaded the whole 
\ ' I creation by A oyoe cr1r6pJ4o&TIKo.t enlivening each living thing. 
Man was endowed with a portion of reason itself so that he 
might work out for himself that good to which end he was 
designed. A belief so essential to Stoic doctrine c~no.t be 
abandoned even by Epictetus, though he is mc>~e concerneq wi.tb 
" 
moral action and choic.e in human beings, than vd.th ph¥s~ca:J,:·iy 
determined courses of motion~-
It is natural therefore to find Epictetus concent.rati~ 
on the aspect of freedom contained in the apospasma theory, 
rather than ·the aspect of determined cause. t1e have -seen that 
freedom is an essential attribute of reason, therefore if the 
gods give a portion of reason to man, there is a sense in which 
he becomes free. 79 Discourse I 1, shows how man's freedom ia 
23.3 
not in the body, but in his reasoning faculty. The Gods have 
given us this portion of themselves, and if·our 1ull intent 
is to care for this, we shall never be hindered •. There is 
here an appeal to a religious response: body is clay, reason. 
is pure; the language here is reminiscent of that in Republic x., 
where Plato depicts the unfettered and naked soul at its 
80 
separation from the body. Reason is given by God; it ~ 
God, and should therefore be honoured above all. 
A similar construction of a Platonic dualism of body 
and soul is given in I 3, 3. ~~ is compounded at b~th from 
two elements,.the body and reason; we share the former with the 
animals, and the latter with the gods. Necessarily therefore, 
reason is the noblest part of man. Epictetus is self assured 
that it is: his audience need recourse to a mythology to be 
persuaded. 
Both man and God nave intelligence and reason, but 
be~ause reason is limited by the directive fordes, of the 
individual. - his desiring function, the reason need not be 
co-extensive in its aims and actions. Pure reason of necessity 
must arrive at the same conclusions on given Chta, but as we 
81 have seen, pure reason cannot operate in the practical 
syllogism, nor in decisions of morall:eba.viour. Thus where. 
moral actions ar.e concerned reason cami.ot assume a cosmic 
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identity, but only an individual identity, being limited by 
each person's will. Once the desiring faculty longs only to 
coincide with the purposes of God and the individual, and for 
nothing external to these, the will, or pro4airesis of such 
a person ie fully rational, and his reason does become ._ 
co-extensive with God's. 
That Epictetus does not regard h~ !easori as 
materially of a kind with co~ic reason, is seen in I 6, 8. 
Providence is seen as the supreme designer ( T 6 X v 'Ttl s ) , 
and amongst the many intricate and co-ordinated aspects of 
creation, is the human intellect. There is no reference here 
to the seminal concept of creation and the physical partaking 
of reason in human minds. The Discourse makes two important 
points: that there is a ~tational Providence, and that man's 
reason has a defini.te-part to play in the universal design; 
but this reason is.l~ft independent to fulfil its part. 
Accordingly in persuading pupils to adjust their 
prohairesis, the apo·spasma belief. has great effect, and 
Epictetus sometimes appeals to this belief with much rhetoric. 
Beca~se reason to the Stoics contained all that was right and 
good, Epictetus can effectively, in a sense. mythologise the 
materialistac doctrine, and refer to thetlpgos as God or Zeus, 
caring little for the physical theory surrounding it.,82 ·but 
. ',. 
'. 
. '-
~- ·.-: -1- •• 
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using it to demonstrate the priority of reason in man and 
the ethical responsibility contained in the apospasm~ theory. 
;)' . , 
Be can appeal to our sense of shame (_ O\Jir. oe ur )( 1'-'lr-J -->, 
• 
when we recall that whenever we entertain impure thoughts, God 
is in fact present within us. 83 He even compares reason to a 
personal deity or guardian angel (. _,ci,H'w" ) , who ever 
accompanies us, and hears and sees - ·- d 84 everything we o. 
There is however an important senpe in which Epictetus 
uses the apospasma theory as more than a pedagogical device. 
In I 14, the theory is referred to as a binding force between 
man's reason and the cosmos. I-n this instance the freedom is 
not emphasised, but rather the natural responsibility to conform: 
110ur souls are .p6\l.hd with- God and joined together with Bini. as 
portions of His being, and their motion is a motion of that 
which is his own.n8.5 The passage is introduced into a discourse 
w~ich opens by describing the obedience of all objects of 
creation obeying God's design. Thus the motions of the 
reasoning faculty, although they are free as the passage later 
describes, {7 - 8), ought also, if goodness is to be attained, 
conform to the reason of the Universe. 
This passage does not contradict the instances 
previously referred to, in which freedom and independence were 
regarded as the essential quality of human reason. Rather, it 
reveals the kind of parad~x which we shall fin~ to be basic 
in Epictetus 1 concept of freedom. The apospasma theo~y is 
a mechanism whereby we are bound to be free and bound to ·be 
rational to a greater or lesser extent, depending on the 
orientation of the desiring function; but in our purest 
aspect, to be attained through education, the freedom of 
the reason is aimed at precisely the same end as the cosmic 
reason has designed for each person; Thus in this purest 
aspect, we are free to be bound by the governance of the 
universe. This important concept will recur in considering 
\ 
the nature of the hegemonikon in the next section, and in 
the concept of in chapter seven. 
5. The Hegemonikon. 
Not much need be said on the hegemonikon, or ruling 
principle, in Epictetus' psychological system, since he transfers 
the characteristics which the earlier Stoics-gave to hegemonikon, 
to the prohairesis. 
In early Stoic thought, the hegemonikon was considerad 
the guiding ele~ent in the soul, and there was considerable 
discussion as to where in the body it was situated. It was 
regarded as the highest part of the soul ( ~v-:.,.,..,_Tov ), and 
the rational part, in that it was responsible for the whole of 
- .-. ·~. 
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the ac.tivity of the psyche, impressions {phantaai.ai), assent 
{ Cl. I ) and inclina. tiona __ opt-tcU 
A phantasia occurring to the .. mind gave the hegemonikon a certaip 
disposition or tendency. In general, the hegemonikon.was-a 
; 
disposition influencing our whole mental activity, and this 
disposition could be rational to a greate·r or le~ser de~ree. 87 
Epi.ctetus adopts the word in its gener~,.~~t,oic usage • 
. ----~ 
It is the reason element with which God has en:dow~d. ..m@; .{as . 
.. ~-.. . . ·' . 
. . ' ' .t 
apoapasma), but with the additional notion of peraond~aj_rective 
function. It may be directed towards pur_e ·.z::e.ason·which is its 
ideal state, or to the neglect of reason by t.tle attract,ion of 
earthl.y ~tereats. 88 The early Stoics gave it many charac-teristics 
of soul, as pervading the body and actually moving it, and in 
Epictetus likewis~,.·it is.~ur desiring _disposition either towards. 
the reason whereof it is compounde&, or towards the externals of 
the body. It is the disposition guiding our choice in moral 
actions, and its beat state is fully rational; the purpo.se of 
philosophy is to train the hegemonikon in reason. 89 
This is the same as aiming to have the hegemonikon in 
accord with nature, 90 for the course of behaviour directed by 
reason will be the one that conforms to nature, or the design 
of the cosmic will. The alternative disposition of the hegemonikon 
is to be warped by neglect and take interest in the cares of 
' · .. 
r" • '~·.' 
., 
l 
the body and exteriors. _l:~~-~~;-~~~Pt~:jJ:'1~cl)e~a~e1r.io:malf-~-
~ "' f • I 
decisions it would not make, apart; from its association with 
~ody.91 
In these passages, the hegemonikon is seen as a controll-
ing disposition, which through lack of training can have a 
tendency tow~ds interests of the body, but if its true rational 
nature is maintained, will tend always towards the right end. 
We may discern here an infinite regression, in inquiring what 
controls the state of the hegemonikon, what part of us is free 
to neglect it or care for it, if it is our highest part. Here 
the concept of a controlling element in us is carried a stage 
further by Epictetus, who makes the main characteristic of the 
controlling element, its power to make a _choice, prohairesis..t 
and this fuller term can be fairly substituted in the passages 
where hegemonikon is mentioned. The inter~hangeability of the 
terms is seen most clearly in III 22, which is address_ed to the 
Cynic, and Epictetus consequently uses the older term, 
hegemonikon, not prohairesis, (33). Yet the main feature of 
the guiding principle is its freedom (41), and the Cynic must 
strive to have his hegemoifiKon- purer- than the-sun-;- ~actly 
the same language is used of the functions of prohairesis in 
IV ~1, 5 - 6. The term prohairesis does occur towards the end 
of III 22 (103), but in the narrower sense of specific choice 
.. :_. 
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and the uoe of phan~asiai, not.·as the totality of our choosing 
dispos:l:tionl ·which is its fuller meaning in Epictetue. 
Here then the hecremonikon becomes closely identified 
with prohairesis, but elsewhere we may draw the following 
distinctions between the two terms: 
1. The hegemonikon is allied to the idea of a definite 
disposition upwards towards reason or downwards towards externals. 
2. As such, it is considered as an element existin$ 
spacially in the individual, rather than a momentary function of 
the totality of self. 
3. aegemonikon is less connected with personal will, 
but rather with some physical motion. 92 In IV 7, 41, the state 
of the hegemonikon is said to be l'lilleQ... It :i.;s in the state, 
good or bad accordinS as you will ( , 8eAe IS ). So the 
concept of I?~ohairesis now contains and controls, through ·~eta 
of choice, the guiding tendency of the he~emonikon. Again 
in II 22, the . Kup1eoov (which we may identify with the 
hegemonikon, but see note 92), follows prohairesis. It is the 
sum of one's choosing capacity which ultimately decides the 
state of the hegemonikon. Thus this latter term ceases to have 
_,.·· 
_ ... , ... ~· '\ '. ·:. .. t ~: .. ·~·, .,. .-: . 
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any useful purpose. 
6. Reason and Freedom. 
In conclusion to this chapter I consider the aspects 
of freedom which have been .seen to inhere in man's mental 
activity. 
In Epictetus, the cause ( 
,, 
~-LTI0\1 ) for action is 
not any exterior event, but the internal decision of re~son, 
or will. Achilles did no.t grieve because Patroclus ,;,aS· dead, 
but because he wanted to ( ~' o ~r:v "'~T :f )~93 __ ~-~*f.LillTct 
are the causes of actions, and these in turn are the result 
of the activity of reason. The external stimulus, the death 
of Patroclus, produces a phantasia, but the main· contribution 
to the phantasi.a was the tendency of the desiring· personality, 
and the lack of knowledge of what death is. 
The cause of action· then lies .in the use of reason. 
The significant characteristic of reason is that it is free. We 
have seen this freedom in two senses. First, it is free as 
being independent of the cosmic logos. God has given us reason 
free as he himself has it. This aspect of freedom has been 
examined in the aEospaama theory. t'le have reason that is 
I 
capable of it·s ·own logical deductions, and each man's reason 
. . -~: 
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works freely on its own. But in fact the deductions of reason 
are necessary deductions. In a logical argument, the chain 
of reason from one step to the next is a necessity. It 
follows then that reason can both promote and restrict freedom. 
It promotes it by dissociating from itself anything that is 
' 
' 
exterior. Exteriors are a hindrance to free activi~y, and if 
reason functions purely, it will take no account of them. It 
restricts freedom in so far as the course of the ideal funct_ion 
of reason is a necessary course, and ~his is the s~e necessary 
course as the course of the cosmic reason. We have seen that 
reason involves necessary ideas of goodness as prolepseis or 
,, 
e. vv 0.1~.1 
. - ' that are fixed in reason as the principles of 
logic are fixed. If reason is the ultimate goodness as well 
as the ul_timate truth, then the absolute... principles of goodness 
are as necessary as the principles of logic. This is seen 
particularly in the study of the pro~epseis. 
From this moral concept of reaf;lon - reason as goodness 
is derived the second aspect of freedom found.in reason. :rhis 
is the freedom for choosing. This freedom is found not in 
reason as pure logic, but in logic applied to moral behaviour, 
the practical syllogism, where some concept of decision or . 
attraction towards the good, must be combined with reason, and 
became one trith it. ~·le have noticed two gaps in the mental 
_tJ...' 
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processes where this eloment outside pure logic has to be 
supplied. The first was in the fitting of the prolepeeie which 
we correctly hold, to any occurring particular. This 
involves the notion of desire seen in exam~ning the practical 
syllogism. The second was the subjective factor in the 
'fancies•, or false phantaeiai. These were seen to arise 
from a wrongly orientated desiring function, and eventually 
to develop into the turbulent passions G.J._Q_'l-- ). These 
two points in the mental process are really one and-the same. 
The fitting of prolepseis is dependent on the strength of 
rational thought; and the giving way to passions, on the 
strength and mis-direction of the desiring function. 
The desiring function is not a separate part of man 
ranged against reason in Epictetus. Desire is an inherent 
factor in reason when applied to moral behaviour, and if a 
wrong desire occurs, it is the result of a rational decision, 
and as the number of wrong desires increases, eo the reason is 
weaker to deal with them. The subjective or desiring activity 
that produces the false phantasiai and passions, and which 
causes the proleps~is to be misappl~ed is itself the result 
of reason making choices on countless occasions. In each 
moral decision there is freedom and responsibility, hence 
Epictetus cannot hold a position of akrasia. But he does devote 
. ·. ~ 
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his life to training pupils in precisely these two areas: the 
fit1;ing of the pi'oiepseis and ·the eradication of bad desires. 
And here again the application of oneself to these studies·is 
the act of the choosing reason. 
We have seen in the concept of the hegemonikon such a 
controlling factor which is inclined to adopt or reject the 
pUre activity of re·ason. Epictetus placed the freedom of 
choice that so guides us, in the hegemonikon• The.begemonl:tkon 
is our tendency to adopt a correct prolepsis, and a tendency 
to avoid falling into "1tJ.9'l.; and· this tendency ·is primarily 
reason, and the natural freedom which accompanies it, as 
apospa~ma. 
But because of the element of personal will,. which 
Epictetus believes to exist strongly in reason aimed at moral 
behaviour, the hegemonikon is a sterile concept. Freeciom .of· 
choice cannot exist in a tendency one \>lay or another, for. this 
involves the same kind of contradiction that.was found in 
apospasma, which always tends to the determined course of rea~on. 
The freedom of choice must be sought in the person's entire 
moral character and self-determination. This character is 
responsible for decisions involving choice, and. so leads to 
actions.· But also the character itself is the result of the 
accumulation o.f such decisions. In Epic~etua the hegernonik<:m 
• ,t- '. • \' . ~ .. 
,, 
_._.., 
·:" ,. 
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is replaced by the concept of prohaire,:;i.e which i~ the \'iho~e 
wiUing and rational personality, and this demands :a f'uller., 
view of man than simply his rational. or mental aspect. 
'. 
NOTES TO CHAPTER F-IVE 
L: Consequently, Epictetus attempts to regard reason, 
wherein alone is f'~eedom, as a piece of equipment 
enabling man to live the good life. -If his definitions 
are imprecise, it ie.because his sco~e ~f reason was 
wider than the earl~er Stoics. There is evidence in 
~, the Discourses that Epictetus was aware of a body of 
teaching on the subject of reason, and, the analysis of 
its function. He refers to certa~ parts of reason 
and the~ proper arrangement. (IV 7 38) Cf. Zeno•s 
elements of reason, 0"' T 01 X;.~ (IV 8 12). But 
these references are to treatises on logic rather 
than on general mental. functioning, and it is cha:racter-
istic that Epiotetus nowhere expands these elements 
of logic. L<:Jgio 'was regarded by him as a good train-
ing ground,-exerQisii18 rational power in the truth of 
language and syllogisms, and distinguishing true from 
false. But the real task of reason lay in practical 
behaviour, that is in distinguishing true and false 
phantasiai in actions. 
2. I 1, 1 - 13; II 9, 4 - 9. 'l·tb~t am I'i •· asks Eptctetus 
'• , • ~ ./ I 
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in IV 6, 34, 'A rational creature ( 4oyu(_,_v e.'•f'-L•-(-'fov_ ) • 
. ' 
r \ \ :1 Jl\. '- I ~ I \ \ . .,. . r' I . !J. 3. .I ~tV OU., """-' 'n"-V~~---«"1f,1'4.C-'-TAI __ .:J:eULQ_I)y~~--P'1-
.. 1I.IIC_p rJ.~t..ob...ou.Qe"',v .,.i-7- ~, ,~~,--,_~, Gt~T~»" ·To ia Aoyt~~:·vtcio" 
~J.. \ , \ :1 \ ' I .. or... I . Cl- . 
.-.,op,.,.tlS ~)(61 "ff'PDS-if ti(J(,.oy.triA'o.v _TJt..U~.&!l.V-.A."Jf;'t(~t.).~ D.TL "T._6 · 
I > \ ~ I f \ Ct . · "' I . . _ - ci\ · 
.)L~OS E..crT I I<Dlllt.O.I.O.~ TLf.Upos __ K.IICLtJTJ,._"'UU._ ""'P'J-T.Ot~ _ 0-A-OIS 
-~"'-'6•v ~}<.t:t. KoeA,t3s • t f.V~ "~·1 -->---· · 
···t, ·. 
4. II 8, 4 - 8. 
5. IV 1, 105; IV 3, 12; I 6, 13 - 22. 
6. Ch. III 2. 
?. As for instance in IV 8, 6. Generally in Epiotetua, 
,, 
there is no clear distinction between__e_vv o t G(_ .. and 
prolepsis~ On the earlier distinctions, see 
'"E Sandbach, vv.or d. and Prolepsis in Stoic !rheQ.ry. 
P• 45. 
B. Cf. Aetius' description (SVF II.83. See Ch. III 2.). 
-
These passages largely reflect stock teaching of the 
Stoics, and are used by Epictetus as illustrations. 
9. I 22t 1 - 4. 
. I. •,-, ~ 
' . ' 
: 
24'7 
10. IV 10, 14. 
ll. I 22 1 1. 
12. I 22, 7. A siMi1ar conviction th~t there ie justioe 
·. J 
and goodness occurs in II 9 5 1 and I 28 5. · 
13. ~ 26, 1 - 2; II 17 1 1 - 6. 
14. II 11, 7. This alternative reading, +.,',. & , 
suggested by Schenk1 1 {Editio maior p. 150 )1 though 
not adopted in his text which retains ~-J~,y of 
the MSS, best fits the sense and context. Cf. the 
16. 
'natural virtues•, Ch. VI 5. 
I·22, 9. 
I 
On no account should any theory o_f--l''t"V."} cres as 
appears in Plato's ~~ be understood by the 
~ ~ ~ . I description~--e_fA . .,.u T os , still less in -lf"UO"' 11< '1 . 
The vexed questi9n whether the prolepseis are inborn 
is eased by realising that the whole of reason is the 
natural state on man. In this sense reaf:!on is 
implanted when we are'born men. Therefore with it is 
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the primary material as presented by prolepseis at 
stage one, which occurs almost without any conscious 
reasonins, and the developments from this, using 
reason, the prolepeeie at stage two. Diocles l~gn~s 
recognised the first stage of prolepseis (Diogenes 
Laertius VII 54.) referring to them as •a natural 
conception of the ~t:ic·t;;.~~t~~~ of a thing, 
( £vvoafl(. +ucruc-? T"i'l~t~~~U ), leading us to 
search for closer definitions.• The real difficulty 
lies in the transfer from logical to ethical theory, 
since moral principles cannot appear to us to inhere 
in reason, but to the Stoics, who equated goodness I? 
and reason, tha problem was not accute, and it was 
,, J. 
natural for them to apply e fA' 't'UTDS to anything 
that \V"as part of reason. Thus it is difficult to 
agree with Sandbach, Qp. cit. p. 45, that in Epictetus 
the prolepseis are inborn in a distinctive sense. 
Epictetus gives no development of his own on the 
··-
theory, and we should regard the words 'inborn' and 
'natural' as indicating a natural·~endency by virtue 
of reason which is ours by nature. See \'latson, 
Stoic Theory of KnotV"ledtie, P• 22 - 3. 
I 
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l7. I 22, 4. 
1.8. II l.l., 4 - 20. 
1.9. II ll., 1.9. Cf. IV l, 41.. 
20. II 1.7, 1.2 - 1.3. Cf~ II l.l, ~8. 
21.. I 25, l. - 6. 
22. For example, 'To guard what is your own' (I 25, 4). 
23. III 13, 13. 
24. I 22, 9. Cf. II 11, 10; II 17, 7 and 14; IV l, 41. 
25. This excludes plants,i which according to Epictetus 
have no sense .Perception, (II 8, 4). The hi~rarchy 
of living things was therefore: 
l. f.'lan, with "7tatp«.Ko>.o~9,cras and 
phantasiai. 
2. Animals, with -XP~ 11"15. of phantasiai. 
3. Plants, witb no use of sense data. 
of 
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27. I 6, 13 - 22. 
28. II 8, 4 f. 
29. I 6, 18 - 22. 
30. II 14, 24f. See further the discussion on man and 
animals, in Ch. VI l. 
31. See Ch. III 2. 
32. I 27, 15 f. 
33. II 20, 29. In a standard explanation of the Stoic 
Theory of vision (~I 23, 3) in purely physical terms, 
Epictetus has no cause to mention phantasiai. This 
suggests that he regards the phantasiai as something 
more s~bjective than simply the received sense- data. 
34. II 7, 11. 
35. II 20, 11; III 2~, 15. 
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36. In this connection should be noted Bonhoffer•s second 
category of phantasiai-of-the-unreal {Epiktet und .die, 
~' p. 58), that ~e, 'those to which there is also 
something in reali.ty corresponding to the phantasiai. 1 
These are termed ;tLv,.CI(crtLDt. +uK"1S- (Dioge·nes 
Laertius VII 61.). ije also notes the subjective 
·-
element in phantasiai-of-the-real of ethica~ and 
aesthetic qualit~es (p. 157), of \'lhich 'the source is 
the mind itself,' and he traces the tempting phantasiai 
back to· Chrysippue. Primarily ho\'rever, as Bonhoffer 1 s 
analysis shows, the main Stoic teaching on phantasiai 
contributed to a_ theory of knot1ledge, not of ethics. 
37. I ~~ 12. 
38. III 20, 1 - 2. 
39. I 26, 1; I 2e, 1 - 6. 
·, 
40. I 28, 5. 
41. Ch. III 3. 
42. III 3, 2 - 3. 
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43. See Ch. III 3. 
44. Aristotle reaches a similar conclusion· in his 
examination of +P ov-, d I~ 
See Ch. II 3. 
45. II 22, 6; I 27, 2. 
in Nic, Eth,. VI. 
46. III 2lt, 108. The verbJ &J..I(ve.• 1 is similarly used 
of emotional behaviour (pity and sympathy) by 
Euripides, Electra, 291. 
47. It may be argued that the phantasia is of a physical 
,· 
object (the gir~), and the Tt'poBut-t-foe. _of an idea. 
This may account for Epictotus' choice of words in 
varying what are really synonyms. For clearly the 
£hantasi~ in the first instance is not the appearance 
of the girl, but the temptation which must be overcome 
( C. I 
"'\TT'f _ ) of acting immorally towards her. 
48. Aulus Gellius XIX 1, 14 - 21, Epict. Fragment 180 
(Schweighauser). 
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49. For the whole ~ass~ge, cf. Seneca De Ira II 1 ~ 4, 
50. 
and Ch. IV 3 above. 
' For the 'T' o'ft o 1 , see Ch. VII 2. 
51. II 18, 8 - 9. 
52. This does not deny the presence of internally provoked 
desires, that is, provoked by our consciousness of the 
good and the divine purpose, which is the reason within 
us. These are discussed later in this section. 
53P In saying this, one is aware that analysis can 
complicate rather than simplify Epictetus' theory. 
In making the analysis I have been disregarding the 
essential unity in Epictetus, - a unity which will 
become more obvious when the concept of prohaires~ 
is examined. The phantasia is naturally st~ong if 
the reason is weak; the external desire arising in 
the first place because the irrational element was 
not properly controlled by reason. 
54. Cf. II 18, 25; I 2?, 3 - ?. 
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55· III 12, 7 f. 
56. III 24, 88. Note the different use of ~antasia: 
a mental picture based on reason o~ly. 
57• Cf. III 24, 110 - 1. 
=- e ' 58. Cf. 0-J-UT'l-5 , II 18, 24. 
59. Cf. II 18, 25. 
60. Plato, Philebus, 39B et aeqq. 
61. III 24, 108. 
62. I 27, 10; cf. III 2, 3. 
63. II 22, 5 - 7. 
~ ' ~' r "' J. 1 ~ ' ~ • c• fj' \ 65. So I interpret, e..,$(& ytJ(p ...-1" ~•• y~Av1tJC6_,.v, olov en-• To- C1'e~~oer 
' TIVI lA-~- -"'.P~-}(wpei". Both Oldfather ("She had the proper 
·-
'' 
conception of what it means-for. one's wishes not~ to 
come truett) an5l SouR.h~ (E~le eut un~ :r;-epresent'ati.on 
. ., .. .' ~'.! 
exacte de ce qu•·eet pour que~~~·~·-l·~-~h~·~· de see 
. . 
·. ·.-·:. . "'i"' ._ 
take OIOV __ as oblique inter~ogative 
dependent on 'oC.VT ~ cr r « v ~t It is f ar true~ to the 
context in explanation of -rr-~~-"1 1 to ~aka both 
'-!!. Cl 
_ o~ ov and "1~- _ as relatives: 'She had that kind 
of phantasia which necessarily results in the failing 
' 
of one's wishes'. Literally: 'She had that kind of 
.• 
phantasia. which is necessary, such as that·:p:f' what 
one wishes, not coming to pass• - i.e.o~ false one. 
66. It seems that the Medea quotation was used to show the 
power of passion over reason: if I intend to do.evil, 
I act from passion overmastering thought ( .,aovAeu.ti'~Tat ) • 
In his co~entary on I 28, Epictetua does involve illedea 
fr in ~,Bo • .oXeeo< . In II l.?, he does not; so I 
conclude that here \'ie have the stock example ~sed for 
a slightly different purpose. 
67. Ch. II 4. 
68. Cf. I 18, 3 - 4. 
J· 
.; . 
... 
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69. Cf. the practical syllogysm in Aristotle's discussion 
of akrasia. Both Seneca and Epictetus similarly 
observe a general will and a specific will. 
70. III 3, 2. 
71. I l, 12. 
72. III 7, 7. 
73. I 31 4. 
74. Hjmans, Qp. cit. p. 27. 
75. Fragment 52 (Schweighauser). 
76. SVF III 431; 432. 
7?. III 31 4. 
78. II 18, 19. 
79. I, 1, 12. 
Bo. Plato, Republic X 611 C - D. 
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81. See Ch. II 3 on tPJ""1 cr 1 ~ in Aristotle, and previous 
section of this chapter. 
82. See Ch. VI. 
83. II 8, 11 - 14. 
84. I 14, 12; see further Ch. VI 3. 
86. SVF. II 836. 
87. Some StGics however, identified the he~emonikon only 
with a rational governing principle. This was the 
position of Posidonius; see Ch. III 5. 
88. IV 7, 40 - 41. 
89. I 26, 15. 
90. III 9, 11. 
91. I 26, 18. 
92. It is noteworthy that where Epictetus does want to 
desc.ribe a controlling element which is more the 
disposition of the whole person's will and interest 
(prohairesis), he avoids 'hegemonikon' and uses 
\ .. 
I __ TO Kllpteu Oil 
.. .. ~ ,, , :.~':1-
e.telJ TO ICUpt&UOV ~IVfll.l • 61 E.V -rr.poaupectel 11 CIC61 41V•U• 
(II 22, 19.) 
This further illustrates the flexibility of Epictetus• 
terminology, and the falseness of the procedure of 
discovering an accurate definition of the term in 
Epictetus. As a philosophic term, heaemoni.kon t·1as 
becoming outmoded, and substitute terms are readily 
supplied. 
93. I f.~ 27 - 40. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
EPICTETUS: THE CONCEPT OF~~ 
1. Man in the Cosmos 
Th~s chapter considers man in his wider aspects than 
just his psychological functions. This we have seen to be 
necessary for a full appreciation of Epictetus' use of the 
term prohairesis. There are two sides to the Stoic concept 
of man: first, the position of mankind in relation to the 
function;i.;ng of the whole universe; second, the proper function-
ing of each individual according to his personal circumstances 
and characteristics. These form the first two sections of 
this chapter. Arising from the first is the question of man's 
relationship with God, and Epictetus' religious attitude, and 
from the second, man's responsibility for acquiring knowledge 
and certain inner virtues. 
The basis of man's position in relation to the whole 
cosmos has already been explained in considering tho cosmic 
logos.1 From the concept of the rationally determined cosmos, 
two-principles are derived, physis_and oikeiosis. Physis, or 
. -
nature, is the design or plan of reason to which the universe 
must conform. Whatever reason has determined, that is the 
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course of nature. Oikeiosis is the response of each of the 
parts of the universe to foll0\'7 its own natural cotirse, and 
preserve the ends for toJ"hich it was made. 2 Following this 
doctrine, Epictetus says that God has made all things in the 
~. I 
universe and the universe itself to be fr.ee ( <!UCw>-.uTO\ ) 1 
and to have thei:r own end ( CICUTOT(~~$­
parts to serve the needs of the whole.3 
), and the 
In Epictetus' version of the oikeiosis doctrine, the 
freedom aspect is again significant. The free functioning of 
the universe referred to here is the independence of each of 
the parts to achieve its own end. In gaining its end it is 
4 
never hampered by another part. 
This teleological view of nature was applied to animals 
and plants. Each part of nature is organised to help God's 
finest work, man. Providence has provided and maintained the 
animal kingdom for the service of man ( 
- 6 
The corn grows in order to be harvested. In the lower works 
of nature, where there is no reason allowing them to make 
choices, the course of oikeiosis works smoothly and naturally.7 
Before turning to .-.I!lan's oikeiosis, it is helpful to 
consider Epiotetus 1 trea_tinent of the Stoic physical theory. 
References to it are few and brief, which is in itself 
significant since his view of man is not essentially a physical 
.,. .. 
' .. 
··' 
. 26i 
one but moral. It is presented most comprehensively in. III 
24, 9 - 11, and is basically a Heraoleitian doctrine of change 
and decay. There are three points: 
1. The universe is a single state from a single 
substance, ( .). 
2. There is periodic change: dissolution and· 
regeneration. 
. 8 All things are full of frien~s organising 
their hou,ee ·with respect to each ot·her~ 
The laot is a further reference to the free·running of 
the universe on the principles of oikei~sis. The most 
significant·· P.Oint ho\'1ever for Epiotetus, is. the s~cond, 9 since 
it is it:l.recognition of this principle that man must not become 
attached to exteriors. It is applied to human death in the 
. 10 
same Discourse: The destruction of ~he individual is 
necessary for the generation of the whole unive~se. It is 
change rather than destruct.ion. \'lhat is now does not become 
what is not, but what is not now. The individual will lose 
-
his identity, but will become a;>mething else which the ul)iverse 
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needs.11 From this we may conclude tllat Epictetus thought the-
self identity Of the individual ~TaB meaninsful only during the 
period from birth to death. The moral progress and ac~ieveme~t 
in man had no significance after death.12 
A second importance of the passage is that death is 
used as an example of the various circumst;ances which man 
must face.13 He should not exe~cise his will on any external 
factor over which he hae no control, but only on Understanding 
why such a circumstance has befallen him. Ue have control not 
over the material process of regen~.ration, but only over our 
attitude of mind tol'lards it whenever it affects us. This 
proper understanding of why death must occur is explained in 
II 1, 19; it is to•complete the revolution of the universe.•14 
Epictetus follows earlier Stoics in using the oikeiosis 
doctrine as a solution to the problem of suffering.15 Since 
man is not detached from the survival of the whole cosmos, he 
.may have to undergo hardship for the sake of the whole. Just 
as the foot, because it is part of the body, must necessarily 
become dirty through its service to the body, whereas in its 
best condition as a foot independent of the body it would be 
16 
clean. 
Against such a philosophy of the physical universe we 
must consider what Epictetus thought to be the oikeiosis of 
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man. If the rest of nature functioned in ord~r to maintain its 
highest creature and could even be sacrificed to maintain him, 
to what end is man directed? From Epictetus' remarks about 
death, the end is not one of maintenance on a purely physical 
level: it is not merely to 'complete the revolutions•, of 
_ univensal regeneration, and it is indeed difficult to conceive 
a moral end of such inconsequence.17 ~an's special endowment 
is reason and his end must make use of this particular 
distinction. 18 His reason gives him the power of moral choice, 
therefore man's end is a moral one. 
Man cannot exercise the freedom of reason on deciding 
on any course of action he pleases, and thereby achieve a moral 
end, since the course of the universe is already physically 
determined. Instead, his reason comprises a bJ\ltiC.f·US 
"Tr~pi:ICI(oAouD'lTU<, which aims at understanding the changing 
circumstances of nature. His ~·rill may then be brought to 
accord correctly l'tith the course of nature. His moral e.nd 
therefore is to have at every moment a correct will. To be in 
such a state is to enjoy freedom in ,its most perfect meaning, 
mbich is happiness. Repeatedly Epictetus sees man's end as 
~I 
serenity; man's function ( epyov ) is to flow with nature 
' ~ ~ ~ ,, ( TO eupo•uv ) and to be unhampered ( e~tttw"uTov ). God 
- \ ' !) c 1'\ ' ' \ :» 8.. 19 made man to be happy and calm, Ls'J'l'- T'O euooc,l"ovan~1_e"lf• To e.ucrfbt. EIV ). 
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As with other animals, man 's end is in himself 
{_ atft_~,.~s-->, for he shoul~ direct his will towards nothing 
external 1 but only at und.erst<¥1d~ng and interpreting correctl.y 
the course adopted by nature. jl_~· does n·C?.t: ·t~ereby achieve 
any physical. end that he can· cal.~ his own, s~c·h as children 
and con~ulships and the like, al.beit he might be given these, 
but he dOes·achieve happiness from a right attitude towards 
.· , 
these as a resul. t of .. . 'Pf'_oe_p,t1CJC.o.~-O-U S "}--~' S • His proper end 
is toadjust his own hegemonikon to nature, that is, to will 
20 by understanding \'lhat comes to pass. · ·--
Accordingl:ty'::.man is morally self sufficient. All that 
God ha~ planned him to have to fulfil his part, he has. This 
is illustrated well in I 9, 5 - 17. Man will not lack the 
necessities_for his life, just as the aiUJnals never fail to 
be provided· with whatever i~ proper for their "'la·y of life and 
function in nature. This independent and self .. suff.icient 
contemplation of the univers.e appears again at III 13, 6 - 8: 
We should be satisfied .in occupying our time in learning the 
divine 5overnance. Man cannot devote himself to two purposes, 
externals and his own hegemonikon, since he will.be drawn in 
contrary directions. 21 Happiness is the result of being 
satisfied in what is under each man's control, that is, his 
. 22 
will,to follow nature. 
Man •s oikeiosis as 'I'I'CIC p ac. Ko~o'u 9'1 11'1~ _ has 
therefore three important aspects: 
1. It gives man a closer relationship with God 
than with the beasts. God as logos desisns; 
man through logos interprets. This affinity 
between man and God is referred to in I 9, 
4; II 5, 26 and II 13, 6 - 7. 
2. Man is self sufficient in achieving his ends. 
For his end, happiness and freedom, dependA 
only on those things which are under his 
control, namely his will. 
3. The function of Yf.tp~ttet>..rf.,9'1r's involves 
decisions of the reason and will. For the 
essence of interpreting nature is deciding 
what our attitude towards it should be. The 
power of understanding {_&:IICICJA-JS 'IC11Cpa&,tt>M111,.,,., 
is immediately bound up with the power of moral 
, . I 
choice ( OIIVoi.IC•S-~po-.•pc.Tuc."J _). This is seen 
'
I I 
in II 23, 8 - 15 1 where the_ IIVCII~IS 'JfpooupETIIt'J 
is the faculty \'lhioh oversees everything and 
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examines its worth. 23 
2. Oikeiosis in the Individual. 
It is a mark of Epiotetus' teaching that he took the, 
oikeiosis doctrine a stage further than the early Stoics, and 
24 following a trend begun by the Fourth Academy, traced the 
importance of oikeiosis in the individual. Accordingly he is 
much concerned with individual character and personality. 
The foregoing section showed how, oikeiosis in general 
was derived from a teleological view of creation, and that in 
mankind it consisted in playing the part of a rational 
spectator, ( 8e.cT-.7c ) , 25 and, from a rational interpretation, 
to adjust one's will according to what one perceives to be 
the.wlll of nature. 
Such a view req~some assessment of individual 
'-· 
character and circumstances one meets with. For man.there is 
a teleology for each individual, rather than a generic purpose 
as with cows, to give milk, or corn, to be harvested. Each 
man must. perceive who he is and for what he is born; and to 
achieve his own ends, he must act in his own particular manner. 26 
By a correct interpretation of h~self and his own surroundings 
or circumstances, he will more easily be able to align his will 
-' 
,··: .. . ~· . . . ·, .., . 
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with God's wi11: lack of such knowledge leads us to make wrong 
. 27 judgements. 
Accordingly Epictetus sets two standards ( ~~11'"'-to.p.ta _ ), __ 
by which to judge a man's action: one common ( 
II I 
other applying to the individual L • '•-~ ) •. 2_ 8 
•\ .. 
I 
I( •• "'1 
The common 
), the 
standard is that man must act using his endowment of reason, the 
generic proprium, in making moral decisions. The indiv~dual 
standard applies to each man's , special 
capacities, and to his prohairesis, his moral character. 
\'lith. these ttro ,.,rords may be connected the notions of 
, 
dynameis and "'("p_o_~w'K ov • Dynameis are personal endo\ments 
enabl£ng each individual to attain his end. This is the 
personal equipment given by_God to achieve his design for each 
person, and it entails a necessary dove-tailing of capacity 
and circumstance• Again this emphasises the aspect of se~f­
sufficiancy: · each man will never lack \'lhat _he needs to fulfil 
the role God has assigned to him. If we imagine somethin.tL is 
lacking, then \'le do not heed His guidanoe~-29 This attitude 
is well put in Fragment, 174 (Schweighauser). IIIf what I 
have is not sufficient for me, I am sufficient for it and so 
it too is sufficient for me.n3° Just as the heavenly bodies 
have capacities enabling them to fultil the±r cosmic function, 
eo men have the necessary endowments for their individual ends: 
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if you are the sun, you have the capacity c~~P«~~e~; ) to 
encircle the heavens, likewise, if a man has a capaci~y for 
leadership, then he should lead an army; this is his natural 
end and calling. 31 
This principle is frequently applied to Hercules, 
notably in I 6, and II 16.32 The first of these opens in 
illustrating the different dynameis in all parts of the 
creation (1 - 7); man likewise has received dynameis so that 
he can confidently face any ci.r'cumstances he meets with~ 
Hercules was the character he was,because of the circumstances 
of his labours. His courageous character did not go out 
tiD seek the circumstances of danger, but the circumstances 
once met had a character equal to them. 33 
Each man can therefore be assured that he has the 
capaciti~s necessary for his existence, and can be confident 
that the end he is made for will not be missed. The same 
idea was expressed by t"lhitman referring to the soul 
venturing on the sea of life: 
"0 daring joy, but safe; are they not all the 
seas of God?1134 
As long as his aim and will is to achieve God's purpose, man 
will never be out of his depth. Iri this way each individual 
can .. share in the Cosmic freedom, ·that· is, in the free working 
In the phys~cal sense therefore, all 
m~il.'a n~eds at:e· given for the physical end t() which he was 
., . -~ ·-
born, and.this g:i,.ves hi.m the freedom contained in his self-
s~_fficie_ncy which is the ability to realise the ·physical end 
independently of exteriors. 
-But man's true end 1 as \"re have seen is ·the moral one : 
that'of understanding nature so that one can adjust the will to 
·aoc·ord wi.th nature. The attainment of the moral end rests 
:with ·the will. Since everything obeys, by necessity, 
I ~he commands of universal order ( K o 1/1 f4 OS .. ), it is unreason-
able, though because of its freedom not impossible, that the 
only thing which is under man's control, namely his will, 
should st.and against the cosmos. This is because Cosmic reason 
has ~e1iberateQ. _better than we can since it organises all the 
. ·. . . 6 
parts toget~er.3 
Because he has the power of will, man is likely to 
follow his O\·rn inclination ( ' ... 1"0 •6 to.v ) and to direct his 
will to externals and not to the internal good of following 
nature. '3?. The natural and therefore m"orally right state of the 
\'fill is tc;» ;tnc1ine ·to what is better adjusted to secure things 
in accordance \•lit.~ nature. If the course ( ~-.f_~s-
·known, ther~ should· tho will be dire.cted. Epictetus re·&lrds 
. -: •.· 
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individual characte~stics as depending primarily on the extent 
to which this ideal functioning of the will is maintained and 
conversly, the functioning of the will depends on character. 
Because of this freedom of will, essential to man's 
moral calling, or oikeiosis, Epictetus cannot say that man is 
provided with dynameis which enable him to have the will 
functioning as correctly as he needs, since in every person the 
, 
T&AOS is to have perfect will (that is, to be in perfect-
accord); nor can he say that a man endot·Jed t·rith a t11eak 
character will not be required to face such tough circumstances 
as a man of strong character. To say this would be to deny 
freedom of the will, and to assert that we exercise will badly 
because \te \tere made to \<rill badly. It io through our ot-m 
fault and by means of our own freedom that we fail to will 
perfectly. 
Accordingly, Epictetus has to adjust the notion of 
dynameis when applied to the moral end of the individual. His 
capacities take the for@ of qualities such as courage and 
magnanimity ( ~vopE.IGC • ), which were the 
dynameis of Hercules, 3B and also patience ( ~7fo JA--6.Y'7Yt1CO~ )-.}9 
These qualities are not the same as tho physical capacities 
which constantly attend other creatures, or, to use the example 
of Epictetus 1 as \'Te have a hand that is always at the ready 
2?1 
to stop the tiresome circumstance of a dripping nose. 40 The 
qualities co.n be developed to a greater or lesser, extent; they 
are dispositions of the mind rather than physical endowments. 
For this reason, Epictetus stresses the freedom ·of these 
dynameis in man. God has given them to us free from restraint 
( ~ '\. a( K c-)1\ "T O:Y' ~+0" . 41 ) and under our control ( 6 ,"#"'" ), 
and has committed the qualities to ourselves to maintain. 42 
Epictetus insists however on referring to such 
qU4lities or dispositions as 43 Thus • 
~ I kindness ( EuyvwfoA-OV ) and faithfulness ( 'ftHI''f'b" ) are 
regarded as natural tendences for a human being, and if a person 
decides to develop these qualities and not allow them to grow 
numb ( ~'tfov&v.ICpWV'Talt • 21), his will in respect to each 
circumstance will be correctly directed. But man is free to develop 
or neglect these natural qualities. 
In this special application of dpameis to man's moral 
end, can be discc~ned the second kind of freedom noted in the 
conclusion to tho last chapter, that of choosing to use the 
capacities t which if \•le choose to adopt them, will lead us to 
correct will at oach particular occurrence, and so to freedom 
in the full sense of existing freely in the course of nature's 
plan. The importance of the notion of dynameis is that the 
will is dependent on certain character traits which we can 
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develop. The extent to which courage, faithfulness and self-
respect is consciously maintained in the individual, is 
responsible for him willing in a certain \'fay. And the 
maintenance of the qualities is in turn an'act of choice, part 
of our freedom, or prohairesis. I will consider further the 
nature of these particular qualities in the final section of 
this chapter. 
\·le have seen that there is a tendency for Epictetus to 
use dynameis in two ways: in dealing with animals and inanimate 
creation, these are their natural capacities; but in man they 
are qualities which he can refuse or choose to maintain. There 
is a similar double use of the term 
, 
npfltrw'ftov _ , and the 
. . t . d 4-4-~ncons~s ency ~s more pronounce • 
The first of these meanings is likely to be a stock 
usage of the Stoics; the second more characteristic of 
Epictetus' own teaching. -rtptcrwlto_~ _ is used in the first 
meaning, significantly in the Encheiridion (17) and in a 
fragment from Arrian's Homilies, which were used for the more 
mainstream Stoic teaching. Both passages regard man as an 
actor playing the role to which God has assigned him; man can 
choose h0\"7 he plays the role, but the actual 
been determined.46 
, 
"'f potr w n o v has 
In the Discouroes, the metaphor of an actor playing his 
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part while it laots, or playing with pieces in a game, are 
frequently used, but the term I -rr p_o_.,.~w_tt_o v___ _ is transferred 
from the role fixed by God, to the quality of determination 
with which \'l'e desire to fulfil that role. 
enables us to be a good or a poor actor of that role. It thus 
becomes very close to what we might call strength or weakness 
of moral character, or moral determination. 
There is one Discourse, I 2, where this particular 
usage of TCp~_fL.w_Tt ov _ is· more developed than anywhere else. 
Ue are told that through lack of education men differ in 
deciding what is rational, and often the irrational is mistaken 
for the rational ( 5 - 6); one factor which determines our 
, 
decision is character (_ '1f_p_ocr WlTo v __ , 8 '); that is, we \•Tear 
different masks which reflect a difference in attitude towards 
externals and duties; there is a point at which a man must 
call off a duty or a friendship in order to preserve his own 
moral principles, and.save his moral determination; in order to 
attain some external good a man will sacrifice his true moral 
conviction; some people sacrifice this more easily than others; 47 
this is a~ essential factor in making dec.isions; 48 and must 
therefore be an aspect of prohairesis. In 33, the identity of 
, 
'l{p_oo-wttov and prohairesis is very close t7hen Epiotetus says 
'consider at what price you sell your prohairesis.' ~·Then 
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properly trained \"re know the point to which it is appropriate 
to undertake a duty (30). I The "''f_p_oao&\J'Itov is an aspect of 
will charaote~istic of the individual, determining the point 
. 
at which a man weakens and is deflected from his moral 
determination. Like dynameis it is a factor determining 
moral choice, and can similarly be raised or lowered by our 
own decisions. These two aspects of personal character will 
be important in examining the concept of prohairesis. 
"' 49 I I So~e aptly translates wpoCJ"CAI'I'tov _ati~ 11dignite, 
personelleJ'moral worth or prestige of the individual, that 
is, the desire to main.ta.in what we know to be correct moral 
behaviour. The word bears this same meaning in IV 2 1 10:50 
man cannot devote himself to externals and to his own interests 
at the same time; if you submit to the temptation of the world, 
your own interest (prohairesis) is neglected; different 
characte:bs ( ) cannot mix. The same point 
is illustrated at IV 7, 13: poverty, if experienced by a good· 
'actor' will be borne patiently. The extent of personal 
interest in undertaking ~ duty recurs in III 24, 49: there is 
a point where a duty is no longer profitable, that is, where 
one must betray his moral character. 
This leads to a consideration of suicide, for often 
the alternative to doing something that is against one's 
. ' 
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interest, is to face death.5l Epictetus held that suicide was 
a proper escape when one's moral dignity was in danger, and 
the phrase, nthe door lies open11 was common to refer to 
suicide, if you must face circumstances that force destruction 
of prohairesis.52 Naturally death was considered an escape from 
the troubles of the \-torld, but Epictetus cannot condone general 
suicide since we must fulfil the life and bear the toils that 
God has prepared for us. The signal to depart is always clear.53 
Suicide was therefore no easy way out, but a means for the man 
of high moral tsorth to maintain what is his own. 
3. Man's relationship with God. 
In Chapter ~. 5, I considered the religious aspect 
· ......... ;--.. 
which Stoicism ~;ras beginning to assume under the Roman Empire, 
possibly through the influence of Roman pantheism. This 
tendency, and the frequent use of religious language in the 
Discourses, is sufficient reason for the inquiry of this 
section, to establish whether Epictetus was a religious man, 
and if so, what was the effect of his religion on his doctrine 
of freedom. 
The evidence for Epictetus being religious lies in his 
use of certain religious t erminol.q gy rather than in his doctrines; 
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this language falls under five heads: 
1. ~· Very frequently the divine logos is referred 
t b t f t c. z '· o as God y a varie. y o erms , ___ o_ au\ , 
_ T~ &aeov ; God is .... ~ '-'-'-l"~"•ov, intelligence ( V_O~-S- ), 
knowledge ( S:'lfJc:r:r-. ..J.f'4"1 ) and right reason ( ;pl_~ft _A.~-Y6S ).54 
This personification of the logos has several aspects: 
a. There is personification of the creative principle; 
hence Epictetus can speak of a creator who is a 
master ~esigner.55 
b. There is personification of the endowment prin~iple, 
allowing him to speak of a Giver. He bestows all 
things, especially reason and dynameis and freedom. 56 
c. Because \oJ'e speak of a giver, the notion of praise 
and thanksgiving makes sense. Such a notion would 
be awkward without the personification of the 
logos.57 
d. There is personification of the derivative logos, 
the apoepasma. .: man carried God around 
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t-Jith 'hiiJl, and each person's. aim -is. to perfect 
God within him; to change from man to God.58 
e. There is personification of ultimate purpose •. 
Epictetus oan teach that men should follow 
God 1 a \'lill and· be of one mind 'l:li th Him 
( By. personifying 
the logos as ultimate purpose Epio~etus thereby 
identifies ultimate purpose with divine will, 
thus providing the logos with a divine 
responsibility, just as human will makes concepts 
of responsibility and goodness intelligible. 
The Stoics were confused in identifying reason 
with goodness, 60 but on~e reason is personified, 
the·conoept of divine goodness becomes much 
easier, for by personification the t~ill intrudes 
into reason. With this too must be connected 
aspects of fear of punishment in the form of 
misery if one disobeys God and rewards. in the 
form of happiness if one obeys. 
2. Divine communication. Two words used by Epictetus 
have connotations of divine communication: The first of these, 
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daimon, occurs only once (I 14, 12) and could be pure metaphor. 
The context is that man possesses reason as an apospasma of 
God's reason, and it is .apt to refer to this reason as our 
guide. Thus it may be correct to classify this instance tinder 
1, d above (the personification of the·human logos). But the 
metaphor is forceful, and strongly suggests some kind of 
personal communication by a guardian spirit, which makes this 
passage a unique expression in Epictetus of some thing much 
. 61 
more common in other Stoics. 
The same Discourse also contains the second term 
under this head, 62 Epictetus refers to the • 
'sympathy' between God and his creation: eath fee~ the 
influence of heaven (2); our bodies ar~ so bound ~p with the 
universe that they share its affections, and our souls must 
share it to an even greater degree (5). 
3. Education. Ther.e are instances where religious 
language is applied to philosophy and teachipg. One-would 
approach philosophy with the same reve~ence as one would 
approach the mysteries, and treat teachers as priests.63 
The hum~ teacher is to be regarded as the voice of God, 
almost in the fashion of the Old Testament propheta. 64 
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4. Purification. Epicte.tus frequently exhorts his 
pupils to purify their guiding principle, that is, the reason 
within them. This is used of the hegemonikon in III 22, 19, 
H h h . 9 , • .. L .. and of the soul in IV 11, 5. ere t e p ra.se_ Kce _.cpoT'1~ ev. r"X'?I 
'9 is very remniscent of Socrates description of __ ga& -'P-"-'S---
/' 
in the Phaedo; 65 the notion of J<.~ 9.cp~rs was closely 
connected with the mystery religions, and was the final aim 
of the initiates. 
( f(aC 9wtt•141f-l:vos 
The idea of devotion and consecration 
66 ) to God's comaands is also present. 
5. Soul. Although according to strict Stoic doctrine, 
there is no place for a Platonic concept of soul, Epictetus 
commonly refers to the highest part of us, the reason, as 
soul. The phrase quoted above is typical of a number of 
passages; 67 our reason is a little sou1.68 
Such is the religious language of the Discourses, and 
it indicates at least that Epictetus desired his teaching to 
have religious overtones. Use of religious language is more 
frequent in Epictetus than in Socrates (Apologl, Crito and 
Phaedo), yet Socrates is generally considered to be the more 
religious person. 
There are good reasons for this: first, it is known 
28() 
tha-t Epictetus based his system on rational materialism, and 
religion as presented by Christianity, is opposed to such a 
basis. But this rieed not preclude a rational system from 
being religious in a certain sense. Second, when instances 
of religious language do occur in Epictetus, they can readily 
be applied to some factor in his rational system_,. (as I nave 
indicated above). Third, Epiotetus is inconsistent in the 
t.erms he adopts, using 'Zeus' or 'God' as he pleases. Fourth, 
the practice of presenting rhetoric by personification and 
mythologising was common in the schools of the Roman Empire, 
and undoubtedly there are instances where Epictetus introduces 
rel*gious notions as pure myth. 69 Metaphors from religious 
language were found to be effective rhetoric, as did the 
frequent imagery from the battle field when Epicte,tus refers 
to the logos as the commander stationing men at their post, and 
sounding the recall at death.?0 And yet Socrates uses the 
same imagery71 \'li.thout it detracting from the truth of the 
religious aspect. 
Sound though these reasons are, they are not cogent 
to the argument. If such language is used· only as imagery 
of material substances and processes, it is surprising that 
the imagery is employed more frequently then the plain 
language. God or Zeus appear more frequently than lo$os; and 
•'. 
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purification of the governing principle, as often as pertecti~n 
or correction ( __ Kot-Tdp 8wtr•S ._ ). Even allowin~ for 
rhetoric, it is unlikely that Epictetus wou1d want to encourage 
his pupils to seek the guidance of philosophy by affecting 
their religious instincts if he himself did not react in some e~nA~ 
religiously to the Stoic teaching. 
The honesty and sincerity expressed in Epictetus' 
.teaching is everywhere manifest 7~ that he can scarcely be 
insincere on this important aspect; and if Seneca can accept 
Stoicism in a religious sense from his experience of Italian 
Pantheism, then so can Epictetus also from his influence from 
Pythagoras and Socrates. Rather, as we saw in chapter f~it the 
adaptation of Stoicism to a religious way of life is easily 
made. Based on rationalism, the religious idea cannot display 
all the characteristics of a religion l~e Christianity,73 
but may not be far removed from a rational mysticism, such as 
is found in Buddhism. 
The language used by Epictetus is appropriate to a 
position of rational mysticism in so far as, 
a. there is recognition of a transcendent being in 
the form of God as logos. This Being, in pro~ding for and 
designing the course of the whole universe, is in every 
respect higher than any individual being. 
.,, 
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b. there is communication between man and the 
transcendent Being, represented in Epictetus by the terms 
daimon and crup. Tt' ~ 9el~, and generally in the idea "of man 
following God's commands and waiting upon God.74 
c. man is moved to contemplate himself and God; 
man 1 s l'lhole purpose is contemplation of God's universe 75 
and of himself.76 (II 14, 20) This inner desire for know-
ledge of God's purposes, and finding Him imaanent in all His 
works, 77 is typical of the mystic.78 
d. there is a longing for man to attain to purity, 
and therefore to oneness with God.79 
In addition to these particular mystical character-
istics, Epictetus presents his Discourses trith a religious 
fervour and conviction throughout, as though ~e could maintain 
faith in those parts of the Stoic system 'llrhich are logically 
Bo 
weak. . He has no doubts about the truth 
of his doctrine, and the attainment of the perfect truth 
he professes. 
If it is right to interpret Epictetus' religious 
language as the expression of-one genuinely experiencing some 
kind of religious mysticism, how will this affect his doctrine 
of freedom? There are two aspects: the religious outlook will 
offer first a certain ltind of knot-rledge, and second, a certain 
kind of will, which is necessary for the attainment of the 
perfect freedom, 
The kind of knowledge experienced is ·intuitive rather 
than intellectual; through contemplation and self-meditation, 
it is possible to share in the knowledge of the universe. 
There can be immediate knowledge of how one should act to 
comply \'Ti th God's design, and \1e may call such knowledge 
prescience of God's purpose. The reference to a person~8~h81 
' ~· 
is important here. It can make man immediately aware when he 
is acting in error, for it knows better than we do. Like the 
Socratic daimon, 82 it guards us against t~ong desire. It is 
a check on wrong will rather than a stimulus to right wil~B3 
We can perhaps see it operating in the restraint that Epictetus 
encourages his pupils to exercise in the three 'areas' ( T~lfOI ) 
of assent, desire and choice; the negative aspects of these 
~J. I ~ ,I ( _oe.yo.pfA-'1 and SKK"''~'S ) receive consider~ble 
attention. 
The natural 'sympathy' described in I 14, 1 - 6 is 
again indicative of an immediate intuition a man can gain 
from his relationship with God.· Our souls, in interpreting 
the universe should automatically possess the knowledge which 
is God's. The language is similar to that of Bergson, 
rtintuition is the kind of intellectual sympathy -by which one 
_;· 
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places oneself within an object in order to coincide with 
what is unique in it and therefore inexpressible." And as 
84 
an example of intuition, Bergson gives self-knowledge 
which is prominent in Epictetus. 85 For the Stoics, the 
intuitive knowledge thus gained was also intellectual 
knowledge, because the God \'lho imparts it is pure reason. It 
may be thought therefore that the religious dimension adds little 
in the sphere of knowledge. But it does make us a\'lare of the 
fulness of kno1.-rledge, that is, of a rationality of not only 
the past or present, but also of the immediate future. Hence 
I refer to this intuition as rational mysticism. 86 Possession 
of this kind of knowledge will make the will more readily 
accord with what it knows to be the course of nature, and so 
lead to freedom of will in accord with nature. 
The religious attitude, however, has a more direct 
effect on the will, If there is a conviction that a being mightier, 
more knowledgeable and better than man exists, then the 
religious man will desire in reverence to approach as near this 
being as he can, and to obey Him and follow His will, and thereby 
to find perfect freedom. In the Greek mystics, this desire 
consisted in attaining the purification of the soul so that 
freedom could be gained after death. In Epictetus the desire 
is for the perfecting of the will so that freedom is attained 
durin~ life.S7 Just as the good is imcediately attractive to 
the soul, so the will of God is immediately attractive to 
the will of man, and he directs his will in harmony. It is 
only the personification of God which allows the divine reason 
to be divine will. Thus the process of contemplating becomes 
akin to desiring the will of God and allowing His will to 
88 
affect one's own. 
Epictetus frequently places together the ideas of 
freedom and God: \"lai t on God and He shall set you free; 89 
it is by looking to God that we escape bondage9° and become 
free. It is this looking to God, and yearning to understand 
his works91 which makes freedom an experience which leads to 
happiness, because we feel the freedom of following a respon-
sible will, and can express joy ( xCI('spwv )92 at doing 
whatever He wills, The alternative was to follow a theoretic~! 
ideal, only possible through the grasp of perfect reason, 
which was the position, ·df the perfect Sapiens of the mid-Stoa. 
4. Knowledge and Education. 
An important result of the enquiry into Epictetus• 
religious position was the possibility of aaining knowledge 
by mystical communion 'l;dth the logos. Ue saw, however, that 
·1·.'. 
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. '' 
the gaining of knowledge was the responsibility of each 
individual,. and the effo;rt towards gaining knot1ledge is to· . 
be made through education. 
The kind of knowledge that is important for the 
attainment pf freedom and directing the l'lill to accord with 
God's, is twofold: first, the knowledge of what the universe 
is and all its parts, what. God is and what man is; second, 
the inner knowledge of one's own self. There remains ho.wever 
a third point in education, namely the desire to apply and use 
the knowledge in the right way. ~ deal·with these three 
points in turn. 
The first part of the education, knowledge of the 
universe, was taught in the philosophic schools: knowledge 
of God and man, and good and evil; 93 knot'lledge of what is under 
one's own control is essential for the proper exercise of 
94 ~rohairesfs. There is no need to say more on this aspect 
of education;·it is the learning of the philosoph,ic principles 
on which the Stoic system is founded, and the fiormal course 
was to progress from logic to moral and practical knowledge.95 
Secondly there is the personal education. This 
involves knowledg~ of self in the full sense of knowing your 
place in the design of the universe. We are ·free when we 
·know, and do, God's comrnands.96 The true divination is 
·',.· 
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w~thin us; through self-examination we can divine what is the 
will of God.9? Similarly in III 24, 34~ man has to do each 
act at the bidding of God, if possible divining what he wishes 
(_ ) • Not only is the ·· 
knowledge of self necessary for divining the \'lil.l of God for 
the individual, but also for discovering where one falls short 
of God's will. The beginning of philosophy is to understand 
the. state of the governing principle (the h~gemonikon). 98 
Once a man understands himself and the reasons for his wrong 
judgements, he \'lill make improvement. 99 The Delphic 
" e , 
_yv..w 1 tr~~.rrov (know thyself) is common advice in the 
. 100 Discourses. 
Accurate perception of this personal kno111ledge and the 
knowledge of philosophic principles, must continue in the 
third stage of education. This is the askesis, or training 
in the moral application of the knowledge. It is this 
knowledge which is essential in each moral decision, and if 
•t . 1 ki . t•ll h.ld . t 101 d 1 1s ac ng, a man 1s s 1 as a c 1 - 1gnoran , an 
this leads Epictetus to adopt the Socratic dictum, 'No one 
errs willingly.102 This is the knowledge which in its moral 
application is ·lacking to most people, as it is to llledea103 
and the criminal in II 26, 1 - 3. 
The application of philosophic principles in each 
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individual life was the hardest task of education. Knowledge 
of the principle is not sufficient, since we too easily forget 
it in the-face of temptation. Accordingly the principles have 
to be rehearsed over and over again, 104 • 
The knowledge must be deliberately practised each time a moral 
decision is made. Knowledge of terms and definitions 
( :J ' o vo,...otTDL ) is nothing without training in applying them 
in the affairs of life.105 Ue learn the theory first, and 
afterwards the praetice,106 The constant practice which 
Epictetus encourages in the application of knowledge is aimed 
at helping the will, to apply correct knowledge in each 
instance. This exercise and rehearsal can conveniently be 
called askesis (Mi1itary training): :a ... we must 1abour ( 6K'ft'OV€.•v ) 
upon our prohairesis and upo~ our :. ' 107 
- -' p f. "'""1 • 
Another aspect of askesis is the se1f-examination108 
of our 1ives, to see how knowledge has been misapp1ied. tie 
must converse with ourselves ( 
fe1lo\'t students shou1d discuss with each other the practical 
situations of their 1ives.110 The who1e exercise given in 
Discourse III 8, is an examp1e of this se1f examination. 
The who1e process of askesis in education is necessary 
because kno\-rled~e of correct moral behaviour involves the 
desire to do good. Often a person has the knowledge to do good, 
·' 
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but his will is directed to evil. If knowledge is rehearsed 
frequently enough, the desiring faculty will follow it. Those 
who have knowledge of the good would knOw how to ~qve it also 
\ J. \ .,. • C" I 111 . 
( K-a(J 'f '"£t.V._ e• o_~L~ _ ) ; the knowledge needs to 
acquire the conviction which can only come from the will· 
( _ -nee cr" 1 rr~oT6v __ ) and from the \'lhoile character of tHe 
person himself. We must porsuade ourselves to learn and be i~ 
earnest about it ( ):112 the will is_to 
be constantly formed on knowledge of the good. 
.,. 
This aspect of education is similar to the habituation · 
solution which·Plato adopts in the Laws. 113 Though the methods 
-
of habituation differ, the aim in both cases is the training 
of the will. 114 Hjmans compares the askesis with the 
habituation process of knowledge in Aristotle,115 where vous 
must be habituated to se~ing the truth. Aristotle's concept 
of + p o'v 'J cr 1 s also provides a helpfu1 commentary P.ere • 
. '· 
Epictetus sees, as Aristo'tle:1 ·· that knowledge in ~ertorming 
actions needs in addition to the objective knowledge of the 
good, the desire for the good.ll6 ... The· desjxe is ·trained 
~ . . ....... 
through askesis. By this habituation ~ knowledge and right 
actions, the prohairesis is guided to its perfect state of 
malting the right moral decisions and therefore functioning 
with full freedom. Yet equally important, the process of 
,, 
.-.- _.-: .. 
290 
habituation itself in Epiotetus is only adopted as a resul~ 
of a decision of;-the will, and in this aspect prohairesis 
is anterior to the askesis. 
Education then in Epictetus holdetwo points of 
significance in respect to freedom. First it provides the 
objective knowledge of the world, and of our own self, which 
enables us more easily to adopt a correct course of action 
in accordance with nature; second, through askesis, it trains 
the desiring aspect of knowing, which results in th~ will to 
adopt this correct course. 
5. The Inner Virtues. 
In addition to the qualities of character with which 
man is endo\-Jed as dynameis, already considered in section 2, 
Epictetus refers to certain other qualities or guiding 
principles of moral virtue. These I now exami:o,e, and see how 
they are the basis of social virtues. 
The virtue moat commonly mentioned by Epictetus is 
aidos, the sense of shame, and therefore we may consider it 
the most essential. It is the moral self respect or sense 
of feeling one's moral goodness is unimpaired, and to lose it 
is to depart from one's moral principles. The notion of such 
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inner virtues preceding social virtues is central in most 
Stoic teaching, and may be described as the personali~eltion 
of all ~oodness; it is different in kind from the virtues 
described in the ethics of Plato and Aristotle., even when 
these approach near to an inner virtue, as for example, in 
cr.w+p-o~-~v'1 (self restraint). \'lith the Stoics the 
individual found his own standards, and exercised,moral good-
noes in keeping to it.117 This is illustrated well in the 
I 
concept of "'fpocrwnov or moral character, (see section 2, 
above). The notion of inner virtue is also an important 
aspect of inner freedom. Freedom of the spirit or mind, 
because it is based on self respect, can be absolute in a way 
that political fre-edom can never be. 
This virtue (aidos), is the nearest Epictetus comes 
to a notion of conscience. 118 Blush;i;ng_'.is recognised as an 
outward manifestation of a departure from aidos.ll9 Accordingly 
aidos becomes a protection against falling in with the opinion 
of the many_. In III 22, 15, the Cynic adopts this protection, 
and his aidos is the consciousness of p~eserving his own moral 
dignity. 120 
Aidos rarely occurs on its own in Epictetus; normally 
it is coupled with ' I To 'fflffTOV (faithfulness). It is 
' I difficult to find the same kind of significance in To "tfi~Tov 
,· .,;.. . . ' . 
, ·_,· 
•.' .I 
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as in aidos. Yet because of ita proximity to aidos in 
Epictetus' thought, we should still consider it an inner 
virtue. For instance, it occurs iniV 9 1 17, along with 
, both inner virtues; 
yet the natural idea of ' I _ T---'L_1f_t_crTo_\L_ is faithfulness in 
h ld . t t t f"" d121 if 122 up o 1.ng a con rae o a ~:a.en or a w e. . We may 
interpret it as the respect for others: _through our sense 
of loyalty we have decided to involve ourselves in a duty 
towards them. It is significant that in the ~ist of Virtues 
ascribed to the deity, 
, 
'li"_La"_.,.. _o s· is included but not 
aidos. 123 The inner sense of shame is not neodod in the 
deity, but faithfulnes~, in that he can be relied upon to 
guide the universe, is. 
Sometimes the string of virtues is increased further: 
the easentilil.. qualit\i,ea in Achillea124 are __ .,t; ':~fAr w~v. 1 
\, 
"ft"JV'TOS. 1 
I . :.-' 
, and _IC.o.er f-A-' O-S-t that is, · ~he 
addition of respect for _guests, and decorum or pro.priety. 
In III, 3, 9 1 brotherly love { .cf>tACIC.& .. e.>.:+f~ ) is added 
to self respect and faithfulness. In III 14, 13 1 justice 
{ l is given as a third. v~tue. In 
Encheiridion 23, 3, high-mindedness ( 
is third. 
There seems to be no clear" clistinQ,tion of inner 
) 
,· ~ ': 
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vi.rtues and virtues towards others. The i-nner virtues are 
~ ~ r I 
chiefly "l DC 1 o ""s , \ , J. TC ts'W 't'Pt>V and \. 'l" To ,...ey~~o Tpov 
the last two really being contained in the concept of, 
aidos; those directed towards others are ' I "'r."O ll' HS T 0 V 
Epictetus has no need to draw marked distinctions since he 
sees vi.rtue towards others as extending.from the inner 
' 
' 
• 
virtues. This is illustrated in II 4, 2 - 4, where friendship 
and political virtues are immediately jeopardised when self-
respect and faithfulness are lost. 
The inner virtues have two characteristics: they are 
natural and are maintained by our O\..rn decision of will 
(prohairesis). They are natural in so much as they are 
characteristic of man and not the beasts.125 Man is born 
126 to self respect and trust. 
J. ' :1 ' Aristotle's ,,ucr '""'' ol peT v'l 
These virtues resemble 
,127 in so far as they are 
capacities which man alone possesses, but which are not given 
conscious expression unless accompanied by the will to do so. 
They are an inborn tendency, rather than an actuality. 
For as with the dynameis discussed earlier, man is 
free to maintain or destroy these virtues \11'ithin him, and they 
are maintained by the adjustment of the hegemonikon within 
~I 9 the individual. It lies l'Tithin you ( "E-CT w e v ) to be 
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shameless and self-respecting and faithful. 128 They are under 
our control, and therefore the result of Prohairesis, or 
deliberate choice. Conversely, nothing need be an object of 
shame to anyone \Y'hich is not his own doing. 129 We are 
responsible for having our prohairosis exhibiting the qualities 
of self-respect and faith. These inner qualities or virtues 
provide the basis of prohairesis as moral character, and at 
the same time are themselves the effect of prohairesis. 
Because no one can take away these qualities, except ourselves 
through an act of choice; they~ our person, the 'I'. The 
person becomes worthless_ if self-respect and the accompanying 
virtues are neglected. This is illustrated in the case- of 
Paris and Achilles: their fall was the result of loss of 
aidos.l30 
The social virtues, as we have seen, are already 
connected with and derived from the inner virtues; nowhere 
docs Epictetus dwell on the nature of individual virtues 
towards others, but is content to let these follow naturally 
from the inner virtues which should be our constant attention.131 
~he exact manner of dealing with our obligations to fellow men, 
(the -~0 1 ~ + o pot ) , and of displaying what are normally 
considered virtues, is dependent on prohairesis and is 
discussed in Chapter VII. 
-, 
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The object of this chapter has been to show that 
E:pictetus was al.'lare of certain individual character traits 
which men display in attaining the end for which they were made; 
and this end is the freedom resulting from willing at each 
occurrence the design of tho logos. These character traits 
form a kind of central core to each person's function of 
prohaireois or will, not dissimilar to Aristotle' a r.fe. '-S • 
The individual character is evident in the development of the 
I d;yru;uneis, in the _ TT p o f!1' w ~ ov 1 in our extent and success of 
education through askesis and in the maintenance of the inner 
virtues; each of these are habituated in that they tend 
eventually to settle do1>rn to a fairly stable standard.132 
In each case this standard has resulted from an act of choice 
operating many times, for each of these traits are part of 
our freedom. Together they form the directing factor which 
guides the prohairesis in each particuilar-moral decision, and 
\lie see in them a kind of moral personality 1 or moral 
character. 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER SIX 
1. Chapter Five, 4. 
· 2. Diogenes La.ertius VII 85; cf. Cicero, De Finibus 
III 16. 
3. Epictetus IV 7, 6. 
4. IV 7, 27. 
5. I 16, 1 - 5; I 6, 18. 
6. II 6, 12. 
7. In II 6, 12, Epictetus remarks that if crops did 
possess power of feeling, they would will to be 
harvested, - just as man should will the course of 
nature. 
~:~-- . . . ...... - - ~,I. ... 1 • 
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9. Cf. Fragment 134 (Schweighauser). 
10.. 91 f. 
11. Death is compared to a going abroad L~ao.&"'J ,...__;Of. ) , 
but involving an even greater change, but not to a 
_/_ . ·' . :) . ' \ •' ~ \ \ . :) state of material non-existence ~uec/ 6;•~- To f'"J. ov. D(IV\ ees 
' .. .. :)I ' • ti :r...o_v.u.v_fA-"J-0-V._OUK l.S a correc on insert~d into the 
Bodleian ~m, and supported by a parallel passage in 
Marcus Aurelius XI 35. Thus a mate~ialistic or 
' 
component identity is maintained, but not a personal 
or composite identity. 
12. See further note 87, below. 
13. Cf. IV 10, 15 - 16. 
14. This physical explanation of death recurs at II~ 13, 
4 - 5 and IV 7, 15. 
15. Cf. Ch. III 3 and note 4Q • 
. , . 
. ·-
16. II 5, 24 f. 
l. 
298. 
Beyan, Stoics and Sceptics, p. 4~ - 50 pointe to 
I . 
the diffi.cul ty the Stoics had in a_~ligning any 
moral end \'lith their theory of rational determinism, 
which is nature, <~+J-.,.,S ). The difficulty is 
only eased by taking full account of the nature of 
the individual as well as the nature of the universe. 
The nature of the universe on its own is devoid of 
any purpose that can bo called morally good. 
18. See Ch. fiv~ 3. 
19. IV 4, 22; III 24, 3; cf. Aristotle's description of 
9e.w pfct.. , which he regards aa man •s highest 
function, (Ch. II 6). 
20. IV 4, 43. 
21. IV 10, 25. 
22. IV 10, 30. 
(II 23,- 11). 
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24. See Chapter III 5. 
25. I 6, 20. 
26. I 6, 15 - 25. 
27. II 6, 14 - 19. 
28. III 23, 4 f. 
29. III 26, 27 - 8. 
30. Trans. Oldfather, II P• 457 Cf. III 13, 13 - 14. 
31. III 22, 5 - 8. 
32. Cf. also III 22 57 f, and III 26, 32. 
33. Cf. I 2, 30. The bull is fitted to his function of 
protecting the herd by his capacity of fortitude which 
is his Tu(pD'crJu_u~- (and the term here seems iden-tical 
to dynamis). The dove-tailing of character and 
circumstance is emphasised here: immediately there is 
34. 
35. 
36. 
37. 
38. 
39. 
.. \ .. 
',• . 
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~,ossession of a particuJ.ar capaci1;y ( -11'-~P-• O"K&U~ ) , 
there arise the circl.unstances of lUiviD.g to use it; 
or i.Uunediately the circum~tance occurs,' the capacity·· · 
is there to·meet it. God has designed ·both to fit. 
Since this is an illustration from the anima~ k;lngdom, 
the character and its use is instinctive: the b~~ has 
immediate awareness ( --~U_VCI( ~ r1 9-q~~~' r~. _ ) of his povr_ers 
in the circumstances. r-ia.n, endowed with &.J..,t:A.~IS 
lt.~.K_D,~ o 11 9'tJ.'T" '"~ , requires lmowledge of 
himself and the wor~d before he can eo act according 
to character. 
~'lhitman, A Passage to Indi-a, Ve-255·,- (1870). 
See section ~. above. 
Fragment 136 (Schweighauaer). 
II 6 15. 
II 16, 4~. 
III 8, 6. 
_;:. 
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40. I 6, .30; II 16, 13. Epictetus uses this illustration 
as a parallel to having coura~e to meet danger. It 
is only a parallel if courage is properly developed 
and maintained by an act of choice. 
41. I 6, 40. 
42. II 8, 22 - .3. 
43. IV 5 1 14. 
44. Epictetus never directly applies the term dynameis 
to man's p.atural capacities, only to qualities. 
45. Fragment 174 (Schweighauser). 
46. ' • ... ,, \ ,. 9 \ c: , (J frov ytA.p T'OUTO E.crTI_, TO oD ev UrfOKf"'-'tl' ~f 
' , ... ~ ''e LJ c: ~ ':.~, 1rpocr~nrov #CeliA~~· £1CAC sotD"'v'Cilt o'duTo oeAAou , E:nch. 
\ ' "' c \ ~~, , ' (fCJ y~p c1 o crearu'rov ••ows ..... 1\'oro" CJ"4c•uiTIDY' 
, ~~ \ \ el\ \ I 
-rr•TrpactrKtus• ~,.o, y~tp atN\WV •fu7tp1A.I'I(outrtv, I 2.-' 11 • 
48. .. , •• \, cl • .• ' •• • TCII.O.IJTOV 6f?TI TO ICII"ral "Jfpo~..,'ft OV • ourtQ,s "/.."f~V _1tc(pd-
"' ~ 9 , , ' +, . -;I ... • .. 'J~ ~01$ ~16'. ltl'fteiiOIS tlffJTO tl'tJtiCitl fp&tv cf GC&ITW" (V ?Cif.l\-'i"_-E ,.-eo-av .. 
( l 2/2~ ) 
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.· I Souil:he, Op. cit, P• 10 f. 
50. Cf. the use of in Ench. 33, 1. 
51. The references to suicide reflect the tyrannical. :r.~igne 
. .. 
of the Roman emperors, notably Nero; see Intro. 3~:(Ch::1,·:J 
. \! -· 
52. III 8, 6; IV 1, 170 - 1. 
53. This teaching on suicide as an escape from moral 
degr~dation, is essentially the same as Socrates, 
Pha.edo 6~ A- 62 E from which it was probably :d~rived. 
This~ as other parts in the op~ning sections of the 
Phaedo, may well reflect Pythagorean convictions. 
,54. II 8, 2. 
55· I 6, 1 - 6; I 14, 1 - 5; II 14, 26. 
56. . I 5, 34. 
5?. III 26, 28; IV 1, 108. I 16, 15 - 21. 
'. · •• c ' •• 
58. II 19, 27. 
59. II 19, 26. 
60. Ch. III 3. 
61. See Ch. III 5. 
62. In De Divinatione Cicero refers to the principle of 
O"UJ'1f~lcloC as 11coniunctio naturae at quasi 
concentus et consentus." See note in Pease's Commentary, 
-~~ II 34, and also Ch. III 5, above. 
63. III 21 1 14 - 16. 
64. III 1, 37. 
65. Plato, Phaedo 67D. 
66. II,16,·46. 
6?. E·~:· II 12, 21. 
68. Fragment 176 (Schwe:Lghauser). 
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69. For example, Hercules is deemed to be a specially 
privileged character because he was the son of 
a God, (Reason); III 26, 29; II 16, 44. 
70. III 26, 29, etc. 
71. Plato, Apology 28D. 
?2. Hjmans, Askesis p. 10 - 11. 
73. It may be that the attempt made around 1900 to 
identify certain doctrines of Epictetus with Christian 
theology and Ethics has caused a reaction to dissociate 
Epictetus from any religious thought. (See Epilogue, <;h~. VIIJ;)~ 
l I ' ,_ ' 
75. II 14, 23 f. 
76. II. 14, 20. 
, I 6, 24. 
. __ , ·.· ~ . 
30.5 
l _C:e~··~~Cloud of Unknowing' p. 93: "It is enou~h tli~t you 
I 
- . 
should be lovihgly moved." I . 
II 19, 27. 
8o. See Ch. ~ -~~e-~ t ; • ' -. 
81. I 14, 14. 
82. See Ch. II 6. 
So Socrates' .daimon' never leads him on, but often cai~s 
him back.' (Apology, 31D). 
84. Russell, ~~sticiem and Logic P• 17 - 18. 
8,5. E.eJ. II 14, 21. 
86. Henry Vaughan is outstanding amongst the Englis~_mystic 
poets in recognising a very similar logical principle 
behind nature to t:Qat of the Stoics. Through prayer 
and sympathy there is com3lunication bett>~een. the princip~e 
and mankind, and man can adjust his life accordingl~: 
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Thus all is hurled 
In sacred hyrnns and order, The great Chime~; 
And sympathy of nature. Prayer is 
The world in tune, 
A spirit voyce 1 
And vocall joyes 
\<Those Eccho is heav'ns blisse. 
'Morning Natch 1 from Silex Scintillans,l654. 
88. Cl.oud of Unknolo~ing P. 93: 'Let this thing deal with you, 
and lead you as it will, let it be active and you 
passive.• Thus the author of 'The Cloud' stresses the 
passivity of man to God's will. Again, because the 
divine will is also the rational will, Epictetus 
requires active intellectual effort on man's part, 
but tho intellectua.J.ef'f6:ttt. 'i.S-it.eeff(; occasioned by the 
' '·. . '• ., .. 
desire to know God and to follow him. The 'prior 
working of God' is already fixed in the rational will. 
89. I 9, 16; see note 74, above. 
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91. I 6, 24. 
92. II 5, 9. 
93. II 14, 19. 
94. II 13, 5 - 8. 
95. I 17, 12. Hjmans has provided a full examination of 
this aspect of education, Askesis p. 33 - 53. 
96. IV 7, 16. 
97. ~~ \ I •I ---EX"'L-toV ~et.VTtV ecrw , (II 7, 3). 
98. I 22, 15. 
99. III 4, 4. 
100 III 22, 53. 
101 II 1, 15. 
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102. II 22, 37; I 17, 14 • 
103. ., \ :tllr OfJ_ ytZC P--:1--0JU- •she did not know' (II 17, 21). 
104. II 1, 29. 
105. II 14, 14 - 19. 
106. I 26, 8 - 12 and 17 - 18. 
107. I 4, 18. Other terms as Y-"fAcV~f£1V , t'8).0(,..;,V , 
etc., used to express this askesis, are examined by 
Hjmans, Op. cit. P• 70 - 1. 
). 
109. III 13, 7; cf. IV 4, 26. 
110. II 21, 20. 
111. II 22, 3. 
112. IV 6, 6 - 8. 
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113~ See Ch. II 6. \•Te may compare also the habituation 
to right thinking commended by Aristotle in lac. Bth. 
II. More strictly, however, Epictetus follows 
Socrates in habituating the exercise of reason, which 
of its own then leads to knowledge, provided the 
reason is not warped by tempting desires. 
114. Op. cit. P• 63. 
115. Metaphysics 993 b 9. 
116. See Ch. II 3, and Ch. V 3. 
117. It is noteworthy that 'shame' was not unknown to 
the earlier Greeks as a basis for moral behaviour. 
• I Socrates uses cCffi'Xpos _in a similar l'lay in Apology 
28D, etc. Thucydides too uses it in PericleJ Funeral 
speeoh (Bk. II 40), and it appears frequently in the 
tragedies. As a popular guide to behaviour it was 
probably common, but did not find its way into the 
more specialised ethical studies. 
118. See·rv 2, and note. 
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119. III 7 1 27; cf. Fra~ent 52 (Schweighauser). See 
Hjmans, On. Cit i p. 29. 
120. The idea recurs in IV 8, 33. 
121. II 22, 30. 
122. II 4, 2. 
123. II 14, 13. 
124. I 28,.2~. Cicero in De Officiis lays great stress 
\ I 
on decus ( oro_•uuquo_v ___ )~ see Ch. IV 1. 
125. I 28, 20. 
126. I 3, ,4. 
127. See Ch. II 3. 
128. II 2 9 4. 
129. III 26, 8. 
130. 
131. 
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I 28, 19 - 28. 
(~"'g.::'lV~1Qp )3. In perfecting the )trC>hairesis ~:~naturally 
follows that human relati()nships are not neelected, I 19, 13; 
(~~ in~)looks after his personal eood, he will- regularly be 
contributing to the common interest; of. Plato, Apoloey 3()B, 
36C, and the earlier Stoics. 
132. This of course does not preclude the possibilit,y of raising 
the standard of attaining to a more perfect freedom. This, 
after all, is the aim Of EPictetus' teaching. But before 
aakesis begins, there is already this habituated core of 
moral dispositions; as the standard of the core is raised, 
so the particular acts of moral choice will approach the 
perfect freedom. 
E!7. In I 9, 16, Epictetus has overstepped his religious enthusiasm, 
following Socrates, and euegeste that freedom comes at death, 
when the soul is freed from the body. There can be no question 
of life after death being consistent with ~toic teaching at 
any period: the rational principle at death will return to 
pure reason and be fomed into something else the universe 
needs, losing all personal identit,y; free it might be, but in 
no sense personal. The freedom thus gained at death is 
3t1a 
a release from our own responsibility, and in this sense 
Epictetus must use it here. The true freedom is mentioned 
later, ( 17) that the man who waits on God, caring nought 
for externals, Will easily endure. 
A second passage whioh has been noted as irldicating 
a belief in aftel'-life {Hjmane, Askesis p. 14, and note 1 • ) , 
is III 5, 7-11 (cf. IV 10, 13,~'1TOC.vop8wll ~f"IICUT~v) where 
at death Epictetus is anxiO\ia God sho1.:ld find him concerned 
as he ought to be with his inner will and freedom. Bu.t the 
meaning here is not to be perfect at the hour of death so that 
we Jll8¥ enjoy freedom thereaf~er, but so that we can satisfy 
God and ourselves that we have enjoyed the perfect freedom 
that he affords in this life. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
PROHAIRESIS AND FREEDOM 
1. Prohairesis: a new term. 
The purpose of this chapter is to apprehend, in the 
light of the discussion on Epictetua' concept of mind and 
purpose of human life, the full significance of the term 
in his Discourses, and ita importance 
to his concept of freedom and responsibility. 
Not only is prohaireaia a key idea in Epictetua' 
doctrine, but also he is responsible for ita introduction 
into the Stoic vocabulary, and we must ask why. The common 
, 
meaAing of _ wp6oupecr•s in the Greek language had been 
. 1 
'choice' or 'preferment•, and this meaning continued into 
later Greek, with little alteration, :except that as the'concept 
of will gradually developed, the term can denote choice as a 
decisive act of will. 2 
In Aristotle the word assumed a particular technical 
meaning to describe a stage in the analysis of .man's respon-
sibility for his action but to translate the word by choice 
is still adequate, provided we understand that it refers to 
I; 
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the particular doctrine of choice set out by Aristotle. 
With him it became a philosophic term in the discussion of 
ethics, just as __ 1J_~B_o_s had become. 
The word played no part in Stoic philosophy_until Epiotetus, 3 
since presumably those writers had no need to distinguish 
between wishing and an act of will, or choice, and found 
the words ~o~>..o.,...d.t , S~Aw , ,-rt,Bu~o&l,....oCI ., 
/3 o:,A'1cr•s or voluntas adequate for their purposes. \'lhen 
a word was required for the judgement necessary for 
' Epictetus' 'rf'P o .c 1 pI t1' •s • 
was used in place of 
For the judgement which led to 
knowledge was not immediately associated with the choosing 
faculty displayed by the will of a p~rson. 
In their doctrine of virtue the Stoics had emphasized 
the diat:Lnct:Lon between .,.:. ~+·t.f ":'d ~ o~: ~+' 6~ , 
and in the Middle Stoa these became 'IW"npoOI•PtTI.COC and 
' . ' T~-~po~·~•T~. When these terms were fashionable, it was 
quite natural for Epiotetus to bring back into ethical 
, 
doctrine the noun, "'ft'poe~up&~l$ _, with which these adjectives 
were associated, prohairesis being the faculty we can 
' , 4 
exercise on or. 'ff.po~tt•pt'IU<ol, of choosing things which are 
able to be chosen. Epictetus' use of the term must be 
considered therefore against this threefold bacltground: 
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1.. as •choice' in current l.anguage. 2. the special. phil.oeo-
phic appl.ication by Aristotl.e, 3. its connection with the 
Stoic adjectives. 
It can by no means be certain that Epictetus was the 
first to adopt the term into common Stoic vocabul.ary. 
Certain Discourses give strong indications that the term 
was generally accepted and bore a distinct meaning in the 
programme of Epictetus' school.. I The occurrence of _w,o.a•.p•''' 
in the opening of Discourse II 16 and I 29 1 suggests that 
'ft pe,/tpCti'IS was contained in a form of catechism used by 
the school.: "Where is the good? - In prohairesis". The 
freedom aspect of the prohairesis is also a concept in which 
the pupil.s are well sohool.ed, as is shown"in th~ opening 
of II 15.5 Whilst these passages assume a regul.ar familiarity 
witq the term, it must be remembered that the discourses 
were additional sermons on the main body of teaching exPounded 
at lectures, and a systematic analysis of the term_might have 
been given there. 
Whether or not Epictetus is original in adopting the 
, 
term; in his writing, wpoocapcr•s undergoes a development 
for which he was almost certainly responsible. This develop-
ment of the term is best cons:tdered as extending trom its 
connection with the Stoic divisions "Wpo"'•Pt."'";. and :C:tepht•P /.T-. , 
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as adjectives. The widespread use of these terms in Epictetus' 
school may be noted from Dis~ouraes III 3 and III 7• 
Occasionally however, a noun construction is adopted, as in 
"'f ... , III 10, 18: there is no good or evil. ~ ~ ?:'}S-'IC.poGCapacreus 
• .. l'· . . , 6 
the phrase bears the same meaning as· .,cv To~s CIC'Il'PO"'PI'tcus • 
Similarly, ~" wpo"''P.tret is used7 'in place of the frequent 
~y 1'i•$ 'rlpoC1C1p~•«;f$o 8 
, 
The converse also occurs, and sometimes "'fp•••pt.,.llt"J 
I 
is used with the article, where we would expect 1f'pooupco>IS • 
For instance, in II 23, 27, the faculty of speech <; +P~~TIH, ) 
~ , 
is contrasted with the prohairesis ( ., wpo••PCTUC"'J ), 
·. , 
yet previously, in 19 of the same Discourse, 11'pOiftp&triS 
the noun, was used with _.; +.pot.rTut.:, • 9 Another illustration 
of this interchangeability of noun and adj~ctive is in I 17 1 23. 
' I I Here_ TO 11po,upcTtKov is used for 'ffp0f(1p811' 15 in what 
, 
I believe to be another catechismal use of 1tporup f4rl$ , 
that it is free and unrestrained. t Normally, -rrpoflllpCA'IS 
the noun,is used for this catechism, as in I 121 9. 
On such evidence as this, I believe that Epictetus 
adopted his.:term from the adjective, and if so, this would 
offer a clue to the use he first put it to, ~maly the faculty 
that.makes the choice, or the actual act of choosing. In 
most instances of the term, the idea of ~dopting a free 
decisi9n on phantasia~ is present; thus it is to do with 
.'·.-·.!;.::. 
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,[l 
ir_uytc.rA-r:C 9acrt.$. _, but emphasising the free aepec't of this 
process. "ff-po~• PCO'«S gives _firfiV~~W.,..:C Be~ls_ ~~·:i.e 
additional meaning of personal responsibility or cho~~e, and 
then immediately it becomes a moral function, or rather, the 
only moral function, being the act which is responsible for 
man 1s good and evil. Here Epictetus mee.ts the Aristotelian 
sense of ' namely, that point in the chain 
of events leading to an action where the person takes on ~he 
' ' responsibility of the action, by bringing the •P}('-
.. 61 
within himself. The one instance of the verb TIP••~PI•Ir~fl!.f 
in Epictetus, bears out this. affinity with Aristotle. :;J:n 
II 23, 43, . is used as a decision taken· fr.eely 
. -= ~-
. 1: 
during the course of a general aim or purpose ( .,.~ 'ftPfi~l.,fA.IIUHI); 
as in Aristotle, each prohairesis is a stage in appro~ch*bS-
.. , .. ·. 
a general wish ( ~o_:,A..,d"IS ). The general purpose is to 
follow Zeus. In Epictetus·the prohairesis adopted is one 
counter to this purpose, occasioned by attractive externals, 
namely to be content and make the choice C w_p_o.M •p~ 
to stop half-way. 
This leads to the special Stoic use of.prohairesis as 
the means of·achieviDg the :recognised freedom from fears and· 
anxieties. Man's good, that is, hie freedom, depends_ on a 
~ , 10 
certain kind of prohairesis ( 'ftOUI TrpoGuper•s ). 
'; 
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Choice must not only be free, but in accordance with nat~e, 
. I Cl . ' ~ or necessary choice '-" pooupt.crt!. o a a& C. I ) •. 11 The 
paradox -contained in this phrase is examined in the following 
section. Here I wish only to show how the noun, once 
adopted for choice in making a decision, is readily turned 
to the moral attitude of acceptance, characteristic of the 
Stoic ethic. 
Whilst it is attractive to consider that Epictetus 
adopted the noun 
, 
'fJ.p o •• p CO" I' as a term on which his 
theory of freedom must depend since the term is so character-
istic of his writing, there are nevertheless a number of 
discourses where freedom is the central subject, and yet 
, 
which do. not employ the noun ff'poaup&ct'•S • Most notable 
amongst these is IV 1, which is often quoted as being the 
fullest account of the Stoic freedom that is extant in any 
writer. I . , There is constant reference here to .,.,_1\pOelffiTit(_te __ 
~ I c I 
f1'7'P o aCIP&Tat. and. to choice loP I""' ) , desire and· 
assent ( fl'tJY l<al T~ Bcr •s ) belonging to 't~ -trp.OtAIPETI_K __ , 
but no separate faculty or function is referred to, embracing 
T~ 1\ pooupeT uc:C. • Another discourse of similar proportions 
III 24, which is centered on the character of the inner man, 
12 has no mention of prohairesis. Accordingly, although 
hr I ~~ ~" the p ase ~po.r•pccr•s ota. o~u is useful as an approach to 
-' 
3],.8 
the Stoic posit:i,on of choosing a course in accordance with 
nature, it must not be thought of as containing someth$.ng 
which is essential to the Stoic freedo¢. 1 and which cannot 
be expressed in other language. 
However, the discourses just mentioned give an 
account of the Stoic freedom as it was traditionally'under-
stood. Their very length and abundance of illustration 
indicate the use of stock material for a standard, lucid 
account of this important aspect of the Stoic ethic. The 
factor which necessitated Epictetus' adoption of the term 
must be found in a fuller meaning in which the term is 
used in a number of discourses, - a meaning which hitherto 
had not been embraced by a single term, because the standard 
description of Stoic freedom had not developed thus far. 
This f~ther stage in the development of the theory 
in Epictetus is seen where 12rohairesis becomes the essence 
of the individual, or the individ~al will making choices. 
, 
This could not be embraced by the technical Stoic _ "fUO"IS , 
' .. 
cr___uy-KotT~9crr•s or po'uJ."1cr•s, for these ter,ms are 
too theoretical and static, lacking the organiC concept of 
choice in Epictetus, where the whole personality combines 
in being responsible for moral choice. npoc/•p«tr~S wa~­
probably first adopted as the act of choice, from the 
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adjectives, as noted above, but then came to refer to the 
whole moral character of a man. Thus translators of 
Epictetus, finding 'choice' an inadequate rendering, have 
variously supplied 'freedom of choice•, 'personal freedom•, 
'moral character' and 'personne morale•.13 
Two factors may have caused Epictetus to bring out 
this fuller meaning of the term. The first was the growing 
interest in man's inner personality. This trend in Stoicism 
was stressed in earlier chapters.14 We have noted that in 
III 24, there is no occurrence of ' 7fpo~apc.cras • 
is however a very strong emphasis on the conduct and 
There 
disposition of the inner man; the example of Odysseus is 
quoted15 as one who, because of a certain inner disposition, 
can maintain his freedom and happiness. From this disposition 
is derived his goodness. 
The second factor is the inherent notion of 
I 
respo_nsibility in Jt P 0 CIU f 6 Cf' tS ' applied to choace. As 
mentioned above, this was an idea present in Aristotle's l.lBe 
of the term. Prohairesis, as man's responsibility, results 
in good or bad acts; and soon it is not so much the individ-
ual acts of choice which become the centre of responsibility, 
but the whole of a man's character which in turn accounts 
for his particular choices. Goodness of character therefore 
. . \ . . 
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may be traced to prohairesis, and because of .the concentration 
, I 
on inner personality, the term _ "" p o 11 • p ~G"•-S was ready to 
fill the deficiency of a term here. Thus prohairesis becomes 
the essential 'I' of a person. 
A number of passages illustrate well this transition 
of meaning from 'choice' to 'moral character•. In II 23, 
the noun is avoided in the early part of the discourse {5-29), 
c ' ~, and "1 -rrp-oe~~&•p&TJIC'1 ouVCIICfUS is adopted for the faculty 
that chooses or makes a decision on each act. But at the 
end of the discourse, when this faculty has been shown to 
be the highest we possess, we are exhorted to purify the 
prohairesis, that is, our whole character. A further example 
is II 101 where at 27 1 ' wpoe~~&1pet1"1S is used as the power 
of free choice, and in 29, as our choosing personality 
dependent on moral virtues.16 
If the conjectures made above are correct, the term 
prohairepis saw considerable development in the work of 
Epictetus. Far by embracing the notion of the essential 1 I 1 , 
the part of man that 'is not mere flesh and bones { c:r'~p~ ),17 
with the choosing faculty, under a single term, he has made 
an important contribution to a concept of will, which 
philosophy was hitherto lacking, in any single term. The 
willing personality as the essenc·e ·and source of goodness, 
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, 
was a development in Epiotetus, and the term_ ,..po.eeptG"fS 
. . 
enabled him to make this advance, and to give a more positive 
interpretation of freedom than was traditionally adopted by 
the Stoics. To reach a full understanding of the term, we 
must examine separately the function of prohaireaia in ita 
narrow application in making a decision, and ita function 
in moral character, displayed as a fuller and further stage 
of ita application.18 
2. The function of Prohairesia in decision. 
The function of prohaireaia in making decisions, or 
moral choice, rests upon distinguishing things in our power 
and things npt in our power. Most basically, there is a 
choice in the use of phantasiai but not in their actual 
occurrence.19 
Three similes are given in II 5, illustrating well 
this difference: in the fall of dice, the way it falls is 
indifferent ( :C&,~<topos ), but what move we make from 
it is ours by choice, ( ' 1t p o oct p e. T"J te ov ) • On a voyage, 
cert~in things are in our power, such as the selection of 
crew and a day for sailing, whilst other things, like our 
safety in bad weather are 
;) , 
o('ft' po ccepeT.c , outside our 
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fie1d of choice; the decisions ~e in t~e hands of the 
helmsman. Finally, in a game of ball, tJ:le.ball itself is 
indifferent, but the throwing and catching is our concern. 
20 To have the ball taken from us is outside our power. 
Accordingly, life itself (_or~ ~"jv ), is indifferent, 
but not the use we make of it. What befalls us, namely the 
, not for our deci~ion;. but ~e-
~-""'\"; . ./~\ . >~- ~ 
must exercise decision in making natural·use of every 
_., 
outcome. 21 
More specifically Epictetus confines the function of 
prohairesis to three fields ( TJ1t.o1 ). These are 
clearly set out in III 2 1 and frequently referred to:
22 
c. \ \ • '• \ \ ,. \, 1. o TU.pt TWS op&,s.ll\ ldltt Tal$ (tCIMICI'tfS : desires and 
aversions. 
2. & ~ep~ 'f~S ~p..-4s t<.:C, :C+ opJA-~~ :~~~1.~ and 
refusals, in the specific sphere of duties, 
and relationships with others. 
• \ ' 9, o 'ftcp• 'f'GfS tluyt<.cT• &6f.tS the consent 
of the mind and will. 
• . . I 
In two instances, II 13, 8 - 9, and I 21, 2, fi'fl't,o.A"f (design) 
I 
and wpc e • .,._,, __ (purpose) are added to the three above. 
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These should be included under field 3, being probably 
technical terms in the logical process of assent to syllogisms.23 
These fiel.ds held an important place in Epictetus' educational 
system, and he doubtless divised them to divide up his aske.sis 
programme. 
It has been recognised by two commentators, Oldfather 
and More, 24 that this is the one original contribution of 
Epictetus to Stoicism. But the division of thr·ee fields does 
not really have any significance in Epictetus apart from being 
a convenient division of school studies, and he may have 
been the first to apply the I TO'rtOI i.n this way. But 
there is evidence in the Discourses themselves that there 
existed separate treatises, for example, on duties, indicat-
~ , 
ing the separate field o p t"" ae 1 , and on passions, indicat-
ing _:,~f.&'-~-_, and no doubt also on truyte-..,.:,.s.,,S , a 
branch of the highly organised subject of logic. 25 With 
such text-books in existence, it requires little originality 
for a headmaster to organise them into separate fields of 
study. If there is originality i.n Epictetus, it must be 
found in less specific items. However, whil_st philosophically 
the division bears little significance, it may Dell&~ . ,lls 
be conveniently adopted in the present study to examine more 
closely the opera~ion of.prohairesis. 
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Before embarking upon this, it is beet to assemble 
the characteristics of prohaireeie which Epictetus directly 
.assigns to it: 
1. Prohaireeie is free. There are three aspects 
of the freedom of prohairesie. 
a. It is free from the cosmic determinism of the 
universe. God has put prohaireeis under our 
control, and given it to us as he had it 
himself, - free. Not even God can over 
26 
master it. We are set free by God, 
..; Aeu8~pC4>fo&oU j"'t'~ TOll 8r.Gu • 27 Thus in 
' , the extent of Tot 1tpoG(apCTI~cl' , man has the 
same freedom of choice as God has in hie 
planning of the cosmos. 
b. It need not be hindered by anything external 
to itself. I~s freedom is rather hindered in 
the choice of an attitude towards an external, 
for example, of covetousness; this choice will 
limit its freedom. Therefore Epictetue can 
say that one prohaireeie compels a second 
prohaireeia.28 Self satisfaction wall perfect 
the prohaireeie; accordingly, as soon as we 
entertain an external desire, the correct 
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state of the P.rohairesis is des·troyed. 29. 
The possibility of P,rohairesis having the 
freedom to destroy itself and lose its 
freedom is important in Epictetus' doctrine. 
c. Following from (b), the prohairesis is able to 
remain unchanged and unaffected by changes of 
circumstance. 30 
2. Prohairesis is the only good and only evil. 
It is natural in any ethical system to place goodness 
in that part of man's action where he makes a free decision 
and therefore has personal responsibility. This was a guiding 
principle in Aristotle's Ethics. Accordingly, anything done 
~ ' SIC '"p oaup&b'C~S can be judged good or bad. ~ni~li2Y,l9_, this 
is clearly put: 
· .. , ·:.' ~ ' ' 1 
Man's good and evil is in prohaires±s; 3 
the essence of the good is in having a prohairesis directed 
in a certain way. 32 
3. The prohairesis is essentially rational. 
It is implicit. from (1) above, that prohairesis is 
essentially a rational function, since it is the gift of God. 
Its main concern is rational, - to make decisions (.GC:yt"acTbC ) , 
and it has the characteristics of the rational hegemonikon 
discussed in chapter five; a rational hegemonikon should be 
maintained against the :C-rcpo• r_p_:.~oc .33 The hegemonikon 
!IIQ.st be brought into confonni ty with nature, and the~ by be :fully 
. ~ -- - . ' . - . 
,2($ 
rational.o; · tW,.s is to QQr,t"ect the pmbM res$s~?4 
I . . . . '; ·. • :_--·.... . - .. . 
I a~ essential~y ratio~, bec~e ~tis ol~ that its-best 
choice is to ~qqse what reason didtates. Yet it is significant that 
~icte~e does not diJ'ectl;v connect the "QJ'QhaiJ!Afli.s with lg~~ afl 
he does the begemon1Jmp. For ·p,mhaiz:eafa. as ·will and choice, is 
.. l" -~ 
reall;v outsid,e the rattonall'ir.ratio:nat cbaraoteristicsl it is more a 
co:r;lc.opt _of desi+"e, not in an irrational aenee, but just as :pe_.c'l"ate-1• 
~t b~cause the Stoic rational monism wae sq strQng, this essential 
human po~er of will, to which we can Illeaning1Ul}¥ &pply the 'l', coul(l 
have no go.od unless it was considered na~q rational. 
Whether or not there is a flaw here in 1\>icte-tue 1 thOl,lgbt, this 
very fact led him to the important concept o_f his t:Peory of freedo1;111 
that free(lom is exercised only tlU'ou:gb rational cboice, thus idea.Uy 
it is a necees~ course. For it is the same neoessar,y logQa that pro-
motes both the ~ction of the universe and the action of man; but tbe 
indirtQ:ual ~an adopt this co~e freely tbrou~ man's :t'ree gift of 
His action is then good in two sense~~ first, because· the Choice 
has foUoweQ. ~ason, which always promotes the good state of the univeme, 
and second, beCBllSe the ~ot W4S pe~on.~ised bY the pp~ration of the 
individual's freedom, -or area of reeponsibiUty: the :C,}(:, was in~ 
~ch are the. Charaote~stics Which !piotetus direct~ applies 
~·~ . _ . :, -'r•. c ·• ·. · r ~ ; · ~ '-_ · " . 1 1 
to prohairesis~-an~ I now turn to consider its fUnctioning in the 
. . ' 
~e fiel~-_of Study, taking ti~t, rtuyKfii.Tfif, s .. ~l$ ~ 
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_ rruy l<oC7't~~.9Evl$ OCC'lQ.'S in the making Qf a judgement 
(. J<p{drs ), or providing a decision ( _,C:Yt'-~ ) on any 
given set of circumstances presented as phantasiai. From 
what has been said above, and in chapter five, if the 
judgement is to be correct and the decision good, it must 
be reasonable; and if reasonable, must follow nature. All 
I 
our actions, thoughts and attitudes, result from ioyfA-oCT~ • 
0"-uy KaCT'~-BaCJ'tS is the logical assent to a certain action or 
attitude, resulting from reasoned will (prohairesis) to 
follow nature. P.rohairesis here, as in ~istotle, 35 is the 
orektic factor involved in making the decision ours, and 
therefore a free decision, or exercise of free will. Further, 
if the orektic factor is reason-directed, the decision will 
be good and lead to freedom from the tension and anxiety 
that occurs when will runs counter to circumstances; this 
:tf i~L _Qup o • oe • Hence Epictetus can produce the remarkable 
I 01 ~ ._ 36 phrase, npo-.tp&~•s ot-. o&t , which epitomises the 
paradox here involved, but resolved by the concept of 
rational will: that free choice if it is to be correct, is 
necessarily determined by the logos in the universe·and the 
logos in man, which in Epictetus' philosophy is inseparable 
from will. Thus Epictetus says 'There is one whom I obey -
God, and after Him, myself, and God has entrusted me to 
myself'.37 ltle must understand nature's will, and we are free 
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if we conform to Zeus' governance.38 Freedom must be discip-
lined as other arts; it is not haphazard will,,:,$_f,.iiJ('v~fto~~~ct9e~tt39 
but reasoned desire of what is ordained. As for the Christian, 
so~ Epictetus' freedom, service is an important' factor: 
C _.\ILl_ A C ' 40 
we are to be free in service, ws 81\tllv&po~, us-cuc'1p-«Trrr. • 
The objection will be raised that Epictetus is 
advocating nothing more than the acceptance of the course of 
events which is the will of God, or resignation to fate: 
of waiting to see what happens and forcing your will to 
agree that this is what you wanted. It cannot be denied that 
in a number of passages, Epictetus does appear to preach such 
willing acceptance: desire each thing as it heppens 
~~\. C. I ( P"C.ntfiV ws y•yv&TCICL), and keep your will in harmony; 
will is better than my own, therefore I am willingly a 
servant; follow events, don't lead them; willingly accept 
necessity. 41 
These passages point to an acceptance of an event, 
God's 
even though it has not already been willed, in the full sense 
of being rationally grasped by the individual as a necessary 
event in his life and in the development of the cosmo~, In 
these instances, the prohairesis simply accepts (agrees to) 
willingly whatever occurs, trusting in the superiority of 
the will and reason of God to his own. Though in a sense 
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this denies freedom of choice (for the individual reason has 
not yet chosen the acceptance), it still brings about the 
more desirable kind of freedom which the Stoics sought; 
namely freedom from disturbance of passion and fear. 42 As 
we will discover, the full concept of freedom in Epictetus 
involves more than this, and though he might advocate this 
as a means to an end in certain practical cases, theoretically 
I IJ the notion of __ ,u_yt(.-.-rrA _ E.crts must involve, as explained 
in chapter five, ·the use of reason to ascertain God's will, 
and in addition there is the possibility of .a religious 
kind of intuition; knowledge at any rate is essential. 
The two remaining fields of study, choice and desire, 
recoil again upon. cruy1c.n·~ 9st1'tS, since every inclination 
and every desire must be submitted to the rational judgement 
' c ' of "fiY~f11To(.9e"'' • The field of choice ( op.~~ ) was 
an inclination towards duty or moral obligation, and there-
fore really a technical Stoic division of desire, - the 
c. ._, 
desire to help a fellow, or society. The advice on opt'-CIC.' 
is given in Encheiridion 2, 2 : "Employ inclina tiona towards 
duties lightly and in a relaxed manner". Generally the 
C I 
feeling is in Epictetus that o p tA-"1 is a slightly more 
allowable kind of desire than .:p 6! IS • 
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In order that desire can be included at all in the 
three fields, it must be restricted to things in our power, 
and therefore able to be chosen ( T'~ "ft_ p o -.e p &T IK~ ) , 
since freedom only operates in these fields. This clearly 
dispenses with covetous desires which are directed at 
externals, wanting something we have not got. There should 
be no turbulent passion or obvious irrationality about such 
desires. As long as the object of desire is external, it 
must be discounted as contrary to the interests of the will 
and freedom. In the free man, desires as we understand the 
term, an outreaching to externals, are denied. This very 
denial then promotes freedom rather than restricts it, 
since covetous desires, once allowed, are strongly determined 
by externals, over which we have no control, and they will 
probably never be satisfied, and result in an emotional 
state. 43 Desires must therefore be restricted to where 
they can be satisfied, that is, to the_~po•UPCTaKJ., things 
~ c. I I ll 44 
we have control over: opc.ft~, •P1"1'f and O"llyth&Tc4VCcr•s • 
This position at once reveals the circular argument, 
or the 'Stoic t'1heel 1 propounded by More, 45 which critics 
have indicated to deny the validity of Epictetus' freedom 
of will. One thing is assured, that free will can only be 
meaningful with regards to the inner man; but so long as 
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Epictetus _prescribes only an inner freedom (and he always 
regards this far more highly than any other form of 
freedom), this is no charge against free will. Wish and 
desire cannot in Epictetus be a drive towards activity, but 
inward~y they can be a drive to thought and attitude. 
,, 
Having reduced the objects of desire to desire (ope! •s 
and : p,... .&, ) and consent ( _o-_u y K ae T ~ B 8 CJ' •s. )_, the only 
meaningful object of 4esire must be _v_u_yK"'T~$-.G"tS • Thus 
our orektic faculty is to be used in the adoption of assent 
through prohairesis, and we conclude that Epictetus, like 
Aristotle,46 allowed rationally directed emotions in his 
concept of prohairesis: to w~l is to feel rationally. 
Desire then is for good, 47 and provided desire 
accompanies reason and vice-veraa, its objects will always 
be attained, and there will be no danger of falling into 
passions. 48 Attention has already been drawn to this doub~e 
action of desire and reason in Epictetus, especially in 
Chapter Six, in the acquisition of right knowledge, and the 
maintenance of the inner virtues and dynameis, and also in 
the more general desire for the good examined in Chapter Five. 
This is seen particularly in III 7, 27 - 8: . iT>~e!llJ.t.e\~i~:&~~-.1 ) 
:· /. ·'· ' -~- ' . . .. .. "• 
.. ~~~a: be~:~aerved :t.p A~se~ ou,. ~desU.~o.r-ean~·~]'"'~~~e.~,.~~ to do 
. . . . .. - -- -- - . : . .- . . . . - - -. ___ · . "" . ·.· . . I 
-.'t~lil ,wi~l~~ __ na-t;ure, . In~7,20, cruvop~w 11.nd -\v.l.tilo.~yott-«1 
. ( :following God m choice and desire ) occnr .afJ 
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. ~ . 
revealing addi tiona to the more common_ o ~~o y ~ w f'L ova, 
(being of the same mind or reason,).~I_,16,42; .,li 1~~ 2f?.) 
Two passages, I 4, 1 and Encheiridion 2, sho\-r that 
desires should be deferred till the early training in 
philosophy is complete. This is consistent with the earlier 
training being in logic, where reason alone can reach 
.,-uytccil1'~ Beer• s , and only later is training given in 
practical -moral behaviour, where ~ uy-K~.,..tBccr •s needs 
reason plus the desiring faculty. When desiring'is later 
allowed, it should accompany reason. In observing this 
order in his educational programme, a degree of habituation 
is seen in Epictetus' approach to character training. 
In the act of moral choice, desire and reason are 
bound together in the formation of knowledge, in the 
maintenance of a virtuous character, and in the particular 
act of making a judgement on the basis of this acquired core 
of character. Decisions are the outcome of the free activity 
of the will in reason and desire. These decisions of the 
prohairesis cannot be aimed at action, since this would 
immediately involve desire for externals or for an object 
involving externals. So that ultimately, all we can have 
control over is the \'lilling activity of the prohairesis, 
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not physical activity. We can control by decision our 
inner disposition or attitude to an event, and therefore 
our e~otions. Examples are given in I 2, 21 - 4:49 You 
decide to put me to death; I decide to die without a tr~mor. 
~here is a correct attitude in suffering which we can choose 
to adopt.5° Good can be derived from ill-fOrtune by 
displaying the correct character; disease and all ills can 
be turned into something blessed, making one happy.5l 
II 16, 16, affords a good comparison with Aristotle: our 
concern should be with our o~m action which we alone can 
control, that is, the decision how we do something, not 
with getting something; concern for the plan itself 
(-ou~eu-'f'&vos ac""'s njs PouUjs ) , and not for what one is planning, 
which involves externals and the accompanying dejection about 
.our proposed actions. 
A particular result of concern with attitude not 
action, is the eradication of fears, since fear is the 
result of not knowing what is under one's control, and of 
applying will to avoid things under the control of others.52 
Death is not fearful, but the fear of death 1s.53 A right 
attitude to events removes fear. 
Again this appears a weak negative position for a 
moral philosopher to hold, and raises the question whether 
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freedom and action are comp~tible. There are two points: 
first, the r_estriction of behaviour to attitude is consis-
tent with Ep~ctetus' concept of the moral end being 
11't~tp.,.,KoAo~9'1cr's:· the end is not achievement in action but 
in understanding. His whole ethic is internally directed 
and external actions are important only in so far as they 
result from internal perfection of the prohairesis and 
freedom. If an action cannot be attained it is to be called 
off in favour of maintaining freedom. 
Second, freedom can never be used unreservedly of 
actions. There are circumstances under which we are not free 
to act, or even to execute and act which we may have 
calculated to be quite in our power. We are free to will 
the use of our bodies in pursuance of action, but even this 
will is likely to involve externals, and freedom may be 
unexpectedly curtailed by paralysis or loss of sight. And 
even if we can calculate the possibilities of achieving an 
action, we do not free ourselves from fear or anxieties that 
there may be trouble. 
Epictetus has chosen a philosophy of freedom not 
of action. Aristotle, with his more practical thought has 
compromised and proved his usefulness as a moral philosopher. 
Epictetus has ideal~sed, recognising freedom in typical Stoic 
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fashion as a quality which loses its value and is immediately 
destroyed when any possibility of restriction is put upon it; 
just as the wise man becomes a fool if he deflects ever so 
slightly from right reason. 
In summary, prohairesis in moral decisions functions 
through reason and desire, mutually employed and directed 
from a basic core of knowledge and character qualities to 
effect tl'tJY 1( .. ,.~ Be" •s , which if reason and desire are both 
right, will be the rational and willed assent to adopt a 
certain attitude to external circumstances. This will free 
the mind from fear and other emotional disturbances, which 
arise when the will runs counter to circumstances. 
3. The Function of Prohairesis in J:l1oral Character. 
I turn now to the important change of meaning of 
prohairesis displayed in some discourses, where prohairesis 
has come to mean the entire moral character of a man. That 
is, it functions not only in performing each particular act 
of moral choice, but in forming the essential being of a man 
as a good or bad character, and as a free individual. 
lf.hether fully perfected or not, the prohairesis forms the 
self-identity of each person. Without prohairesis he may be 
pure logos - _though the concept is difficult - but he cannot 
display the personal logos, that is, the part of the logos 
that is identified with the person because it is free. Thus 
54 in IV 5, 12, Epictetus can say, 'You are prohairesis', 
8 ~ I and in II 22, l - 19, the e.yw ~ I and the &f'L ov is in 
~' 9 prohairesis. The use of 6 crw 4 v 
doctrine, for instance in I 18, 17 
points to the same 
19: when you are in 
pain and groaning, you do not groan in the centre of 
yourself ( ). With this 
Epictetus connects the Delphic command,· 'Know thyself', 
that is, realise that the self is prohairesis (17). If one 
is free from the enslavement within, from the passions and 
the like, the self is realised in its true freedom.55 
The transition from the function of prohairesis in 
moral choice to this fuller function in character is easily 
discerned, and based on the essential character of the 
prohairesis, namely its freedom and capacity for good and 
evil. If we recognise a responsibility in our cumulative 
(character) tendency towards good and eviL,: this must display 
a freedom, and therefore result from prohairesis. Each 
time we make a decision, we do so from a particular moral 
character, (the moral 'core' discussed in Chapter Six), 
which has been formed through cumulative acts of choice. If 
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perfect choices have been maintaiped throughout, this 
cumulative moral character, dependent on choices, will be 
absolutely free, and as formed. entirely on our own re·spons-
ibility, is deserving to be called the self. If we have not 
made moral choices in accordance with right will, but through 
an interest in exteriors, it \'lill be difficult to find a 
part of us which we can really name 'self'. The difficulty 
is well illustrated by Ibsen when he represents Peer Gynt 
comparing his life to the layers of an onion, which lacks 
the live shoot in the centre.56 
This concept of prohairesis as character is clearly 
:~,.., ' , 
connected with the inner qualities of. alro~A~$- and To "'frcrTov. 
In exercising prohairesis in moral choice, these qualities, 
being guarded and maintained, lead to full freedom. 57 If 
self is in prohairesis, then it is the preservation of self 
respect and faith that perfects it.58 
Because prohair.eeis carries this fuller significance, 
it ~ecomes clear why Epictetus makes this the single end of 
his education programme.59 By making right moral decisions, 
the whole moral character is deveioped; his training therefore 
is directed towards perfect·ine prohairesis, that is, in 
bringing about the correct basic moral character of a man, 
so that the act of correct moral choice will follow naturally • 
. , 
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This direction of training towards character is emphasised 
in the case of the Cynic.60 
Prohairesis in this sense of the essential 
individual is not always distinct from the prohairesis as 
choice in decisi9ns. There is as we have noticed previously, 
a two way process: an accumulation of acts of choice 
contribute to the prohairesis, and conversly, the prohairesis 
(as character) is responsible for acts of choice. This is 
illustrated in IV 2 (especially 4): one cannot perfect the 
prohairesis by making decisions which are truly free, and at 
the same time maintain the same kind of habits in respect to 
one's friends'and duties. Here prohairesis appears as determined 
Character resolutions. 
Habituation thus becomes an essential factor in the 
shaping of prohairesis. Habits ( _ r!Q•S ) are confirmed 
by corresponding actions. Each time we do something, a ~f-•-S- _ _ 
receives strength, and the quality of our character depends 
on every act of choice. The term _rf•s is rare in 
Epictetus, but where it occurs, 61 it denotes the core of 
moral character that is formed by habituation, and is the 
basis of prohairesis in the sense we are discussing, and can 
almost be identified with it.62 This converse situation of 
choices, that is prohairesis as decision, having effect on 
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Pr~hairesis as good or evil character is expressed in 
I 29, 1- 2: if judgements'are correct they make prohairesi.s 
good. I have attempted to illustrate this dual concept of 
prohairesis comprehensively in the accompanying dia~ram, 
with the lar~e outer circle representing prohairesis as 
character, and the inner circle representing prohairesis as 
chosen decision. 
A particular aspect of prohairesis as the essential 
'I', is the affect of death upon it. The passage that 
pertains is IV 7, 31. The prohairesis is not affected by 
any of the fearful events which may happen to the body after 
death, such as being thrown out unburied. The 'I' is some-
th~ng different from the corpse: it is will (prohairesis>. 
Provided one wills death when it occurs, the 'I' is 
unaffected. If one does not will it, then indeed there will 
be fears. The 'I' as will, however, cannot survive after 
death, since the very existence of will as prohairesis, is 
dependent on the presentation of phantasiai through the 
Cl\. sen~es. Without the UA~ (material) of phantasiai, the 
concept of will is meaningless. Thus with the dissolution 
of the body, the logos will return to the cosmic supply of 
pure logos, but the personalising aspect of it as prohairesis, 
will cease to be. Epictetus is desirous.;that death should 
339a 
Diagram illustrating 
THE DOUBLE ASPECT THEORY OF PROHAffiESIS, 
as moral character (outer circle) and moral choice 
(inner circle), and relating these two aspects to 
Epictetus• psychology 
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find him paying attention to his prohairesis,63 so that in 
the final challenge, he shall maintain his freedom of 
existence and not fear death. 
Prohairesis in this wider sense of moral character, 
shares the same characteristics as prohairesis in decision, 
which were examined in section two: it is free in that it 
is the personal identity, the individual existing with 
reference to nothing but itself; the centre of his being 
( Sl 8 ecrw_ ev ) which exists as pure self. Through 
this freedom it assumes, by habituation of choice, 
' , characteristics which are essential to all goodness, ~o "'ftdToV 
and it is the perfection of reason through 
constant study and self examination. But the reason has 
to be adopted and willed by the prohairesis, which is the 
totality of self and the free identity of the whole desiring 
reasoning being: the personal orektic mechanism is involved: 
I 
wish to satisfy .yourself, ( 9e)_"lcrov_ ); desire 
( iw._QJ,....,.. crew) to become pure with your pure self 
( )ACT~ tct&9•pou crC!luT•'71 ), and with God. 64 
4. Prohairesis and Freedom. 
In this section I want to summarise Epiotetus' concept 
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of freedom as it has become apparent through the examination 
of prohairesis. 
Freedom is enjoyed only by the inmost self. This 
inner nature of freedom has been noted in many aspects: 
first in moral decisions. Decisions are restricted to 
judgements on phantasiai, which are themselves partly the 
• 65 
product of prohairesis exercising right desire.· Second, 
in the acquisition of knowledge, we are free to discover 
knowledge about ourselves and the cosmos, and this in turn 
66 forms a basis for prohairesis. Third, we are free to 
develop and maintain the inner guiding qualities (dynameis) 
anq virtues. 67 Fourth, we are free to restrict our desires 
to what is under our control, thereby making desire identical 
to w111. 68 When freedom ceases to be inner freedom, then 
it destroys itself; accordingly, freedom of choice must 
adopt correct choice if freedom is to be maintained. 69 
With this basic notion that freedom is an internal 
exercise and activity, I turn to three types of freedom 
displayed in the Discourses, namely freedom of choice, 
~reedom f~om anxiety, and freedom for existence. These 
three types are associated with the three stages in the 
, 
application of the term trr_p o_ « 1 p a. cr 'S 
in section one. 
;~ discussed 
A. Freedom of Choice 
The freedom to make a right or wrong decision is 
will. One can will the acceptance of a phantasia or its 
rejection. The will is both rational and orektic. This 
is the freedom that the earlier Stoics discovered in 
rruy K~T.{.. 9e.O'rs , and the development· of the will has been 
traced through the Stoica.7° Epictetus does not join ~n 
the free-will debate characteristic of many Stoics, but 
recognising that if there is ~ill ·it must be free (other-
wise the c~ncept is self-contradictory) concentrates on 
the area to which will is restricted, that is, the 
ru.y ec ot .,...:_ 9e tr as {» phantasiai, and on the origin of h ~ 
the directive power of the will, which is the prohairetic 
core of the individual, and this in turn has been formed 
from accumulative willed decisions. Freedom of will was 
assumed by Epictetus. The object of his teaching was to 
educate the will so that it could will the correct judge-
ment and so lead to the second type of freedom. 
B. Freedom from Anxiety 
The state of freedom for the Stoics was the inner 
freedom from fear and anxiety, and desires. Such freedom 
34.3 
lit '() shows a ·distinctive negative qua~ity_1n__ -' '""' ••~, 
--~"uTf:Cil • ~+f>(lfctt, ltT,_p-.flot •71 Since the beginning 
.,': 
of Stoicism, the .aim of the wise man \'las to achieve this 
freedom or unperturbedness of mind L~T•poe! :0( ). In 
Epictetus·, this is the freedom that figures most. Its key 
is ·to will tbe course of nature, and because of our freedom 
of will, it-is possible for each person to will to accept, 
in the sense of adjusting one's disposition to ~.t~e 
events ,that befall. Epictetus devotes his longest and 
most s~kilful discourse to this kind of freedom; 72 its 
message: give up what is not yours, and make your wi11 
accord with God's. Similarly this was the purpose and 
message of the Encheiridion.73 
In these passages and elsewhere, the doctrine is 
preached ~hat freedom is achieved through discipline rather 
than by practising the full psychological principles of the 
freedom, namely that by perfecting his logos through 
prohairesis and prohairesis through logos, the will naturally 
follows the cosmic logos. This was the ideal approach to 
freedom and led to freedom in the third sense. But not unlike 
Plato in the ~' Epictetus realised that giving up 
desires through ascet~c training74 would in practice achieve 
this kind o£ freedom, without any further. theorising, and he 
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much admired the disciplined ascetisism of the Cynic.75 
There are two further points on this kind of 
freedom. First, the freedom is restricted to a necessity, 
namely to what is already ordained by the cosmic reason. 
Here a distinction must be made between a state of freedom 
and an act of freedom. The freedom of choice (A), resulted 
in a free act. If there is the possibility of any restrictions 
at all, an act cannot be fully free. Hence Epictetus had to 
re·strict free actions to the activity of the mind, where 
there need be no restrictions. 
A state of freedom, however, can be restricted and 
still be meaningful. In fact, only thus does it have any 
meaning at all; for freedom in all its meanings is essentially 
freedom ~· For freedom from something necessarily implies 
contact with its opposite: if one is free from danger, he 
is in rea·ch of safety; if something is free from artificial 
colouring, i~ is bound by its own colour. If man is free 
from evil, he is bound to the good, Now even a free act 
of will may be regarded as a 'freedom from', namely a freedom 
from causes outside itself; thus by partaking of the opp9site, 
it becomes self-determined, which is a tru~sm. This explains 
why free-will, or will, is a very special case of freedom, 
because any state of freedom, when partaking of the object 
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opposite to that from which it is free, becomes some positive 
characteristic, but not identical to freedom itself. For 
instance, a state of freedom from fear, is a state of 
easiness of mind. But it is not allowable to call this 
freedom, as it is allowable to call self-determinism free 
will. Easiness of mind only embraces freedom from fear. 
The restriction therefore of 'freedom from' to the proper 
course of nature, is not to deny freedom in this sense, 
any more than any other state of freedom is denied by what 
one is bound to as a result of that freedom.76 
Second, and this is a more reasonable objection 
to such freedom being proposed as a moral objective, this 
freedom displays negative and passive qualities in those 
who experience it. The cause for this I have explained in 
discussing resignation, in section two. Certainly, moral 
action, as understood by Aristotle and in general, cannot 
be demanded if such a freedom is adopted. In terms of 
activity prompted by human beings,, it does only amount to 
acquiescence in \'/hat is the will of Another. Epictetus 
~, 
frequently describes this freedom as _eupo•ae. , maintaining 
the good rumiing order of the universe, or as :Cw~Baaae , 
laclt of feeling rather than any positive feeling other than 
the desire to comply. But whilst for practical purposes it 
/ 
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was convenient to preach acquiescence i'n~Another's will, 
ideally, this will through the common logos and a perfect 
prohairesis, became identical with the individual's will. 
It is this theory which leads to the third kind of freedom. 
c. Freedom for Rational Existence. 
The aim and absolute end of Epictetus' teaching is 
to perfect the prohairesis, and thereby to achieve freedom. 
~ I Thi.s is man's chief moral commitment or chief «p&T"'J , the 
function that he alone can perform by design of the creative 
logos. Freedom is regularly used in an evaluative sense, 
and this causes us to see a weakness in 'freedom from•. In 
Epictetus it is the ultimate value. This evaluative use of 
'freedom' as oppose to the abstract or logical use, which 
-we have seen is in essence negative, has two important 
characteristics. · 
The first it shares with 'freedom from' as being a 
state of freedom, and therefore necessarily bound by the 
opposite from which it is free. Moral freedom means that the 
individual's acts are free from any causation or responsibility 
on the part of others. It is bound therefore by self-
responsibility, and this distinguishes it from permissiveness 
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or licence. Self-responsibility is a moral undertaking, ~d 
as such aims at the good, hence it is frequently associated 
with the notion of self discipline. 77 If the good io 
something known and to be aimed at, moral permissiveness 
becomes a contradiction in terms. Hence we might feel that 
'self-responsibility' is an adequat~ equivalent to this 
moral freedom. But in Epictetus, as we shall see, self-
responsibility does not adequately cover its purpose, for 
self-responsibility in Epictetus means logos - responsibility, 
which is at cince something larger than self. 
The'second characteristic of moral freedom is that 
it is positive, in being directed to action, rather than 
submissive and negative. Thus it shares this characteristic 
with free choice: it is freedom for action. I~ it should 
appear self-contradictory that moral freedom is both a state 
and acts of freedom, it may be remembered that the·.concept 
of prohairesis offered just the same position as being the 
function of free acts of choice and freely developed ~f&•S 
or states of character. Moral freedom then is meaningless 
unless it shows an opportunity for positive action, even if, 
as in Epictetus' case, the activity is mental and willing 
activity. 78 
If then Epictetus' theory of moral freedom is to be 
t 
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a valid one, we must find in it some positive characteristic 
in the form, at least, of willed activity. This can be 
found in the function of prohairesis as moral character. 
~l> C. I 79 . The final end of all study is a roaov 'JYt.f"OVIKo~, that ~s, 
to have. one's own hegemonikon or rational guiding principle, 
in accord with the natural course of events designed by the 
cosmic logos for each individual. If the design of the 
cosmos is rational (and this was the fundamental Stoic 
belief), the unimpeded functioning of reason (logos) in the 
individual will reach the same end, or 'conclusion' as the 
cosmic reason. The conclusions of reason are necessary, but 
its course is free in that it is absolutely dependent upon 
itself. Reason in the individual is limited only by 
prohairesis, the totality of the rational-desiring function, 
and this we have seen to be free. Thus reason through its 
knowledge of the world and of the individual, calculates, 
and conquers all desires so that prohairesis wills events 
which actually occur. 
Through the rational monism, Epictetus' moral 
freedom is actively engaged on anticipation of God's will, 
for this ~reason, rather than on resignation after his 
will is manifest through events. In this constant application 
of reason to understand nature, the follower of freedom is 
. I 
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inwardly a.ct;i.ve and in great earnest. ~Yli1'48 ::tb:i*to~lll\.\St be 
--4uA.c{TrQY_o_s 1 8·'6.o::t.: to the making of money or ·seeking o_f reputation 
L • ~~ ~ S o_S o_v ) • ~lha t comes to pass 1 comes from our own 
81 
self and from God, from our own self, because we through 
reason and prohairesis actually willed it, and from God, 
becaus.e the cosmic logos had planned it. Each step in 
reason is a free acceptance (through prohairesis), but leads 
to a necessary result, And through reason, man has means 
to develop his prohairesie to the point that it desires and 
·' 
wills the cosmic plan for his life. 
The constant freely willing state of the prohairesis 
as moral character makes such freedom possible. The freedom 
then displays the 
;:a I 9 E ~~-~ T"~ a • Gt 
::~~ r ' positive characte~stics of _ __-oe._l o.ws. _ , 
:. .A I 
and c.vvcJ_f,UCJC. , as well as the negative 
. 82 
·ones already mentioned. It requires us to develop 
positive moral qualities of courage and high-mindedness. 
A further positive characteristic is the preservation 
- .• . -
of self, the essential 'I'. There is in this third concept 
of freedom, the freedom of the self identity. t·Te are \'lhat 
we are, and our intentions are what they are because of 
ourselves and nothing outside ourselves. The.function of 
prohairesis as moral character, contributes to the freedom 
of the \'Thole personality of the ggo as a l'lill:ingl rational 
being. 
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I remarked earlier that self-responsibility was 
inadequate to cover fully this third type of freedom. This 
is because in Epictetus, self-responsibility becomes the 
responsibility to share in the freedom of the universe, 
that is, the freedom of reason. By being free, we discover 
that \·le are existing in a sphere bigger than that of self, 
and in a sense, released from self. Thus through the 
purification of the prohairesia, man can enjoy a freedom 
for existence \"lider than hi;s own experience; such an 
existence is something to be desired, even yearned for~ not 
because it brings freedom from anxiety, but for ita own 
sake. 83 
, 
Again the point is raised, whether_JCCIC.BCII.p.c:ns and 
~ "" ... oft ;a 
o..,.oyvw#At>VI-'1141 T0\1 cteo&J etc., are used purely figuratively 
in Epictetus. If the interpretation given in this section 
is correct, the idea of a mystical union with the One, is 
very nearly approached. There is a religious enthusiasm 
in Epictetus' exposition -of this freedom, even if the 
direct evidence for a religious experience is lacking. 
Epictetua is significant not for noting this third 
type of freedom or for experiencing it. The idea must have 
been present in the freedom of the perfect Sapiens and the 
. Dl. 84 -~ I 
Stoic _a.upo•GI • Even in Aristotle, the final end,_ _:ct~P-• ~ t 
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woul.d almos'!; certa:i.n.ly have been accompanied by these 
characteristics·.F9llBc"'~ is expounded with -a poetic 
enthusiasm, more characte~stic of Plato than Aristotle. 85 
Epictetus is important for co-ordinating this type of 
fr.eedom with the practical life of the individual, by show-
ing it is a development of his freedom of choice, and that 
by ppoper .training and understanding of the Stoic principl-es, 
t_his freedom is within reach of everyone; and also for making 
more explicit, through his concept of prohairesis as moral 
character, the full positive activity and experience that 
results from what was the commonly accepted Stoic freedom 
from fear •. 
5· Social Responsibility. 
In the foregoing sections we have seen that in 
Epictetus, mJn•s mtira~ commitment is to perfect his freedom 
through prohairesis. He is to be free, noble and self-
- '86 
re.specting. If this end were achieved by every person, then 
everyone would act to God's will, and the whole of humanity, 
through individual prohairesis, would perfectly accord l'lith 
divine reason, as the rest of nature does of necessity. This 
is the kind of Utopia to which his teaching on freedom would 
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finally lead. In such a world, the virtues would not be 
social virtues of love and justice, since outer virtues 
would have no effect either on the design of the cosmos, 
or on .~other people's prohairesis; rather, inner virtues 
alone would be necessary, for on these depends p~ohairesis. 
These virtue~ were discussed in Chapter Six. Essentially 
t!J,en in Epi.ctetus responsibility is to oneself, to perfect 
your otm area of freedom, that is, prohairesi.s. 
This view is open toMe charges: first it displays 
sel.fishness, or Aristotelian_ +•)..~u-r{ ~ • Secondl.y, it 
may be objected tha.t the world in reality is not an Utopia, 
and we necessarily impinge ·on other human beings whose 
prohairesis is far from perfect, so should there not be a 
responsibility here to correct others? 
Epictetus replies to the charge of self-love in 
I 19, 11 - 15: if man concentrates first on his own character 
and essential virtues, it 1rlill follo\'1 naturally that he will. 
achieve the social virtues, since inter-dependence is a mark 
of human oikeiosis. The probairesis is free; if this is 
rightly directed through its judgements, it will be the source 
of love and affection, civil concord and peace.~7 
So although love of self is the prime consideration, 88 
Epictetus recognises that one entire fiel~out of the three 
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, 
'f_0'1t_~l where prohaireais operates, is devoted to having 
. i . 
a right attitude to our obligations towards other people, 
in fulfilling the social aspect of oikeiosis. This is the 
c:. , 
field of study in op t4"] ~.1. I and 41C.'fOPt'") • Thus significantly 
it is under the heading of prohairesis that Epictetus gives 
any guidance at all on the attitude towards duty and what 
constitutes duties. These duties were the_ Koe.9~I(OVTat 
, ,. 
or officia, which were considered ""S•ot+opac. (indifferent) 
by the early Stoics, but received prominent treatment from 
Panaetius. 89 Epictetus, whilst not elaborating on the, is 
clearly aware of their teaching, as his classification of 
duties in Ill 7, 24 indicates.90 
Epictetus gives no systematic teaching on duties, 
or analysis in the manner of the De Officiis, but considere 
they have their origin from prohairesis in the field of 
0. , 
_ Opfi4.~ , though it may be noted that he allows this sphere 
to be more externally committed than desire.9l A duty, or 
social responsibility occurs as a phantasia, an inclination 
to sympathy, help and so on, and as a phantasia, must be 
referred to reason and prohairesis.92 Accordingly, in the 
matter of duties, the decision on how far we undertake it 
and in what attitude of mind, is under our control, and 
. a I 
so .far we can exercJ.se oPt'"l . But tte must not be carried 
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too far with a duty, so that it affects our self-respect 
and destroys the freedom of the prohai.resis. The exercise 
c. I 
of "Pt'"l will lead to actions, but only·in meeting the 
potentials of relationships, ( ~1-~uv~fi"t•\ TwvtrxuarAv), 
. ' . ·c "' which are· not regarded as essentially ours ( .. "l'O, _:QJ_UT-0-.:.Uc ) 1 
but as something given to us. 93 This is illustrated .. ~n 
sympathy, not to try to remov.~. another's grief' at all· costs, 
but only so far as is under your control, and also in natural 
' 
I 
affection, ( ,dt•~-o.G"Topye-. .): don't let affection for, another 
lead you to misery.94 
Accordingly, duties involve man in the world and 
externals, but do not commit him to these, and ail wor/l.dly 
undertakings, events and circumstances are characteristically 
I described with levity by Epi:ctetus as a game ( .. 7tc!.UOl"' ), 
c. I 
or a festival ( .. a.o_p_T'l- ). If the crowd of civic life gets 
on top of you, treat it as a festival. Bear relationsb.ips 
with your wife and children, as children playing five-stones, 
for as long as those stones are there. Simply devote yourself 
to the game as long as it lasts, or as long as you can main-
tain self-respect. 9.5 Thus Socrates only so far obeyed the 
Thirty: when they commanded him to bring Leon to trial, he 
refused, even though he would face death; he would no longer 
'play the game•. 96 
' ~.· : . 
... 1,.• 
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The concern of prohairesis in duties is not to harm 
oneself, rather than to benefit others. Often there are 
misjudgements as regards duties, and the prohairesie suffers. 97 
We should know by rationally considering each change of 
circumstance, when to retire from a duty. 
Involyement in duties requires choice of act~ons, 
or a series of sensible choices in fulfilling them - a 
process of deliberation in the Aristotelian sense. All the 
possible means within our power to accomplish an action, 
must be considered, and the best one chosen, or selected; 
when we can no longer make a selection without becoming 
affected by the exteriors, then we must withdraw. 
A significant point is, that in discussing this 
~ \ I proc.ess of deliberation, Epictetus uses the term &K"OY1J 
not 1prohairesis 1 , which is reserved for things in our power, 
that is, it will finally tell us when to withdraw from a 
duty. This again emphasises the inward•directed nature of 
\ ~'6 prohairesis and its independence: with . Toe &lw (externals) 
( ::» \ I ) we must .not act thoughtlessly . ot~'oyaO".,.WS ; if my brother 
. treats me ~adly, I can do nothing but use my relationship 
with llim as I ought , (~.s .&Ct ) • 9B That is , I must take thought 
for the best, but being aware that the outcome is not under my 
control. Although the process of selection in fulfilling a 
'': .· '\·' .. 
... ·: 
duty is simi1ar to Aristotle (Ethics III), when lie discusses 
-·. ·~ 
deliberation and voluntary actions, Ep:llcte~us doee not employ 
the Aristotelian term prohairesis for !!!!!. choice of .e~tern~is. 
The following· are instances of Epictetus '_-use of .. ate~oy..J _: 
!!.t..).W a.. 1~.ff. Epictetus is discuss;l.ng the correct 
attitude to~~~~,opot.. Things indifferent are compared with 
the fall of dice; the fail is ~S.~fDpot , but the use we make 
of it is ours, ( npoaupe.TIK~ ). Simi.larly, on a voyage it 
is ours to choose ( l~e1\& f fl. triJr(, ) the helmsman, sailors and 
time for sailing. After this we are in the helmsman's hands. 
II, &, i!. Discussing to \'lhat lengths one should go 
to fulfil a duty, Epictetus quotes Chrysippus: "As long as the 
consequences ( r:C. eJ;s ) are not clear, I cling to what is 
( ... •..a., ,., \' more in accordance with nature, . Twv ea~,.uccrT&p...,"- e.xof"Gtl "'fpos To 
, ... \ ..l , Tuy}..rl..,e.w Twv IC-'f' . .c .,u_r_,_v__). For God created me with the 
f h , c n • power o c oosing :_,.. __ tLve:os 1J I I ~ \ I 61COI1'JD"C.V .,.Ot,l"fWV .. £11(/\EKTIHOV~ 
II,10t, 6. Again in a discourse on Duties, Epictetus 
states that since we do not know the future, it is o~ duty 
to cling to 
~ ~ ' 6JC OY'1" 
.. . \ 
what is more naturally fit to be chosen:,.._," "-~U- ___ _ 
~J. , _, " 
e u,. u e.crTe.pwv c X &.o-o-"' I _ • 
I, t., 27. An anecdote about Thrasea: Thrasea said 
he would rather be killed today than banished tomorrow; to 
which Rufus replied, "If you choose (death) as the heavier of 
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~ ' c II I two misfortunes, what folly of choice"•- &I,...." W$ ,.oepuT&p_ov 
a\1 ~~ I ... , 
_,K'A•Yn ~ Tl$ '? f"t4fJf" T'7S Ctci'OY'']Sj _The wise choice is towards the 
most natural, whichever that is. 
These passages illustrate an important change in 
the development of the application of the term prohairesis 
from Aristotle to Epictetus: the former adopts it in the 
choices of a process of deliberation, the latter reserves 
it for the inward reaction to externals. The function of 
making choices in carrying out a duty cannot really be 
separated from prohairesis, but the avoidance of the term 
in the above examples, probably shows his uneasiness to 
include duties at all in the perfection of his system. He 
is obliged to say something about them, because he recognises 
them as part of human nature in the social oikeiosis. Yet 
even in this teaching, Epictetus is not wholly consistent, 
\ ' 9 99 since he equally regards the oikei.osis as _,.. GCpGt. ICOADU- 'I" IS , 
implying that man can fulfil himself by contemplation and 
perfecting inner freedom. The feeling that duties are 
·somehow 'dr~gged in' by Epi.ctetus cannot be avoided. 
The second charge against regarding self-responsibility 
as the only responsibility shown by an individual, is not so 
easily met by Epiotetus, namely the responsibility ot correct-
ing others who are manifestly in error. If Epictetus believed 
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in the social o~eiosie, then we would expect to find a d~ty 
towards justice in society. But on this aspect Epictetus 
reverts to his thorough-going inwardness of freedom and 
responsibility, which if followed ab.solutely, would not require 
him to hold a doctrine on duties at all. For a man may show 
kindness and sympathy towards someone in need or suffering; but 
if he realises that the need or suffering is something towards 
which that man has adjusted his prohairesis, then he knows 
that the man is free and happy and needs no help. For this 
reason, duties in the form of a purely altruistic act to 
anyone, does not appear in Epictetus. But he does recognise 
duties demanded of natural relatione and friends, and allows 
in respectm these; but in the more distant aspects 
of social inter-dependence, especially in correction of the 
criminal, he holds to his self-responsibility doctrine. 100 
So whilst it is remarkable that Epictetus himself sets forth 
a rigid educationm progress to moral perfection, yet never 
advises that one should take pains to correct another, this 
is the logical conclusion of his doctrine of freedom, where 
pursuance of duties is ultimately superfluous. 
His teaching on criminals is that hO\'lever wicked they 
might be, they can never harm another~s prQhairesis or freedom, 
so let them be. The punishment, not correction, that awaits 
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cr.iminals is in haVing a 'bad ~rohairesis. For whilst the 
• - '~~ 7- • 
. . ·. ·. '' . I 
wicked man may appear better off, he fai.l_s in~ard.ly in:...To.'ftJf".:..To.v 
"31 I . ' 
and .au&ws ; and the person who does wrong, always- receiv~e 
. 101 the punishment. 
Further, criticism of others is out of place since 
one must first determine what kind of a judgement produced 
the misdeed. Until one learns the judgement from which a 
man does each act, one cannot apportion praise or blame; and 
the judgement is never clear to the observer.102 
Although Epictetus adopts this attitude when he is 
on his guard against a criminal having power over another's 
belongings, even over his life, and is seeking refuge in his 
own prohairesis, yet in his role as an educator, he sho\·ts 
that he can, as an observer, distinguish a wrong judgement, 
and before the person concerned can be expected to act 
otherwise, he must first be shown how his reason and desire 
have lead him astray into doing a wrong which, he argues, 
no one can do willingly.103 But these passages display an 
educative responsibility not a social respo~sib±lity, and 
occur in the context of discussion on choice and right will, 
not on duties. 
Epictetus' c~~scene example, which occurs twio~,104 
well swilmarises his attitude to other'smistakes. In court 
. ~ . 
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the defendant's responsibility is to make a good speech; he 
cannot be responsible for his acquittal or condemnation; he 
can be innocent and make a good speech to prove it, but 
still be sentenced. The judge has responsibility of passing 
sentence, and he might err. If the judge errs, he destroys 
his prohairesis: the defendant has maintained his. The 
judge runs a risk more painful than the defendant. 
Whatever anyone else does is not my responsibility, 
whether his actions are right, (in accordance with nature) 
or not. This is his concern, my concern is to treat his 
deci:;;ion and his act as an -~i 1 ~ q, o p@ , an occurrence o-..Jj 
given by Zeus, and to adjust my-will, through prohairesis, 
accordingly. A contradiction remains here: ·that one person 
can make a wrong decision, that is, act contrary to nature, 
whilst the same act or circumstance must be regarded by_ 
another as nature's course, and submit to it. The contra-
diction reveals a difficulty in any system involving free 
will and determinism. Namely that the wickedness of another 
person has to_be regarded as a determined circumstance 
relative to one's own moral progress, whereas relative to the 
other person that wickedness can be avoided by lli act of 
choice.105 These examples also reveal Epictetus at his 
weakest, in interpreting life as making the most of a bad job: 
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because of the universe, the body and fe~low men, it is 
impossible for catastrophes and injustices not to happen. 106 
All each person can do is to submit to them willingly, and 
enjoy the freedom of the prohairesis, seein8 that it is not 
bound by externals, and devote all his attention to this. 
. -
..... · 
J • ~ 
NOTES TO CHAPTER SEVEN 
1. Ve~y rarely was t4e word used of casual choice. 
2. 
·-' 
•' 
. ' 
, 
One of the earliest occurre_nces. of _wpo . .c.tp.t.~t~ 
is in Plato, Parmenides 143.C, where it is combined 
with the verb, to give considerable emphasj;s to the 
~ Gl .#> I ' ' act of choosing: ev e~e.ccr~:r 1'-'fl . . TfPQtnp ere• 'Yfpo.cr_p~U-fA&f.t. 
Similarly, it is frequently used by Demosthenes to 
denote 'set intention', e.g. with_fto"~e.~o .... ou 
in 44, 57. Demosthenes commonly couples it with 
I 
.tt.o_A,_rr .. eeat to denote the policy of the state, e.g. 
{ } c 1 , ' c ~ 1 De Corona 93: of. 192 , fJ wpoc~.rp&~•s "'•f',-ICcrCI "1 'flo-'"''"'. 
I The use of the verb 7rp_otCtpOIIfA-cC.I particularly 
illustrates this. Its single occurrence ·in the New 
Testament (II Cor. 9, ?.) indicates the purpose or 
will of the heart, that is not swayed by any 
e/ IJ I compulsion or feeling of sorrow: ateGtG"TOS JCGc. .Col1.s 
, " r ' ' , \ I ~ ~~ • ' 
't.'C"pO!JP"JTaU r? 1e11po1~ ~"J6KI'Uli'"'S "1 6l """YIC.,$ • 
. . J I 
These qualifications are strikingly similar to 
I Epictetus' use of prohairesis. The noun_"po,o~ep_a,rs 
occurs ·several' times in Polybius, always denoting 
'set will', (e.g. 39, 29 =expressed opinion or will), 
but even sometimes extending the connotation of 
will to include the whole of a person's type of 
conduct or character, e.g. in 18, 31. 3, where 
s.~,.~s .,~.,k~.sJneane 'because he displayed such 
conduct or character•, and could well pick up 
the xp~vc..tru•v _which occurs a few lines earlier. 
Colson's remarks on the varied meanings of pro-
hairesis in Philo's works are ~luminating: 
"The uses (of prohairesis) in Philo, all 
spri~ging from the sense of choice of purpose, 
may be divided into those which describe the 
purpose or motive of some particular action, and 
those which ret;ulate a lifetime or a career." 
(De Vita Contemplativa, Appendix (2), p.·518.). 
''li.~~i-.g~~ occurrence of ""po1111C1•.pe.~·~ 
. ' . _., ,•- •· . . 
in the 
Septuagint o, · (.'.§.g,cl:fJ_Bieate~ ;.tli~f4'.P1)~·:, translateftl(? 
- ,w • • •• ··.-·. ·- ' -·- , ' t. 
the Hebrew, 1J~l1 ... n,_v ';I t'"'P ... ecras ,..",.;f".,To_s~o.~Engl:ieh 
I • 
t~alationa·-var.y,"waywardness of spirit", 11ve:x,atiop of 
"spi:rf.t11 9_.1~cha~iT!~ ·th~ witJd"(N .~.;a~ l:o .. whlch a~Pea~ to. imply 
somethirie contrary":to s~t purpose •. · The .li tenu. meaninD' of the 
Heh~w, f~m tJJ.e ~~em :n Y. ~ · , to pasfu~~ ~ .:£l<?ck, is ~ 
feeding upon ·the Wind, therefore' a desire for', for. Which 
., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
opc'f ''- would :have _been a nearer Greek equivalent. It riley 
·. ! I .f . - ' ~ ' . 
be .that 'J.po.t•peres._-was erroneo~ly' ~dopt~d l>Y confusion 
ln.~~. the Cbaldee~ n ·l V":l , u~~<'~ in ~ra 5~ 11 .and 1.,1a, 
l!lean:ing, ~elib~rated. Will~ but from tb:A (:l~e ete!l!e . 
3. There is one occurrence of 'ftpoaltpccrcs in the Stoic 
fragments, (~ III 173). The fragment describes 
the stages in the thought process leading to an 
·action, remniscent of Aristotle's analysis in 
~· III, but embroidered with an impressive 
string of Stoic terms, which probably bore indistinct 
shades of meanings even to its author, as for example, 
c:.l I between oCI pe.cr as , 'ftP o ott p &O"CS 
This is far nearer to Aristotle's use than to the 
application of the term in Epictetus, of which it 
gives no suggestion. The occurrence is interesting 
in that it shows that the term was still in 
philosophic usage, though this was a very specialised 
use. Whether the originator of the Fragment was 
Chrysippus or Panaetius, it is difficult to regard 
him, (as Hjmans does, Askesis p. 24n.) as a 
•mediator' between Aristotle and Epictetus, since 
the usage is far too close to the Aristotelian 
analysis. 
4. I do not think the pref~. npo. in the word has any 
semantic significance in Epictetus, since the word 
had already been in existence .from fourth century 
'•! 
i ;_. 
_Greek, meaning 'choice•. Admittedly the fragment 
mentioned above (Note 3), makes so~e narrow 
distinction between "'-~~p-e cr • s ' and .7r p.O! "al. .IP-•-~•..S 1 
but this illustrates the Stoic inclination of 
devising terminologies, and of creating distinctions 
of meaning between two words which in colloquial 
Greek meant the same, except that the form of the 
. . 
word. with the prefix was generail.y more.emphatie. 
No use of the word in Epictetus can mean 'choosing 
befor.ehand' 1 as opposed to any other kind of cho~sing, 
in spite of Hjmans warning (Askeeis P• 24). Neither 
do I believe, as Peters suggests, (Gree~ Philo'sophical 
Terms P• tG3 ) that Epictetus consciously connects 
with &•·-'• p&.O"'tS • The latter occurs 
:i.n I~I-._ 6, 24' .. f1S the distinction bett7een what is in 
our po\'Ter and what is not. Its occurrence is rare 1 
,and if E;p;Lctetue chose the word to denote that 
-·'I 
_,it p_fi>_;,_._p &0"1' shoUld preceed 6 • :C,_p &t'-1$ , then we 
should expect some mention of ft' p 0 ./1p_e.fT.;.tS- .in the 
context. 
5. Cf. I 12 1 9. 
6. II 1 1 10~ II 22 1 28. 
I . 
•. 
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II 10, 25. 
8. II 1, 9. 
, 
C f. also the juxtaposition of 'ftpDGt.tpttcns (noun) and 
:J I 
OC'Rpo oCI p&TCI( (adj.) in this section, (II 23, 19). 
10. I 8, 16. Cf. I 29, 1 - 2. 
11. I 18, 8. Cf. I 30, 4. and IV 5, 32.) 
12. Cf. also, II 13 and IV 4. 
13. Souah~, Introduction p. L, note 3. 
14. Ch. 3, 5. Ch. 4, 1. 
15. 13 - 21; see also, 22 - 25 and 58 - 77. For other 
examples of the essential 1 I 1 meaning, see section 
3, below. 
16. It is not always easy to decide which of the 
meanings. 7tpoJepeCJ'tS bears in each instance, (see 
App. I), and frequently both meanings are combined 
in a single occurrence of the term, e.g. II 22, 19. 
See additional note (18) below. 
-· 
17. IV?, 32; II 23, 22. 
18. The division of Epictetue 1 usee of "PO-'~peG"I' is 
only for analytical purposes, and not an actual 
division in Epictetue' thought. Cf. note 16 1 above. 
19. This has already been shown inCh. 5. Cf. I 1 1 7; 
II 19, 32; Fragment 169 (Schweighaueer), etc. 
20. Epictetus frequently introduces the notion of a game 
as a metaphor ~n describing our attitude to the 
circumstances we meet in life. See section 5 1 below. 
22. Cf. I 17, 21 - 5; I 4, 11; IV 4, 15 - 22; IV 10, 1 - 3, 
etc. 
23. Schenkl has adopted _'fl'pot1"9etrsa in place of 1fp~9stt&l 
. ... '~ . 
'~;/ ·., ' 
. ,~. . ' . . ' 
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··in .. :t 21, 2. This firlql.y fixes it .in ·the ~erjn~ology 
-~ Ll - ~ I 
of logic, (cf. w.po.~v-.~..S----with_Q_w_o)<.~~ ___in I 4, 
11; ·where ~o-th terms are part of ___ t:J'_uytcr~.T.d.!Je,,s-- ). 
It _ie likely that both . _wpotrBe~:~ts 
were pax.-t of the vocabulary of the logicians, and 
only ~inutely distinguishable. Cf. note 4, above. 
24. Oldfather, Vol. II, P• 20, note 4. More, Hellenistic 
Philosophers, p. 107. 
25. E. g. I 4, 14; IV 4, 16. 
26. III 31 10; I 1, 23. 
27. IV 7 1 16 - 1?; cf. Ench. 7, 35. 
28~ I l7t 26. 
29. IV 4, 23; IV 6, 24; I 19 1 7 and I 20, 5. 
30. II 6, 25. 
• . ! ~· • 
· .. ··' 
... -
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I I ~I I ) I C \ ' 31. c.~TO~O tclltc.la& fo4.0~ I(Uf'"J (ttpo.cap_IVI' Y·Y~T'IICIIIJ-'P'"'l ,..ov-,. 
Cf. II tQi, :a~; III 10, 18. 
32 ~ 
1 
.,. D .o.. I I - 4 I I 
• OUtrla& TO" otyiCC70iJ 'frfJ06Ctpe.fi'I,S "frOI.C1 TOU ~oUCOG 'CfOdtplaoU •oi,C • 
I 29, 1; cf. I 8, 16. 
33. II 1, 39. 
34. III 5, 2 - 3. 
35. Aristotle, ~ VI. See Ch. 2, 3. 
36. I 18, B. 
37~ IV 12. 12. For the obvious lacuna, the Bodleian MS 
(Codex Saibantinu§) .» .. suggests <T&es)f4CT'E~t41vo., • 
Diela' emmendation, -J4C.T' EICCivov(:fA'o,'), , seems 
more appropriate (and meaningful) in the light of what 
immediately follows. Other suggestions are cited by 
Schenkl, Editio Maior, p. 448. 
38. I 17, 14; II 23, 42; cf. III 4, 9; I 12 9; III 5, 7 - 10. 
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39. I 12, 12. Compare the thought of Wordsworth's sonnet, 
'Nuns fret not at their convent's narrotT room 1 , where 
he expresses the 'Weight of too much liberty•. 
, 40. I II 24 1 ~. Compare the Book of Common Prayer , p. 49, 
"(God ••••• ) whose service is perfect freedom". 
41. I 12, 15; IV 7, 20; III 10, 18 (cf• 'I want the victor 
to win', III 4, 11.); Fragment 1~ (Schweighauser): 
c \ c' 'n 'o.. ,.. 
. 6Gt\ITOV 6\KovTCil b'eKecru~l To' «Vfll.yt<§la-.. 
42. These are listed in IV 3, 7. 
43. I 27, 10 - 13. The passions as a special branch of 
destre, were treated in Ch. 5. 
44. I 4, 1; III 9, 22. 
45. More, Hellenistic Philosophers, p. 102 - 3. More's 
resolution of the 'wheel' (p. 161), that the things 
• 
that are one' a O\oJn have a different quality of reality 
in a world of ideals, comparable to the Platonic forms, 
is interesting, and will be referred to in the 
Conclusion. 
.. ·,:.,_; 
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46~, Se.e Ch. 2, 3. 
47. I 4, 1 and 11. 
48. I 27, 10 - 13; III 9, 22; particularly the latter, 
. which emphasises that desires are not disal1ot7ed 
altogether, but are to be restricted to what can be 
satisfied. 
49. Cf. I 24, 6. 
50. III 10 1 13 - 16. 
5i. III 20, 15. 
52. II 13, 4; I 29, 1 - 8 • 
.53. Lucretius ·makes a similar remark though for slightly 
different reasons, De Rerum Natura III 955 f; also 
79 - 84. 
54. .Cf. III 1, 40. 
55• IV 1, 57.-
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56. Ibs~n, Peer Gynt, Act v. 
57. IV 3, ?. 
58. II 22, 20. 
59. II 23, 36 - 4?. 
60. III 22, 103 - 5; of. IV 6, 25 - ?, and IV 4, 26. 
61. II 28, 1 and 6 - 8. 
62. Askesia, p. 64, correctly notes that Epictetus' 
01 
use of 6f •s has the •connotation of a potentiality, 
an inclination to certain actions, brought about by 
habituation' 
63. III 5, ? - 11. See Ch. 6, note 87. 
64. II 18, 19. 
65. Ch. 5, 3. 
66. c~. 6, 4. 
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67. · Ch. 6. 5. 
68. Section 2, above. 
69• St. Paul, I Corinthians 10,2,, sees a similar limitation 
to the Christian's liberty. All things are permitted, 
(n«v*· t'!aco_t\1_), but not all things are expedient 
( o& 1t~VT~ tr'U.f4t~ptu _ ). The Christian should feel 
free only ~o build up ( o~K o~o~i1 ) the work of 
th~ Church. C. K. Barrett, Commentary, P• 239, 
comments, 'A man who acts on the principle that he 
is free to do anything he likes is in danger of 
losing his freedom through becoming enslaved to the 
.practices for which he feels himself to be free•. 
70. Chs. 3 - 4. 
71. IV 3 ; 8; · c f. IV lf., 36 • 
72. Philo •s eqsay; Omnia Probus Liber Sit (Every good 
·maxi is free), provides a very close parallel to 
this discourse. ·Two points particularly emerge: 
1. that freedo~ is primarily freedom .from the 
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passions tbrough asceticism, and one should desire 
what virtue demands. 2. Freedom implies service 
I in obedience to God. (cf. Epictetus '- npo.cepe.r•S 
cJ ~ "' Otot oEt -• 
73. Cf. ~· 5 - 9. 
74. IV 1, 176. 
75. III 24, 64 ff, and particularly III 22, passim. 
76. There is a useful discussion on the limitations of 
freedom in Reid, Philosophy and Education, p. 112 - 3. 
77. This self-discipline is admirably expressed in 
Wordsworth's Ode to Duty. The best illustration 
in Epictetus is Fragment 169 (Schweighauser): the 
right ~of freedom involves law and self-control, ( vVc t<J, _."'+pocr~v, ). 
78. On this, see section 2, above. 
79. I 26, 15. 
375 
80. IV 4, 42. 
81. IV 4, 47. 
82. IV 3 1 8. 
8 . •\ 9 I 3. In St. Paul 1s Epistle to the Romans, CI\.QU •piG& 
again is used in the sense of a freedom that is a 
positive goal, where we share the freedom of the 
heavenly order ( a)\cu9E.pfal Tftl &'~!"'JC 'I"~V TJKVWV 
To'b 94ou, BQJI!..&21) at the end of the world. The sons 
of G~d enjoy a 'glorious liberty'. In Epictetus the 
freedom is definitely fixed in this life, in having 
a free mind or will ( npDGupecr•s ) which is immune 
from the groanings of our bodily hurts. The 
parallel of the free Stoic avoiding groaning within 
( ,..., CI"T&v~f~' ~ .. w9£." I 18, 19) with the groaning of 
creation in Paul •s Epistle (~. B, 23) oetT6t ~v C!~UTOiS 
crT4!v:C( o..,e v is again striking. 
84. See especially Fragment 169 (Sch"Teighauser), which 
co~d well represent Stoic thought anterior to 
Epictetus. 
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85. See Ch. 2, 6, where the Platonic characteristics 
of the _9ewp~~ do.ctrine were noticed. 
86. III 7, 27. 
87. IV 5, 35; cf. III 3, 5- 8; I 22, 16. 
88. Cf. · Aristotle 1 s + I~D(I.IT{~ , N. E. IX. 
89. See Ch. 3, 4. 
90. Cf. Cicero, De Finibus III 16 - 20; though 
Bonhoffer, Die Ethik, p. 205 - 6, prefers to regard 
the triple division as a gloss, but the longer 
treatment of duties in II 10 does appear to owe 
something to such. a classifica.tion. 
91. See section 2, above. 
92. I 28, 4 - 5; IV 5, 28 - 32. 
93. IV 12, 16 - 18; III 7, 28. 
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94. III 24, 20 - 24; 58 - 60. 
95. IV 4, 24f; IV 7, 5; II 5, 15 • 
96. . ~ I I 1 OUIC6TI 'II'Glf)W , IV 7, 30. 
97. IV 6, 35; II 10 ll- 15, esp. 13 - 14. 
98. III 10, 17 - 20. 
99. Ch. 6, 1. 
100. Christ, in the New Testament, affords a contrast 
here, since His teaching demands both an outer 
love, 'love thy neighbour• (-for love's sake), and 
an inner purity, in the .sermon on the Mount. The 
combination of the two, is a characteristic mark of 
the Christian, but rarely for the Stoic, who at the 
best, loves his neighbour for his own sake. In 
Seneca, ho\'Tevcr, there was found a strong suggestion 
of this self-giving, or Christian love, (See Ch. 
4, 4. ). \'That place seJ.f-giving love had in the 
ancient world, and how far our ideas about this kind 
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of love are shaped by Christianity, is a question 
of considerable interest; were the Stoic duties 
always undertaken either for self interest (towards 
friends), or from some long association of 
(in civic duties)? 'l'he respo~e;ibili ty of correctine others, 
. . ' . 
however, is: .fi:nnly stated thl'Ougbout Plato's Rewbl'ic, partic-
l:tlarly ~ the Cave Allegory, and at 519· D 7~· . 
101. I. 17, ll - 14; Fragment 13 (Oldfather); II 17, 
2 - 6; II 13, 18. 
102. IV 8, l - 4; cf. IV 4, 44. 
103. II 26, l - 7; cf. I 18, 13; IV 5 1 10. 
104. II 5 1 29; II 6, 21. 
105. Compare tl:).e ending of Socrates' Apology (~j;D). 
Socrates wishes at the same time both to accept that 
his death, and therefore the miscarriage of justice, 
was fated, and yet to rubuke, gently,· ( ott '"~"u ) 
the judges who were responsible for such a miscarriage. 
106. II 5, 2 and 7 - 8. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSIONS AND AN EPILOGUE 
It was seen in the last chapter that Epietetus' 
importance in Stoic thought lies in his introduction and use 
of the term 'prohairesis'. MY thesis has devolved upon an 
interpretation of this term. The very adoption of the term 
indicates an intrusion of an element of uncertainty or 
choice into the determinist account of ethics given by the 
Stoics. This element of choice is at the centre of Epictetus' 
doctrine, in contrast to other Stoics, who felt the need to 
give an account of freedom and choice, but allowed nothing to 
turn them from their rational determinism, and so found the 
normal vocabulary adequate. 
~y chapters on the Stoics and Seneca afforded a chance 
to trace certain trends in Stoicism leading to a fuller 
appreciation of man in all his aspects, including will and 
personality. These two aspects were seen to be a late develop-
ment .in Stoicism, and prepare for Epictetus' fuller consider-
ation of them by examining the concept of prohairesis. The 
chapter on _Plato and Aristotle had a twofo:Ld importance: first 
it indicated the approach of these ph!losophers to the 
irrational aspects of man~s character, showing how, in each 
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activity, there is a desiring function as well as a reasoning 
function. This was clearly seen in Aristotle's account of 
knowledge, and the practical syllogism. The problems 
encountered there have direct bearing on the concepts of will 
and freedom in Epictetus. Second, we examined Aristotle's use 
of 1prohairesis 1 1 and found some useful points of comparison 
with Epictetus, particularly in choice exercised in making 
moral decisions. The fuller account of man's personality in 
the later Stoics has much in common with the complex psychic 
elements appreciated by Aristotle and Plato, in the 
co-ordinating of reason and desire. 
With the wider appreciation of man's nature, two 
concepts rapidly developed in Stoicism, will and the 
individual's freedom. The Stoic position, particularly that 
.of Epictetus, is interesting because these concepts have to be 
framed within the Stoic rational monism. The impact of 
theories of mixed psychic functions (rational and non-rational) 
on the strict rational system coerced the development of 
concepts of will and freedom, and much of Epictetus• doctrine 
appears to be the result of certain Platonic and Aristotelian 
convictions super-imposed on the Stoic rationalism. 
It has not been the purpose of this thesis to fix an 
exact point or exponent of Stoicism where these modifications 
381 
took place. I do not hold that.Epictetus was solely responsible 
for the change. As early as Posidonius new influences were 
apparent in Stoicism, and a keen interest in personality and 
will was seen in the writings of Seneca. Epictetus rather 
stands at the end of this development, and is the fullest 
exponent on the concepts of will and freedom. In Marcus 
Aurelius, writing later than Epictetus, there is a regression 
to the earlier Roman Stoicism of the period of Panaetius and 
Cicero, with an emphasis on the brotherhood of mankind; there 
are instances also of the free-will versus determinist 
arguments, and of freedom from the passions, but the central 
theme of the individual's will and freedom is missing1 • 
By Epictetus' time, the Stoic rationalism was not 
impregnable. Only with difficulty had Chrysippus absorbed 
the irrational motions in his basically·rational he~emonikon; 
weaknesses in the rational bastions of the system were 
mentioned earlier in the thesis, notably in the concepts of 
prolepseis and conscientia. These imperfections in.the Stoic 
account of causation, ... on the causation of knowledge and of 
moral conduct respectively, - afforded greater consideration 
to be given to the concept of will. In the history of 
philo~ophy, the time was now ripe for this concept to be 
developed,_. and along l'lith it, a fuller account of the individual's 
freedom. This development was possible in Epictetus because 
he adopted a single term (prohairesis) for the ruling part, 
the former hegemonikon, and the choosing element, and set 
this firmly in reason. Seneca's use of 'voluntas' did not 
necessarily combine will and reason. In Epictetus, prohairesis 
shares the attributes of reason and of choice, as the 
controlled desiring function evident in Aristotle and Plato. 
Since will is a specific aspect of individual freedom. 
I shall consider Epictetus' important contributions on this 
subject presently. First we must examine his concept of 
freedom in its broader aspect. In the previous chapter, we 
saw how Epictetus arrived at three 'levels' of freedomY freedom 
of choice, freedom from a~ety, and freedom for existence. 
The operation of pr,ohairesis is important at each level. The 
perfect state of the will (or prohairesis) is to be fully 
rational. This can be achieved by education and habitual 
training ( askesis ). \Vhen our choosing function is fully 
rational, it is guided by reason to make identical choice with 
what actually occurs by natural determinism. In the final 
level of freedom; reason will be so perfected that. the prohairesis 
chooses in advance of the course of nature. Thit;:;is.the 
exercise-of positive freedom. 
The will finds its freedom in reason; this reason is in 
substance identical with the reason that governs nature, - it 
is an apospasma of cosmic logos. Consequently, if operating 
perfectly, it will reach the same rational conclusions, 
allowing a choice to be made in accordance with nature, - not 
following nature, but arriving at the same conclusions of its 
own accord. But reason itself is free, (this is one of its 
essential attributes in Epictetus), and so there is no coercion 
from outside in reaching the conclusions; .. the conclusion is 
dependent on reason alone, that is on a process of logic where 
each stage is a contingent truth. Provided at each stage the 
premises are correct, reason will operate freely towards 
necessary conclusions. Each stage in reason is approved of 
by our own choice (prohairesis), whereby we become responsible 
for that reasoning, Accumulated choices of this kind, building 
up the entire choosing personality (prohairesis in the wider 
sense), result in our whole life being directed willingly 
towards the circumstances and ends ordained by natural reason. 
This liberation by reason has much in common with 
..... ~ 
Spinoza, who regards activity as continuous thought, with each 
idea following its pred~cessor, and.found freedom in self-
evident truths. 2 The theory is criticised by Berlin, together 
with the view that virtue is knowledge (which is the ethical 
application of the former). For pure reason can only operate 
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when knowledge is perfect. Knowledge and certainty offer a 
limiting restraint to freedom, which true freedom should not 
feel3. Epictetus might be allo\'led, or at least excused his 
position, more than the later exponents of liberation by 
reason, since he was otill in the tradition of the materialist 
concept of reason: logos was a substance pervading the 
universe, and man's reason was a part of this substance. The 
apospasma and the hegemonikon were thought of as parts of an 
individual, as substantial as we regard heart and mind, and 
frequently Epictetue even makes prohairesis similarly a 
materialistic conce~t4 • This consideration makes the theory 
lees idealistic and more acceptable, but since it depends on 
a tradition which can be traced back to the earliest Greek 
philosophers being use~ by Epiotetus, but not re-examined, 
and which is today seen to be invalid, it cannot ultimately 
acquit Epictetue of the impossible idealism contained in 
this particular theory. 
The materialistic concept also prevents freedom in 
Epictetus from assuming an emptiness which often accompanies 
the philosophical examination of the term, as for instance 
in Karl Jaspers• theory. In many points the two concepts of 
freedom are identical5 , but Jaspers tended to see freedom as 
an empty goal. He was seeking some nature, or original 
essence 'which hao some positive content, and is not empty 
38.5 
. 6 
liberty.• He finds no. complete solution to this emptiness. 
Epictetus can at once fill the vacuum by the apospasma, or 
prime reason. This is the objective original self, \'lhich 
is realised in freedom. It is the self given by Zeus. The 
difficulty eJtpressed by Jaspers' "I come to myself as a gift", 
is solved by Epictetus' doctrine, where \'le are given reason 
as an apospasma, and our freedom consists in perfecting this. 
We may note a further consequence of Epictetus' use 
of the materialist concept of reason in his doctrine of 
freedom; this is the restriction of freedom to a necessity. 
This is a basic idea in many views of freedom, and was 
discussed in the previous chapter. Freedom is best when it 
is limited by certain laws. This applies particularly to 
freedom in behaviour, and is found in many moralists. One 
·of the earliest instances is in Psalm 119, "I shall walk at 
liberty; for I seek Thy commandments." \"le have noticed the 
same teaching in St. Paul and Nordsworth. But the limitation 
of freedom by necessity, also applies in the philosophical aspects 
of freedom. The views of ~pinoza1 Locke, ~Where there is no 
law, there is no freedom."), Montesquieu, Kant·and Burke are 
cited by Berlin.? All have in common the idea that freedom, 
as a philosophic concept, involves necessary restraint. 
Epictetus' rr " (choosing 
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as one ought), is an early instance of this philosophic 
paradox, and is more easily resolved than similar positions 
occurring in later philosophers. The 'proper choice' is the 
course of nature, - the events ordained by the natural logos; 
part of the logos (as apospasma), exists in each individual, 
and 'free choic~' consists in recognising the natural and 
necessary conclusions of this reason. How far this solution, 
(depending on rational materia.lism), is valid is less 
important than the fact that Epictetus did recognise that 
perfect freedom was free submission to some necessary rule of 
being governed. 
There is one other important consequence of rational 
materialism-in Epictetus' doctrine, namely that reason (the 
apospasma) affords a link between the general (nature) and the 
particular (the individual). Reason is co-extensive with the 
Absolute and the individual. If the Stoic rational monism -
that reason is the absolute cause and substance - were valid, 
the criticism put by Berlin against freedom as an absolute 
goal, would have to be rejected. But Berlin's criticism8 is 
based on a transcendent not a co-extensive view of the 
Absolute. The Absolute in Epictetus is not found in an ideal 
realm whose characteristics we in our finite state cannot 
conceive. The Absolute, reason, pervades the world, causes 
and is the wor~d we encounter in ordinary experience. 
Epiotetus• freedom lies in the perfection of this substance, 
not in attaining a unity with a transcendent concept. 
The rational monism also helps the problem of 
knowledge inherent in any absolute system: namely, how can 
anything less than the Absolute have knowledge of it. This 
was a problem in Plato, and in the many aspects of mysticism. 
We noted that rational mysticism was a fair interpretation of 
Epictetus• religious convictions. Epictetus 1 concept of reason 
at least contributes to an easing of the dilemma of the one and 
the many. 
Ne have therefore in Epictetus· a theory of freedom 
embraced in the Stoic rational monism. The reason in the 
individual is the cause of his thought and activity: if the 
reason is perfect, his activity will accord with nature. Each 
stage .in reasoning is ac~ompanied by choice, or prohairesis. 
It is this choice which is responsible for the perfecting of 
reason. An individual strives to identify his prohairesis 
with reason; it does not, however, thereby lose its function 
of approving reason, or of willing reason: it becomes the 
desire ever to will what reason d~ands, yet remains the essence 
o£ individuality. As this individuality identifies itself 
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with reason, it partakes of a generality, namely reason. Then 
any action resulting from this individuality-reason 
identification, can be said to be caused, since cause can only 
be explained by reference to generalities. So far is the 
person's activity determined. But in so far as action results 
from individuality (the prohairesis), the activity is free, 
since there is ultimately no generality of the individual 
eseence, therefore no causation. Though not definitely stated, 
this appears to be Epictetus' position in the free-will versus 
determinist debate, and like Aristotle, he clearly accepts 
free-will. Thus far the Stoic monism might allow him progress 
on principles that may satisfy in part, both determinists and 
free-l'lill adherents. But for reasons we have noted in the 
chapter c;levoted'to their doctrines, the Stoic position cannot 
stand. 
The study of Aristotle's theory of knowledge has shown 
a-specific weakness in the rationalist view, which is relevant 
to the question of will. It was seen that the same type of 
reason cannot operate in the practical syllogism as in 
theoretical reasoning. An additional desiring function was 
present in the former. This important conclusion rr·om 
Aristotle ~as been repeated by modern authors on the subject 
of will, nptably Hampshire, who d~aws a distinction between 
two kinds of knot~ledge: knm·rledge of intention and kno1rrledge 
of fact. The latter is obtained from deductive reasoning, 
both from the natural course of events and from objective 
self knowledge. Such kno"t·rledge can be proved wrong. 
Intentions can never be proved 1rrrong since they depend on 
beliefs and desires, and on a degree of probability, not 
certainty. Our intentions are in the end responsible for 
making our decisions. 9 This knowledge of intentions is very 
close to the knowledge with desire that was necessary for 
the specific or particular premisses in Aristotle's practical 
syllogism. They both indicate a breakdown of general 
reasoning (and no other type of reasoning is really valid) or 
of objective kno1rrledge, when an individual makes a decision in 
a particular circumstance. Epictetus' failure to observe this 
shortcoming in reason and knowledge is the chief criticism of 
his doctrine of freedom. 
However, whilst Epictetus is not explicitly aware of this 
shortcoming - he could not openly criticise reason on these 
grounds and at the same time maintain his position as a Stoic -
the introduction of the term 'prohairesis' indicates Epictetus' 
dissatisfaction with a fully rational system, and his use of 
the term shares many aspects of the uncertainty principle in the 
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knowledge of intentions. His adoption of a single term is 
the nearest approach to a concept of will that exists in 
ancient philosophy, and we must see how far the concept 
developed under this term. 
In Seneca, will was closely attached to decision 
(voluntate ac iudicio). This was a development of the free 
adoption, by c:ruyt<ot~Becrts, of the phantasiai in the earlier 
Stoic account. In using prohairesis, Epictetus makes the 
decision and the will one and the same. That is, no decision 
in behaviour can be made without the intervention of \"lill. 
The prohairesis \'tas seen in the previous chapter to be an 
orektic function, neither essentially rational or irrational, 
but desiring to function with reason. It was t:qe factor which 
individualised each person's activity, making it their own. 
Thus it is not true to say, as Souilhe comments, 10 that in 
Epicte~us the rational is always superior to the irrational. 
The factor that is basic in Epictetus' psychology is 
prohairesis, which is the free individual personality which 
may seek the rational or irrational, and which is ultimately 
responsible for each decision. Epictetus here progresses 
beyond his predecessors by allowing uncertainty, something not 
subject to the laws of reason, in his principle t~thich causes 
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behaviour (prohairesis). 
Epietetus also gives a useful account of what 
constitutes this uncertainty principle of will. As seen in 
the previous chapter, tho prohairesis is the entire willing 
and desiring personality of the individual. Epictetus 
\ :» I 
stresses that everything that is individual ( TO &,...ov ) is 
in, or depends-upon, prohairesis. Ne have noticed this in 
the individual dymunei~ and character ( Tf pC:~,.,nov ) , in the 
degree of knowledge each per,son attains, and in displaying 
certain inner virtues of,.~ 'fUf1"T~V and aidos. All these 
individualising aspects contribute to prohairesis. 
The teaching on dynameis was particularly important 
in respect to idll: these qualities or capacities remain 
dormant until activated into actuality by prohairesis. The 
individual, through prohairesis can determine whether to 
realise his pot-1ers or not, and to what extent. Modern accounts 
of will have given much attention to the comparison of will 
11 
and power, or capacity, in human actions. 
Another aspect of will in Epictetus, again repeated 
in modern accounts, is its organic constitution: each choice 
dontributes to some change in a person's total personality. 
His individual identity is changed in some way, hot1ever small, 
by any single act of will. This was seen clearly in the two 
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uses of prohairesis in Epictetus, - as choice, and as the 
total willing person~lity. The latter is an accumulation 
of the former. 1~1hat I do or will, is caused by tho whole of 
my complex personality at that moment, but the decision I 
make, what I do, subtly alters this personality." This 
treatment by E. R. Emmett reflects the position of Epictetus: 
11prohairesis compels prohairesis11 • The will - the 1 ! 1 - is 
organic and dynamic, not a static substance as reason is. 
This is the will, or the orektio element, that functions in 
attaining the knol11'ledge that leads to decisions, as opposed 
to objective reasoned knowledge (see above). According to 
Jaspers, the personal self-determination of the free 
personality is manifest in "fugitive sensations, perceptions, 
feelings, intuitions and intimations of the private 
consciousness. 1112 These are precisely the areas controlled 
by prohairesis in Epic.tetus 1 teaching. 
There is no adequate account of the part of desire 
in willing in Epictetus. The reasons for this ·omission are 
connected with the thoroughly inner concept of Epictetus• 
idealism, and were examined in the prev~ous chapter. The 
omission however must detract from a useful account of the 
will. We are left·with the impression that while prohairesis 
is orektic and repreoents a tendency to\·rards rational or 
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irrational, it is only valuable to the individual when it 
is fully identified with reason. In actual practice, will 
is a blend of desire and reason, and a proper account of it should 
attempt some analysis of the blend, as was done by Aristotle, 
especially in his discussion on rutrasia. 
The essence of will is that it is something outside 
the process of caused events. It is free. Philosophers often 
have to place the will quite arbitrarily in the string of 
caused events. This was evident in Aristotle's account of 
deliberation, and even more so in modern approaches to the 
philosophy of action.13 In Epictetus this elusive quality 
is displayed in having to regard prohairesis from two different 
points of v.iew: - as the individual choice, and as the total 
willin5 personality. They are not different concepts, but 
two ways of looking at the same thing; but at \-1hat point can 
they both be regarded as the same? \'There do they meet? This 
difficulty in pinning down the \·Jill to a particular function 
is common to both ancient and modern accounts. The reason is 
probably because the will bU definition is uncaused, and apy 
notion that is by nature uncaused, ultimately escapes analysis. 
\thy then do we us-e these terms of freedom and will at 
all? Here we fall back on the final argument of the free-will 
adherents, - that because the terms will and individual freedom 
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are meanin~ful.concepts in the language, even to the extent 
that notions of good, bad, praise and blame, in fact the 
whole of ethics depend upon them, they must represent some 
basic freedom in the willing and activity of the individua1.14 
t·Je may say that . the concepts of will and freedom are part of 
our 'experiential reality'. In this 'experiential reality' 
events may occur which are not predictable, and therefore are 
not experienced.as caused events; such are elfents of the will, 
and free-will is meaningful. Opposed to this is what we 
might call 'actual reality', the reality of the world of 
causation. It may be that all events are caused, including 
those of t..rill. Those \'tho hold a determinist position, 
particularly amongst psychologists, believe that events 
occurring in the mind obey the laws of the mechanistic universe, 
and can all be reduced to cause and result. It is difficult 
to prove this position of thorough determinism wrong: it has 
not yet been demonstrated to be·right. But if it were right, 
and all psychic events were caused, we would still not be in 
a position .to predict results, so long as the processes of 
causation remain unanalysed. So allowing that it is right, 
\·te can hold that there is an 'actual reality' in which all 
eve·nts are caused; the analysis of this causation could well 
be an impossibility: amongst mQdern thinkers it is so regarded 
by Jaspers and Emm~tt. 15 But so long as there is causation 
• I 
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\·lithout prediction, ideas of \'lill and freedom are valid in 
terms of •experiential reality•. The Gtoic rationalism 
represents a view of 'actual reality•, and prohairesis in 
Epictetus a view of 'experiential reality', and for this 
+eason, the Discourses present a notable position in 
discussions on freedom.· 
In a sense, the above account only takes the free-will/ 
determinist problem a stage further back, to ask \thich of the 
two realities is truth. 'Actual reality' may be regarded 
as truth because it is reducible to la\'IS and reason. But 
in support of 'experiential reality' is the consideration that 
it provides a strong enough basis of all ethics and the entire 
human applications of philosophy. Science and metaphysics are 
concerned with 'actual reality'; and most of the problems of 
metaphysics on the one hand, and ethics on the other, have 
their origin in this divorce of 'experiential' and 'actual' 
reality. 
"IJle must novr consider the question of ethics and the 
individual's responsibility. The conclusions on this ~Tere 
~eached in the previous chapter, that the individual's 
responsibility was primarily to himself alone, in perfectiP6 
his ot-m prohairesis. From this initial responsibility,., sOcial 
responsibility would result. Essentially~ lpictriilp"toi:tchM the 
. .· . 
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earlier Stoics in placing the point of responsibility in 
G'uyKotT'9~fl'l$ , - the choice of approval of rational 
suggestions. His account of prohairesis as the willing 
personality necessarily extends the notion of responsibility 
to all a person is at any moment. 
This teaching is consistent with the oikeiosis 
doctrine of the Stoics, that man's proper function is the 
free contemplation of the rational universe; from this, 
social oikeiosis will follow. This is theoretical, and 
consistent with Stoic ideals. But a concept of freedom can 
be criticised on two levels: first on the philosophic 
understanding and approach to the concept and terms involved; 
this we have examined in relation to freedom and will; second, 
on the value of freedom as a moral virtue: is it sound ethical 
sense? The term 'freedom' lends itself to limitless 
philosophical debate and analysis, but in Epictetus it is 
put as t~e highest goal of moral conduct, and its value as 
such must be examined. 
Here Epictetus is disappointing, but at least 
consistent. The aim of his freedom is the perfection of the 
individual. His ultimate aim is a world peopled with perfect 
individuals, - a Utopia of perfect ·ldlls. Epictetus meets 
the objection that perfect indiv~duals can never form a 
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perfect society, by the rule of natural reason, which is 
responsible for the making of perfect individuals in a 
perfect society. This is the social oikeiosis. The real 
flaw in the argument again turns on the shortcomings of the 
Stoic concept of reason, which were discussed earlier. 
Each act of an individual towards society has to be 
individually willed. In terms of the practical syllogism, 
it is an event of behaviour, and the will must be involved. 
Epictetus' concept of will is always internally directed, 
whereas the notion of willing, as desiring, is naturally 
externally directed. Compromising though it may be, the 
position of Aristotle is at least more practical, and the 
same practical attitude is adopted in modern times by Berlin16 , 
who criticises the Stoic 'retreat to the inner citadel'. 
tlliile reason may demand a single virtue, such as truth or 
freedom, perfect human life and life in society requires a 
blend of virtues, and freedom must take its place with 
justice, generosity, and so on. Epictetus could recognise, 
through the oikeiosis doctrine, that self-identity (perfection 
of Erohairesis) and tota1 harmony with others were compatible, 
but this wao possible only through his idealism. The more 
common-sense view adopted by Aristotle and Berlin recognises 
that for society ~ the individual to attain towards 
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perfection, self-identity cannot be completely meaningful 
in the sense that the individual exists freely in himself 
alone, nor can social harmony ever be perfect, each must 
sacrifice a little in mutual compromise. 
There was a glimpse of such a compromise in the 
middle period of Stoicism, especially amongst its Roman 
exponen~a; but Epic~etus returns to the full Stoic tradition 
and concentrates his whole teaching on the freedom of the 
inner person, hoping thereby that externals and society 
will look after themselves. But let us not dismiss this 
uncompromising freedom without noting its importance, both 
philosophically and practically. We are dealing here with 
the third and final 'level' of freedom discussed in the 
previous chapter, freedom for existence. 
The attainment of this freedom brings each 
individual to his self-identity, that is, to a state where 
his inner will is direct_ed towards goals of t'lhich he is the 
onl.y cause and source of responsibility. In its simplest 
terms, this goal is the maintenance of the perfect,freedom 
in order that all virtues and attributes of the individual 
may be fully his own, caused only by his willing personality, 
and the self finds itself through freedom. The emphasis on 
self and prohairesis as the essential 'I', is very marked in 
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Epictetus• teaching. 
In some recent thinkers, thiG freedom of existence of 
the self-identity has been a characteristic of the 
existentialists. Parallels between Epictetus and these 
thinkers are numerous, both in spirit and detail, though less 
in the French School. I have taken Karl Jaspers us 
representative, though equally one could find parallels in 
Nietzche and Kierkegaard: 
"At the bottom is my liberty, the source of my 
possibilities, of what I will to be. Existence for me is this 
active choice of myself in liberty. If I do not come to 
myself and exercise my liberty in the realm of being-oneself, 
-
I remain in the realM of being-there, objectively determined, 
a thing. Nhen I do come to myself, accompanied by the anguish 
and the thrill of knowing t~at all I think, decide, and do, 
separates me from the solid ground of being, there I launch 
myself in flight.n17 
The three levels of being in Jaspers, - being-there,_ 
being-oneself, and being-itself, are parallelled in Epictetue 
\ :.If to the external world ( T"Gt. E. k> ) , the willing personality 
(prohairesis) and the cosmic reason (logoa). From this it is 
seen that Epictetus' freedom does not entail the despair of 
Jaspers, rrr.zyo essence is freedom 1 I have no essence. 11 The three 
modes in Epictetus are unified by reason. Reason is 
responsible for the external world; the willing personality 
is only free when it is reason-tending; and the logos is 
pure reason. Jaspers remarks that to fail to attain the 
freedom of the willing personality, or 'being-oneself', is 
more to be feared than death. The loss of oneself (one's 
freedom) which comes from attachment to objective substitutes, 
(for example, a party or state), or by falling back into 
being-there, causes one to die without having lived. This 
was exactly Epictetus' position. Absolute inner freedom is 
necessary to maintain a personal identity of existence. 
This then is the purest aspect of freedom as a goal, 
to attain freedom for the sake of freedom, that is, in order 
to be wholly oneself. There are however two aspects of inner 
freedom \·there its importance is rather in application. 
Both of these have to some extent been represented in 
Epictetus' idea of freedom. They are the freedom of the 
individual for intellectual speculation, and freedom for 
religious mysticism. 
Aristotle stressed the importance of self and +•~oc.uT:oe. 
in his excursus on 9ewp:ol (contemplation). In Epictetus, 
the individual oikeiosis was 'n'oepat K.oAo~B?Ja"IS , the 
understanding of the use of phantasiai. Satisfaction is 
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is gained from speculation and contemplation of the universe, 
only if it is dono in a free spirit. And it is possibly the 
only activity to which 'l'Te can devote ourselves· in a free 
spirit. Russell's remarkable essay in praise of Stoic freedom 
for twentieth century man, makes this point: "In thought, in 
aspiration, \'le are free. Let us learn then that faith which 
enables us to live continually in the vision of the good. 1118 
Intellectual contemplation of man's ideals is the last reserve 
of freedom we have. 
From the intellectualist application of freedom, we 
pass to the mystical: here freedom is found in communion with 
an Absolute, Before such communion is possible, there has to 
be purification to dissociate the mind and personality from 
anything in the external world, to become his true self alone; 
then the mystic's freedom is perfected in communion. "Strain 
every nerve in every possible way to know and experience 
yourself as you really are", says the author of the Cloud of 
UnknowinR. The mystical tendency in Epictetus was examined in 
chapter six, and t'le concluded .that trhilst he share.d many 
aspects of mysticism in the purifying of the prohairesis, 
the communion he seeks is with pure reason, which is the 
immanent source of creation,und regent:!l.ration, and all activity, 
including his own willina personalityl rather than a 
~02 
transcendent Absolute being. Here again the rational monism 
of the Stoic system preserves Epictetus from true spiritual 
mysticism, just as it preserved him from thorough idealism in 
his theory of lfoCPO( t< o A~ll8'YJ~''l • The same consideration, 
incidentally, preserves him from insisting on a transcendental 
will of the individual (Kant), or on a transcendental self 
(Jaspers). 
These are the philosophic considerations surrounding 
the concept of the individual's freedom. But what is this 
freedom in practical terms? Here we must be content "tith 
defining it as 'feeling free', or labelling it spiritual, or 
perhaps, 'poetic' freedom. It cannot be defined in more 
pr.ecise terms for exactly the same reason as 'will' could 
not be so defined. Freedom (like will) is part of our 
'experiential reality', which ultimately is not reducible to 
definition in terms of cause and analysis, but only in terms 
of experience, of 'feeling free•.1 9 
But \\Te must not allow such a definition to detract 
from the importance of 'poetic' freedom, as Berlin tends to 
in preferring a compromise approach to freedom. 'Feeling 
free' ~a positive value, relative to the importance one 
attaches to being an· individual person, or to the \..rorth of 
one's individuality. If one is convinced that this is 
everything, and whatever happens outside an individual 
ul.timately concerns his innermost self in no way t~hatsoever, 
than this freedom must be guarded at all costs. This was 
Epictctus' position, and is present in some degree in most 
individuals~ yearning to be free - particularly in those 
who look forward to a perfection of individuality either in 
this t·torld, as Epictetus does, or in a spiritual world, which 
is the concern of those who believe in the immortality of 
the soul. Unamuno states that, "there is nothing more 
universal than the individual, for what is the property of 
each, is the property of all. Each man is worth more than 
the whole of humanity, nor will it do to sacrifice each to 
all, save in so far as all sacrifice themselves to each. 1120 
If ultimate ends are regarded as individual ends, 
not social, then the 'poetic' freedom is valid. Again, through 
the Stoic monism of reaeon, the individual end perfects the 
social end, and con~equently Epictetus does not feel the 
same tension in holding a philosophy of 'poetic' freedom as 
modern thinkers do. This tension is ma~ked in Jaspers from 
the existentialist point of view, and in Berlin, from the 
socialist angle. Further examples abound in the plays of 
Ibsen, notably, 1Hedder Gabbler•. 
Epictetus' teaching should hold a place in philosophy 
for the account he gives of will, and of the 'poetic' freedom. 
Both aspects have in common a certain elusive quality, since 
they are both in the realm of 'experiential reality•. 
Therefore, our philosophy of them may be enriched by studying 
different approaches by philosophers schooled in different 
philosophical traditions. The tradition of Epictetus combines 
one of the most thorough-going systems of rationalism known 
in the history of philosophy with an emerging awareness of 
human experiences outside this rational fabric, - the aware-
ness of will, personality and individuality, and the desires 
and aspirations which accompany these. In Epictetus, these 
aspects are constantly breaking in upon the bulwarks of 
reason, but our conclusions have shown that the rational 
monism stands firm against the ideas of will and freedom, to 
give a unique i~terpretation of these concepts which arise 
from experience. 
An Epilogue: Epictetus and Christianity. 
I have ,deferred discussing similarities between 
Epictetus and Christianity since it is difficult to compare 
usefully until both objects of comparison are carefully 
understood in themselves. In this postscript, I turn to survey 
this question not because I think that literature on this 
40.5 
subject needs augmenting, but because some of the conclusions 
of this thesis may help to assess the tradition emerging 
from the Renaissance and adhered to in the majority of 
studies and commentaries on Epictetus, of concentrating on 
Christian parallels and the religious aspects of Epictetus. 
Published in 1911, Bonhoffer's 11Epictet und das Neue 
Testament" was a scholarly examination of the similarities, 
and has become the definitive work on the relation between 
Epictetus and Christianity. His inquiry was a reply to 
current thinking in Germany led by Theodor Zahn and others 
who advanced the theory that the Stoicism of Epictetus was 
influenced by the New Testament documents. 
Bonhoffer opposes this case for 11Abhangigkeitsverhaltis 11 
(dependence through direct influence) by showing that the 
Discourses are the expression of a man who places his entire 
faith in the Stoic materialism and who preaches these 
doctrines so unfalteringly and with such complete conviction 
and satisfaction that he had no need to turn to a different 
quarter for new thoughts to supplement his beliefs. 21 This 
mainspring of Bonhoffer's refutation is borne out by a close 
examination of words which are common to Epictetus and the 
Ne\t Testament, and of significant words which are peculiar 
to either, and also of specific parallel passages. He examines 
in addition the influence of Stoicism on the lJ:e\'1 Testament 
writers, 22 and shot"'s that the parall.els which exist arise 
from the two faiths emerging amongst the same intellectual 
tendences. In the syste.mat;lc comparison of Epictetus and 
the New Testament, t·thich forms the last part of Bonhoffer 's 
work, he admits a far-reaching common spirit shared by both 
'faiths•. 23 But when we meet these remarkable parallels of 
thought bet\-1een the two, t"'e must be satisfied that there is 
no causal connection bet\'teen them. Consequently, if 
discussions are going to be useful, they must be directed 
elsewhere than attempting to show direct influence of 
Stoicism on Christianity, or vice versa, in any essential 
dogma, however tempting the parallels at first appear. 
There has hot-1ever been an equally misleading trend 
in the discussions, which has not been so authoritatively 
countered. It was especially prevalent at the beginning of 
this century, and mayhave been influenced by.Bonhoffer's 
final rejection of an actual connection between the New 
Testament and Epictetus. This is the sentimantal view 
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expressed by P. E. r'lo;re~~~. Dill and 6thers1. that Epictetus 
was typical of an ago groping in darkness before the 
enlightenment ·oi'. Christianity, an(i \'Ie are to discern in the 
late Stoics a deficiency· to be filled by the revelation of 
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Christ. Such thinking engenders a desire to read into 
Epictetus much that is unwarranted, and to overstate the 
case for Epictetus' religious personality, as though he would b~ 
an immediate convert to Christianity once in possession of 
the Gospel. To speak as Dill does, 25 gives a false impression 
of Epictetus: "By love and emotion he solved the dualism of 
the world. God is within the human soul as the voice of 
conscience, spiritual monitor and comforter, - Holy Spirit, 
still small voice." Such love, if it has any place in ancient 
philosophy is Platonic or even pre-Socratic, not Stoic, and 
nowhere is the Stoic divinity regarded as "cherishing in 
mercy11 • 
P. E. More also admits that he wishes to come to 
Epictetus as a Platonist not as a Stoic, and to regard him 
as "almost a Christian11 • 26 Nor is there any evidence in the 
Discourses that Later Stoics feel an "inadequacy of man's 
l'lill alone and long for divine aid". 27 On the contrary, as 
Bonhoffcr had demonstrated, Epictetus regards the will as 
sufficient in itself for virtue and the attainment of freedom, 
and its perfection is through human endeavour. Epictetus' 
religious zeal, which cannot be denied, docs not detract from 
his rational convictions; as I have shown already in Chapter 
Sil!', his religion, a kind of mysticism, is rational and, 
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paradoxical though it may seem today, there is little indication 
that he wanted a more spiritual religion. 
t"le may then dissociate our discussion from this 
sentimental thinking that Epictetus just missed Christianity, 
and putting aside for the moment any correspondence in religious 
fervour, we can consider common aspects of the intellectual or 
rational content of the two beliefs. First there is the 
existential a~pect, that both beliefs concentrate primarily 
on the inner well-being and existence of the individual. In 
Epict~tus the life of the individual is unconcerned in the 
first place with the external \ororld, being totally concerned 
with having his own will directed in the way of reason. This 
is most clearly expressed in Discourse IV, 11, on 'Cleanliness'. 
Man exists to perfect his will, and thereby his life, for by 
this means he attains freedom. 
Christ Is aim t..ras to give life more abundantly. 
(St. Joh? 10, 10), and this more abundant life was the 
spiritual, inner life of the individual, preparing for salvation 
after life. This way of salvation for the individual was by 
a personal and continual commitment to follow Christ. 
Epictetus demands a commitment constantly renewed of the 
individual's will to follow reason: both require a continual 
adjustment of the will towards a life-giving ideal. This 
focus of attention on the individual's \·Till, common to both 
faiths,· could account for the many similarities which occur 
in their moral teaching. The differences emei'fSe from the 
end on which the will is fixed, rather than on the means. 
Stoicism io traditionally offered as comprisins a 
large part of the intellectual background to the New 
Testament and the Apostolic age, but in such treatments this 
later development of Stoicism- the individual's responsibility 
for his inner perfection which is his true life, receives 
little attention. ~hether or not there were common social 
and political factors caus~ng this concentration on inner 
perfection to emerge at approximately the same time in Judea 
and the Graeco-Roman cities, 28 this parallel in thinking is 
important and basic in comparing the two beliefs. 
The second common intellectual factor is metaphysical 
and logical rather than moral. Epictetus• doctrine of the 
individual's freedom has to be reconciled with the Stoic 
determinism. Similarly the message of personal commitment 
of the Goopels has to be accommodated to a doctrine of 
historical destiny in Judaism, and this led to many compli-
cations in the Gospels, and to the probl0m of predestina.tion 
in St. Paul's epistles. 29 In this \'lay Epictetus and St. Paul 
are faced with a similar philosophic problem, and compromises 
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led to the same kind of logical difficulties. 
In the \'lritings of St. Paul, as ~tell as in the Gospels, 
these two aspects account for much of the par~llel thought. 
The concern for the inner man accounts in addition for a 
similarity in their spirit of preaching. For both Paul and 
Epictetus are committed to turning_man away from the 
licentious \'lorldliness of the age and the temptations of the 
flesh. The First Epistle to Corinthians is a notable example. 
But the mistake must not be made of thinking that because 
Paul was pressing the same cause, he used Stoic dogma in any 
form to present this aspect of his teaching to the Gentiles. 
The introduction to I Corinthians, clearly shows how Paul 
rejected the wisdom of the Greeks, in preference to the 
wisdom of God in a mystery; God is not in logos but in power. 30 
~fuilst there are incidental and important similarities of 
expression, Stoicism is not a vehicl~ which Paul can use to 
make the Christian faith intelligible to the Gentiles. 31 Nor, 
since Stoicism was based entirely on the material concept of 
reason, could he even adjust the theories to the extent that 
the Christian Fathers were able to accommodate Plato and 
Aristotle in their theology. 
In the Patristic period, philosophy made definite 
incursions upon theological thou~h t, and .. we· may inquire \'rhether 
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the ~~itings of Epictetus had any influence on this thinking, 
and particularly whether his philosophy of the will had any 
effect on the debates that l·rere to take place in tho Church 
in the following centuries, and on the Church's concept of 
freedom. 
After Plotinus the chief philosophic trends from 
300 AD were set by the Church, and until Augustin~ developed 
mainly from Neo-pla tonism 1 and the concept of the lo~ill 
dominated many discussions and treatises. It was prominent 
in Gnosticism, particularly Origen, \'Those psychology is 
Nee-platonic rather than Stoic. He believed that it was man's 
duty to. overcome sin by his own will, aided by God's grace; 
through the ~rill man can attain freedom from sin and fellol'l-
ship with God. Right desire was emphasised by Macarius and 
Clement of Alexandria. The latter held that the will was the 
instrument of the stronger desire. It may be that this 
emphasis on will was influenced by the later Stoics, Seneca, 
Epictetus or Marcus Aurelius, perhaps transmitted through the 
Neo-platonists, 32 but no compelling argument can be found to 
support the view firstly because the part of the will was a 
natural postula. te in the Church's doc trine of rd.demption, 
and not necessarily allied to any previous philosophy, and 
secondly because the concepts and the psychology were 
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insufficiently \-Torked out by these Fathers to make any doctrine 
recognisably similar to that of Epictetus. 33 Accordingly, in 
the absence of any references by the Fathers to the Stoic 
philosophers on the concept of will, we can say no more than 
that the predominance of will in Epictetus and other Stoic 
philosophers might have provided a sufficient tradition for 
the concept of will to be such a widely acceptable topic for 
theological discussion. 
In the theology of St. Augustine and those following 
him, there is a much stronger admixture of Aristotelean 
thought \..rith Neo-platonism. His teaching on will and freedom 
is complex, since he sets out to retain an insistence on will 
\-r,hilst defending the doctrines of salvation by grace and 
predestination, against the ~alvation by will alone' heresy 
of Pelagius. Augustine's compromise position required the aid 
of a doctrine of Original Sin. In his arguments he has a 
strong tendency to regard the will as a faculty of the mind 
following the tradition of Plato and Aristotle, rather than as 
a function of the whole personality which is making the choice. 
This latter was Epictetus' concept of prohairesis. This 
characteristic feature of Augustine's arguments on will is a 
regression f~om the stage reached by Epictetus. 
It is rather St. Augustine's concept of soul as a 
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whole which in certain aspects resembles Epictetus' 
'prohairesis'. Soul is described as, "a certain substance 
participating in reason and suited to directing the body; 
on it depends all sensual perception and memory, will and 
intelligence, which have no existence apart from the soul, 
but are identical with it; they are three relatively, but 
ono substantially.n34 Also he states in De Trinitate, 
110mn.es nihil aliud quam voluntates sunt."35 This is closely 
parallel to Epictetus 1 11 You are prohairesis11 • For as \"lith 
Epictetus, will is the controlling influence in the 
acquisition of knowledge, and on it depend the mental 
operations of judging and reasoning, and it determines the 
result of both sensations and feelings. Thus when 
Augustine is using a concept Of l"Till :inciden'fally, as he is 
in the above passage which illustrates the doctrine of the 
Trinity by analogy to human faculties, there are similarities 
to Epictetus. But.in works more specifically related to 
'will', especially when countering heresies, there is far 
less resemblance. 
Augustine provides a further parallel in an idea of 
a perfect freedom, that is; 11the free decision of the self-
determination of the \'lill toNards the good and holy, 
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exercised in the .next life by the righteous: the freedom only 
to do good because.~~ orily wills the good."36 Again it is 
chiefly the doctrine of original sin, demanding an inherently 
evil will, which prevents this freedom being attained in this 
lifti;~~:J preached by Epictetusftt~~ii-~. good l'ras 
. '. ~,· . . ' .... - . ~ ·., _. . 
reason, and also by later Christian mystics, 'Wa~ for +hi~ lif~. 
From these instances it will be seen that the germs of 
the philosophic problems of will and freedom which were 
evident in the Gospels developed rapidly during the period 
of the Church Fathers, and it was natural that many of the 
observations made by Epictetus were to ·be repeatedly voiced by 
theologians. But there is no evidence that the Fathers based 
any part of their doctrines on Epictetus;37 thus as with 
Paul, so with the Fathers, we must conclude that any 
similarities that exist are the result of parallel development 
of basic philosophic questions, not of direct contact. In the 
absence then of any association between Epictetus and Christian-
ity during the early history of the Church, what justification 
is there for the established and fervent connection between the 
two? 
The attraction of Epictetus' works has always been for 
their moral content rather than literary worth, and not for 
moral content alone, but for the sincerity \·rith trhich this is 
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taught, thus distinguishing Epic'tetus from CicerQ or Seneca. 38 
In the resurgence of Stoicism during the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries, Epictetus was considered to be 
outstanding as a teacher of morals. This at least was the 
opinion of Justus Lipsius of the Low Countries, "Non est 
qui bonam mentem magis aut trahat aut formet 11 • 39 Primarily, 
the popular book l'ras the Encheiridion, and we may assume that 
this was frequently translated and read without reference to 
the Discourses; it is til:ire*~:fi~ by Lipsius, and the 
Discourses are dismissed as other works. 40 
The first translation, and this was of.the Encheiridion 
alone, appeared in an age and country where it was less 
enthusiastically received than its successors, - fifteenth 
ce_ntury Italy. This was a translation into Latin by Perotti 
,· 41 
~ Rome for Pope Nicolas V in 1450. . The elaborate rhetoric 
and self ir.lportance ofthe age found little to admire in 
Epictetus• unembellished style and meekness. But towards the 
end of 'the century ano.ther translation, apparently independent 
- . - -· 42 
of Perotti's, was made. by Politian, and was far more 
favourably.accepted, perhaps because of some propaganda on 
the part_of the translator defending Epictetus against the 
prevailing tendencies of Renaissance thought. 
In 1604, a translation of the Encheiridion, together 
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with the commentary to each chapter by Simplicius, appeared 
in English from the hand of Geoff~y S~anhope. In the 
introduction it is definitely stated that the work should 
be used as a Christian handbook. 43 
During the eighteenth century it is probable that the 
impact of the Age of Reason was leading Christian preachers to 
adopt Epictetus' teaching more carelessly, without the 
reservations specified by Stanhope. For it would be to counter 
such a tendency that Elizabeth Carter wrote her Introduction 
to her translation of Epictetus of 1758, which claims to be 
the first modern translation (except in French) of the entire 
extant works. 44 Writing in an age "Fond of preferring the 
guesses of human sagacity before the unerring declarations of 
God", throughout her exposition of the Stoic philosophy, she 
condemns the basis of Stoic doctrine as being obscure and 
contradictory, and favours the revelation of God in the Bible. 
She is worried by the corporeal nature of God, by the lack of 
an after-life and its accompanying rewards, and by the belief 
that virtue alone is sufficient to produce happiness, a 
belief "repugnant to sense and reason"• 
We may infer f~om her invective that certain Christian 
preachers had been confusing aspects of the Stoic rationalism 
and materialism with the Christian religion. She finally admits 
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however, that, nthe Stoics may be read with advantage, 
especially in roles of self-government, social behaviour, 
of the noble reliance on the aid and protection of heaven, 
and of a perfect resignation and submission to divine will, -
but in subordination to Christian reflections". Allo\ting 
this, she states, "The Stoics everywhere testify the noblest 
zeal for virtue and the honour of God, but they tended to 
establish them on principles inconsistent with the nature 
of man. 1145 
The observation is both accurate and important, 
anticipating the conclusions of the enquirers of this century. 
For she admires Epictetus for sharing to a great extent the 
spirit of Christianity, but rebukes those using him as a 
substitute for the Bible; and, as Bonhoffer notes, Christians' 
appreciation of Epictetus had oscillated between these two 
. 46 VJ..ews. Subsequent translations47 followed Miss Carter's 
cautions, but they had the advantage of increasing knowledge 
about the development of Stoic thought. For it was notable 
that Miss Carter was referring to the spirit of Stoicism in 
general, without realising Epictetus' distinctive free use 
of religious expression. Unfortunately, the nineteenth 
century commentators used their extra knowledge, that the 
religious element in Epictetus was a distinct development from 
41.8 
the earl.ier Stoics, against the background of the establ.ished 
association of Epictetus and Christianity. Consequently, 
they immediately tried to show that the two had some 
special relationship historically. This was the view which 
Bonhoffer set out to correct, and the general conclusions of 
his work compare \'sel.l with Niss Carter's Introduction. 
But even the more recent commentators are stil.l 
enthusiastic to indicate the Christian parallels in 
Epictetus. So~he48 finds the religious attitude more 
fervent in Epictetus than in either Seneca or the Marcus 
Aurelius. Lagrange, 49 writing close upon Bonhoffer's study, 
suggests that there does exist a parallel of spirit between 
Epictetus and the New Testament. 
This religious "esprit 11 of Epictetus has al.ready been 
examined in Chapter Six, and certain aspects of this, set out 
below, can readily be related to Christianity: 
1.. The urgency of tne preaching. 
The repetitive and unembel.lished style of Epictetus, 
and his dependence upon illustrations and anecdotes, 
unparallelled by any other Stoic writer is similar to the 
urgency of the Gospels and the even6elistic spirit of the 
Church in the Apostolic Age. They are pressing, without 
recourse to unnecessary rhetoric. 
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2. The Mystic Spirit. 
This has already been discussed in Chapter Six. 
Christianity has had many mystic followers. The Church has 
condemned fanatical mystic movements as heresy, such as the 
"Pantheist Heresy" of the thirteenth century, but more 
moderate experiences of Mysticism are entertained within the 
Church, and indeed are almost inseparable from its theology. 50 
The most dominant mystical aspect which is shared by 
Epictetus and Christians, is the unity of God and man, and 
the spiritual freedom resulting therefrom. The Christian 
mystic, in becoming like Christ, shares His will, becoming 
detached from self; he wills t·rhat Christ wills, and eo gains 
a_perfect freedom. The parallel with Epictetus is clear, 
(though the differences are immense): Epictetue perfects 
himself in reason which i~ hie universal, or God. The 
Christian perfects himself in Christ-likeness, that is, 
follot·ring the example of perfect humanity particularly in 
humility and love; of love, at least, there is no hint in 
Epictetus. But the result of the mystic tendency, the harmony 
of wills and perfect freedom has made Epictetue greatly 
admired by the Christians.51 
3. ~he claim upon the inner man: 
"Both in Epictetus and Christianity, goodness, or, for 
420 
the Christian, salvation is dependent on the state of the 
inner man. In both beliefs, the purification of the internal 
dispositions are towards an ideal, in Epictetus the ideal of 
reason, in Christianity the ideal of Christ-likeness. 
Similarly, the attainment of this ideal results in a perfect 
freedom. Because of this common orientation of their moral 
thinking, the personal conduct of the Stoic and Christian 
has much in common. 
First, their moral conduct requires a certain 
detachment from material goods, from wealth and extravagance 
and positions of honour. These are not to be held in esteem, 
for such externals are unable to benefit the inner man. The 
Stoic extends this detachment to human relationships, since 
the rational spirit can be sullied even by ties of affection. 
For the Christian seeking Christ-likeness, the perfection of 
love is an essential aspect of the Christian character.52 
On the attachment to life itself, there is a distinct 
difference between Stoic and Christian. Martyrftom, that is, 
to be killed while defending one's belief against persecution, 
is admired by both. But suicide is contrary to the Christian 
belief in the sanctity of life.53 For the Stoic, it is 
permissable and laudable if in any act he has no alternative 
but to transgress his principles and soil his personal inner 
421 
vi.Ttue. The Christian only faces voluntary death if the 
alt,ernative is to deny in public his professed faith, and 
to betray Christ or the Church. If he is merely forced to 
act in an un•Christian way, he may pray for God's grace and 
forgiveness. 
Second, this attitude of detachment is inclined to 
create a tension in the individual between the natural man of 
worldly desires, and the inner,or·spiritual man seeking 
detachment from these. Both Stoic and Christian experience 
this tension bett-reen an inner will or conscience that desires 
the good and passing desires stimulated by some external 
object which tempt the inner will to yield. Although the 
exact terms of this tension vary considerably, - and significantly -
the problem is basically the same as that encountered in 
Aristotle's position of akrasia. 
The third common characteristic in moral conduct arises 
from this need to conquer the natural man. It is the method of 
self-discipline or askesis. In formal discipline the 
brotherhoods and sisterhoods of the Church have much in common 
\~th Epictetus 1 training programme. In order for the inner 
will to attain perfection, it must be fortified against 
temptation through thorough schooling and habitual exercises. 
This repetition of moral principles, the self-examination of 
conduct, and the examples of Stoic 'saints•, are important 
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aspects of Epictetus' askesis. The moral disc~pline extends 
. .J: 
from the formal discipl~~e of the school to the self-
imposed discipline of daily life. Thus the asceticism of 
the Stoic was far from mere denial, but rather a striving 
after virtue, which is the perfecting of the will, just as 
st. Paul speaks of exercising himself ( ~C7Ketv ) to have 
a clear conscience.54 
Today, amid the restlessness in theological thinking 
and the indecisiveness in the principles of Christian 
morality, appeal is again being made to the d±scipline of 
orthodoxy, and for Christians to strengthen their practical 
profession of the Faith through the traditional ascetic of 
r~gular prayer, office. and sacrament. And equally important 
is the habitual recollection privately, to keep the tenets of 
faith in constant rehearsal.55 
Finally, in pursuing moral progress, Christian!!.;at¥t·.thA 
I Stoic practise self-effacement, the virtue of becoming 'TbC'It'EIVOS, 
- an adjective collllilon to Epictetus and the New Testament. 
Epictetus admired the Cynic's way of life, and is eager not 
to make a show of philosophy, but rather to undertake every-
thing for the improvement of one's own inner life. This .. -. 
virtue is not conspicuous in other Stoic ~~iters of the 
period. Self-effacement however does not preclude holding 
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one's o~;rn lifo as an example to others. Epictetus and 
St. Paul did this unashamcdly,56 but the sincere believer, 
Stoic or Christian, expects no praise nor material reward. 
These are aspects where there is a general 
similarity of spirit between Epictetus and Christianity, 
which wo can n0\'1 define further as a similarity in moral 
commitment and method of moral progress. These are 
immediately recognisable in reading the Encheiridion, or 
any selection of the Discourses. If thoroughly examined, 
they will always testify ~tlss Carter's observation that 
Epictetus' ethics are based on a different concept of man's 
destiny from the Christian view. But we are not here making 
a systematic comparison between the two beliefs, but 
enquiring with \'rhat justification Epictetus has been a 
popular author amongst Christians. 
The majority of Christian people through the ages, 
have not involved themselves primarily with thoughts on 
the destiny of man and the nature of God, or the relation 
between man and God. Their faith has simplified these 
important theological questions to an expectation of life 
after death, to a conviction that God ~ love, and to_ the 
observance of the sacraments of the Church, approached in 
holiness and purity of life. Acceptinff this faith, the 
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everyday thou~hts of· the- o;rdinary Christian are concerned with 
purity and moral progress. This pilgrim's progress is not an 
intellectual grasp of theological questi,ons, but a progress 
towards -a moral perfection through the imitation of Christ. 
It is precisely this purity of life that is emphasised in 
Epictetus• ethics, and for this reason his writings are 
immediately attractive to the ordinary Christian, irrespec-
tive of the principles on which the homilies towards moral 
progress are based.57 To exercise the means for reaching 
the end is poosible for every Christian, but to understand 
:fully the end, requires much learning. 
Thus the common spirit shared by Epictetus and 
Christians is a common method or approach to the perfect 
life; and a Christian reading the Discourses \·rill be struck 
by this common e'sprit, will be uplifted by it, and will want 
to re-read. Be will not ·base his beliefs on the parallels; 
for he is l:i,kely to know as little about the philosophic 
basis of. Epictetus' morals as he does of the principles of 
Christian theology, but he will feel inspiration finding 
that a Greek pagan could share even to this extent the moral 
spirit of Christianity. 
Just ao, in examining the •common spirit', the 
parallels were seen to be in practical conduct and the moral 
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outlook of one's life, so now, in turning to specific 
similarities in the theories on which conduct is based 
we find considerable correspondence between the ethics of 
Epictetus and the moral theology of the Church, but not 
extending to the metaphysical or religious basis of the 
ethics. And in this sphere of ethical concepts and theory, 
the following parallels may be n6ted.58 Commentaries have 
given comparatively little attention to these parallels in 
theory, concentrating more upon the incidental parallels in 
the practical outlook of the 'common spirit'. 
1. The end of man. 
For the Christian, the end of man is God: to share 
in His goodness. For Epictetus, the end is reason, and 
perfection consists in sharing this,;all-pervading reason. 
Further, the Christian believes that there is a special 
sharing for man, which the rest of creation· does not enjoy, 
because man, although a creature, reaches nearer to 
perfection since he is made in the image of God. 59 The 
distinction in Epictetus was that man possesses the faculty 
of understanding ( 7f oe p o<. 1< o >... o ~ ft"t] tr 15 ), and is therefore 
equipped to reason ideally, on the level of universal reason; 
his reasoning faculty is an apospasma, or 'off-cut•, of that 
reason. 
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2. The will. 
Neither Epictetus nor the Church arrived at a clear 
concept of will. In Epictetus' view some elusive or 
incalculable factor was involved, yet this did not deter him 
from placing prohairesis at the centre of our whole moral 
being. Belief in will also had its problema for the Church, 
as we have noted, but its importance in human nature and 
conduct is always stressed. "It is by trill that we both 
sin and live righteously." 
. 60 
says St. Augustine. External 
acts add nothing to the moral character of the individual. 
Every deed must be the result of an inner will and commit-
ment to the good. This is the teaching in the Sermon on the 
Mount. The will likewise is essential in sin. 61 Sin is a 
"voluntary aversion from the immutable and universal good, 
and the turning to one 1 s otm good and to external and 
. 62 inferior goods. 11 An evil desire arises from perverse trill. 
This aspect of the Christian doctrine of sin closely resembles 
Epictetus 1 teaching on the 1Tc:1911J. 
The Church teaches that man has conscience, as the 
power of knowing tTha t conduc~ is right, and he also has free 
will to determine his own self to adopt this conduct. The 
ttill may be feeble and lead hi.m to act against conscience, as 
St. Paul's, "The good that I would I do not" (Romans 8, 19). 
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On the qu~stion of consciontia, we oaw that Seneca was 
nearer to the Church's teacning than Epictetus, and the 
omission of conscience in Epictetus' doctrine requires 
explanation. 
The term 'conscience' involves not only knowledge 
of \'lhat is good, but also an accompanying desire to do this 
good. This desire would be tl:le general J3 o~>..,., t1' •S \'lhich 
Aristotle adopts. Any tempting immediate desire can then 
pull against this knowledge, and even overmaster this 
general will. In Epictetus, as was seen in the discussion 
on akrasia in Chapter five, .man potentially has the knowledge 
of the good in his reasoning faculty. But in order to adopt 
the correct conclusions of reason, the choic~ of the 
• I prohairesis is required in the JUdgement, or ~P·~•s. This 
control by a rational w~ll then becomes our 'conscience', in 
the oense that it is knowledge of the good, accompanied by 
an orektio factor. But if the will judges against reason, 
the 'conscience' (reason with t·rill) is destroyed. 
In reaching this position on 'conscience', Epictetus 
was follO\'ling the traditional unity of the hegemonikon in 
Stoic thought, which disallows opposing desires. The 
contrary drives in deliberating conduct occur in the 
phantasiai, which are of varying strength, and are regarded 
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as external to us. But it l"tas noted in Chapter Five that the 
phantasiai \'Jere not really external, but since .they contained 
a subjective element, l'tere only external to the prohairesis. 
For this reason, lthilst the idea of 'conscience' is foreign 
to the Stoic psychology which Epictetus was following, his 
writings often suggest that to be tempted against reason was 
to act against conscience. Moreover, it is natural that 
Seneca, being more eclectic, abandoned the strict Stoic 
teaching on this point in favour of a concept, conscientia, 
which accords better l"rith our experience. 
3. Natural and supernatural virtues. 
The Church has distinguished bet\·Teen natural and 
supernatural virtues. 63 The natural virtues can be acquired 
by habituation, such us by mainta.inin8 a right attitude 
tO\'lards externals. The supernatural virtues are attained 
only through a supernatural principle, God's grace. Moreover, 
natural virtues unless assisted by sup~rnatural virtues, will 
not remain virtues, but will degenerate into habits. In 
accordance with these two classes of virtues, there can be 
naturally good actions and supernaturally good actions. 
~here is a resemblance here in the virtues frequently 
listed by Epictetus, - self-respect, faith and magnanimity, 
. and his over-riding virtue, the perfection of the prohairesis. 
429 
The separate virtues which the good man displays are only 
ppoperly acquired if they are the result of a good 
prohairesis, and this prime (cf. supernatural) virtue is 
acquired through a universal principle, namely reason. 
A naturally good action in Epictetus, may be 
described as one in which the agent accepts the will of 
nature as he sees it expressed. This offers freedom at the 
second stage, the stage of resignation, in the analysis given 
in Chapter Seven. By consistently willing each event as 
it happens, a person is doing the right thing. A supernaturally 
good action would be one in which the prohairesis perfectly 
reflects universal reason, so that £rohairesis of its own 
natural accord, chooses the course of nature; this is freedom 
in the third stage. In this two-tier concept of moral actions 
there is resemblance to the Church•s-; teaching, for attainment 
of virtue at. the higher level depends on the perfection of 
the universal principle in us. 
Knowin$ how readily a comparative study may degenerate 
into a game of intellectual 1snap 1 1 I have tried in this 
epilogue to accountfor.ucl,i_n a sense 1 to justify the association 
between Epictetus and Christianity, not by indicating every 
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incidental parallel, but by finding grounds for the existence 
·of a comwon spirit, and further, by showing some common 
approaches in ethical theory. The 'common spirit' has 
appealed to Christians of different periods, because it 
serves a number of intellectualising aspects of Christianity, 
such as mysticism and rationalism. Today, the existential 
thought of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries has 
influenced some theological discussions, and this spirit also 
is reflected in Epict'etus, as 1r1as noted in the Conclusions. 
Less intellectual aspects, especially the strong sense of 
moral discipline, have also held their appeal. 
In ethical guidance, we have seen that parallels 
betl'leen Epictetus and Christian, occur on a level deeper 
than mere practical moral conduct, and exist in some 
of their basic ethical concepts. And I believe this does 
more than explain the association of the tl'IO beliefs: it 
justifies the usefulness of Epictetus' doctrines for the 
Christian, provided he realises that these parallels are 
confined to the moral beliefs. For as Elizabeth Carter 
remarked, the concept·s of man and God, and the relationship 
between man and God are basically different. Interest in 
comparin5 the @Oral aspect of the two beliefs is enriched 
by underotanding those essential differences: Epictetus 
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shows a religious aspiration to ·rea$on,· which in his 
psychology is •supe~-~an·,- tho porfection_of each 
individual's personal life, and in his metaphysics is 
'supe·r-men', - the cominon universal IIiJ~t~rial of all 
mankind and creation; he has no God apart from this 
rational material~ 
Even though the association of Epictetus• teaching 
with Christianity is valid to a point, this ought not to 
influence commentators to regard this association as the 
major importance of Epictetus• works. If it was likely 
that Epictetus had influenced the Church in any essential 
aspect, or if the New Testament had influenced Epictetus, 
which theory Bonhoffer has rejected, then this associa-
tion would warrant the most diligent investigation. But 
since this evidence is lacking, a full comparative stu~, 
although being interesting, would little advance our 
knowledge either of Epictetus or of the Christian faith. 64 
For the Christian certainly there is justification to 
approach Epictetus sympathetically, for they share a 
common spirit; but those apP,roaohing Epictetus cr~tically 
should view him in his rightful liace in tho history of 
philosophy, as representative of the final trend in 
Stoicism, not as the precursor Qf Christianity• This 
·has been the object of this thesis, and approached in 
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this way, there·will occur to the student many 
parallels with philosophers and beliofs othor than 
Christian, particularly of the modern era~· 
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NOTES TO CHAPTER EIGHT 
1. The social oikeiosis is stressed throughout the 
Meditations, (II 4f; IX 22- 3; XI 21, etc.): 
the individual is important as part of the 
entire plan of the cosmos, and attention should 
be given to the inner rnan, that his 'will' 
always accords with nature. Consequently there 
are references to the self-examination, (III 5 - 6), 
\. I 
and the inner virtues of To _'11', ~ToV and aidos, 
which are reminiscent of Epictetus. 
But "the Meditations contain no positive 
function of will, and no mention of prohairesis. 
Man ·comprises hegemonikon ,. ' tTot.p K I OV and 
\ I 
To 1tY£U,...otT •o-"". After Epictettis, prohairesis 
again lapses into the hegemonikon, from which he 
had developed the concept,of will, (see Chapter 
Five). 
- . The nearest approach to will in Marcus Aurelius 
is ' TO ' npoot•peT•t<ov l , a single occurrence, 
(VIII 56). The context is to be noted: l-iill is 
introduced as a solution to the problem of evil. If 
each individual is desi~ned tQ function in harmony 
434 
t·Jith nature, hotr can evil arise? - through ~fill 
( ... .... Tw '1f p 0 o( I p! T'tf(.,, 
~ ~ 
), that is, an 
inclination to turn from reason. The function 
is the same as Epictetus 1 'prohairesis', -a 
controlling factor of will outside reason, 
prompting choice. But will is not generally 
used in Marcus Aurelius in this sense, and we 
may interpret this single instance as the 
author being forced to introduce a term, 
almost a 'dirty word' into his pure Stoicism, in 
order to ease a real problem. Epictetus had 
pushed the non-rational too far in adopting 
' I prohairesis, that a reaction set in. To wpoo~tptTtHov 
(== prohairesis) was still current, but not for 
Stoics. Marcus Aurelius well illustrates the 
negative kind of freedom ('freedom from') typical 
of the Stoics, the 'retreat to the inner citadel' 
(VIII 48); Epictetus' prohairesis preserves him 
from a purely negative position. 
2. Ha~pshire, Spinoza and the Idea of Freedom, p. 197. 
3. Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, p. 141 - 154. 
4. Epictetus, II 22, 19, etc. 
435 
5. For further parallels, see belo\"T. 
6. Blackham, Six Existentialist Thinkers, P• 48 - 9. 
7. Berlin, Op. cit. p. 147. 
8. Berlin, Qp. cit. p. 146f. 
9. Hampshire, Freedom of the Individual, p. 85 - 90. 
10. Souilh~, Epictete, Vol. IV, p. 12- 13 (note): 
"Epict~te, comme toute la morale Stoici~nne 
d'allieurs se caracterise beaucoup plus par une 
exalt'ation du jugement quo par une exageration de la 
volunt~~" 
Souilhe fails to recognise that in Epictetus, 
prohairesis is anterior to judgement. Judgement is 
certainly the all-important factor in living 
accordin~ to nature, but prohairesis is responsible 
for jud~emerit; and must include desiring as well as 
calc~lating faculties. 
Epictetus is distinctive alilongst Stoics for 
stresGing will (prohairesis) in favour of rational 
judgement, as the controlling factor in decisions. 
souh.h{l 1 s interpretation disregards this important 
development, 11 Le jugement entrainant fatalement la 
tendance, le desir et !'aversion." 
11. Hampshire, Freedom and tho Individual, P• 24- 7. 
12. Blackham, Op. cit. p. 46. 
13. For instance, Molden, in The Philosophy of Action 
(Ed. t1.hite), p. 70. A selection of modern studies 
which afford useful comparison with Epictetus' 
position, appears in the Bibliography. 
14. Berlin has recently put this argument, Op. cit. 
Introduction, ~tvii - xxxvii. 
15. Blackham, Op. cit. p. 46. Emmett, LearninB to 
Philosophise, p. 208. 
16. Berlin, Op. cit. p. ~67f. 
17. Paraphrased by Blackham, Op. cit. p. 48 - 9 
0 
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18. Russell, A Free Han's 'Vlorship, contained in,. 
1-lysticism and Logic 1 p. 43. 
19. A general point may be made here: \then persons are 
involved in discussions on their personal or 
political liberty, it is a feeling of liberty they 
wish to preserve. In colloquial use the word is 
rarely meant to extend to absolute freedom; if at 
this moment I was not 'free' to speak to the 
person I am l'li th in the room, I should feel a 
restriction of my liberty. But if I was not 'free' 
now to walk to Lands End, I should perhaps 
intellectually accept that this \tas a restriction 
on my freedom, but I should feel no such restrmction. 
A recognition of this feeling of freedom, or 
relativism, is important to our understanding of the 
concept, 'freedom•. 
20. Unaouno, The Tragic Sense of Life, p. 61. 
EPILOGUE 
21. Bonhoffer, l!:pictet und d~s Neue Testament, 1911, p. 75. 
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22. Op. cit. Book one, Sacond part. 
23. In parts of his comparative study, especially 
p. 382 - 90, Bonhoffer presses this common 
spirit almost to the point of contradicting 
his main refutation. 
24. P. E. Moro, Hellenistic Philosophies (1923); 
s. Dill, Roman Society from Nero to Marcus Aurelius 
(1904); J. Baldwin Brown, Stoics and Saints, 1893; 
F. W. Ferrer, Seekers after God (1902) P• 186f. 
25. 0~ cit. P• 389. 
26. Op. cit. p. 63. 
27. c. H. Hoore, Ancient Beliefs in the Immortality of 
the Soul, (1931) P• 51 - 2. 
28. E. R. Dodds has traced a similarity in the stresses 
faced by individuals in the lat. and 2nd centuries 
in Pagan and Christian in an Age of Anxiety. He 
notes, for instance, the idea of confession of sin 
in Epictetus, (III 10, 2.) A similar view is held 
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by Gilbert Murray, Stoic, Christian and Humanist, 
P• 74. 
29. The difficulty is not only noticable in st. Paul, 
but also in Philo, who adopts intermediaries to 
explain the transcendence and i.rnmanence of God, 
which is a related problem. See especially, 
Quod deus sit immutablis, 10, 47 - 8. 
30. II Corinthians 2, 5. 
31. On Paul's attitu~.e to the Stoic tradition, see 
Bonhoffer, Op~ cit. ~ 98 - 101. 
32. For instance, Simplicius of Cilicia, the last of the 
Neo-platonists, was sufficiently interested in 
Epictetus to t·lrite a full commentary on the 
Encheiridion, in the early sixth century. 
33. In reflecting generally on the development of 
Ancient and Hedieval philosophy, it is surpr!Lsing _ 
to find so little advance in the concept of will. 
From S~~ates onwards, philosophers are increasingly 
440 
aware of its importance in moral discussion. Yet 
if it was sometimes central to the philosophers' 
thought, it was never central to the tradition or 
system t-thich they were following. The question 
was rarely asked: 11\'lhat constitutes will ? 11 The 
most objective analysee~, by Aristotle and the 
Middle Stoa, were incomplete and lacked a clear 
definition of ter~s. It is only in modern times 
that we can speak of a Philosophy of the Will, when 
the development of linguistic philosophy and 
psychology affords a clearer terminology for 
description than was possible before. Against 
this general background of will in the history of 
philosophy, the idea of prohaireais in Epictetus, 
cannot be regarded as meagre. 
34. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, ix. 
35. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, xi. 
36. J. Morgan, The Psychological Teaching of St. Augustine, 
p. 156. of. St. Augustine, Encheiridion, cv. 
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37. Bonhoffer gives evidence of certain Christian 
paraphrases of the Encheiridion, such as the 
Encheiridion of Nilus, but th.ese were confined to 
the Eastern Church; op. cit. p. 383 - 5. 
38. w. s. Landor, in his Imaginary Conversations, 
(1821 - 1863) composes an• interesting dialogue 
between Epictetus and Seneca, in l"rhich the latter 
is severely censured for his parade of philosophy 
and rhetoric: "Are philosophers only philosophers 
for tho people, and inste.ad of instructing them, 
must they play tricks before them?" Perhaps in his 
admiration for Epictetus, Landor t·ras influenced by 
Robert Southe;r, .\-Tho in a letter to Landor writes: 
"Christian Stoicism is wholesome. for all minds: were 
I your Confessor, I should enjoin you throw aside 
Rousseau and make Epictetus yolli' manual." (1808) -
from R. H. Super, tlalter Savae;e L(lndor: a Biography. 
39. Justus Lipsius, .li1anductionis ad Stoicam Philoso;phiam 
Libritres. (Ant't1erp, 1604), Dissertatio XIX on Ep:Lotetus. 
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40. On Epictetus' \..rorka, Lipsius says: "Encheiridion 
sane egregium et Stoicae moralis philosophiae 
velut anima; item Dissertationes quas obiter in 
via domo schola habuit." 
41. Now edited by R. P. Oliv~ Niccolo Perotti's Version 
of the Encheiridion of Epiotetus, (Illinois, 1954). 
42. R. P. Oliv~ op. cit., P• 28. 
43. "The instructions are so wise, the allusi.ons so 
lively, the exhortations so moving and the arguments 
so strong that they may well be allowed to excite 
our greatest admiration. The application is so easy, 
by a little change of philosophy into religion, and 
the plurality of Divine Beings into tho one True God, 
that any considering Chrietian may here find a scheme 
of what he himself ought to be." (Introduction to 
Stanhope's translation, 1604) 
44. Elizabeth Carter, E;Pictetus' Discourses and Encheir;i,dion, 
1758, now re-published in the Everyman edition. In 
1702, a further rendering of the Encheiridion alone 
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had been undertalten by Ellis ~·la.lk.er: Epictetus made 
English in a Poetical ~araphraae. 
45. Op. cit. Introduction p. xix. 
46. Bonboffer, Op. cit. p. 2: "······ teils als Geistesver-
wander der Christlichcn Lehre, teilsals Ersatz fursie." 
47. G. Long, 1877. P. E. rJla the son, 1916. t1. A. Oldfather, 
1946. 
48. Soub.he, Introduction:> to his translation, p. viii. 
49. Fr. M.' J. Lagrange, La Philosophic relie;ieuse 
d'Epictete. Revue Biblique, 1912, p. 192 ff: 
"Le parallele vient ~ l'esprit de chacun, (Epictetus 
and N. T. ). " 
50. For evidence of the mystic spirit 'trithin the Church, 
seo S. Spencer, Mysticism in t-lorld Religion, Ch. 7, 
especially p. 231 - 56. 
51. The similarities and contrasts bett'leen Epictetus and 
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Christianity on the mystic freedom are \"fell expressed 
by C. F. d'Arcy, God and Freedom.in Hunian Experience, 
(1915), p. 217: "The principle of love hariilonises 
wills \"li thout destroying- their freedom. There is 
a relationship amongst spiritual beings, and a 
relationship \thich can be characterised as goodness 
or harmony of ''~ills. The a11·-inclusi ve aim of the 
universe is a realisation of love; this definition 
includes all goodness, all· freedoms, and is as far 
as possible from regarding the spiritual world as a 
great mechanical system working out inevitably a 
pre-determined end." 
52. +•~o<7Topy/oc. _, nattiral b:J;"otherly affection, is 
mentioned as a virtue by Epictetus, but only secondary 
to the prohairesis. It is not the 'love' which is at 
the centre of the Christian character. See Bonhoffer, 
op. cit. p. 134. 
53. Ephesians 5, 29. 
54. ~ 24, 16. 
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55. Martin Thornton, The Rock and the River, (1965, 
London). 
56. Epictetus, IV 10, 14 - 15; and St. Paul, II Corinthians 
I . 
4, 8ff • Qn TCX1tE1 VO$ . 88@. qb.2 .~te 13,. 
57. P. E. Matheson, in his introduction to the 
translation, p. 38, sums up the spirit of the 
Discourses thus: "His overmastering conviction of 
the supr~mecy of reason, hia impatience of unmanliness 
and loose-living, his belief in the unity of nature and 
the kinship of the rational world, in whic~ all men 
are related as children of one father, - all these 
doctrines are enforced by a dramatic method which 
arrests and convicts, a sarcasm which strips 
affectation bare, and a fiery earnestness which robs 
his crude strokes of their cruelty: 
58. For a basic Christian moral theology I have used the 
work of the Roman Catholic theologian, Hormann, ~ 
Introduction to Moral Theology, (trans. Quinn, London, 
1961). 
59. Philippiano 3, 10 - 15. 
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60. St. Augustine, Rotr. 1 c.9, n.4. 
61. St. Matthew 15, 19. 
62. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. 2 c.l9, n. 53. 
63. Hormann, Op• cit, p. 126. cf. R. C. Mortimer, The 
Elements of Moral Theology, p. 103 - 8. 
64. In the German Language a thorough comparison has 
been made in Bonhoffer's·work (op. cit, p. 195 ff.) 
in which all the comparative material has been 
collected. Interest lies in the conclusions to be 
drawn from this material, and these he leaves for 
each individual reader to decide for himself (p. 389). 
The comparative material is a basis for speculation 
only. 
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. .A-PPENDIX I 
P~OtiAIRESIS IN EPICT~TUS' ~OrlKS 
The different categories of reference of the term 
prohairesis in Epictetus, are sot out be1ot1. Note has been 
taken of each distinctive occurrence of the term. These 
occurrences are: 
Diocoursa: I. 1 23 1? 26 29 3 
2 33 18 8 29 1, 2 
4 18 18 1? 29 12 
8 16 19 8 29 4? 
12 9 22 10 30 4 
17 21 25 1 
Discourses II. 1 12 10 2?, 29 22 29 
5 4, 6 16 1 23 1? - 19 
6 25 22 19 23 22 
10 1 22 21, 26 23 40 
Discourses III. 1 40, 42 5 ?, 2 22 103 
2 13 10 18 22 105 
3 8 18 passim 23 5 
4 9 19 2 26 24 
Discourses IV. 4 23 5 32 13 14 
5 11, 23 12 12 13 21 
Encheiridion 4 9 13 30 
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Of these instances I have chosen seven classifications; where 
two references are put beside each other, their contexts are 
closely similar : 
A. The prohairesis is free, i.e. independent of externals. 
I 1, 23 I 29, 47 II 16, 1 
I 4, 18 II 5, 4 6; 6 25 III 18 passim 
I 12, 9 II 10, 1 III 21 8 
I 17, 21 II 10, 27 IV 12 12 
I 18, 17; 19 8 
B. Prohairesis as the choosing function in making a judgement 
or decision. 
I 22, 10 
·II 1, 12 
II 22, 29; III 22 103 
III 2, 13 
C. Good and bad is only meaningful in terms of a good or bad 
prohairesis. Prohairesis is the source of moral 
responsibility. 
I 8, 16: 29 1 - 2 
I 29, 3 
II 10, 25 
IV 12, 7 
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D. Prohairesis implies right, or necessary, choice, in 
accordance \'lith nature and reason. 
I 18, 8 
I 30, 4 
III 4, 9 
III 3, 8; 5 7 
IV 5, 32 
Ench. 4; 13; 30. 
E. Prohairesis as choice, affecting prohairesis as moral 
character. l'-1oral character in turn is responsible for 
choice. 
I 17, 26 II 10, 27 29 III 18,passim 
I 18, 8 II 23, 17 19 III 19, 2 
I 29, 12 II 23, 40; III 1/+2 Diss. IV 4, 23. 
F. Prohairesis as a man's moral character. 
I 2, 33; IV 13, 14 II 5 1 2 
II 22, 19 III 10, 18 
II 22, 26 III 23, 5 
G. Prohairesis as a man's character in terms of a ttilling 
personality, directing his free existence. It is the 
essential self. 
I 18, 17; 19 8 
II 22, 21 
II 23, 22 
III 1, 40 
IV 5t 11 23 
~- 9 
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SOCRATIC REFERENCES IN EPICTETUS' WORKS 
The resurgence of Socrat~c elements in later Stoicism 
was noted in chapters two and three. I believe the interest 
in the Socratic Dialogues of Plato, and Xenophon's account 
of Socrates' life, accompanied a general tendency found in 
'~iters of 1st centuries B. c. and A. D. towards certain 
Pythagorean precepts and doctrines. There is at any rate, 
material hero for study, and its importance in the later 
development of philosophy, particularly Neo-Platonism, could 
be considerable. 
Below I have listed and classified the references to 
Socrates in Epictetus' works. I have included direct 
references only. The study could be extended to include 
parallel terminology, particularly l'li th the 'Apoloe;x_ 1 , for 
r 1 :a(' 1 instance, the use of ooctt"'WV (I 14, 14), o(foWS 
(passim) and ;,I ;J ~ , tHOVToCI e•o~voCI{II 11, 2). 
A. Socrates, an example of the Stoic sage. 
I 2,· 33 
I 19 6 
II 4 8 
II 13 24 
III 7 34. 
III 16 5 
III 22 26 
III 24 38 
III 26 23 
IV 8 22 
IV 96 
~· 33 
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B. His methods of philosophy, dialectic etc. 
I 17 12 
*II 2 32 
II 12 5 
II 12 14 
II 26 6 
III 14 9 
IV 1 41 
•A remarkable reference to ~~itings by Socrates. 
c. The importance of self-examination. 
I 25 31 
I 26 18 
II 2 32 
III .5 14 
III 12 1.5 
D~ He was unaffected by externals and 'duties•. His own 
life was self-sufficient, and his attention was on 
inner t·rill. 
II 16 35 
.II 18 22 
III 24, 60 
IV53-4 
IV .5 33 
IV 7 28 
IV 9 19 
~· 46 
Frag. 11 (Sch\'leighauser) 
D~ By willing resignation, he was unaffected even by his 
imprisonment and death. Thia was God's role for him, 
and they therefore cannot affect the inner man. 
I 4 24 II 2 8 IV 1 ·123 
I 12 23 II .5 18 IV 1 159 - 169 
I 29 17 II 6 26 IV 4 21 
- 2 
I 29 65 III 18 4 Ench. 
-
.5 
II 1 1.5 
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E. God stations each person at his post, (military metaphor). 
I 9 22 
I 29 29 
III 1 19 
F. His belief in a personal God 
I 9 1 
G. An attitude to divination. 
III 21 19 
Illi 24 99 
I 12 3 
Ench. 32. 
A :li"eoent I',J~dy of .some Pythagorean sou-rces has been ~de 
, : '' ' • I' _ ' -/, .- ' .~ . ·• 1 , •. I ' 
b.Y C•de Vogelt Philoeophia I (1970),pp.27-107. These chapters are 
L - ' •• · -' • ' ', ' ' • 
' '. ·, 
of value in mald ng an ee~.imate of Soc~tes and the later Socratic 
influences U!,)On StQicism, cparticularlyon'IE t Bl,>i~tualising_• 
r 
tendency, discussed at the entl ?_~ c}lapter three. of. this thesis. 
Her second volume_ of Philosoph~a, o~ aspects of Christian and 
Patristic thought, will, I. hope, contribute considerabzy to some 
of the problems of development of later Stoicism-referred to 
. - ' 
in this thesis. 
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DlDEX- OF PRINCIPAL PASSAGES CITED 
Aetius 
( see Stoicorum 
vaterum fragmenta ) 
Aristotle 
Nic. Ethics, 
1109 b - 1115 a 
1139 a - 1144 b 
1147 a - 1151 a 
1168 b - 1169 a 
1177 a, 12 et seqq. 
Aurelius, marcus 
Ueditations 
page 
35-41 
45-50 
49-50 
68 
76 
VII 56 433n.l 
Chrysippus 
( see s.v.F. ) 
Cicero 
Academica post. 
I 11, 40 113-4 
De Finibus, 
v 24-6 149 
v 47-59 149 
De Natura Deorum, 
I 43-4 119 
Paradoxa 
v 156 
Cleanthes 
( see s.v.F. ) 
Dioa1es magnes 
( see S.V.F. ) 
Epictetus 
Disc-ourses 
I 1, 1-12 
1, 4 
1, 7-9 
1, 27 
2, passim. 
2, 30 
3,3 
3, 4 
4, 1 
6, 1-7 
6, 8 
6, 10 
6, 18-22 
6, 30 
9, 5-17 
11, 27-40 
12, 12 
14, 7-8 
14, 2-14 
16i, 1-5 
17, 1-3 
17, 11-14 
232-3 
192 
194 
356-7 
273-4 
299n.3 
233 
230 
332 
268 
234 
197 
207-8 
270-1 
301n.40 
264 
3lln.87 
240 
328 
311n.87 
119, 197 
278 
283-4 
260 
194 
-- 358-9 
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Epi:ctetus ~ Epictetus ~ 
Discourses (contd.) Discourses (contd.) 
I 17, 23 315 II 10, 6 356 
17, 26 324 10, 27 320 
17, 27 185n.5L 11, 1-20 200-1 
18, 1-2 231 247n. 14 
18, 8 327 13' 8-9 322-3 
18, 17-19 336 13, 13 292 
19, 11-15 352 14, 6-12 235 
20, 1-6 195 257n.85 
22, 1-9 198-200 14, 15-16 207 ... 8 
368n.23 16, 1 et seqq. 314 
22, 9 202 16, 16 333 
25' 1-6 201 16, 41 268-70 
26, 15 237-8 17, 12-13 261 
27, 1-2 210 17, 19 227-8 
27, 15 et seqq. 209 254n.64 
27, 10 225 18, 8-9 221-2 
28, 1-6 209,216 18, 15-25 224 
28, 7-9 2l:Z.-8 18, 19 231 
28~ 12 et seqq. 212-4 18, 29-32 225-6 
29, 1-8 333 19, 26 277 
II 4, 2-:-4 293 20, 11 210 
5, 1-17 321-2 22-; 6 220 
5, 10 356 22, 19 239 
5, 24 et seqq. 262 23' 3 250n.33 
5, 29 359-60 23' 5-29 320 
6, 9 356 23' 19-27 315 
6, 12 296n. 7 23' 43 316 
a, 1-14 194,206 26, 1-7 287,259 
a, 4 .et seqq. 208 26, 2 228-9 
8, 11~14 235 28, 6-8 338 
28, 19-28 294 
45.5 
Epictotus :2aGe; Epictetus ~ 
Discourses (contd.) Discourses (contd.) 
III 1, 25-6 193 IV 3, 8 343,349 
2, 1-2 322 4, 24 et seq_q. 354 
3, 2-3 217;230 5, 14 27;1. 
3, 4 231 6, 6-8 289 
5, 7-11 311a,n.87 7, 7 192,246 n.3 
7, 7 230 7, 31 339 
7, 24 353 7, 40.-41 237 ;.239 
7, 27-8 291,331 89,1~4 359 
8, passim 288 10, 8 322 
10, 17-20 B55 11, 5-6 238 
12,7 224 12, 12 369n. 37 
13, 7 288 12, 16-18 354 
20, 1-2 2l215-6 Enchoiridion 
21, 14-16 278 2 332 
22, 5-8 267-8 17 30ln.46 
22, 33-41 238 
23' 4 et seqq_. 267 Fragments 
24, passim 317,319 (Schweighauser, ed.) 
24, 9-11 261 52 222~l 
24, 20-24 354 174 267 
24, 34 287 180 221-2 . 
24, 58-60 354 Ge11:ius, A ulus N.A~-VII2 130 
24, 88 224 Plato 
24, 91 et seqq. 26 Laws 
-
297n.11 644 D 73 
() 653 A,.O 63-5 108 220-225 
24, 110-11 284 709. A;_B 73 
25' 6 2~1 715·E- 716 D 71 896 D - 897 D 74 
IV 1, passim 317,343 903 B-C 71 
2, 4 338 904 :a-c 72 
Plato (contd.) 
Phi lobus 
21 cD- 36 B 
50 B - 52 B 
Republic 
436 A - 444 B 
516 c - 517 c 
617 E 
Symposium 
210 A - 212 A 
Plutarch 
De Stoicorum 
Repugnantis-
1045 E-F 
456 
61-3 
62-3 
59--<;0 
77-78 
72,75 
77 
125-6 
1055 F et seqq. 117,130 
1057 A et seqq.' 117 
Seneca 
De Benefl.ciis 
IV 6-8 
De Ira 
I 8 
II 1-4 
Epistles 
XVI 
XLI 
174 
166-7 
165-6 
·145 
174-5 
Stoicorum vetorum 
fragmenta (ed.Arnim) 
I 537 (eleanthes) 172 
II 75 115 
II 83 (Aetius) 118 
II 87 (Dioc1es) 118-9 
III 173 364n.3 
III 377( Chrysippus) 125 
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Note The only volumes underlined are those such as 
journals or collections of works and papers, 
of which the b~bliographical item is only 
a part. 
A. Sources 
Noto This is a select list of the principal authors; 
other ancient authors and works appear in the 
general index. Other editions of works here 
listed and commentaries which I have used, will 
be found in the General Bibliography, under the 
editor's name.: 
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics (ed. I Bywat~r, Oxford 
Classical Texts), Oxford, 1890. 
Aurelius, AntonmUI!!J marcus, The Meditations (Trans. 
O.R.Haines, Loeb Classical Library,-If• C.L.-), 
London, 1916 
Cicero, De Fini bus (Trans. H. Rackham, L·. C. L. ) , 
London•, 1913. 
De Officiis (Trans. W.Miller, L.C.L.); 
London, 1913. 
Paradoxa Stoicorum (ed.A.G.Lee )\Macmillan 
Classical Series, London 1953. 
Epictetus, Edi tio Maior ( ed •. Schenkl, H. Edi tio rlinor, 
1898, 2nd.ed.l91.6; Teubner Texts), 
Leipzig, 1894~: 
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<rellius•; Aulus, Noctes Atticae (Trans~ J.C.Rolfe, 
L.C.L.), Londonr 1927. 
Greek I~ew Teatament,Thc (Ed. Atland, Black, Ne1;zger 
and Wikgren), London, 1966·~· 
Philo 
Plato 
Quod omnia probus liber sit (Trans. F.H.Colson 
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:London, ~941.' 
Laws (Ed. J .Burnet, Plato, vol. JV, 0. C.T.), 
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Philebus (Ed. J.Burnet, Plato, vol.IV, GC.~·), 
Oxford, 1904. 
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Oxford, 1901. 
Plutarch De Stoicorum Repugnartmis, from Moralia 
Vol.VI, fasc.2, ed.M.Pohlenz, Leipzig 1952. 
S"eneca De Beata Vita 
De Benoficiis 
De Ira 
( Trans. J.W.Basore, in Moral Essays,3 vols. 
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Epistulae Morales (Trans. R.M.Gummere, 3 vols. 
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see Nature,Choice, 
Wordsworth 3 '70.ri.B9, 3 74n77 ,385 
-
Zeno 79,109,113f.l26,226 
Zeus 172,201-2,276 
B. Index of Greek Terms 
. &s,J~op« 112, 128r .13 2,135 
{ adiaphora)l55,170, 3 21,353 
a(-, { ) ' ·~~ OCI-o.US aides , TO o<r Cl"')f.'OV , 
14' 230,290-1, 
337,349,391,428 
01 8 
-t.t•.ct '761§ 42-3,50,89n59,119 
a \ 1 
_t.JC K o "CIC.(J' fer&. 5 3 
~ ' 
--«Kpotcrtt:rt { akrasia), 
in Ari st. 5lf. 6 8, 7 0, 
90n71,144n68,393,421 
in Epictetus 228-9,242 
in Plato 78 
~ I att<p.C"Tll)~ 4 7,133, 143n60 
:,·1tocrnC:.cri'Ol { apospasma) 69, 
194-5,232-6,240,243,276 
288,383,384 
~ . I I 
-'-- -~pDalt p6 ToL 8 9 9 ?r.pDdt pET II( f1( 
--~tri{V£1~ 56 
l-ci'crte'1cr's {askesis) 14,202-3, 
218,220,222,224, 
287-90,295,382,421-2 
:J t' ~T-~l~~ 107,110,343 
:l I 
GIC UT'CIC p t<e IGl 66, 75-6 
-/J D~~£UCI"I$ 144n65 t 228 
in cl K patT..J' 56 
in Arist. 36,46-7 
f3ou~,,., s 231,313,316 
in Arist. 36-9,51,56,427 
in Plato &Arist. 63,77 
6ot11J-'WV { daimon) 74-5, 
100nl48,134,172,184n4~ 
235, 2~8, 282-3 ,305n83 
0£tY~T.,S 46-7 ,92n81,144n~6 
Gt:C9etr•s 155 
~.«Bpt.>,.,s 201 
oraltp£t:r•s 365n4 
478 
r ' ~lot VOl ol 37 
&~yJA-rA 192,224,225,240 
' see Kpt "'~ , judgement. 
&.ct~~ 36,55 
GJ.v-~~·s ( dynamis) 152, 
159-60,267-72,274; 
290,293 '2.9)5 ,341,391 
- AoytK..j 192-3 
- I 
- trpOCICtpeTUC"'l 
Suv~ """Q'S , 
Aristotle 
-- ~ cjuHrt ~<J' 
~ I 
-EY t<pDCTE to&. 
~ \.. I 4hC_"oY"1 
l K VToCT U(O\ D~ , 
e ~ e.v9~ p roe. 
320 
48 
271 
68,133 
355-7 
57 
1f. 22n1 
see Freedom 
~ I 
'votp ys1oe 115,231 
~, ;a , 
E.VVOtot , 6\IVO,,...oL 116, 
118-20,196-7 
~' J. l.f4~VTos e.. 200-1,24 7nl6 
I 
-all .ccuv~• 119 
.D'c , 6~~ To( see externals. 
Ef-•-S 34,41,42,48 
'n I 
- '1"''1<'1 85n35 . 
I 
• -lrpDcritpf!.TIIC"'J 65,80,158 
E 'ft' •/l o~-.1 · 3 22 
l1r-,9Uf-'~ol 36,39,55,§7,231 
see Desire. 
114 
116 
349 
, 'o (-CI11'~vE lot 
~I . 
230-1 
E:upotG& 31,109,263,327 ,350· 
'lt , 
.E u-trTrx9 e tol 349 . 
' I f 
'JYE-... OVII<OV To (hegemonikon)'f 
69,81,125,164,178,22~ 
227,236-40,243,264,27~ 
293,325-6,348,384,427 
in M.Aure1ius 433nl 
in Chrys ippus 
.. as reason 
6.£.w p~o& , 
116 
122 .... 3 
as contemplation 69-70, 
'76,350-1,400-1 
as knowledge 54 
t9-"fA-OS 36-7,39,83n12 
Bu,...oe.tb~~ T~ 59 
I<#.Botptr•S 279 
~CJC91~wToe T"~ see Duties. 
l(o(vwv 201 
~<t~tT~~"lt•s 113,115,111 
l<oel" ,; p 9 w tA-d. 15 5 
I 
Kpurts 81,83nl8,318 
I \ 
K.u ptEuov ro 239, 258n92 
A.~yo ~ (logos) 45, 26~4, 
212' 234 '336.,339 
as craftsman 
personification of 
in p:r:acti.cal syll. 
127,172 
276 
50 
i~ St6a 120£ 
lpFJos A·. 42,44, 53,133,194 
I . 
and 1foa9os 127 
I 
•DI 6'«c.p,.~TIHOf 127,172,23 2 
479 
, 
·" _VO"'JC1'1S 3'9 
_VOf'A-J I 1 J, 5 
w.o:Us 69,76,98nl29,.194 
, , . 
ou<£1WVIS (oikeiosis), 
122,127,160,352, 
357,358,396-7,433nl 
in individual 266-75 
in man 262- 66 
in universe 259-62 
Dl _o_p_£~ 'S' 3 22,330-1 
in Arist. 36,42,167 
in +PC:"'J"'S 45f.'48, 50,53 
in Stoa 124 
c , 
op~-., 124,167,237,317 
322,329,353-4,358 
I~ \ 
-1t'CilCOI'E:tv TD 2.09,231 
-'1I~ 9'1 see Passions. 
.1hlf1111(Dko'u91615 122' 192' 207-8 
213 ,.263-5, 3 24 '3 57, 4 02;425 
7( ct ~ Jc ·tJ' It' tl., 3 00n3 3 
lf t 8t1. V~1'~S 220 
, I 
lUcrTov, To 14,271,291,337 
.... 
---" __ 'JfVE Uf." ol 121,122,172 
Ttpo~t:petJ'tS (prohairesis), 
Ch.7,passim 
Arist. 36-50 
Arist. & Epict. 80 
bad~.as punishment )66 
central in Epiot.ll,l3,178 
as character 40,43~48-9, 
267' 272, 294~5, 
319-20,335-40,391 
tnpo.o&tpE:crts (contd.) 
characteristics listed, 
324-6 
as choice 212,217,220 
choosing personality,-
226-7,243-4,318-9,383,391 
conditioning of 65, 
185n51,289-90 
and conscience 163-4,428 
as decision 229-30 
and desire 39Q-92 
in deliberation 36-40 
desire + reason 231-2 
double aspect of 3 21, 
338-9,383,390 
elusiveness of 48,80-81, 
87n52,393 
fre e~dom of 3 24-5 , 4 29 
as goodness 12,!4207,316 
in Jaspers 
and knowledge 
39@ 
286 
and mysticism 401 
perfection of 337 
Plato and Epict. 80 
& Platonic love 78 
pufification o~ 76 
rational nature of 103, 
194,325. 
and rational will ]58,178, 
203 '218' 219-20 
and St Augustine 413 
in Souilh& 435nl0 
and virtue 
~ I in otte p~T'~'U 
and dyna.mis 
) \. , 
and € tc "OY'1 
and hegemonikon 
- Dldo f>E.t 
, 
and 11 oe. 9 'J 
' and 11 p 0 CS"'W"'ft'O V 
480 
40 
56 
212 
357 
238f. 
158,236 
53 
223-4 
' ' and ~U'/Kd.Tr~t9ttns 113 
in +P~V"'}D'IS 42f. 
, ~ ' 1f.pocupE.TH<CIIC., c(TpoceapE.Tot. 313, 
314-6, 317 
in M.Aurelius 453nl 
Cl I 
Oll\ld.fA.I$ ltptJottpETfi("J 265 
, 
1rp.oot1pout-'d. I 316, 362n2 
tr.pb fJE.t:TIS 3 22 
1f p o f) Ul'f- t'd.. 2 21 
1rp~~'lt IS (prolepsis), 118, 
120,123 '195-204' 218' 
228,241-3,247Bl6,381 
I 
lrpo vo •- 193 ,
1t.po1't£TE tot 
, 
"Tf_po crwnov 
56,82nll 
152,160,267, 
272-4,291,295 
' ' 
tr..u_yt<tA.TfJI. IJE 1:1'1.5 113, 116, 
1 117,123,129,158,16~ 
192,216,237,316,317, 
322,327,329,342 
~.ufAn~St~e~t 134, 278,282,283 
~u,.+ti>wvfat 134 
trutJJitt9 '1 tT 1 s 3 0 On3 3 
\ ,, It" • • 
tJy...v_e,, o"1cr 1 s see Consc~ent~a 
rw_+po6u"'1. 59,60,68,133, 291 
1"oC11'E.IVO$ 98n133 ,422 
I 
-r£.xv , .,. -., r. 121, 23 4 
I C " 
TaK'OI, 01 85n32,222,283,322f. 
I 
"1:po7ro• 117 
, 
'1Lulf W fT I $ 
Cfl_ 
U.l'"'J 
c I ~1t'11) p £cr'IO& 
tf>. oe. v 1"oC. t1' {at ( phan tas ia) , 
113 
339 
260 
in Arist. 50-1,56,89n62 
in Epict. 204-232 
in Stoa 63,79,90n71, 
113f.l25,133,205 
in animals 122 
categories of 210-11 
and duties 353 
false +· 203,210-12,219 
~, 
forming £VVDioU 197 
and hegemonikon 237 
judgement of 202,315 
material of reason 195 
I 
and 1tot8t') 165,167-8, 
220-30, 25ln36 
subjectivity of 221!.240, 
242, 25ln36 
true and false 208-11,215 
q,. ~'/~~..Boo 231 
f,l(otTGl~,1rTIK~ 115-6,117,118 
<l>tAaluTI~ i 68,352,400 
~~~o~Topy:~ 354,444n52 
+p.:v,~IS 33,35, 42-J3,60~84n44,289 
f~-rr, s 109,121. +,;.,.,.J,lpeu-293 
